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Introduction 
A Renaissance explorer who dreamt of discovering previously unknown lands 
needed to plan his journey beforehand. He knew full well that when he set out 
from his homeland, he needed a map. He took a compass and a sextant to 
position himself in relation to the objects he would pass on his way. However, 
above all he knew that in order to find new paths, he first had to follow the 
well-trodden ones. So too, a cautious scholar in humanities also knows that 
he/she needs a frame of reference for his/her academic journey. Interdisci-
plinary research resembles an ambitious project of geographical discovery in 
more ways than one. One needs to explore the arcana of respective fields, 
following in acclaimed researchers’ footsteps. Yet in combining the fruits of 
their intellectual inquiry with one’s own academic instinct, a young scholar 
attempts to unveil the remote and yet unspoilt plains of investigation. The 
academia of modern day humanities is a rough and dangerously deep ocean. 
Any scholarly work that tries to explore the depths of the literary and philoso-
phical visions of a highly influential and additionally heavily researched 
writer like William Shakespeare or a thinker like Friedrich Nietzsche is bur-
dened with substantial risk. One can be submerged under the powerful waves 
of theory or lost in the maze of paths that ever cross in endless allusions and 
parallels made possible by the intellectual wealth of both Shakespeare and 
Nietzsche. If a scholar additionally asks more general questions about the 
political, social and cultural circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
works in question, in other words, if he/she wants to explore the great minds 
of the various epochs, the task becomes even more ambitious. The main goal 
of this dissertation is to set out on a voyage of discovery through this rough 
sea, combining the fruits of Nietzsche’s rich philosophical output, the modern 
theoretical basis, the source material, as well as Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s 
dramas – in an attempt to investigate in detail the identity of their ambitious 
characters. The spark of inspiration behind this research project was ignited 
by an instinctive feeling that there exist numerous parallels between Renais-
sance figures of intense aspiration and a Nietzschean conception of an ex-
traordinary human being towering over the rest of humanity – der Über-
mensch. My assumption is that analysis in the light of Nietzsche’s philosophy 
may shed new light on the so called “great” Renaissance men and women, 
hopefully bringing insights into the already heavily researched area of early 
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modern identity. Mentioning Nietzsche’s Übermensch – “overman” – it seems 
most apt to refer to Walter Kaufman’s succinct, but most accurate definition 
of Nietzsche’s key philosophical creation. Der Übermensch is an extraordi-
nary individual “who overcomes himself, sublimating his impulses, consecrat-
ing his passions and giving style to his character” (Kaufmann 1974: 312). The 
premise of this dissertation is the strong belief that the strong-willed charac-
ters of Marlowe and Shakespeare follow this Nietzschean pattern of develop-
ment in the process of their identity-building. Moreover, I also assume that 
these exceptional figures are products of the atmosphere of their period. They 
reflect the positions of those Renaissance men and women who fulfil their 
urge to give style and form to their identities against the backdrop of fre-
quently limiting or almost stifling ideologies. I assume that the English Ren-
aissance is driven by strong personalities characterized by ambition or a will 
to strive, to overreach or, to use Nietzsche’s terminology, to overcome. As 
hinted, the area of the early modern identity has already been an object of 
academic scrutiny, thus, I first intend to present the rationale behind my pro-
ject of utilizing Nietzschean thinking and so justify the necessity to yet again 
undertake the topic of identity in the Renaissance.  
Despite the existence of the substantial body of works dealing directly 
or indirectly with the question of ambition in the early modern period, I 
would like to argue that ambition is the most crucial ingredient driving the 
formation of the so called identity of the Renaissance man/woman. The works 
of William Shakespeare and his contemporary Christopher Marlowe are to be 
treated as one of the most successful literary manifestations of the early mod-
ern self. Obviously, the very idea of a distinct Renaissance identity characte-
rized by acute interiority, and a realization of one’s singularity and individual-
ity often treated as a springboard into modernity, has already been both 
praised and contested in the contemporary scholarship. Stephen Greenblatt 
(1980: 1-2) in his preface to Renaissance Self-fashioning admits that he 
wanted to write a book about Renaissance individualism. Yet in the course of 
his reading of contemporary texts he realized that a human being in the early 
modern period was really more of a slave to the social and the communal 
element rather than a full-fledged individual. Jonathan Dollimore in his Rad-
ical Tragedy strengthens his cultural materialist line of argumentation by a 
reference to Greenblatt’s interesting observation. Dollimore (1985: VIII) also 
uses it as legitimization of his view that man or “culture does not (cannot) 
transcend the material forces and relations of production”. Thus, Shakespea-
rean or Marlovian characters cannot be treated as independent specimens of 
individuals but rather as products of their societies and surrounding circums-
tances. Greenblatt’s new historicist and Dollimore’s Marxist rereading of 
identity in the Renaissance are two of numerous questionings of early modern 
subjectivity. I would like to postpone a detailed discussion on the theoretical 
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background of this dissertation until the first chapter, where I present my 
methodological premises. However, I am referring to these two exemplary 
stances to demonstrate the fact that, in a sense, theory has come full circle as 
the concept of early modern identity has been seemingly dismantled by the 
subsequent waves of Marxism, deconstruction, new historicism and cultural 
materialism. Yet the newest book by Stephen Greenblatt, The swerve (2011), 
is one of the most assertive praises of the Renaissance as the period which 
gave birth to modern sensitivity through its rediscovery of the Ancient Epicu-
rean singularity and the cult of the individual. To my mind, Greenblatt’s book 
is the boldest statement of the distinct nature of the Renaissance identity 
since the publication of Jacob Burckhardt’s The civilisation of the Renais-
sance in Italy (1860) which indeed paved the way for subsequent scholarship 
on the Renaissance. Greenblatt’s book is definitely a manifestation of, or a 
step back to, the deeply ingrained belief, long felt in educational institutions, 
that the Renaissance or the early modern period is seen as separate from the 
Middle Ages for a reason. The rediscovery of the ancient texts where human 
singularity is regularly under scrutiny and the expansion of the world is seen 
as a consequence of the great geographical discoveries are factors referred to 
whenever the Renaissance is approached. The apparent questioning of the 
Burckhardtian framework performed by e.g. cultural materialists like Alan 
Sinfield, Catherine Besely or Jonathan Dollimore through their thorough 
reinvestigation of source texts looking for signs of the enslavement of the 
marginalized groups like women, native inhabitants of the new colonies, reli-
gious minorities etc. was an absolutely necessary and fruitful step, disman-
tling the all-too optimistic, imperialist and, above all, idealistic vision of the 
early modern period. Yet books like The swerve by Greenblatt make a re-
peated gesture towards the concept of subjectivity pointing to the vitality of 
such a way of seeing the period. What the reader is left with, then, is a source 
of slight confusion, as some distinguished scholars attack the concept of the 
Renaissance singularity while others reiterate its validity for research and 
educational purposes. None of the sides is, in my opinion, entirely right or 
wrong, as the naïve belief in the omnipresent spirit of modern individuality 
infusing the period seems to be more than fantastical, while the tyrannous 
workings of ideology behind the Renaissance states seem by now to be an 
established fact. It is hard not to agree with the notion that a text of a play is 
always a result of its political and social circumstances. However, it is also 
difficult to deny the immensely popular theatre its individualising potential. 
So, as it seems, theatre and literature cannot be entirely free from their ideo-
logical and conforming limitation, yet its subliminal message is that of acute 
individualism. When approached in this way, Renaissance subjectivity is a 
theme both highly complex and still worth exploring. 
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This tension was very well felt by Burckhardt in the second half of the 
19th century in his instinctive perspectivist approach to the Renaissance. 
Burckhardt (2004: 99) saw the Italian Renaissance as a period driven by ex-
traordinary personalities when he wrote that “[d]espotism, as we have already 
seen, fostered in the highest degree the individuality not only for the tyrant or 
condottierre himself, but also of the men whom he protected or used as his 
tools – the secretary, minister, poet and companion.” Though he mentions the 
development of the high interiority of “the private man”, he focuses mainly on 
the great men of politics. The development of art and culture expressing in-
tense individuality is for him a direct consequence of the rule of despots. So 
Burckhard’s (2004: 98) observation on the reawakening of the Renaissance 
“human consciousness” as entirely separate from the Middle Ages, later 
picked up by the advocates of the (early) modernity of the period, is neither 
politically naïve, nor optimistic, nor ideology-free. However, it obviously 
takes the perspective of a handful of men in possession of power. And here is 
where the near contemporary of Burckhardt, a philosopher of powerful indi-
viduality, great perspectivist and reader of human psychology – Friedrich 
Nietzsche – enters the stage of the Renaissance interpretation. I would like to 
argue that Nietzsche’s open minded and illusion-free attitude to human na-
ture and morality makes him a viable alternative to overly optimistic readings 
of the early-modern on the one hand, and slightly outdated, yet still popular, 
interpretations of Marxist origin on the other. That is exactly why his perspec-
tivism and genealogy of morality are chosen as interpretative keys to the dis-
sertation on ambitious figures in Shakespeare and Marlowe. The need to re-
consider ambition as a crowning feature of early modern identity arises from 
my already signalled dissatisfaction with the current state of theory on the 
Renaissance singularity, which cancels and validates it at the same time. As 
mentioned, I believe that new historicist and cultural materialist interpreta-
tions constitute invaluable contributions to our knowledge of the period. Yet I 
also instinctively feel that in their anti-essentialist edge and their insistence 
on the ubiquity of enslaving ideology, they run the risk of becoming wasted 
and reductive. I strongly believe that the philosophical reading of texts and 
the recourse to the works of distinguished thinkers does not have to be con-
flicted with the historical analysis of source texts. I can also see no reason why 
one should assume that reading philosophically could possibly blur the inter-
pretation. Again, I would like to refer the reader to a detailed discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of philosophical analysis in the following chap-
ter. However, at this stage I want to state that with the present state of Sha-
kespeare studies after Theory the right time has come to seek ways of combin-
ing the best practices of post-Marxist critics and philosophers or critics prac-
ticing philosophical analysis. Among many other more specific goals, the pur-
suit of a more effective and insightful methodology motivates this dissertation 
Introduction 11 
as well. Behind this pursuit lurks a question that must bother all readers of 
Shakespeare and other Elizabethan or Jacobean playwrights: what drove a 
Renaissance ambitious mind and how similar is the face of this ambition to 
our modern understanding of the phenomenon? In other words, a scholar 
wants to unveil how much modernity can one really find in early-modernity. I 
am of an opinion that Nietzsche’s philosophy, heralding a very modern notion 
of individuality, can help to pursue these questions in Shakespeare’s and Mar-
lowe’s plays. 
Reading early modern dramatists through the lens of Nietzscheanism, 
itself a very diverse and disunited philosophical direction, has other impor-
tant implications. Nietzsche’s philosophy directly and indirectly found its way 
into the works of many distinguished interpreters, thinkers and literary crit-
ics. Along with Kierkegaard, he is the key influence on the development of the 
existentialism of Jean Paul Sartre or Martin Heidegger. Through Jean Paul 
Sartre’s literary enterprises, the impulses of Nietzschean origin found their 
way into mainstream literature, while thanks to Michel Foucault’s or Giles 
Deleuze’s indebtedness to Nietzsche, his ideas indirectly resonated in literary 
theory too.1 Occasional references to Nietzsche’s philosophy that can be found 
in Terry Eagleton’s or Jonathan Dollimore’s books make it possible to couple 
Nietzsche’s ideas with Shakespeare studies and the developments in the lite-
rary theory in the second half of the 20th century.2 Eagleton (2000: 85-86) 
sees Nietzschean ethics behind an individual as “his or her own autonomous 
measure, self-generating and self-delighting” that features in such Shakespea-
  
1 Foucault’s entire canon seems to be indebted to Nietzsche. It is worth looking at 
“Creation of values” (206-213). in The order of things (Foucault, Michel. [1966] 2003. The 
Order of things – an archaeology of human sciences. London and New York: Routledge). 
Besides, in an article entitled “Nietzsche, genealogy, history” which appeared in Hommage 
a Jean Hyppolite (Foucault, Michel. 1971, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire” [Nietzsche, 
genealogy, history], in: S. Bachelard (ed.). Hommage à Jean Hyppolite. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 145-72.) Foucault traces the sources of his development. Speaking 
of Giles Deleuze one should refer to his influential, though highly personal book Nietzsche 
and philosophy (Deleuze. Giles. [1962] 2002. Nietzsche and philosophy. Translated by 
Hugh Tomlinson. London and New York: Continuum).  
2 Terry Eagleton’s background in Marxism is a well-known and established fact (e.g. 
see: Eagleton, Terry. [1986] 2002. Marxism and literary criticism. London: Rutledge.). Still, 
he is capable to insert elements of a Nietzschean perspective in his interpretations. For 
instance, he interprets Antony and Cleopatra through “aristocratic reading”. This perspec-
tive is obviously very Nietzschean.  Eagleton writes: “[i]n this aristocratic or Übermensch 
ethic, each individual becomes his or her own autonomous measure, self-generating and 
self-defining, not to be compared with others or subdued to a mean” (85-86) (Eagleton, 
Terry. [1986] 2000. William Shakespeare. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.). Jonathan Dolli-
more’s Marxist readings of early modern literature also pledge an alliance with a 
Nietzschean strand of thought. Dollimore takes up Nietzschean genealogy from Foucault to 
develop his idea of the “Decentred Subject” (Dollimore 1984: 269).  
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rean plays as Antony and Cleopatra. Dollimore (1984: 20) parallels the inter-
nal contradictions and anxieties of the Renaissance scepticism with 
Nietzsche’s nihilism. In the immense wealth of texts treating of Shakespea-
rean plays there seem to be only two articles available that directly connect 
Shakespeare and Nietzsche by discussing Nietzsche’s vision of Shakespeare. 
Scott Wilson’s “Reading Shakespeare with intensity: a commentary on some 
lines from Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo” is an interpretation of Nietzsche’s passage 
on Julius Caesar and Hamlet. In the article Wilson (2000: 89,98-100) places 
the words of Nietzsche within a greater context of his philosophy using De-
leuze’s concept of “intensity” as well as Klossowski’s Freudian reading of the 
same passage, where Nietzsche is identified with the supposedly Oedipus-like 
Hamlet.3 Peter Holbrook’s article “Nietzsche’s Hamlet” also takes up the topic 
of Hamlet in the context of Nietzsche’s focus on individualism and moral or 
intellectual independence. Here Nietzsche’s philosophical outlook, but also 
his personal life choices, are coupled with Hamlet’s reflective battle with his 
weakness and his eventual emergence as a self-reliant individual who chooses 
his own path and makes his own decisions. In Holbrook’s (1997: 172-173) 
analysis Hamlet becomes a Nietzschean synecdoche for the problems of mod-
ernity in the battle with the pitfalls of nihilism. Helpful as these reflections 
might be, it is important to note that both these articles employ Nietzsche’s 
views and his texts on Shakespeare to talk about Shakespeare. Despite be-
longing to the realm of Shakespearean criticism, they provide readers with 
explications of Nietzsche’s opinions on Shakespeare. Thus, they are not Nietz-
schean analyses of Shakespeare’s plays per se but the opposite – they are ra-
ther commentaries on Nietzsche and his philosophy. This is also not to men-
tion the fact that they are limited to somewhat one-sided readings of the 
aforementioned works; Hamlet and Julius Caesar seen through the respective 
isolated passages in Nietzsche. So on the basis of the above examples, one can 
see that Nietzsche features insignificantly in modern literary theory, while in 
the interpretations on Renaissance playwrights his presence is scant if not 
totally non-existent.  
Taking into account the almost limitless corpus of analyses of Shakes-
peare’s plays one can see that the intersection of Nietzschean philosophy and 
Shakespeare or, to put it more generally, the early modern, constitutes a re-
search niche that calls out to be filled. The references I have mentioned are 
either very scant or, if more detailed, shift the attention to Nietzsche himself 
rather than the Renaissance. Except for the ‘trace elements’ of Nietzsche in 
the most well-known explications of Shakespeare’s plays or early modern 
drama in general, so far there has been no scholar who would attempt to 
  
3 I will come back to Wilson’s article in more detail when I discuss Julius Caesar in 
Chapter 4. 
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plunge Shakespeare and his contemporaries into the depths of Nietzschean 
philosophy. The near-absence of a wider Nietzschean perspective should be 
even more surprising as there exists a relatively bigger plain where the phi-
losophy of Nietzsche’s near contemporary – Danish philosopher – Søren 
Kierkegaard is utilized.4 Kierkegaard features prominently in Małgorzata 
Grzegorzewska’s readings of Shakespeare and ancient tragedy. For instance in 
Kamienny Ołtarz [The Stone Altar] she starts her analysis with a reference to 
Kierkegaard’s Fear and trembling, which becomes a point of departure for 
the discussion on Macbeth’s accountability and the Weird sisters’ role in his 
downfall (Grzegorzewska 2007: 24). Kierkegaard’s (2006: 73) provocative 
statement that “Greek tragedy is blind” becomes a springboard to a fascinat-
ing debate on moral responsibility in both ancient Fatum-driven tragedy as 
well early modern tragedy where freedom of choice is granted. Grzegorzewska 
(2007: 22-25) suggests that in Shakespeare, Kierkegaard’s philosophy comes 
to life and becomes a commentary on “existential” blindness. Speaking of an 
“existentialist” strain in Kierkegaard, it is worth reminding that both Kierke-
gaard and Nietzsche are seen as philosophers of intense individualism. They 
used to be coupled together as the fathers of existentialism, though there are 
evidently more differences than similarities in their philosophical outlook, 
with Kierkegaard being a devout and pious Christian by instinct while 
Nietzsche was an ardent critic of Christian morality and a self-anointed Anti-
christ. Paradoxically, it may be exactly for this reason that Kierkegaard often 
becomes an interpretative path for Shakespeare’s plays while Nietzsche has 
remained almost untouched. The saturation of literary theory with Christian 
morality and Christianity-derived valuations, so ingrained that it goes almost 
  
4 It seems necessary to refer to Małgorzata Grzegorzewska’s two important books Ka-
mienny Ołtarz – horyzonty metafizyczne w tragedii antycznej i dramacie Williama 
Szekspira [The Stone Altar – metaphysical horizons in ancient tragedy and William Sha-
kespeare’s drama] and Scena we krwi – Williama Szekspira tragedia zemsty [The stage in 
blood – William Shakespeare’s revenge tragedy]. Grzegorzewska makes Kierkegaard an 
ever present point of reference in her analyses, though it is it important to note that her 
Kierkegaardian analysis is by no means the only one. Michael G. Bielmeier’s Shakespeare, 
Kierkegaard and existential tragedy testifies to the popularity of Kierkegaard as a metho-
dological basis for analysis. In chapter 1 of his work Bielmaier (2000: 1-26) presents “A 
synthesis of Kierkegaardian literary applications” where he points to the highly literary 
quality of Kierkegaard’s philosophy which makes Kierkegaardian reflection a conducive 
interpretative environment. Next to Grzegorzewska’s and Bielmeier’s books one may also 
enumerate articles which employ Kierkegaard as a methodological tool by other authors for 
example: Bennet, William E. 1984. “Shakespeare’s Iago: a Kierkegaardian Aesthete”, The 
Upstart Crow – a Shakespeare Journal vol. 5. 156-159. Or Cheung, King-Kok. 1984. “Sha-
kespeare and Kierkegaard – ‘Dread’ in Macbeth”, Shakespeare Quarterly vol. 35. 430-439. 
And finally: Palfrey, Simon. 2004. “Macbeth and Kierkegaard”, Shakespeare Survey 57. 96-
111. I will be coming back to some of these analyses in my readings of Shakespeare’s plays in 
the spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
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unrecognized, makes Kierkegaard a more intuitive first choice in western 
criticism – that is after all built on the Christian tradition. Yet, as mentioned, 
Nietzsche overshadows criticism and literary theory, even if his presence is 
unacknowledged. Whenever a literary character’s choices demand a more 
complex moral framework, whenever the traditionally-conceived boundaries 
between good and evil collapse, Nietzsche’s philosophy becomes an invaluable 
axiological weapon. In my opinion, in the sphere of the early-modern studies 
his interpretative potential is more than desired. Hence, this dissertation sets 
a goal of performing a full-fledged analysis of selected plays by William Sha-
kespeare and Christopher Marlowe using the whole wealth of Nietzsche’s 
texts – a much wider spectrum of his thought, not only selected aspects. The 
rationale behind this project does not only concern arguments of novelty but 
is to demonstrate the full workability of the philosophy against those who 
would profess irreconcilable contradictions or gaps in Nietzsche’s line of ar-
gumentation. The ubiquitous influence of Nietzsche on literary theoreticians 
and thinkers, yet his scant presence in analyses of early modern drama, call 
for a more detailed reconsideration of his philosophy as an interpretative 
framework. One may suspect that in the world of literary studies, the stigma 
of fascism still attaches to the name of Nietzsche. Despite the fact that in the 
philosophy departments of universities across the world the exploitation and 
gross misuse of Nietzsche’s philosophy has been long exposed while his name 
has been restored to the canon of history of philosophy, literary critics have 
been rather reluctant to refer to Nietzsche’s works. Thus, another goal of this 
dissertation is to introduce Nietzsche into the mainstream literary analysis as 
a first-hand interpretative tool, and not just as a source of catchy quotations 
embellishing discussions on immorality or nihilism thanks to its aphoristic 
aptness. Nietzsche’s influence on the history of philosophy is profound, while 
his impact on the Anglo-American thought inadequately and insufficiently 
acknowledged. His genealogy of morality, criticism of Christian morality, as 
well as his cult of extraordinary personalities and finally his conception of der 
Übermensch (“the overman”) seem very appropriate tools to revaluate the 
idea of Elizabethan and Jacobean ambition. Nietzsche’s penetrating and in-
stinctive feel of human psychology may be used to infiltrate the minds of ear-
ly-moderns through the meticulous reading of source texts and analysis of 
their plays. It also seems of utmost importance to combine the fruits of 
Nietzsche’s life reflections with the developments in modern literary theory 
on a much more equal basis, deeper and more detailed than a selection of 
passing allusions and parallels. It is also interesting to cast a cursory glance at 
the way Nietzsche himself saw the Renaissance and to what extent his vision 
could be coupled with our modern understanding of the period.  
The revaluation of the early modern ambitious figures and an attempt 
to glance at the formation of their identity through their aspirations and de-
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sires using Nietzsche’s psychology, seems to be itself the most important aspi-
ration of this dissertation. Yet if I may refer to the sea journey metaphor once 
more, I would like to reiterate that plunging into the sea of a philosophical 
analysis requires sound preparation ahead. Thus, in order not to drown in the 
sea of theory and texts, one needs to cautiously sketch one’s own roadmap, 
step by step. Before the “Nietzschean” background of the period is introduced 
I would like to rework the methodological map of the thesis. A well-thought 
methodological framework is absolutely necessary to set the intellectual aims 
of the dissertation and limit its scope. Such is the goal of the first introductory 
chapter to the dissertation, whose key explorative notion is a Renaissance 
human being marked out by his/her extraordinary ambition. I propose my 
own methodological basis, which attempts to combine the best practices of 
classical philosophical analysis with the fruits of cultural materialists and the 
new historical method. Because this dissertation aims at incorporating 
Nietzsche within the body of theory currently used in the reading of early 
modern drama, it seems necessary to refer to the main tenets of the theory in 
question and to draw parallels with Nietzsche’s own views. Hence, in the first 
chapter I will discuss the rationale behind new historicist and cultural mate-
rialist readings and their implications for this dissertation. Moreover, as the 
thesis attempts to employ philosophical analysis using Nietzsche as a frame-
work, it also seems reasonable to enumerate advantages and disadvantages of 
such a procedure. The discussion of these seemingly separate stances on lite-
rature analysis will hopefully lead to a proposal of an effective methodology 
for the present work. At the closing of the chapter, I intend to present my 
proposal for a methodological framework that takes into consideration the 
shortcomings of the approaches under scrutiny while minimising them and 
combining them with the best practices of these stances. The last section of 
Chapter 1 is my grappling with the heritage of Nietzscheism; itself a separate 
and huge field of study in the history of philosophy. By means of this brief 
discussion I also want to give the reader insight into the face of Nietzsche I 
myself utilize later on in the analytical chapters. Chapter 2 is my first attempt 
to utilize the methodology presented in Chapter 1. I wish to investigate the 
activity of the potential historical “overmen” of the English Renaissance in the 
respective fields of philosophy, politics, science and the widely understood 
adventure where their overhuman potential is realized. The goal is twofold as 
I wish to outline the historical and cultural background to my further analysis 
of the dramatic texts but also couple the early modern with the Nietzschean to 
draw further parallels and substantiate my argument.  
The last part of my dissertation is devoted to a detailed analysis of Mar-
lovian and Shakespearean overhuman figures. Chapter 3 presents Marlovian 
overreachers – Tamburlaine from both parts of Tamburlaine, the Great – and 
Barabas, the protagonist of The Jew of Malta. Marlowe’s heroes explode the 
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accepted standards of Elizabethan morality and subversively undermine the 
existing social order. The plays grow out of the post-reformatory atmosphere of 
the 1580s in England and simultaneously they seem to communicate sceptic-
ism, if not atheism. They present the success stories of men who, against their 
limiting circumstances, overcome their underprivileged positions. Both Barabas 
and Tamburlaine are proud to the point of conceit, self-confident and sure of 
their superiority. In order to win their positions of power, they also employ 
means which are morally dubious. Though often cruel and conventionally evil, 
they succeed and manage to stir admiration or fear among their enemies. In a 
Nietzschean perspective they embrace and follow their instincts in order to 
overcome their circumstances. They are also characterized by ingenuity and 
inexhaustible energy – turning themselves into manifestations of a blind and 
uncontrollable life force itself. Hence, in their vicious greatness they seem per-
fect candidates for overmen. Whether they actually succeed in sublimating 
themselves into Nietzschean overmen is the topic of the chapter. Next, I turn 
my attention to Shakespearean potential overmen. I discuss three characters – 
the protagonist of the tragedy of Macbeth, Brutus, for most critics the “right” 
tragic hero of the tragedy of Julius Caesar, and Edmund, a seemingly minor 
character in the tragedy of King Lear, who is actually the driving force of the 
key tensions in the play. These men are connected by their bold leaps at power 
in which they break the natural progenitors’ bonds. They also overcome their 
circumstances which relegate them to secondary roles. In order to launch their 
project of self-overcoming, they also have to embrace, rather than repudiate, an 
intense urge to topple the progenitor. Though equipped with more interior ref-
lection than Marlowe’s vicious life affirmers, Shakespearean overmen are nei-
ther more principled or less cruel. Filtered through the dictates of conventional 
morality, they also appear as very problematic. Despite their morally questiona-
ble conduct, their strong wills to power are admirable, while their attempts at 
self-overcoming testify to their life energy – reminiscent of the Nietzschean life 
affirmation. Both Shakespeare and Marlowe offer a plethora of captivating and 
strong male characters who demonstrate a will to power and act it out in their 
self-overcoming. Thus, one may have an impression that the discussion of the 
overhuman potential and hence singular identity is an exclusively male domi-
nion. In order to prove otherwise, in the last chapter I intend to discuss the 
overhuman potential of Marlowe’s and Shakespeare’s female characters. 
Nietzsche’s philosophical treatment of femininity is notorious due to its sup-
posed misogyny, while the concept of das Überweib (overwoman) is absent in 
his philosophy. Perversely, as I would like to argue, it is this notoriety that 
makes his philosophy such a viable tool for the discussion of the early modern 
conceptualizations of gender and femininity. It seems to be a well-established 
fact that in recent years his philosophy has come within the orbit of feminist 
criticism, though it has never been utilized in the service of the studies on early 
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modernity. In my view, Nietzsche’s negative comments on women to a certain 
degree mirror early modern misogyny and, hence, may provide a springboard 
for an analytical deconstruction of the early modern notions of womanhood. 
In Chapter 5 I investigate Zenocrate from Marlowe’s Tamburlaine, the great 
whom I contrast with Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth from Macbeth and the 
sisters from King Lear; Regan, Goneril and Cordelia. I believe that Marlovian 
and Shakespearean women, like their male counterparts, also launch their 
projects of self-overcoming. They too demonstrate that they are “blessed” 
with the primeval instinct of the will to power, though the Elizabethans would 
deem them monstrous or unnatural – as it seems their processes of self-
negotiation are frequently more complex as they have to build their overhu-
man identities against the backdrop of their demanding fathers and/or hus-
bands, as well as the expectations Elizabethan patriarchal society imposes  
on them. Like in the case of the dramatic overmen, living up to Nietzschean 
requirements turns out to be a difficult process. Hence, some women are able 
to utilize their overhuman potential better and approximate Nietzsche’s pers-
pective, while others fail in their self-overcoming. Nietzsche (2006c: 212) 
himself believed that the Renaissance, obviously the way he knew and unders-
tood it, was “the last great age”, when both men and women lived more pas-
sionately and more intensely, embracing their instincts rather than quieten-
ing the whispers of their wills to power. As it seems, the “greatness” of Re-
naissance exceptional figures did not lie in their moral considerations but 
their aesthetic appreciation of life energy. Having in mind Nietzsche’s amoral 
perspective on the Renaissance, it seems, then, justified, or actually very 
tempting, to seek Nietzsche’s overmen among Marlowe’s and Shakespeare’s 




Philosophical Shakespeare, philosophical 
Marlowe – on the question of theory 
As indicated in the introduction, in order for the journey through the sea of 
Nietzschean philosophy and the early modern identity to commence, one first 
needs a proper map and some advanced planning. Hence, in the opening chap-
ter of my dissertation I propose an account of the existing theories and interpre-
tative tools that will be useful for the project of combining Nietzsche’s intellec-
tual output with the concept of the early modern identity. I wish to propose my 
own methodological framework that would utilize the best practices of the new 
historical or cultural materialist paradigm and the more traditional philosophi-
cal analysis. Because this dissertation is heavily based on the works of philoso-
phy, a brief outline of the possible intersections between the fields of literature 
and philosophy seems to provide a reasonable introduction to the analysis 
proper. As Shakespeare studies are currently dominated by materialist analysis, 
I feel there is a burning need to justify a return to the more conventional tools 
and perspectives provided by philosophical analysis. Moreover, as the field of 
inquiry concerning Nietzsche himself has grown substantially in the 20th cen-
tury, a choice of the right “face” of Nietzsche is also necessary, especially that 
Nietzscheism is not a homogenous philosophical school or movement. Finally, a 
brief account of Nietzsche’s own views on the Renaissance may provide a bridge 
to a Nietzschean analysis of the English Renaissance in Chapter 2.  
1.1. New philosophical analysis after the Theory 
The investigation of intersections between the dramas of Shakespeare and phi-
losophy has a very long tradition. Out of numerous works one can enumerate 
analyses with a historicist edge which discuss the contemporary philosophical 
background in which Elizabethan authors were immersed and which might 
have inspired Shakespeare too. In this respect scholars focus on biblical allu-
sions, ancient Greek and Roman sources (e.g. the sceptics, Epicureans, Horace 
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or Ovid etc.) as well as contemporary thought (e.g. Montaigne or Machiavelli). 
One could refer here to a classic book by E.M.W. Tillyard’s The Elizabethan 
world picture (1942) which aims at a systematic classification of Elizabethan 
beliefs or more recent accounts engaging more with recent developments in 
theory like Hugh Grady’s Shakespeare, Machiavelli, and Montaigne: Power 
and subjectivity from Richard II to Hamlet (2003). Next to the source studies 
there are more detailed interpretations which utilize the philosophical systems 
of Shakespeare’s near contemporaries e.g. Francis Bacon, David Hume or Tho-
mas Hobbes. Farhang Zabeeth, the author of Shakespeare – the philosophical 
poet (1990) – who himself attempts to read Shakespeare in the spirit of semiot-
ics and pragmatics, makes an interesting classification of a long standing tradi-
tion of Shakespearean philosophical readings. There seems little point in going 
into the details of these analyses yet it seems reasonable to summon up the 
most interesting titles to have an instinctive feel of the wealth of the tradition of 
the philosophical analysis. Zabeeth enumerates the following titles: A philoso-
phical analysis of Shakespeare by William Richardson (1774), The philosophy 
of the plays of Shakespeare unfold by Delia Bacon (1857), An inquiry into the 
philosophy and religion of Shakespeare by W.J. Brich (1848), The philosophy 
of Shakespeare by K.J. Spalding (1953) and The lion and the fox by Wyndham 
Lewis (1927) (Zabeeth 1990: 28). Despite this very long tradition of philosophis-
ing Shakespeare or the early modern, since the publication of the ground-
breaking books of Stanley Cavell (Disowning knowledge in six plays of Shake-
speare 1987) and Martha C. Nussbaum (Love’s knowledge essays on philoso-
phy and literature 1992) philosophical criticism came to a sudden and unex-
pected halt. It seems that the growing radicalization of literary criticism which 
came to be coupled more and more often with politics and ideology pushed phi-
losophical criticism as politically naïve to the very margins of literature studies. 
One could feel that since the publication of Political Shakespeare (1985), 
unquestionably a manifesto of the new school, the early modern has been forever 
chained to the “material forces and relations of production” (Dollimore 1985: 
VIII). As Sinfield and Dollimore argue “a combination of historical context, theo-
retical method, political commitment and textual analysis offers the strongest 
challenge and has already contributed substantial work” (VII). Nevertheless, in 
spite of brilliant contributions to the Renaissance studies, in the most recent years 
a conviction of the exhaustion of new historicist and materialist readings as well as 
a feeling of disappointment in the hopes for a more lasting impact on Shakespeare 
studies have been more and more often felt among critics. The most serious accu-
sations levelled at post-Marxist theories are of its growing irrelevance in the 
present political environment, its rapid ageing and finally its institutionalisation 
(Sinfield 2006: 1-2). Hugh Grady in his excellent article entitled On the need for a 
differentiated theory of (early) modern subjectivity criticizes the cultural mate-
rialist obsessive antagonism to essentialism and modern subjectivity. He points to 
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the pitfalls of the main tenet of cultural materialism and, to an extent, of new his-
toricism, namely, the imprisonment of potential subjectivity within the unbreaka-
ble walls of social determinants and political circumstances. A point of departure 
for most cultural materialists is a famous passage from Karl Marx (1907: 5), which 
says that: “Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole 
cloth! He does not make it out of the conditions chosen by himself, but out of such 
he finds close at hand.” This means that authors, consciously or unconsciously, 
are always bound by the ideological environments they produce in. It is hard not 
to agree that man can never live in a vacuum and is constrained by the conditions 
of his life. However, I would totally agree that an exaggerated dependence on the 
belief in the total un-freedom of man’s actions seems to have driven literary criti-
cism into a corner. As Grady (2000: 40) writes:  
[t]he great weakness of both Foucault and Althusser is their tendency to make sub-
jectivity a purely passive outcome of determinate social forces, thereby paradoxically 
replicating positivist social science. Here, I think the Marxist tradition’s own overde-
termined blindspots – its reductionist, systematizing tendencies – contribute to the 
problem, reinforcing Foucault’s and Althusser’s failures adequately to theorize the 
possibilities of critical rationality, of subaltern communities of resistance, and of 
utopian thinking and action. Thus it will be necessary for renewed materialist theo-
ries of subjectivity to create an account of agency, of the potentially creative, power-
resisting activity of the self within the world – without at the same time regressing to 
myths of complete individual autonomy from the social. 
I do believe that Grady calls for a “differentiated theory of (early) modern subjec-
tivity” because he seems to instinctively feel that despite being politically and 
ideologically informed, Elizabethan and Jacobean texts are products of individu-
als and always expressions of a partially or fully realized singularity, which should 
not be lost in the over-intense debate on the all-too powerful ideology. I also be-
lieve that radical cultural materialist readings underestimate human capacity for 
resistance and creativity, thus generalizing and oversimplifying complex mean-
ings implicit in the texts of both Shakespeare and Marlowe. I take the twilight of 
Marxist theories in the 21st century and Alan Sinfield’s elaborate defence of them 
in Shakespeare, authority, aexuality – unfinished business in cultural material-
ism (2009) as an indicative of their shortcomings.1 Similarly the shortage of works 
practicing classical philosophical analysis demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the 
method in dealing with Shakespeare and the early modern in the age post-Theory. 
Since there seems little new material that would account for the philosophical as 
well as political/ideological load of the Elizabethan texts, I do believe that the 
combination of the best practices may prove a viable alternative. However, before 
  
1 For detailed arguments in defence of cultural materialism in the 21st century, see: Sin-
field (2009). 
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such a combination can be proposed I suggest casting a glance at both attitudes in 
order to fully grasp their potential. For these reasons I intend to discuss the cul-
tural materialist/new historical paradigm in the following sections as well as clas-
sical philosophical analysis in the next sub-chapter.  
1.2. Cultural materialism and new historicism 
Those whose names have been associated with either new historicism or cul-
tural materialism (or both in some cases) often unanimously agree that the tools 
or practices employed in their analyses were not meant to form a pattern or a 
formula to read literature. For instance, Alan Sinfield (2009: 6), the co-author 
of Political Shakespeare, speaking of cultural materialism, claims that: “[i]t has 
never aspired to become a movement, or a programme; yet it is not content to 
be a formula for processing literary texts. It is an array of interlinked preoccupa-
tions, involving history, ideology, culture, textuality and political struggle”; 
while Stephen Greenblatt (2000: 1), calling himself a new historicist openly 
states that so far new historicism has not been sufficiently theorized but, as it 
turns out, its main characteristics actually resist “systematization”. In his opin-
ion “‘new historicism’ at first signified an impatience with American New Criti-
cism, an unsettling of established norms and procedures, a mingling of dissent 
and restless curiosity” (Greenblatt 2000: 2). I would like to argue that in the 
insistence on the scholars’ opposition to stiff systematization, both new histori-
cists and materialists bear an affinity with Nietzscheism as Nietzsche himself 
was a problem- rather than a system-thinker. Greenblatt (2000: 6) sees the 
process of understanding as “the encounter with the singular, the specific, and 
the individual” as opposed to “the extraction of an abstract set of principles, and 
still less on the application of a theoretical model.” Nietzsche’s body of thought, 
deeply ingrained in historicism, is also unquestionably the philosophy of the 
individual written against the premises of any system. As if in response to 
Grady’s accusations about the cancellation of subjectivity, Greenblatt (2000: 16) 
points out: “[b]ecause of this very lack of a given set of objects, new historicism 
becomes a history of possibilities: while deeply interested in the collective, it 
remains committed to the value of the single voice, the isolated scandal, the 
idiosyncratic vision, the transient sketch.” So one can conclude that the spirit of 
new historicism reflects the spirit of Nietzschean inquiry in its experimental 
nature, its aphoristic or anecdotal style. However, the similarities are not only 
stylistic. The closeness seems to lie in the common object of inquiry, namely 
culture, which is seen in terms of conflict and creative tension between depend-
ence and independence.  
Despite the anti-systemic edge of the Theory, it seems a well-established 
fact that new historicism and cultural materialism treated as literary trends of 
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more or less common origin brought about an unprecedented change. Before 
the advent of the Theory, Shakespeare along with the Renaissance seemed still 
instilled within the myth of the universal values, ungraspable greatness and 
systemic order expressed in the scholarly work of the previously mentioned 
E.M.W. Tillyard and A.C. Bradley. Both scholars represent a radically different 
attitude to scholarship, but they are equally severely criticised by post-Marxist 
researchers. It would seem that Tillyard’s Elizabethan world-picture (1942) or 
his Shakespeare’s history plays (1944) on the surface resemble new-historical 
works as they are close to the source texts and history-oriented, yet as Wells 
(2009: 186) points out in Tillyard’s view the plays “reflected a belief, supposedly 
universally held in Elizabethan England.” Tillyard sees the Elizabethan culture 
and politics as a unified and unquestionable system widely supported and ac-
cepted by the majority of society. Not only do his books communicate the idea 
of a universal system, but also they support the illusory unity and legitimacy of 
“the Tudor myth”. In this sense Tylliard’s works, despite being based on source-
texts, become hostages of ideology, ignorant of marginalized and isolated social 
groups. On the opposite spectrum of Shakespearean criticism one finds the 
Bradleyan criticism, at the core of which lies the tragic hero as if suspended in 
an interpretative vacuum. Bradley’s Shakespearean tragedy (1904) sees the 
essence of the tragic in the motivation and behaviour of the tragic hero inexora-
bly chased by decrees of fate. Jonathan Dollimore (1984: 54-55) attacks Brad-
ley’s “providentialism” or “an ultimate order of things” along with, ill-judged in 
his opinion, attempts to inscribe a Hegelian system within the structure of Ja-
cobean drama. The most grave accusation levelled at Bradley is obviously his 
essentialism, which Dollimore (1984: 58) calls “the telos of harmonic integra-
tion as a dominant critical ideal, sometimes in uncompromisingly formalist 
terms (Eliot) but more usually as an aesthetic reflection of the eternally true, the 
unchanging human condition (Bradley, later Eliot).” Indeed, both aforemen-
tioned scholars assume the existence of some universal and uncontested moral 
or political order which functions in accordance with unchanging human na-
ture. It seems that the most important lasting value of the new historical and 
materialist studies is their intense questioning of thoughtless universalism and 
their demolishing of systems. As Alan Sinfield (2009: 2, 20) underscores “the 
goal of political responsibility in literary and cultural studies” is crucial as litera-
ture is “to dislocate and disturb, laying bare the implicit ideological assump-
tions of established practices.” In this sense, the aims of materialism overlap 
with Nietzsche’s intense scepticism towards universals. Nietzsche made it his 
utmost goal to “philosophise with a hammer” in order to unmask the hypocrisy 
of human morality, which makes groundless claims upon human nature. 2 As 
Greenblatt (2000: 5) writes about the goals of his studies:  
  
2 This is naturally a reference to Nietzsche’s Twilight of the idols (1889) whose sub-title 
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[t]here is no longer a unitary story, a supreme model of human perfection, that can 
be securely located in a particular site. Any individual culture, no matter how com-
plex and elaborate, can express and experience only a narrow range of options avail-
able to the human species as a whole, a species that is inherently – that is, abstracted 
from any particular historical manifestation of its being – without qualities.  
Greenblatt (2000: 5), following Johann Gottfried von Herder, believes along 
with him in claiming that humans, extracted from their culture contexts, have 
almost no instincts. Here Greenblatt’s line of thinking diverges from the 
Nietzschean spirit as Nietzsche would never agree to the idea of a human being 
devoid of their instincts. However, I would argue that ultimately Nietzsche as a 
proponent of self-overcoming and transfiguration is not an essentialist who 
would limit the wealth of human potential to claims of uniformity. 
The anti-systemic and anti-essentialist attitude to human nature is not the 
only element worth comparing between the Nietzschean and neo-
historicist/materialist understandings of culture. As mentioned, Nietzsche valued 
conflict as the driving force of the development of culture. He first demonstrated 
his views in The birth of tragedy where he dismantled the illusory idea of the so 
called Greek serenity. He argued that the most valuable works of the ancient 
Greeks were products of the clashes between powerful, often destructive, forces 
(Nietzsche 2006d: 42-44). Cultural materialists, following the ideas developed by 
Raymond Williams in his Problems in materialism and culture: Selected essays 
(1980), also argue for a multiple understanding of culture, believing that there can 
never be one monolithic culture in operation. New cultural constructs emerge in 
the struggle between dominant culture and emergent as well as residual cultures 
in the curse of constant transformation, adaptation (Sinfield 2006: 7). Such a 
conceptualization of the cultural process is a basis for the criticism of scholars like 
Tylliard who insisted on the existence of a unified world-picture (Sinfield 2006: 
7). Cultural materialists would also base their argumentation on the study of 
sources, because for them history and culture are encapsulated in the text, though 
the meanings that can be read in between the lines are by no means easily deter-
mined or universal. As Sinfield (2009: 17) writes:  
[c]ultural materialists understand that ‘the text’ is not a stable entity that can simply be 
invoked to establish this or that authoritative reading. They know that the conditions 
through which a Shakespearean play reached an audience or readership in his lifetime 
were both haphazard and constrained. Today the conditions are different but no more 
reliable. Even so, cultural materialists want to comment on (for instance) the relations 
between king James and the monarch in Jacobean plays, and for this they are going to 
                                                                                                                                        
is “or, how to philosophize with a hammer”. The book belongs to Nietzsche’s substantial 
canon and, along with Genealogy of morality, Beyond good and evil and The Antichrist, it 
aims at deconstructing misconceptions about human morality, especially Christian morality.  
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quote from diverse documents, noting connections and disjunctions. These operations 
do not need to suppose that the text is autonomous, or has a unified effect. On the con-
trary, cultural materialists are inclined to regard the text and its context as a site of 
struggle – riven with conflict and contradiction, sustaining alternative as well as op-
positional elements, and emergent elements alongside the dominant ideology.  
Yet it is important to note that as powerful as these cultural conflicts can be, there 
are always individuals behind them. As Dollimore (1984: 8-9) points out, the ide-
ology that informs the texts lives within the people who create them, while certain 
Jacobean tragedies disclose the very historical transitions which gave birth to 
them. The early moderns must have been able to grasp the extent of despotism 
under which they lived. Likewise, they were capable of issuing nuanced criticism 
of it exactly like we moderns can (Sinfield 2009: 12). Ultimately, sensitivity to the 
aforementioned nuances as well as the focus on ‘muffled’ decentralized voices 
seem to be the strongest assets of the new historicism and cultural materialism. It 
can be seen that new critical directions constitute a substantial advantage over the 
more traditional and older ‘schools’ by freeing criticism from the shackles of naïve 
universalism. Above all, they seem to do it in a truly Nietzschean style. However, 
as I have already signalled, anti-essentialism can be really a blessing in disguise. 
Jonathan Dollimore, an arch anti-essentialist among cultural materialists, insists 
that the source and basis of human knowledge was a particularly urgent issue in 
the Renaissance. This intense epistemological reflection led to a crisis of faith and 
knowledge in the form of the Renaissance scepticism.3 Dollimore (1984: 70) com-
pares this phenomenon to an acute feeling of Kierkegaardian anxiety. The realiza-
tion of human contingency and accompanying dread, similarly to Kierkegaard’s 
body of thought, is also a substantial share of Nietzsche’s philosophical heritage, 
though both of these near contemporary philosophers propose radically different 
ways of dealing with despair. Kierkegaard was himself an advocate of intense self-
examination, which made him a proponent of subjectivity as a source of truth 
(Martin et al. 2006: 193). Nietzsche, on the other hand, was notoriously suspi-
cious of subjectivity as a potential source of self-deception and illusion, and in-
stead he proposed the examination of the historical process as a source of knowl-
edge (Martin et al. 2006: 194). So, in a sense, the mechanisms which Dollimore 
examines are more Nietzschean than Kierkegaardian. Though in Nietzsche’s view 
subjectivity cannot be fully trusted, it is never cancelled, rather it is seen as a his-
torical fact accompanying the development of human morality. It is strong per-
sonality that drives the Renaissance in Nietzsche’s vision. 
Dollimore’s (1984: 100-105) epistemological diagnosis of the Renaissance, 
which, according to him, can be demonstrated in the works of influential figures, 
from Godfrey Goodman and Richard Hooker to John Calvin, consists of the disin-
  
3 The phenomenon of Renaissance scepticism will be discussed in detail in the second 
chapter. 
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tegration of the providentialist belief in favour of mutability, the decay of nature 
and obsession with chaos. It makes him (1984: 153) claim that: “the essentialist 
concept of ‘man’ mystifies and obscures the real historical conditions in which the 
actual identity of people is rooted.” Nevertheless, the acute realization of these 
forces among Renaissance men is not for Dollimore a piece of evidence for the 
emergence of subjectivity. On the contrary, he argues for the “decentering of man” 
and follows Michel Foucault in the belief that man does not possess power but it is 
power that possesses man. In this understanding of a subject, he/she can only be 
defined in terms of their social relations. Anti-essentialists go as far as to suggest 
that the idea of the individual was a much later invention. The early 17th century 
supposedly could not understand the concept of the individual outside his/her 
social construction. Essentialist humanism, which has long been an interpretative 
framework for the Renaissance, is apparently an Enlightenment invention at-
tached to the Renaissance later on (Dollimore 1984: 154-155). The sudden reawa-
kening of singularity advocated by ‘optimistic’ humanists and the belief that Re-
naissance people were in possession of the key to the essence of human nature 
seems indeed ludicrous. Yet to my mind the anti-essentialist line of argument has 
some logical faults as the lack of control over the circumstances of man’s existence 
does not rule out the awareness of his singularity. I would also argue that the idea 
of the decentering of man underscores rather than cancels his subjectivity. Anxie-
ty is a deeply individualist emotion which even when shared with fellow men is 
after all experienced by an individual in his singularity. Anti-essentialists, obses-
sively dismantling any notions of universalism, confuse, in my opinion, the very 
existence of subjects with the claims of their nature as unchanging and universal. 
The realization that human nature is not solid and unchanging has, to my mind, 
little to do with the very awareness of having a singular nature in general. Moreo-
ver, the great paradox of this unfortunate and confusing terminology overlapping, 
is that the challenge of the essentialist world-picture is at the same time the most 
assertive expression of individualism. The arrival of sceptical tendencies and the 
phenomenon of the theatre, as I will argue, are demonstrations of subjectivity. 
The disintegration of the preconceived essence in Man performed by cultural ma-
terialist analysis is incorrectly equal to the total obliteration of the concept of the 
individual being. Man is construed only in the context of his relations in society, in 
accordance to Marx’s views. It is undoubted that man is entangled in social rela-
tions but he is not a sum of them. Human nature (if there is indeed such a phe-
nomenon) is not built in the process of a mathematical operation. Man may be a 
product of his environment but one cannot deny the singularity of emotions like 
suffering, love or hatred. Dollimore (1984: 156) ventures to support his anti-
essentialist argumentation by claiming that before the year 1690 the word “indi-
vidual” was only used to mean “eccentric”. This linguistic example is, in my opi-
nion, by no means a piece of evidence in favour of anti-essentialism because even 
the literal meaning of “eccentric” points to the instinctive feel of what a subject 
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really is. Nietzsche can be seen to be as suspicious as Dollimore of fixed or univer-
sal natures, yet he would claim that men share common instincts which are to be 
overcome and transfigured in numerous ways. Dollimore, again following Fou-
cault, claims that Nietzsche is one of the philosophers who saw the problematic 
nature of individualism. He (1984: 159) understands that for Nietzsche identity 
was understood as a process of transcendence. Yet he fails to see that the realisa-
tion of transcendence was for Nietzsche only a point of departure. He also seems 
to fail to understand the fact that man’s nature may not be fixed but he must oper-
ate within a common framework of instincts, for which Nietzsche proposes an 
umbrella term of the will to power. The subjectivity of Nietzsche is thus anti-
essentialist but enclosed within a “human, all-too human” frame of physiological 
drives.4 The awareness and embracing of personal will to power becomes a mark 
of individuality. This element is then the only universal that has to be taken into 
account when speaking of the Renaissance or any other period. Dollimore (1984: 
169-174) definitely does not account for this single universal when he interprets 
figures like Machiavelli, Hobbes, More, Montaigne and Bacon as anti-
essentialists. He reads conventionally understood individualism as an effect of 
misunderstanding the political and social mechanism for expressions of singulari-
ty when he says:  
[i]ndividualism has become a notoriously problematic term, used indiscriminately to 
cover a wide range of concepts and theories. The confusion surrounding its use is es-
pecially prevalent in relation to the Renaissance, one reason being that far-reaching 
material and ideological changes in Elizabethan and Jacobean England – in particu-
lar the breakup of hierarchical social structures with a corresponding increase in so-
cial mobility – have been erroneously interpreted in terms of Enlightenment and 
Romantic conceptions of individuality. (Dollimore 1984: 175) 
The strong personal and individualist strain in the works of thinkers like Ma-
chiavelli or Bacon is evidently problematic for him, but he sticks to the anti-
essentialist paradigm at all costs – even when it does not fit the beliefs of the 
authors in question. Of “conventional” Renaissance individuals he (1984: 177) 
says: “even the amoral ‘individualist’ of the drama possesses not a fixed identity 
but a chameleon one”. Robin H. Wells, when criticising the anti-essentialists 
readings of the Renaissance, says:  
Jonathan Dollimore examined a number of representative Renaissance writers who, 
he claimed, evinced a thorough-going distrust of essentialist notions of humanity. 
But his analyses were based either on selective quotation, omission of counter-
example or simple misreading. To claim, for example, that Machiavelli was a radical 
anti-essentialist is to make nonsense of his entire philosophy of history. For Machia-
velli the past has a lesson for the present because human nature is fundamentally the 
  
4 The quotation “human, all too human” refers to the same title of Nietzsche’s book.  
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same in all ages […]. Even Montaigne, who left few areas of contemporary social and 
philosophical thought unchallenged, recognized the existence of a universal human 
nature. (Wells 2009: 193)  
Wells’ statements could be located on the totally opposite pole as they embrace an 
elemental universal nature but one can easily see sense in his arguments. I do 
believe that the key to the reconciliation of anti-essentialist and essentialist claims 
is the Nietzschean understanding of human nature as unfixed and unstable but 
sharing the potential of common instincts. This potential, to my mind, can also be 
unveiled in what Wells names “fundamentally the same” in human nature. 
Man/woman is thus a multiple being but marked by the existence of their will to 
power, which is shared not only with the whole of mankind but the entire Uni-
verse and which cannot be cancelled by any anti-essentialist claim.  
Hopefully, the above presented debate demonstrates sufficiently enough 
the strengths and weaknesses of the cultural materialist/new historical paradigm. 
It seems that its recognition of the debate between source texts as an important 
factor unravelling ideological nuances behind their creation is its most important 
advantage over other critical paradigms. It is undoubted that new historicists and 
cultural materialists forever free literary criticism of the burden of political nai-
veté. Their critical closeness to source texts as well as their political commitment 
will be also utilized in the course of the present journey through the Nietzschean 
waves of the early modern ocean. The greatest weakness of historic-
ism/materialism seems to be at the same time its strength. Anti-essentialism 
makes the paradigm creatively sceptical; it points to the contingency of the human 
being and the instability of meaning inscribed within a written text. Its failure to 
account for shared instincts, as hopefully demonstrated, can be easily resolved by 
the employment of the Nietzschean will to power with regard to the reading of so 
called human nature. It is crucial, however, to remember that the impossibility of 
self-knowledge in philosophical terms does not rule out and cancel the discussion 
on individualism, because, conversely, the intense questioning of human intellec-
tual independence becomes a most definitive mark of the Renaissance individual-
ism. Intense questioning of Hamlet makes him a modern figure which appeals to 
the minds of the moderns. The instability of the self so intensely inquired by the 
20th century existentialists is also the core of Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s ques-
tioning. But, as I would argue, it goes back to the spirit of the Renaissance. 
1.3. Philosophical analysis 
The very initial dilemma faced by anyone interested in reading literature phi-
losophically concerns the interdisciplinary nature of such a project. The 
scholar, whether he/she is a philosopher or a literary critic, usually must first 
ask crucial questions concerning the end product of his/her attempted analy-
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sis; to whom is the work directed and whom does such an analysis ultimately 
serve? Literary scholars, even with historicist interests in mind, usually know 
that their work will be scrutinized by other literary scholars or possibly stu-
dents of literature. With interdisciplinary studies the range of potential read-
ers is widened. Stanley Cavell (1987: 2) opens the discussion on the potential 
recipient by saying:  
I become perplexed in trying to determine whether it is to addicts of philosophy or to 
adepts of literature that I address myself when I in effect insist that Shakespeare 
could not be who he is – the burden of the name of the greatest writer in the lan-
guage, the creature of the greatest ordering of English – unless his writing is engag-
ing the depth of the philosophical preoccupations of his culture.  
Tzachi Zamir (2007: 44) observes that philosophical literary criticism is fre-
quently a way of invigorating stiff and highly abstract discussions in the de-
partments of philosophy at universities across the world. This vitality that liter-
ary questions bring into the realm of traditional philosophy is a reason for the 
growing popularity of philosophical analysis within the circles of professional 
philosophers. Martha Nussbaum or Stanley Cavell, as will be demonstrated, 
discuss literary subjects as a way of philosophizing. In the realm of literature 
theory the situation is more complicated, as literary critics “sense that there is 
an anachronism” in such an approach (Zamir 2007: 44). Though Zamir (2007: 
49) tries to illustrate that philosophical criticism is not an alternative or a com-
peting field but rather a supplement to the existing sets of tools, there still 
seems to be much mutual hostility and distrust. He (2007: XIII) summarizes 
the existing situation by saying: “Aesthetes worry that philosophical readings 
are reductive and ignore literary merits. Others dislike the way philosophical 
interpretations plead for one cause or another, thereby obliterating the borders 
between philosophy and education. Many distrust the chiselling out of general 
meanings from their material, ideological, or historical context.” As can be seen, 
these mutual expressions of distrust indeed complicate the question of the po-
tential audience of philosophical analyses. Moreover, the complexity of the rela-
tionship between literature and philosophy does not only depend on the possi-
ble receiving end of the analytical outcomes but, more importantly, on the ulti-
mate purpose of the endeavour. In other words, we may ask whether literature 
is to contribute to philosophical reflection, serving it as kind of laboratory where 
literary characters function as specimens under scrutiny, or the other way 
round. It might be also that it is philosophy that is supposed to help unveil 
meanings which otherwise would not be easily discernible. I would argue that 
both ways are really possible depending on the intention of the author and the 
direction his research takes. The only problem that one has to meet head-on is 
one’s own mental flexibility in the pursuit of ones’ academic goals as well as the 
relative rigidity of philosophy and literature departments.  
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As Cavell (1987: 2-3) underscores, in the Anglo-American context, until 
recently philosophy and literature were treated as separate fields. Martha Nuss-
baum (1992: IX) also speaks of a problematic “disciplinary location” when she 
heralds her interdisciplinary approach, which is intended to blur the very idea 
of field affiliation. From Cavell’s (1987: 2-3) line of argument one learns that the 
separation of the fields is neither necessary nor singularly proper for both fields. 
Examples from continental philosophy where literature has been often intert-
wined with philosophical reflection demonstrate that the attitude of both discip-
lines to one another does not have to – and should not – be hostile. Cavell 
(1987: 2-3) invokes German philosophy as being particularly literature-infused. 
Nietzsche’s philosophical heritage could be definitely used as an example of 
Cavell’s statement, as world literature is a source of examples as well as an un-
derlying intellectual framework of Nietzsche’s line of thinking. Starting with The 
birth of tragedy where he traces the sources of Greek tragic feeling using nu-
merous examples from Ancient literature, Nietzsche never ceases to support his 
ideas with literary or literary/philosophical examples of diverse origin e.g. 
Goethe, Montaigne or even The book of Manu. When one looks at Thus spoke 
Zarathustra one may stop and wonder with admiration at the perfect fusion of 
the deeply disturbing philosophical load and the literary, stylistic merit that 
Nietzsche offers to his readers.5 Pondering upon the effect that Nietzsche tries 
to achieve in Thus spoke Zarathustra, making his book both a philosophical 
treaties and a worthwhile literary endeavour, it is possible to see yet another 
point of contention in the debate on the intersection of literature and philoso-
phy. For both formal philosophers and conservative literary scholars this seem-
ing fusion of boundaries may paradoxically be a reason for the insistence on the 
divisions between the disciplines. Martha Nussbaum (1992: 19) suggests that 
the problematic nature of the relationship stems from the traditionally con-
ceived formal expectations that we attach to the respective fields. Conventional 
philosophical discourse is based on the clarity of style and formal transparency 
in the imitation of the language of science. It is literature that seems to have an 
exclusive right to formal experimentation. Some would posit that Nietzsche’s 
Thus spoke Zarathustra, allegory and aphorism-based, causes more confusion 
than it presents merit – as instead of logical argumentation it offers intensely 
allusive and Bible-derived archaic language. An opposite scenario is equally 
plausible. There are literary works which create an impression of being philo-
sophical treatises in disguise. For instance, Dostoevsky’s parables inserted with-
in the conversation-based action of his The idiot make one forget for a while 
about the preoccupations of the key characters and plunge into the abstract sea 
  
5 For a more detailed appreciation of the literary and stylistic merits of Nietzsche’s writ-
ing in the context of his philosophizing, see: Kofman, Sarah. 1993. Nietzsche and metaphor. 
(Translated by Duncan Large). Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
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of reflection on the nature of human existence. So both Nietzsche’s and Dos-
toevsky’s works more than often make one stop and ask: is the work more litera-
ture or is it more philosophy? Of course the weightiness of the question really 
adds up to the total value of these works, as paradoxically the message of Thus 
spoke Zarathustra is enclosed within the allusiveness of its language, while the 
literary value of The idiot in its philosophical load. Yet for a deeply conservative 
researcher such a way of understanding philosophy/literature dynamics might 
be an unnecessary burden and a reason to raise arguments against the stylistic 
wealth or philosophical message respectively. 
Despite the aforementioned complexity of the relationship between lite-
rature and philosophy, there seems to exist a solid basis on which philosophical 
analysis can be built. Tzachi Zamir, the author of Double vision, an exemplary 
study using moral philosophy in the service of literary interpretation, attempts 
to categorize the functions in which philosophy may serve literature and vice 
versa. His main aim, as he (2007: XIII) claims, is to present the ways in which 
philosophy facilitates literature, rendering any criticism or mistrust irrelevant. 
Whether his goal is fully met is a question for a more extensive debate, yet his 
book presents one of very few attempts to revive “philosophical criticism”, as 
Zamir calls the philosophical analysis of literature, since the works of Cavell and 
Nussbaum. At the same time, Zamir takes into account accusations from new 
historicists and cultural materialists levelled at the potential pitfalls of philoso-
phising literature. For the purposes of the present dissertation, it seems very 
useful to review and discuss some of Zamir’s ideas. In the most general sense, 
the basis for the relationship between the two fields is, according to Zamir, of an 
epistemological and moral basis. Speaking of epistemic, or in other words the 
knowledge-yielding functions of both philosophy and literature, one turns 
his/her attention to philosophy first. Zamir recalls quite an instrumental role of 
literature as a source of examples for any philosophical argument. As he (2007: 
4-5) argues, philosophy needs literary examples to be functional and convinc-
ing. Life, itself very often turns out to be a too multiple and diverse phenome-
non for specific reflection, while literature, presenting accumulated, particula-
rized slices of human existence, becomes a potent well of behaviours or motiva-
tions. What is more, literary experience, especially taken from classic or well-
known literature, has a greater chance of universally appealing to readers across 
cultures or social groups for the sole reason of its ubiquity. This might be part of 
the reason why Shakespeare features in the philosophies of Hegel, Marx, 
Nietzsche, or Goethe, but also Benjamin or Derrida.6 In the function that Zamir 
  
6 For more information on well-known philosophers writing about Shakespeare, see: 
Kottman, Paul. A. 2009. Philosophers on Shakespeare. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
This book is a useful anthology of texts by the most acclaimed philosophers who express 
their stances on the works of Shakespeare.  
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analyses, it is literature that can facilitate systematic philosophical reflection. 
However, in a far more general sense, literature (e.g. reading experience) is 
necessary in the formation of beliefs and opinions not only of those who “pro-
fessionally” seek truth, but most probably a substantial part of mankind (Zamir 
2007: 6). Philosophising seems to be part and parcel of life on a very basic level. 
On this most primeval plain, literature simply becomes a form of philosophis-
ing, a springboard for reflection on existence. For a scholar this very basic level 
might seem too crude or too obvious to mention, yet such an embrace of litera-
ture seems to be most fundamental to people’s instinctive feel of literary func-
tions. Any reader of literature when asked what, in his/ her opinion, literature 
stands for, is bound to answer that it helps him pursue questions about life it-
self. So next to the provision of entertainment and relaxation, literature answers 
to the intellectual needs that are part of social life. As Zamir (2007: 10) summa-
rizes: “[l]inking philosophy and literature is thus not some closed endpoint but 
rather a method, a mode of philosophizing not necessarily limited to moral 
questions but potentially applicable whenever contingent claims or first truths 
need be supported.” On top of this, the incorporation of literature in philoso-
phizing is knowledge-yielding, but also it is “itself an inquiry into the structura-
lization of knowledge” (Zamir 2007: 16).  
Next to the epistemological function of literature, there is also a moral 
dimension of the intersection under our scrutiny, which is, to a degree, an ex-
tension of the epistemic realm. By the moral function of literature Zamir (2007: 
20-21) does not exactly mean the “moralization of literature”, which, in his view 
may lead to “interpretative vulgarity”. Obviously, there is no question that cer-
tain forms of literature serve didactic purposes. If they do intend to bring about 
a social correction or condemnation of certain behaviours, they also become 
forms of axiological discussions. Even the most evident form of didacticism 
always delegates literary criticism into the realm of morality or social correct-
ness. This seems exactly what Zamir is trying to point our attention to, though 
he fears any overzealous moralization which may limit the scope of inquiry. 
Instead he praises literature as a powerful incentive to moral reflection. On the 
surface, one may think that there is an overlap between the epistemological and 
moral dimensions. After all, both are to inspire philosophical reflection. Yet the 
moral dimension of literature differs from its epistemological function in the 
fact that it does not only ask about life but also about the valuations of its phe-
nomena as well as human activities. Zamir (2007: 33), following in the footsteps 
of Martha Nussbaum, sees literature as moral philosophy and believes that lite-
rature has a capacity of freezing singular experiences e.g. of private suffering, 
and communicating them to the reader – and thus inciting moral reflection. 
Nussbaum also insists on the moral underpinnings of literary endeavours. For 
her (1992: 4-5), the moral message of literature is intertwined with its form as 
there is “an organic connection between its form [the text’s] and its content” 
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and that is why e.g. a paraphrase will not do when one wants to render the 
meaning of a good piece of writing. For Nussbaum (1992: 5), literature is indeed 
moral reflection because “certain truths about human life can only be fittingly 
and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative 
artist.” Nussbaum’s line of argument concerns mainly novels, but her theory on 
philosophical criticism seems to fit more literary forms than just narratives. 
There is no reason to think that drama, especially when treated as text, is any 
different in terms of its epistemological and moral functions from narrative 
works. Nussbaum’s passing remarks on the philosophical message implicit in 
Ancient drama and their communication through the medium of the theatre 
lead us to believe that drama can indeed be also a form of philosophising, just 
like any narrative text. For a very long time ancient literature has been seen as a 
“popular background” to the work that philosophers did (Nussbaum 1992: 14). 
This is why many significant texts were not an object of investigation for philo-
sophers but rather the classical philologists. Nietzsche’s dissatisfaction with 
such a treatment of classical heritage may be seen in his texts, but also in his 
radical movement from philology to philosophy marked by the publication of 
The birth of tragedy. It seems that his acute judgement and open-minded ap-
proach could not stand the strait-jacket of philology. So one can see that yet 
again Nietzsche anticipated the ideas of later thinkers, including Nussbaum who 
so strongly criticizes the artificial, in her view, division of the texts of Antiquity 
into literary and philosophical. Instead, she (1992: 15) proposes a term “think-
er-poets” to designate those who easily cross the boundaries later set by scho-
lars. It seems that one may carry on this term of a “thinker-poet” further to ac-
count for Shakespeare too. Even if Shakespeare himself, due to the nature of his 
business in the theatre, did not see himself as an artist or a poet per se, he did 
earn this reputation in the course of the interpretative history of his works. A 
wealth of studies treating Shakespeare as a philosopher appears to testify to this 
idea.7 Already William Hazlitt in his 1817 book Characters of Shakespeare’s 
plays ([n.d.], loc. 838-839) wrote: “Shakespeare, who was as good a philoso-
pher as he was a poet […] knew that the love of power, which is another name 
  
7 To see a more extensive list of titles, see page 15. Speaking about Shakespeare – the 
philosopher it is worth mentioning K.J. Spalding’s The philosophy of Shakespeare, where 
the author compares Shakespeare to Aristotle in his aim “to reveal to men the real nature of 
‘man’” (Spalding 1953: 1). It is worth mentioning a recent account of philosophical ideas in 
Shakespeare by Colin McGinn’s Shakespeare’s philosophy: Discovering the meaning be-
hind the plays, which announces that “an avowedly philosophical approach to Shakespeare 
can reveal new dimensions to his work, and that this work can contribute to philosophy 
itself” (McGinn 2007: 1). One of the most recent works on the intersection of Shakesepare 
and philosophy is Stanley Stewart’s Shakespeare and Philosophy (2009), with a chapter on 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. Stewart’s earlier book (1992) Nietzsche's Case: Philosophy 
as/and Literature (co-authored with B. Magnus and J.-P. Mileur) should definitely be 
added to the list. 
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for the love of mischief, is natural to man.” Hazlitt’s description of Shakespeare 
does not only designate him into the realm of general philosophy, but more 
specifically capitalizes on the Nietzschean potential of his works. What also 
seems worth mentioning is that even if Shakespeare saw himself rather as a 
member of a creative, collaborative enterprise, his near contemporary, Ben Jon-
son, already felt himself to be an individual and single artist – a kind of “think-
er-poet”.8 However, coming back to Nussbaum’s (1992: 15) line of argument, 
what seems most significant about Ancient literature is that for e.g. ancient 
Greeks, disciplinary separations were unnatural. As she (1992: 15) stresses: 
“form was itself a statement, a content.” The form of Ancient theatre, so differ-
ent from our modern conception of theatre, made it a forum for the discussion 
of ethical issues. Again, though Nussbaum herself does not say it, the idea 
seems also true for Elizabethan theatre, where form was also inextricably con-
nected to the message communicated. Similarly, Elizabethan theatres were plat-
forms where contentious political and social issues were being acted out. For 
this reason, the understanding of Elizabethan drama as an investigation of cur-
rent moral dilemmas seems more than justified.  
As presented, what appears most crucial about philosophical analysis is 
the fact that it helps to investigate the implicit moral load of a literary work. As 
Nussbaum insists, form and style contribute to the communication of the moral 
message. In both Ancient and Elizabethan drama the aforementioned form was 
of crucial importance. Nussbaum suggests that certain moral issues are com-
municated more effectively through artistic or literary creations precisely 
thanks to the literary form they take. She (1992: 3) claims: “[s]tyle itself makes 
its claims, expresses its own sense of what matters. Literary form is not separa-
ble from philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of content – an integral part, 
then. Of the search for and the statement of truth.” Though one instinctively 
feels that this might be exactly so, it does not seem entirely obvious why should 
form contribute to the moral message. After all, philosophy based solely on ra-
tionality and the strength of logical argument should be capable of a successful 
interrogation of human morality by itself. Here Nussbaum offers a seemingly 
banal yet brilliantly insightful parallel. She recalls an educational method of 
teaching children fractions. As she (1992: 6-7) explains, it is obviously possible 
to teach children mathematics in abstract terms but, as most teachers know, it 
is far more effective to compare apparently abstract fractions to the very real 
pieces of a cake. This is exactly how the moral basis of literature could be ex-
plained too – both when literature serves as a mere illustration for the other-
  
8 The publication of Jonson’s luxurious 1616 Folio is often seen as a ground-breaking 
event that changed the perception of theatre and drama as it paved the way for seeing both 
as art. The publication of the collected works in a folio format by the author himself seems 
to be also quite an explicit statement of the artist’s individuality. For more information on 
Jonson’s Folio, see: Hadfield (2012). 
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wise plain and logical argument in a philosophical treatise, and when one reads 
a highly philosophised literary text that communicates its moral message 
through its action or characters. In both cases – mathematics and philosophy – 
an instance taken from “real” life becomes a model for the decision making 
process. It seems that the procedure is effective because it is freed from the con-
straints of the abstract and delegated to the realm of the affective impulses. Just 
as the conception of the pieces of an imaginary cake lets the child free its mind 
from the potentially unimaginable abstractness of mathematical discourse, so 
too an illustration resembling an authentic dilemma extends one’s imaginative 
capabilities to account for an ethical problem. Without going into details con-
cerning various theories of mimesis, one can assume that the imaginary cake 
inspires strong emotions in a child. Likewise, an imitation of a moral problem 
becomes an incentive for moral reflection. Also, this incentive might be stronger 
than the one expressed in the potentially stiff, academic discourse of philosoph-
ical departments. Nussbaum’s (1992: 7) comparison leads us to a conclusion 
that certain emotions cannot be stated or understood by intellectual activity 
only. The form of a literary work communicates powerful emotions, and these 
are determinants for the power of the communicated moral message. As sug-
gested, these moral underpinnings seem to work both ways – for “literary phi-
losophy” or “philosophical literature”. This also means that not only do the 
boundaries between literature and philosophy come tumbling down but also 
those for psychology. When one looks at Nietzsche’s intellectual heritage, bear-
ing in mind the fact that Nietzsche is predominantly a philosopher of morality, 
one immediately sees that he had an instinctive grasp of what Nussbaum tries to 
theorize. Nietzsche’s most powerful and memorable ideas are usually first pre-
sented in the forms of literary illustrations. The death of God is heralded in The 
madman parable in The gay science, while the theory of the eternal return in 
the form of a fictional narrator’s dream or rather a nightmare (Nietzsche 2007b: 
119-120, 194-195). Nietzsche, great psychologist as he was, must have been 
aware of the effectiveness of his compact scenes, which are undeniably meant to 
appeal to the affective side of human nature. He was one of the first philoso-
phers acknowledging human instincts as key in the development of morality. 
Pre-dating Freud, he realized that human conscious (or rational) intellectual 
activity is always blurred by powerful emotions. Nietzsche’s instinctive feel of 
the powerful intersection between philosophy and literature also heralds later 
theoreticians like Martha Nussbaum, but also Stanley Cavell.  
In The avoidance of love: a reading of King Lear Cavell identifies psy-
chology as an important aspect of his interpretative premises. Indeed, psychology 
emerges as crucial for the analysis of the plays where characters, if not real people, 
are models for people, in other words specimens in psychological analysis. In a 
sense Cavell places an equation sign between philosophy and psychology like 
Nietzsche, seeing psychology as a philosophy of the human mind. He (1987: 39-
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40) openly condemns a shift in criticism from characters to words and a frequent 
interpretative assumption that “characters are not people”. The shift Cavell has in 
mind is most probably formalism and new criticism, with its characteristic and 
exclusive focus on the literary form and aesthetic merits of literature. So, in his 
philosophical reading of Shakespeare Cavell challenges formalist paradigms as 
being insufficient to account for the vast phenomenon which literature amounts to 
with its epistemological and moral communicative load. Interestingly enough 
Cavell’s challenge is reminiscent of the new historical and cultural materialist 
approaches which also attack formalism on pretty much the same grounds. How-
ever, this parallel should not really be taken for granted as there are many accusa-
tions against philosophical criticism which new historicists and cultural material-
ists make. In order to work out a balanced and reliable account of philosophical 
analysis, it seems necessary to look at those criticisms as well. 
The very first feature of the body of works of philosophical criticism that 
strikes one as problematic is its exclusiveness. Philosophers or philosophical 
critics do not form a coherent movement or school, though this in itself does not 
seem to be a serious shortcoming. After all, many philosophical trends or devel-
opments in theory do not initially attempt to form any lasting “interpretative 
alliances” yet with time they do transform into more or less coherent stances. 
This is the direction which eventually new historicism took, of which Green-
blatt’s and Gallagher’s book Practising new historicism (2000) is a piece of 
evidence. Likewise, Sinfield’s Shakespeare, authority, sexuality – unfinished 
business in cultural materialism (2006) demonstrates the crystallization of 
cultural materialism as a unified practice. Yet with philosophical criticism one 
cannot really speak of such a crystallization. This is partly due to the very vast-
ness of philosophy as a field of inquiry. Each and every philosopher attempting 
to read literature through philosophy finds himself amidst schools, movements 
and stances. To give just two examples; while Nussbaum (1992: 36) chooses 
“the Aristotelian ethical view” as an interpretative framework for her study, 
Cavell (1987: 3) claims to write within a widely understood tradition of sceptic-
ism. Nevertheless, the divisions do not end here, as they both do not seem to 
agree on more fundamental issues. Nussbaum, as mentioned, sees literary form 
as fundamental to the communication of ethical issues. Cavell, on the other 
hand, underlines the importance of the psychological interrogation of literary 
characters. So the greatest paradox of philosophical criticism is that though 
most philosophical critics plead for the obliteration of boundaries between phi-
losophy and literature, they often do stick to traditionally conceived field divi-
sions in philosophy. Obviously, one could claim that the success of literary criti-
cism does not lie in the agreement between the critics but rather in the multip-
licity of voices which add up to the general debate on philosophical matters 
implicit in literary works. Yet, as it seems, philosophical criticism, in its exten-
sive multiplicity, offers no guidelines or more or less unified theoretical premis-
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es for those who would like to plunge into its depths. One needs to first tackle 
the sea of theory in order to find his/her own way of approaching philoso-
phy/literature dynamics. Moreover, the available material has its faults, which 
become even more visible when juxtaposed with the newest research fruits of 
the new-historicists and materialists. 
As mentioned, Martha Nussbaum suggests the form consciously chosen 
by the author is inextricably linked to the intended philosophical load of the work. 
As she (1992: 5) writes “life is never presented by a text; it is always represented 
as something”. Thus, the aim of philosophical analysis should be the uncovering of 
these intended meanings. Yet such a notion seems to be more than anachronistic. 
It is nowadays almost fantastical to suggest that the role of literary theory is to 
uncover the design of the author. The author’s intentions or even the intended 
message do not seem fundamental to the ultimate meaning the work communi-
cates. What emerges as more important is either to try to trace the conception of 
the literary work as it was seen and understood by the author’s contemporaries, or 
to investigate the meaning that could be possibly communicated for the modern 
man/woman. In her musings on literary form, Nussbaum (1992: 8-9) eventually 
discredits the idea of the author’s intention as fundamental for the interpretation 
of the text, yet she then implies that the communicability of literature depends on 
some universal message encapsulated in the text. At the same time, Nussbaum 
(1992: 9) is bold enough to say that reading of a literary text is like: “seeing shapes 
in the clouds, or in the fire. There the reader is free to see whatever his or her fan-
cy dictates, and there are no limits on what she may see.” For an ordinary reader, 
the encounters with literature may indeed resemble telling fortunes from clouds 
or fire, though I would not personally venture to offend readers of literature by 
limiting them to fortune-tellers. However, the implications of such a conception of 
literature for literary scholars may be disastrous. Complete relativity of meaning 
for both readers and scholars seems to diminish the role of literature as a source of 
knowledge or teacher of moral attitudes. On the other hand, the naïve insistence 
on the universality of certain texts strips them of their historical and cultural con-
text, cancelling their ideological and historical relevance. It seems that the insis-
tence on the universal meaning of certain texts and context-free interpretation, 
supported only by abstract philosophical terms, is the most serious problem phi-
losophical criticism has always faced. With the advent of new historicism such an 
accusation becomes even more poignant. For instance, though Cavell attempts to 
reinterpret Shakespeare as a sceptic, he barely touches upon the influences of 
Montaigne on Shakespeare. He (1987: 4) does acknowledge that such an intellec-
tual interchange between these two Renaissance minds might have taken place, 
yet he claims that Shakespeare was a sceptic intuitively. Cavell (1987: 20-21) he-
ralds the advent of scepticism in the Renaissance as a defining feature of moderni-
ty when he says:  
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[t]he catastrophe I anticipate, controversially, is of course the event of skepticism, 
conceived now as precipitating not alone a structure each individual is driven by, or 
resists, but as incorporating a public history in the modern period, in principle 
awaiting a historical explanation for its specific onset in, say, Shakespeare and Des-
cartes.  
 He (1987: 21) also sees scepticism as a springboard for the development of singu-
larity when he claims: “I want to say that with the birth of skepticism, hence of 
modern philosophy, a new intimacy, or wish for it, enters the world; call it privacy 
shared (not shared with the public, but from it).” Despite these insightful observa-
tions, his analysis of e.g. King Lear has no support in contemporary sources which 
could substantiate his arguments. Nussbaum’s readings of literature, though in-
teresting at certain points, also do not recourse to the contemporary conceptions 
of ideas she touches upon. In my opinion, this context-free study of literature is 
burdened with serious consequences. Along with the severing of history-and cul-
ture-specific meanings, having no recourse to source texts might turn literary 
criticism into a barren exercise in erudition. I would argue that the pursuit of par-
allels between various texts, as well as a detailed study of the aesthetic and formal 
features of texts, is not sufficient a role for literary theory. For the same reason I 
believe thus that plain philosophical analysis brings little value into literature 
studies. For example, if one looks at a fairly recent book of A. A. Ansari entitled 
Shakespeare – the existentialist (2009), one can be amazed by the wealth of par-
allels the author finds between Shakespeare’s works and certain existentialist 
ideas. However, as much as I agree with Ansari that Shakespeare’s plays invite the 
possibility of an existentialist analysis, I also do believe that the discussion of e.g. 
Twelfth Night without any reflection on the status of cross-dressing in the Eliza-
bethan England blurs essential meanings of the play. I also do find the treatment 
of existentialism as a unified and coherent philosophical movement very prob-
lematic. There are, after all, divergences between Sartre and Heidegger or Jaspers 
and Camus, not to mention the fact that each philosopher associated with existen-
tialism either denies his affinity with the movement or has a very specific perspec-
tive on the idea of existence. When one ponders on the position of Shakespeare in 
such a philosophical reading, one sees him as a single and individual author torn 
out of the circumstances in which his plays were created. Of course, I am not sug-
gesting that there is no place for such an analysis within the sphere of literary 
criticism at all, but my feeling is that such studies perform slightly different func-
tions; instead of trying to reach the minds of early moderns, they open our own 
minds to previously unknown intertextual pathways and build new intellectual 
bridges. Yet ultimately they do not teach us anything new about the period of 
which the texts they try to interpret come from. Hence, one is left with a very illu-
sory idea that Shakespeare was a monument of individual and single genius, can-
celling at the same time the collaborative and highly inspirational environment 
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which gave birth to Shakespeare, and of which Marlowe, Shakespeare’s shadow 
precursor, was also a part. Obviously, such a perception of Shakespeare is still 
tempting to numerous scholars and highly appreciated by readers of their books 
as the popularity of e.g. Harold Bloom’s Shakespeare – the invention of the hu-
man (1999), an astonishing piece of idolatry heralding Shakespeare as the father 
of humanity, beautifully testifies to. Despite the success of Bloom’s book, which 
undoubtedly is due to Bloom’s own brilliance of style and immense creative in-
stinct, one should be aware of the shortcomings of announcing Shakespeare as a 
single and only genius. Not only does such an attitude force one into an epistemo-
logical void but also it risks rendering Shakespeare’s contemporaries empty of all 
merit. Frahang Zabeeth’s attempt at a philosophical account of Shakespeare is not 
entirely independent of the Renaissance context as he attempts to read Shake-
speare along the lines of his contemporary as well as more modern philosophers. 
Nevertheless, by singling out Shakespeare as the bard, he runs into a trap of es-
sentialism. In Shakespeare – the philosophical poet he posits:  
[t]he Bard, to use Aristotle’s idea of an ideal man, is magnanimous, a great-souled 
man. He is a Renaissance figure, surpassing by far his erudite contemporaries in his 
use of language, the music of words, in his enchantment with music, “the food of 
love”, and in his understanding of human nature and culture those non-professional 
philosophers, the Italian Giordano Bruno, Erasmus of Rotterdam and Sir Thomas 
More of England, and those professional, talented and university educated co-
playwrights and poets, Christopher Marlowe, Ben Jonson, Philip Sidney and Robert 
Greene. Moreover, the internal evidence indicates the Bards’ awareness of certain 
thoughts of Femocritus, the laughing philosopher […], of Plato, the Sceptics, the Epi-
cureans, and Machiavellians, even of Galen’s medical theory and of Eluclid’s parallel 
axiom as well as the works of Erupides, Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, Virgil, Horace, 
Ovid and Montaigne. (Zabeeth 1990: 5)  
It seems that Shakespeare’s extensive knowledge of contemporary and ancient 
literature and philosophy that Zabeeth is referring to is one of the convincing 
arguments in favour of seeing him as a philosophical poet. Yet what Zabeeth is 
doing, quite on purpose as it seems, is undoubtedly an act of pure bardolatry. To 
my mind, seeing Shakespeare as a solitary, unerring and almighty genius, by far 
surpassing his contemporaries, is a politically and ideologically naïve interpre-
tative procedure. This is not to mention the fact that passing all-too confident a 
judgement on the genius of the author does not exactly belong to the sphere of 
literary criticism. In this dissertation I will be arguing for the perception of the 
Renaissance as a period of strong personalities, but I do believe that the strong 
individuals in both Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s plays are the products of the 
period rather than some genius stroke of luck. Yet reading Shakespeare’s works 
through the dominant intellectual trends of the period seems a reasonable basis 
for a philosophical analysis. In this sense Zabeeth is proposing an interpretative 
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procedure of more value than just pure philosophical analysis in the vein of 
Ansari. For this reason, I do value Zabeeth’s (1990: 4) ambition to “exhibit these 
issues in detail”, namely, Shakespeare’s philosophical preoccupations like: “the 
concept of time”, “Platonic division of the soul and the conflict of reason, pas-
sion and the will” etc. Yet in its abstraction it is a work which might very well 
come under the severe criticism of modern literary critics for the same reasons 
Zamir enumerates in his account of philosophical criticism. 
The aforementioned vision of Shakespeare as a single genius as well as 
the illusion of the absolute universality of his works frequently emerge as the 
suspect elements of philosophical criticism which Tzachi Zamir points to. Philo-
sophical readings by the virtue of pleading the truths of the chosen philosophi-
cal systems perpetrate the idea that humans have always been limited by uni-
versal, constant and unchangeable values. For instance, the application of a 20th 
century trend like e.g. existentialism in the case of Ansari, might be problematic 
because it suggests that the people contemporary to Shakespeare had exactly 
the same preoccupations as we moderns have. To use Zamir’s (2007: 51) words: 
“[t]he philosophical critic errs by choosing a superficial framework for analysis, 
which is itself the outcome of ideological forces that the critic is compelled to 
strengthen.” As Zamir underscores, this very myth of the continuity of values 
and traditions was dismantled by cultural materialists or new historicists (Za-
mir 2007: 50). Zamir underscores the accusations that anti-essentialists have 
long levelled at more traditional criticism. Philosophical analysis without re-
course to context, history, or the philosophy of the times seems dry and redun-
dant. As mentioned, it can often turn into an astonishing albeit irrelevant dis-
play of the author’s erudition, a flexible but inconclusive play with methodolo-
gies and theories. As Zamir (2007: 51) aptly points out, even seemingly “univer-
sal” concepts like “love, honesty, truth, loyalty, parenting, obedience guilt and 
other notions […] have been reflected upon without taking into consideration 
diffused conceptual and ideological networks.” In other words, philosophers use 
“faulty morality” in order to uphold this “powerful cultural deception” (Zamir 
2007: 52). It is hard not to see sense in the arguments Zamir recalls, especially 
in that they follow the anti-essentialist line of thinking already presented in the 
above paragraphs. However, if these arguments be true, then the discussion on 
the efficacy of philosophical analysis remains open. Zamir does not reject philo-
sophical criticism on the grounds of which anti-essentialists talk. On the con-
trary, he follows Nussabum’s idea of understanding literature as moral philoso-
phy. I would definitely agree with him that finding faults in philosophical criti-
cism is not a sufficient argument for its total abandonment. Rather it is a sign 
that an improvement or a correction of certain methods is necessary. An out-
ward dismissal of philosophical analysis on the grounds of its political and ideo-
logical naiveté, to my mind, would be itself a sign of an enslavement to ideology. 
It would also signal that philosophers in general are not capable of seeing the 
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subtleties of anti-essentialist stances, that they apparently do not understand 
the complexity of the historical process and rely on the very banal and naïve 
idea of the so called universal values. I would argue that there is actually no one 
better equipped and prepared to unfold this complexity than a professional 
philosopher. The highly influential body of Marxist literary criticism, after all, 
can trace its beginnings within the philosophy departments. This too is not to 
mention the lasting influence of existentialism on world literature, which had 
also stimulated the development of literary theory long before the advent of new 
historicism and cultural materialism. Existentialists had pointed out the contin-
gency of human beings before anti-essentialists realized the inevitability of 
ideological imprints on human existence. One can be critical of Ansari or Za-
beeth, but the fact that some philosophers would be tempted into the lure of the 
universal is not a sufficient argument against philosophical analysis in general. I 
strongly believe that it is of crucial importance to make philosophy serve not 
only purely literary analysis but culture and history investigation too. So, in 
other words, as I will be frequently highlighting, in this analysis the aim is not to 
show how Shakespeare’s or Marlowe’s works illustrate the workability and func-
tionality of Nietzsche’s philosophy in the task of describing human nature, but 
rather how Nietzsche’s philosophy combined with historicist or cultural investi-
gation can be used to unfold mechanisms and schemata behind the Elizabethan 
and Jacobean minds, in the midst of the systems they functioned in. Just as new 
historicism and cultural materialism are not exhausted as interpretative me-
thods, there is still space and, more importantly, a need for a philosophical 
analysis of Shakespeare’s works – but a new method should be proposed, a me-
thod that does not relegate Shakespeare to some philosophical desert of his own 
genius, cancelling the contribution of his contemporaries (such as Marlowe) in 
the development of this collective phenomenon of the Renaissance. The method 
should account for the context of the period and simultaneously be more politi-
cally viable. In the following paragraphs I want to ponder on the possibility of 
combining philosophy and literature in this wider project of reading Shakes-
peare and Marlowe through Nietzsche.  
1.4.“New historical philosophising” – a combined method 
As I have outlined above, both anti-humanist stances and philosophical criti-
cism have their pitfalls. As Zamir (2007: 49, 55) points out, cultural materialism 
has an “anti-philosophical stance” because philosophy cannot answer to the 
forces implicit in literary works, while new historicists fail to “provide existen-
tial coordinates.” Consequently, the hopeless flight from ideology results in the 
dismissal of the moral engagement of literature (Zamir 2007: 55). As already 
mentioned, literature for philosophical critics is a form of moral philosophy. 
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The basis of the appeal of such an attitude does not have to be universalism. 
There seems no reason to believe that the dogma of universal human nature 
absolutely explains the continuity of literary values. Anti-essentialists may be 
very right in their claims that the continuity of human perception and feeling is 
just an illusion. The belief in an intangible flame of God’s being encapsulated in 
the human soul or a more rationalist claim of the existence of some Kantian 
categorical imperative that is common to mankind may for some constitute the 
anachronistic remains of the metaphysical guise of literature. This belief always 
halts one at the brink of reason, when one may look down at the chasm of meta-
physics. Yet, as I would argue, if there is absolutely no continuity to human ex-
perience, one should wonder why plays written more than four hundred years 
ago still appeal to so many. That is exactly why I will insist, following Zamir, on 
the existence of a “trans-historical” element to human nature. If there were no 
such dimension to mankind, if mankind were indeed totally contingent, the 
comprehensibility between literatures and cultures of the past to us – moderns 
– would be lost forever. We do not keep on looking for new ways of recreating 
Shakespeare or the Renaissance experience because we do not understand 
them. On the contrary, people, when asked about Shakespeare, often claim that 
his plays touch at the very core of what to be human means. We need to recreate 
and reread the Renaissance exactly because we feel it to be human and thus 
appealing to our nature.  
Zamir (2007: 58-59) suggests that this “trans-historical” element con-
cerns our ability of feeling the personal suffering of those whom we see or read 
about. He (2007: 49, 55) claims that: “[l]iterature is sometimes a branch of 
moral philosophy. And when it is seen in this way, it can, in unique ways, fur-
ther a detailed understanding of the suffering of the weak. It can create an expe-
rimental understanding of the workings of power and the limitations of self-
articulation that power creates.” Indeed, it might be so that certain texts do stir 
more intense feelings as the tragedy’s primeval function is to awaken fear and 
pity. However, arousing empathy does not seem to be literature’s exclusive 
function. Firstly, this is because the sufferers are not always weak, while power 
does not always belong to those entirely evil. Secondly, empathy cannot be pos-
sibly a sole moral function of literature as morality is not only empathy-driven. I 
do see such a notion as wishful thinking, which moreover delegates us into Kan-
tian dialectics again. The apparent “universal” or “trans-historical” empathy 
would not exactly explain why we find Iago, Macbeth or Tamburlaine so fasci-
nating. The source of our fascination does not seem to stem from our feeling for 
their victims but rather from the very core of their evil passions. So, to my mind, 
this “trans-historical” dimension of literature goes beyond the feelings of pity or 
empathy, it rather encapsulates the whole plethora of emotions comprehensible 
to humanity. There may be no universal understanding of truth, honesty and 
even love as these might be ideologically and socially determined. Such values 
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can be conceptualized differently across cultures and ages. However, the emo-
tions of fear, pain, suffering, as well as joy, longing and desire are undeniably 
shared by all human beings. The social or political circumstances of their ex-
pression as well as reasons behind them might again be predetermined, yet the 
instincts themselves remain a common human denominator. Their explanation 
is by no means metaphysical but rather physiological. Already Charles Darwin 
devoted The expression of emotion in man and animals (1872) to the discus-
sion of the evolutionary nature of emotions. What seems most crucial is that 
Darwin combined the expression of human emotions to man’s descent from 
other creatures, thereby making emotion a common feature of virtually all exis-
tence. He wrote that:  
[n]o doubt as long as man and all other animals are viewed as independent crea-
tions, an effectual stop is put to our natural desire to investigate as far as possible the 
causes of Expression. By this doctrine, anything and everything can be equally well 
explained; and it has proved as pernicious with respect to Expression as to every 
other branch of natural history. With mankind some expressions, such as the bris-
tling of the hair under the influence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth 
under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood, except on the belief that man 
once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition. The community of certain 
expressions in distinct though allied species, as in the movements of the same facial 
muscles during laughter by man and by various monkeys, is rendered somewhat 
more intelligible, if we believe in their descent from a common progenitor. (Darwin 
2012, loc. 228-234) 
Nietzsche, as Darwin’s near contemporary, was familiar with his works and 
grappled with Darwin’s discoveries in the realm of the natural history of man in 
his own philosophy. Nietzsche might have seen the evolutionary theory as a 
potential source of a great crisis of man, but he never openly questioned its sci-
entific validity. Yet he was also very conscious of the political/ ideological de-
terminations of human morality and thus he came up with his own explanation 
of the drives that push both man and other life creations to action. In the case of 
man, Nietzsche’s will to power explains both his social as well as more biological 
functions. So Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power might be seen as an um-
brella term for those emotions or instincts that seem to be shared by humans 
now and back in the past. This widened perspective accounts for the universal 
which anti-essentialists fear so intensely, but it also makes room for an acute 
realization of the ideology behind social behaviours. Thus, it seems to be a more 
effective tool of literary analysis than the notion of universality Zamir seeks. 
Nietzsche’s will to power is also, in my opinion, a potential point of intersection 
between philosophical criticism and the more recent ideology-oriented devel-
opments in theory. For instance, Raymond Williams’ (1989: 22) idea of “struc-
tures of feeling” provides also an umbrella term with “a relation between social 
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and literary facts”. Williams (1989: 21-22) sees certain “mental structures” 
within the works of groups of writers and artists as demonstrations of behav-
iours collectively created by individuals. Williams’ vision of individuals within 
society, precursory for cultural materialism, though of Marxian origin, turns 
slightly into a Nietzschean direction. His perception “both of alternative and of 
oppositional culture” being a product of the struggle between emergent and 
residual elements resembles the Nietzschean Dionysian/Appolonian dichotomy. 
So as can be seen, Nietz-schean perspectives build intellectual bridges between 
chiefly materialist ideas as well as philosophically motivated analyses. 
The reconciliation of properly edged universalism in the form of a com-
monly shared instinct – the will to power with an awareness of the political/social 
limitations of an individual – is not only possible but actually captured by Nietz-
schean philosophy. Nietzsche might agree with Dollimore’s (1984: 251) “material-
ist conception of subjectivity, on which, in so far as it retains the concept of es-
sence, construes it not as that which is eternally fixed but as social potential mate-
rialising within limiting historical conditions”. Obviously this “essence” would not 
be understood in metaphysical, Kantian terms but exactly as a potentiality, a pos-
sibility to overcome, transfigure and transcend. The core of the anti-essentialist 
argument seems to trace back to an earlier existentialist tenet, inspired by 
Nietzsche. According to Jean Paul Sartre (1966: 289, 290), a human being really 
lacks any stable preconceived essence, just like anti-essentialists claim. Yet for 
Sartre, like for other existentialists, man is what he makes of himself. So the lack 
of essence is inextricably linked with transcendence, which is the process of mak-
ing oneself. Nietzsche calls for this creative transfiguration of oneself when he 
says: “What does your conscience say? – ‘You should become who you are’” 
(Nietzsche 2007b: 152). In their obsessive fear of universalism, anti-essentialists 
very often forget about the potential of “becoming” as universally human. In the 
idea of transcendence, understood as a potential for ever becoming anew, a basis 
of the will to power, I see the constancy which philosophical critics should seek 
when approaching the moral dimension of literature. The experience of ever be-
coming is a shared human element which, when successfully portrayed, makes 
good literature appealing, even in the face of the passing of time or moving across 
cultures. The same transcendence is no barrier to the reading of literature amidst 
the political and ideological awareness of its production. On the contrary, it is in 
the sphere of human social relations where over-coming takes place, so the histor-
ical/social and political context is necessary in order to grasp transcendence itself. 
Nietzsche focuses on the potential of the individual and this is an element, as I will 
be arguing, that approximates him to the Renaissance experience. For instance, 
when one looks at Machiavelli’s conception of virtù, a dynamic drive shaping a 
successful individual as presented in his Prince, one has a feeling that the passing 
parallel which forms in one’s head might bear more of an affinity to Nietzsche’s 
will to power than actually meets the eye. So one may observe that Nietzsche’s 
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philosophical load makes it a solid basis for a new interpretation of the period and 
its key texts. Hugh Grady, in his article entitled On the need for a differentiated 
theory of (early) modern subjectivity, calls for a proposal of a new method in the 
light of the insufficiency of the existing methodologies. He wants to remind scho-
lars that:  
every self is an outcome of complex psycho-historical processes, and while the selves 
of specific cultures and societies share socially constructed discourses and ideolo-
gies, they are by no means identical or interchangeable, differing significantly 
through both historical change and individual variations within historical epochs. 
Our accounts of the history of the self should accordingly be nuanced and open to 
the complexity of historical and individual differences. (Grady 2000: 41) 
Because a combined method, in its historicism, emerges as sensitive to ideologi-
cal nuances, but at the same time lends itself to the investigation of morality, it 
seems to have the potential of bringing new insights into the study of the early 
modern and thus Shakespeare and Marlowe.  
The combined method I would like to propose will incorporate the ideas 
from the vast body of Nietzschean philosophy. However, I intend to capitalize on 
the key notions of Nietzscheism, namely: the will to power, self-overcoming, amor 
fati, the eternal return and, finally, the conception of der Übermensch (the over-
man). I see these notions as most appropriate in the investigation of the Renais-
sance identity marked by ambition. The Nietzschean genealogy of morality will 
provide a mental framework for my understanding of Shakespearean and Marlo-
vian characters. The valuations of certain Shakespearean and Marlovian charac-
ters can be, in my opinion, traced back to an element that is beyond reason. After 
all, Shakespearean tragedies like Macbeth or Othello thrive on a single excessive 
passion that burns the protagonist and leads him to his downfall. Marlowe’s Tam-
burlaine is undoubtedly also pushed by an unexplained drive towards further 
conquests. Because, as mentioned, this dissertation is supposed to be historically 
and politically sensitive, I am determined to read the aspirations of these charac-
ters through the lens of contemporary source texts. Finally, as there seem to exist 
some intersections between Nietzsche and the materialist line of thinking, I want 
to exploit these relations to the advantage of my analysis. For these reasons I 
deem the fruits of materialist analyses of such distinguished scholars like Ray-
mond Williams, Jonathan Dollimore, Catherine Belsey or earlier Michel Foucault 
or even Karl Marx well worth incorporating within my line of thinking and collat-
ing with Friedrich Nietzsche. This is why I see Williams’ (1989: 22) “structures of 
feeling” as well as his conception of culture as very useful. The same applies to a 
paradigm of subversion/containment featuring in Stephen Greenblatt’s (1985: 
292) writings. Martin Warner (2010: 115), recalling Plato’s banishment of poets 
from his Republic, speaks of “opening an incipient divide into a gulf.” By this gulf 
he means obviously the division that has arisen between philosophy and litera-
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ture, a gulf which turned them into separate disciplines whose meetings always 
have to be negotiated in the form of such lengthy methodological essays as this 
one. However, as has been demonstrated by numerous examples, the divide be-
tween these branches frequently emerges as superficial. I would suggest that it is a 
divide between the methodologies of their respective studies that often appear 
irreconcilable. This dissertation attempts to change this perception by its widely-
understood interdisciplinary edge. In the era when philosophical criticism heads 
more into a direction of linguistics (what the fruits of analytic philosophy of the 
first half of the 20th century and the proposals of philosophers of language in the 
second half best demonstrate) I am more interested in such a wide perspective 
that becomes both the reading of culture and philosophising at the same time.9 
Therefore, I would like my dissertation to take a mixed stance of “philosophical 
cultural materialism” or “philosophical historicism”. In the simplest words possi-
ble, it is to be a linear equation in which philosophy, literature and a wider context 
of history and politics constitute constants. The solution of this equation hopefully 
emerges as a deepened and new perspective on Renaissance valuations in the 
plays of Shakespeare and Marlowe. It is maybe a misnomer to refer to the lan-
guage of mathematics, its being a science of precision resulting in no loose ends. It 
seems the case that with disciplines that are more elusive, like literature and phi-
losophy, it is different. As Nietzsche jotted down in one of his notebooks during 
his long reflective walks: “[a]gainst that positivism which stops before phenome-
na, saying ‘there are only facts’, I should say: no, it is precisely facts that do not 
exist, only interpretations...” (Nietzsche, as quoted in Kaufmann 1988: 458). Since 
there are indeed no facts but only interpretations, especially in the realm of phi-
losophy and literature, Nietzsche is right in naming his approach “perspectivism”. 
The combined method that is intended, also possibly termed as “new historical 
philosophising”, is to welcome a whole spectrum of interpretative angles. Hence I 
see it as an expression of Nietzschan perspectivism, which I would like to make a 
crowning feature of my own investigation. Nietzsche was no systematic thinker 
but rather an experiment-loving inciter. Doubting the effectiveness of a system as 
an interpretative method, I also commit this work to the power of literary experi-
ment. Though the aim of this dissertation is not to incite, the interpretative expe-
riments I propose will hopefully bring new perspectives on the issues under scru-
tiny. Once more, I deem it significant to reiterate that combined experimental 
analysis, tailored to political sensitivity and historical context, has a greater 
chance of capturing the very delicate equilibrium of what is shared and common 
to human experience between what is now and the Renaissance. Speaking of 
  
9 For more details on the past and present state of philosophical analysis, see: Warner, 
Martin. 2010. Philosophy and literature: yesterday, today and tomorrow, in: Schroeder, 
Severin (ed.). 2010. Philosophy of literature. Chichester: Willey-Blackwell. Warner, unlike 
Zamir, focuses solely on the intersection between literature and philosophy. He presents a 
very systematic account of influential stances.  
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Nietzschean perspectivism, it now seems necessary to turn our attention solely to 
Nietzschean thought for a moment. Just like the intersection of literature and 
philosophy emerges as a varied and sometimes confusing body of thought, so is 
Nietzsche’s philosophical heritage. Hence, this spectrum also requires a short 
introduction before the plunge into the early modern may be possible.  
1.5. “Whose Nietzsche?” – on the multiplicity of nietzschanisms 
“New historical philosophising” – or the combined method that I have proposed 
as a methodological path taken for this dissertation – is intended to limit the 
vast scope of inquiry which opens up whenever one encounters the intersection 
of literature and philosophy, on the one hand, and broadly understood studies 
on the early-modern, on the other. The so-called “Nietzschean philosophy” is 
meant to provide a philosophical background to the analysis. Nevertheless, the 
idea of exploiting Nietzsche as an interpretative key poses some difficulties. 
First of all, the term “Nietzschean philosophy” is by no means clear when one 
bears in mind the troubled history of Nietzsche’s texts. Naturally, the instability 
of Nietzschean works poses problems for scholars not only due to technical or 
historical mishaps but also because of the elusiveness and original style of his 
philosophy, so indebted to the power of metaphor and aesthetic expression. 
This specific highly metaphorical depth produces a multiplicity of responses on 
the part of scholars and philosophers. So on top of down-to-earth scholarship 
problems, one also has to bear in mind the fact that Nietzschean philosophy is 
no longer equal solely to Nietzsche’s philosophy as the term nietzscheanism 
(alternatively Nietzscheanism, Nietzscheism) encompasses both the body of 
interpretations of Nietzsche, and independent reflections inspired by 
Nietzsche’s writings of such diverse authors as Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, 
Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray or Sarah Kofman. All these elements call here 
for a brief consideration. It seems that an encounter with the “dynamite” 
Nietzsche must be a plunge into an ocean of texts. Any creative use of these 
oceanic waves first requires making decisions as to the selection of directions 
and authors. 
Nietzsche’s works, the so called “Nietzsche canon”, constitute several 
published works of substantial length which he published himself, works fi-
nished before his breakdown in 1889 but suppressed for some time and pub-
lished posthumously, a substantial book Wille zur Macht [Will to power], edited 
and compiled from Nietzsche’s notes by his sister, and finally his so called 
Nachlass – a huge jumble of notes accumulated over the years, some used in 
rewritten forms in his published works while others were abandoned in the 
creative process (Kaufmann 1974: 76). The precedence and importance of these 
texts has long been an object of hot debates between scholars. Some scholars 
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give precedence to the published material (e.g. Kaufmann, Hollingdale) while 
others turn their attention to the unpublished notes (e.g. Heidegger, Klossows-
ki). Some study both, or make an informed selection of notes or quotes for their 
own particular philosophical ends (e.g. Derrida). It is thus not difficult to see 
that one can speak of a certain dispersion of meaning in the Nietzschean texts. 
David Pickus (2007: 6) summarizes this situation by saying that: “[f]rom the 
standpoint of the twenty-first century, when Nietzsche is securely established as 
a scholarly subject, it is easy to forget how unstable ‘Nietzsche’ was to the read-
ing public in the first half of the twentieth century, as he was, more often than 
not, ‘packaged’ in a way that was not conducive to concentrating on his writings 
as a whole.” The instability of Nietzschean texts partly stems from the highly 
non-academic activity of his sister Elizabeth, who after his break-down became 
his sole guardian and an exclusive owner of Nietzsche’s manuscript notes.10 She 
withheld unpublished though finished works like The Antichrist and Ecce Ho-
mo until 1895 and 1908 respectively. Instead, with the help of Nietzsche’s friend 
and secretary Heinrich Köselitz (known as Peter Gast), she presented her own 
selection of Nietzsche’s notes (which he himself by the way discarded) as his 
opus magnum – The will to power (1901). As Kaufmann (1972: 7) claims: “[t]he 
publication of The Will to Power as Nietzsche’s final and systematic work 
blurred the distinction between his works and his notes and created the false 
impression that the aphorisms in his books are of a kind with these disjointed 
jottings.”. Moreover, it seems that it is Frau Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche who is 
responsible for inciting the growth of the Nietzsche legend and further misap-
propriations of his works (Kaufmann 1972: 4). Though the name of Nietzsche 
has been already disassociated from the connections with Nazism by the efforts 
of Kaufmann, Jaspers, as well as French philosophers like Georges Bataille or 
Giles Deleuze, while his Nachlass was published in its entirety in a joint project 
to publish the complete works of Nietzsche by Giorgo Colli and Mazzino Monti-
nari, the “instability” of his texts remains a crucial aspect of Nietzsche scholar-
ship.11 This might be so because Nietzsche’s distinctive style, despite its vivid 
imagery and biting directness, more often covers rather than reveals meanings 
– hence the multiplicity of responses. 
  
10 It is interesting to note that the instability of Nietzsche’s texts slightly resembles the 
instability of Shakespearean drama, which on more than one occasion exists in numerous 
textual versions. Of course, the circumstances are radically different. The distortion of 
Nietzschean works is partly due to the efforts of his sister and partly to the selective and 
biased attitude of some of the ideologists willing to appropriate his philosophy to political 
ends. Shakespearean textual instability stems from the nature and role of Elizabethan thea-
tre, in which a text of a play was not considered a literary achievement, nor was the position 
of the single author recognized as important.  
11 For more details on the Coli/Montinari project, see Hollingdale, R.J. 2001. Nietzsche. 
Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 294-298. 
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This hardly graspable nature of Nietzschean philosophy is aptly summa-
rized by Jacques Derrida in an interview with Richard Beardsworth entitled 
Nietzsche and the machine, where Derrida (2002: 218) claims that: “[t]he clos-
er one is to ‘Nietzsche’, the more one is aware that there is no such thing as the 
Nietzsche-text. This text demands interpretation in the same way that it argues 
that there is no such thing as an entity, only interpretations – active and reac-
tive – of that entity.” If, indeed, as Derrida claims, there is no single core to the 
Nietzschean body of texts, the multitude of interpretative efforts on the part of 
scholars should not be a source of any wonder. Yet, knowing that philosophy, as 
a founding branch of science, usually seeks systematized and more definite con-
ceptualizations of beings and phenomena, the instability of Nietzsche’s output is 
often a source of frustration for scholars and thinkers. Even such avid readers of 
Nietzsche as Pierre Klossowski at moments yield to this philosophical despair 
resulting from Nietzsche’s elusiveness. Klossowski (2005: 67) reads Nietzsche 
as a first modern philosopher, who returns philosophy to the bodily experience. 
In a sense, he suggests that Nietzsche cannot be ultimately interpreted or un-
derstood completely, as even seemingly reasonable processes are also merely 
impulses of the body. Beings, as accumulations of their impulses, need to accept 
their “opacity”. The very title of Wolfgang Müller-Lauter’s book Nietzsche: his 
philosophy of contradictions and the contradictions of his philosophy (1971) 
suggests that such an “opacity” exists within the body of Nietzsche’s text. Yet 
Müller-Lauter does not suggest that the wealth of perspectives, often seen as 
insurmountable contradictions in Nietzsche, is a barrier in the pursuit of philo-
sophical meaning. Ciano Aydin explains that Müller-Lauter’s reading of 
Nietzsche is important because:  
it made room for many other, diverse Nietzsche interpretations. His account of the 
meaning and worth of the multiplicity and struggle in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
prompted many authors not only to come up with a different and better Nietzsche 
interpretation but also to elaborate further on themes that Nietzsche introduced. 
Furthermore, Müller-Lauter’s insight that we should not take Nietzsche on his ‘word’ 
but should understand his views within the particular context in which they are used 
has greatly contributed to a more adequate reading of Nietzsche’s texts. Many pre-
sumed irregularities in Nietzsche’s philosophy often seem to be the result of the 
equation of concept with word. (Aydin 2011: 101)  
So, as one can see, when dealing with Nietzschean text one cannot take words at 
their face value as they form a dense mesh of metaphor built with allusion, alle-
gory and symbol, but also, on top of all the others, ancient topoi requiring erudi-
tion. What is more, beside the allusions and metaphors one finds that 
Nietzsche’s style is teasing and sometimes almost obnoxiously direct. His pro-
vocative stylistic manner lets some forget that Nietzsche aims at a revaluation 
and thus his message is often based on the reversal of what is actually being 
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said. Unlike most modern-day scholars who have “redeemed” Nietzsche, Leo 
Strauss (1988: 57) blames this intentionally allusive but simultaneously often 
obnoxious language of contempt, that is so characteristic for Nietzsche, for the 
exploitation of his concepts. To my mind, Strauss seems to be saying that, in a 
sense, Nietzsche himself invited misunderstanding of his philosophy. Strauss 
himself had researched medieval Jewish and Arabic philosophy whose authors 
resorted to esoteric writing. As Mathew Sharp and Daniel Townsend (2011: 133) 
write: “[t]he premise of esoteric writing is that the author writes multi-layered 
texts. On the surface of an esoteric text are edifying teachings available to all 
readers who stumble upon the book, teachings which accommodate the author’s 
positions to the prejudices of the age. However, this esoteric layer serves to con-
ceal the author’s true, and often heterodox, views.” If Strauss rightly sensed 
Nietzsche as an esoteric writer, as Sharp and Townsend would have us believe, 
then even the subtitles of e.g. Thus spoke Zarathustra – a book for all and none 
or Human all too human – a book for free spirits – are not surprising at all. 
They themselves herald the esoteric content of the books. However, when 
speaking of the esoteric Nietzsche one sees that the surface structure is far from 
“edifying teachings”, it is rather built on biting criticism. Only behind the veil of 
loathing hides the actual energy and affirmation of life. Yet the problem is that 
many would not go beyond the surface and would remain forever in the sphere 
of loathing. So in this sense I agree with Struass that Nietzsche is partly at fault 
when it comes to the understanding of his writings. Very often Nietzsche criti-
cizes, using bitter ad hominen arguments, but at the same time gives few test-
able or viable alternatives. Then again, it is also worth observing that the lack of 
alternatives does not cancel the righteousness of Nietzsche’s criticism as such.  
As can be seen, the confusing nature of Nietzschean scholarship 
emerges already at the very basic level of approaching the texts. The instability 
of Nietzsche’s writing along with his elusive style make an attempt at a unified 
and single reading of his body of thought really problematic. On the other hand, 
though, for the inquisitive minds of philosophers and scholars Nietzsche consti-
tutes an irresistible temptation and an ambitious challenge. So for professional 
and experienced thinkers Nietzsche becomes an intellectual imperative. No 
wonder, the number and significance of these respective nietzscheanisms is 
growing rapidly. However, though the field of potential inquiry widens con-
stantly, for someone who wants to methodically utilize the heritage of nietz-
scheanism, the situation might emerge as the infinite cosmic black hole. In the 
midst of such varied interpretations one is faced with a need to make a choice – 
or, in other words, an academic commitment. Ashley Woodward gives a very 
telling and apt title to the introduction to the collection of articles on the inter-
pretation and reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy – Interpreting Nietzsche. 
Woodward (2011: 1) opens her discussion on the multiplicity of nietzschanisms 
by posing a question: “Whose Nietzsche?”. This title question captures the es-
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sence of conflicting emotions that anyone approaching Nietzsche for academic 
purposes inescapably feels. Having realized that there is indeed no single 
Nietzsche, one has to choose whose Nietzscheanism to follow. So there is no 
wonder that for a young scholar investigating the early modern period and an 
upstart philosopher, the multiplicity of stances and diversity of Nietzschean-
isms is a source of wonder but also a kind of a scholarly angst. A crucial ques-
tion looms on the horizon: how can one put nietzscheanism through a creative 
sieve in order to choose what benefits the study of Shakespeare? In order to 
make an informed methodological choice, it seems necessary to cast a cursory 
look at various relationships scholars have developed with the Nietzschean text.  
Numerous scholars who approach Nietzsche are themselves philoso-
phers of their own right who creatively tackle his philosophy by challenging it 
and improving it or, in other words, building up on what is left unfinished or 
unexplained in his writings. In these cases Nietzsche often becomes a philo-
sophical companion or a springboard for further, deepened reflection. 
Georges Bataille (1976: 640) claimed that Nietzsche was his “main company 
on earth” and thus Bataille’s philosophy is, in many respects, more than just 
an explication of a Nietzschean text but rather a continuation of Nietzsche’s 
thought. Giles Deleuze’s seminal Nietzsche and philosophy, though very sys-
tematic, is nonetheless hard to grasp for non-expert readers. As Jon Roffe 
(2011: 67) explains “it’s often difficult to know exactly who is speaking. In the 
case of Nietzsche and philosophy, for example, is it Nietzsche himself (that is, 
is Deleuze merely presenting Nietzsche’s own views)? Is it Nietzsche refracted 
through a Deleuzean lens? Or perhaps Deleuze’s own views, dressed in a 
Nietzschean framework?”. So, as can be seen, both Bataille’s and Deleuze’s 
readings are intensely personal. As it seems, both philosophers aim at a better 
understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy but, at the same time, they provide 
their own interpretation of his works. Their philosophical output, similarly to 
other nietzscheanists like Jacques Derrida or Luce Irigaray, constitutes a cre-
ative metamorphosis of Nietzsche which often serves further and separate 
philosophical goals. Philosophers of Derrida’s, Bataille’s or Irigaray’s standing 
often approach Nietzsche in order to tackle his controversial heritage. One 
could even suspect that, more than often, they personally attempt at surpass-
ing the power of his philosophy. As David Pickus (2007: 5) suggests, following 
Nietzsche’s own “psychohistory”, the history of philosophy and its scholar-
ship, including secondary literature on Nietzsche, are also subject to the me-
chanisms of human psychology and thus expressions of the will to power. 
Anyhow, the works which aim at going beyond Nietzsche, insightful as they 
can be, do not seem systematic enough to constitute a solid methodological 
basis for the use of Nietzscheanism as a functional tool in literary analysis. As 
it appears one should be on the look-out for those monographs that aim spe-
cifically at Nietzsche explication with maximum objectivity. 
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When the methodological field of inquiry is thus limited three names of 
distinguished philosophers/scholars come to mind, namely, Martin Heidegger, 
Karl Jaspers and finally Walter Kaufmann. These three authors form, as op-
posed to French thinkers like Derrida or Bataille, what I would call, the German 
wing of Nietzscheanism. Heidegger and Jaspers were both independent philo-
sophers linked with existentialism and they definitely read Nietzsche in the 
spirit of existentialism. Martin Heidegger will definitely forever remain the first 
thinker who heralded Nietzsche a philosopher (Ryan 2011: 5). As Sean Ryan 
(2011: 5) writes: “[w]ith Heidegger’s interpretation, Nietzsche no longer appears 
solely as a psychologist, moralist, and cultural critic, as he was to previous 
thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey, not a precursor to the ideologies of National 
Socialism, as he was to official Nazi interpreters such as Heidegger’s contempo-
rary Alfred Baümler, but a thinker of the same rank as Plato and Aristotle, Kant 
and Hegel.” So, the world owns the reintroduction of the Nietzschean canon to 
the mainstream of philosophy to Martin Heidegger, who himself confronted and 
tackled Nietzsche throughout his entire career as a scholar and philosopher. 
Heidegger (1998: 9) grounds the complexity of Nietzschean philosophy in its 
affinity with the plight of modernity and he is the first to recognize the pitfalls of 
mythologizing or, quite the contrary, defaming Nietzsche without the proper 
understanding of his thought. Heidegger’s main line of thinking about 
Nietzsche concerns the question of metaphysics.12 Heidegger reads Nietzsche as 
the last great metaphysician, thus initiating a long-standing debate on whether 
Nietzsche still belongs within the sphere of metaphysics, is ranked somewhere 
in between or is long past metaphysics. Though ground-breaking, Heidegger’s 
position has been numerously contested by other scholars. This is partly due to 
Heidegger’s vision of metaphysics in Nietzsche, but predominantly because of 
his controversial choice of material to work on. In the beginning of his two-
volume book on Nietzsche, Heidegger (1998: 9,13) announces that his aim is to 
describe the basic stance of Nietzsche (Grundstellung) on the Western history 
of thought, at the same time suggesting that this Nietzschean stance never as-
sumed its final shape as Nietzsche did not manage to formulate his opus mag-
num. For this reason, Heidegger treats the unpublished notes of Nietzsche as a 
basis of the hidden, not fully conscious message of the Nietzschean text. This 
unfortunate decision on the part of Heidegger is a source of the greatest criti-
cism levelled at the philosopher, whose take on Nietzsche is thus treated as “a 
singular misreading” (Ryan 2011: 5). I would argue that such an attitude does 
  
12 For more details, see: Heidegger, Martin. [1961] 1998. Nietzsche tom 1 [Nietzsche  
vol. 1]. (translated by Andrzej Gniazdowski, Piotr Graczyk, Wawrzyniec Rymkiewicz, Ma-
teusz Werner, Cezary Wodziński) Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN. The Part enti-
tled Will to power as art, Chapter: Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker (7-11) and Part 
entitled Will to power as knowledge, Chapter: Nietzsche as a thinker of fulfilling meta-
physics (475-482) (translated by me from the Polish version of Heidegger’s book).  
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not do justice to Heidegger though I do agree with Ryan (2011: 9) when he 
claims that: “the decision to treat as pivotal a collection of notes not published 
during Nietzsche’s lifetime is a refusal to take seriously neither Nietzsche’s 
achievement as a writer nor the general problems for philosophy of the question 
of style.” It does not seem right to treat as central the notes that Nietzsche him-
self discarded in order to work on other subjects. Also, knowing Nietzsche’s 
almost obsessive attention to details when it comes to stylistic choices it seems 
highly improper to give precedence to notes that Nietzsche kept on revising and 
rewriting. Despite its shortcomings, Heidegger’s monograph nevertheless con-
stitutes a helpful commentary on the unpublished material and opens a discus-
sion on the unrealized potential of the Nietzschean philosophy. In a sense it 
starts the on-going dialogue with Nietzsche, later taken up by Jaspers and 
Kaufmann.  
It indeed seems interesting to look at Kaufmann’s and Jaspers’s mono-
graphs together as their two “big books” were forever linked through a personal 
strife between the authors.13 Kaufmann’s Nietzsche: philosopher, psychologist, 
Antichrist published in 1950 and Jaspers’s Nietzsche: Einführung in das 
Verständnis seines Philosophierens [Nietzsche: An Introduction to the under-
standing of his philosophical activity] from 1935, despite their relative age, re-
main among the most influential, still currently used, monographs. Their ad-
vantage over other works on Nietzsche lies in the fact that, as Pickus (2007: 5) 
writes, they “challenged the reader not to settle for anything less than a full 
Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche’s work and personality”. As mentioned, 
Heidegger’s work places Nietzsche predominantly in the sphere of metaphysics, 
the area that was especially close to Heidegger’s heart.14 Jaspers and Kaufamnn 
“clearly played decisive roles in allowing Nietzsche to be studied as a whole” 
(Pickus 2007: 6). Moreover, as Pickus (2007: 8) highlights: “Jaspers and Kauf-
mann […] although certainly philosophers in their own right, aimed to balance 
their own philosophical horizons with efforts to let Nietzsche speak directly. 
Their books, consequently, have a different character than Heidegger’s”. Their 
books are living proof of the immense work both scholars devoted to ordering 
  
13 To trace the details of the conflict between Kaufmann and Jaspers concerning read-
ing and understanding Nietzsche, see: Pickus, David. 2007. “Wishes of the heart: Walter 
Kaufmann, Karl Jaspers, and disposition in Nietzsche scholarship”, Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies, No. 33, 5-24. 
14 As a basic introduction to the Heideggerian vision of metaphysics it is worth recom-
mending his short essay entitled “The way back into the ground of metaphysics” that was 
translated into English by Walter Kaufmann and published in his anthology of existentialist 
texts Existentialism – from Dostoevsky to Sartre. See: Heidegger, Martin. [1949] 1966. 
“The way back into the ground of metaphysics”, in: Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism – 
from Dostoevsky to Sartre. Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books. 206-220. Kauf-
mann’s anthology is one of the first and most influential works of this kind introducing 
existentialist texts to the English-speaking reader. 
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and organizing the Nietzschean canon, including making amends to it after 
years of exploitation and distortion, as well as efforts to elucidate the key as-
pects of Nietzschean philosophy. As Pickus (2007: 5) claims: “[w]ithout the 
efforts of Karl Jaspers and Walter Kaufmann, serious Nietzsche scholarship 
could have been set back at least a generation”. However, it has to be noted that 
the two books constitute “rich, yet conflicting, readings of Nietzsche’s work” 
(Pickus 2007: 6). So, the status of both monographs inescapably underscores 
the elusiveness of Nietzsche’s writing. The authors very well knew about it and 
warned their readers about the deceptive accessibility of Nietzsche’s writings. 
Kaufmann (1974: 72) famously posited that:  
Nietzsche’s books are easier to read but harder to understand than those of almost 
any other thinker. If we ignore for the moment the symbolism of Zarathustra, we 
find that practically every sentence and every page of his writings presents far less 
trouble than the involved and technical periods of Kant, Hegel, and even Shoupen-
hauer. Not even the British Empiricists would seem to have written more lucidly. Yet 
grave difficulties are encountered when one tries seriously to follow Nietzsche’s 
thought. As soon as one attempts to penetrate beyond the clever epigrams and well 
turned insults to grasp their consequences and to coordinate them, one is troubled.  
Kaufmann quite explicitly warns against a too hearty and uncritical embrace of 
Nietzsche’s writings, and keeps on reminding his readers to try to see Nietzsche 
globally by meticulously reading his entire output in the original chronological 
order. Jaspers (1997b: 9) seems to agree with Kaufmann when he compares 
Nietzsche’s works to a mighty rock wall blasted into more or less hewed stones, 
yet lacking signs of any monument being erected out of these stones. The fact 
that the Nietzsche canon lies thus like a huge mountain of debris does not 
mean, according to Jaspers, that it lacks building potential. The bits and pieces 
can form a whole though they connect ambiguously (Jaspers 1997b: 9). Jaspers 
(1997a: 4), like Kaufmann, tries to persuade his readers to read Nietzsche as a 
whole rather than “yield to the fascination of the almost countless details, or 
capriciously and fortuitously select this or that item”. However, Jaspers insis-
tence on Nietzsche’s ambiguity is one of the points of contention between him 
and Kaufmann. 
Jaspers (1997b: 365), in the conclusion to his book, compares Nietzsche’s 
sentences to a mosaic that one can play with endlessly and with a degree of ten-
dentious bias. Though Jaspers (1997b: 365) points out that there is a limit to this 
endless appropriation of Nietzsche as there is a potential for a coherent whole, he 
nevertheless seems to suggests that the very whole itself lies beyond Nietzsche’s 
text and is something that philosophers and scholars, in their collective work, can 
achieve. In other words, according to Jaspers, Nietzsche’s body of thought alone is 
wrought with deficiencies and internal contradictions. Consequently, it can easily 
be misused, which is actually what happened in the case of Nazi appropriation. 
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Though Kaufmann (1980: 304-307) himself also partly blames Nietzsche’s style 
for the misuse of his philosophy, he could never agree with Jaspers that 
Nietzsche’s works were contradictory. It is this “self-contradictoriness of 
Nietzsche”, as Pickus (2007: 9) puts it, that becomes the bone of contention be-
tween the two scholars. In an insightful chapter entitled “Jaspers’ relation to 
Nietzsche” in his seminal book From Shakespeare to existentialism Kaufmann 
develops biting and passionate criticism of Jaspers, rejecting both his fundamen-
tal premise and his research method. As Kaufmann writes:  
[...] Jaspers admittedly discounts Nietzsche’s philosophy as opposed to his ‘philoso-
phising’; he refuses to take seriously overman and recurrence, will to power and subli-
mation, or any other definite concept. […] Jaspers fails, his intention notwithstanding, 
to introduce us to Nietzsche’s philosophising because he employs an untenable 
method. He makes no distinction, either in his references or in his evaluation, between 
Nietzsche’s finished works and his fragments and notebooks scribblings; generally he 
makes no distinction between early or late passages either, but disregards the dates and 
thus necessarily also Nietzsche’s intellectual development. (Kaufmann 1980: 311) 
So, as Kaufmann (1980: 305-306) puts it, Jaspers intentionally “sets us whirl-
ing”. However, this “whirling”, according to Kaufmann is not Nietzschean but 
rather Jaspersian in nature. As it seems, Jaspers fascination with Nietzschean 
supposed “ambiguity” might be driven back to Jaspers’ own background as an 
existentialist, or to be more precise the Existenz philosopher.15 Kaufmann 
(1980: 305) observes that existentialists were in general fascinated by the con-
tingency of existence and its inherently contradictory nature, and thus ambigu-
ity became Jaspers’ own premise to investigate Nietzsche. So, according to Jas-
pers’ research method one should dig deep into Nietzsche to uncover the neces-
sary contradictions which are inescapably part of life itself. In this light, Kauf-
man emerges a more reliable Nietzschan scholar, who, being also an important 
theoretician of existentialism, is capable of distancing himself from the texts 
under scrutiny. So, being an outsider, Kaufmann remains relatively objective, 
always leaving out his own philosophical stance. Thus, in my opinion, despite 
the passage of time and the arrival of new studies of Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is 
his monograph that remains an authoritative secondary source. Obviously, if, 
following David Pickus, monographs on Nietzsche are indeed always written 
within a hidden agenda, then Kaufmann’s books are not fault-free.  
Alexander Nehamas (1985: 15), an author of a fairly recent study 
Nietzsche – life as literature – points out that Kaufmann was “determined to 
  
15 For more information, see: Jaspers, Karl. [1941] 1966. “Existenzphilosophie”, in: 
Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism – from Dostoevsky to Sartre. Cleveland and New York: 
Meridian Books. 131-205. The essay provided in Kaufmann’s anthology constitutes a com-
prehensive yet accessible introduction to Jaspers’ own philosophy of Existenz.  
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show that Nietzsche’s aphorisms are ultimately unified, that behind them ‘there is 
a whole philosophy.’ […] Kaufmann’s is an effort to find an underlying unity, at 
least of method and attitude”. Hence, Kaufmann’s methodological premise is fun-
damentally opposite to Jaspers and other existentialists. His aim at a communica-
tion of the total coherence of the Nietzschean message seems to result in his negli-
gence to cater for certain unclear aspects like e.g. the feminine in Nietzsche, as 
well as a degree of relative idealization of certain Nietzschean concepts.16 Kauf-
mann’s Nietzsche eventually emerges a refined humanist, which, when reading 
Nietzsche, at moments seems to be counter-intuitive. Scholars of the second half 
of the twentieth century, including Nehemas, more often contest the neat and 
ordered vision of Kaufmann. Nevertheless, for an unprofessional philosopher and 
reader of Nietzsche Kaufmann’s book provides necessary structure and order for 
the huge ocean of Nietzschean texts. Being aware of Kaufmann’s slight idealiza-
tion, a responsible and cautious reader will make the most of his elucidation of 
Nietzsche. Simultaneously, having scrutinized the highly diversified plain of 
Nietzschean scholarship and having realized the multiplicity of potential res-
ponses and relations philosophers and scholars develop with Nietzsche, one al-
ways comes back to Kaufmann’s organizing principle ruling his Nietzsche mono-
graph. For this reason I do believe that it is best to make Kaufmann’s Nietzsche: 
Philosopher, psychologist, Antichrist as a “prime” secondary source to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. To those who may still feel unconvinced by my choice, I would like to 
highlight that Kaufmann is the most important translator of Nietzsche’s as well as 
other existentialists’ texts in the twentieth century. Along with R.J. Hollingdale, he 
translated the Nietzschean canon, and thus introduced Nietzsche to the English-
speaking reader. Kaufmann’s and Hollingdale’s English translations made 
Nietzsche’s philosophy accessible to virtually the whole world, turning a German 
philosopher into a really global philosophical phenomenon.17 I strongly believe 
that the intense engagement that is required for the process of translation makes a 
good translator also a reliable critic of the work he/she undertakes to translate. To 
my mind, this is true both about Kaufmann and Hollingdale, who first worked 
with the original Nietzsche in order to produce their translations and later their 
respective monographs on his thought. So, it is the sense of structure and internal 
order as well as an intense closeness to the Nietzschean text that make Kaufmann 
and Hollingdale the most appropriate candidates for methodological guides into 
  
16 The female/feminine question in Nietzsche emerges as one of the most complex, con-
troversial and, at the same time, potentially contradictory aspects of his philosophy. The 
body of research on the topic has grown substantially in recent years. The topic definitely 
deserves a fair and exhaustive treatment. For this reason, I would like to suspend the dis-
cussion of “female” Nietzsche until Chapter 5 – which is devoted to the “overwomen” in 
Shakespeare and Marlowe. 
17 Interestingly, Nietzsche’s inclusion into the widely-understood body of popular cul-
ture is reminiscent of Shakespeare’s global import as an international commodity. 
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Nietzsche. Hence, Kaufmann’s line of argument will be the underlying structuring 
principle behind my elucidation of Shakespearean and Marlovian “overmen” and 
“overwomen”. Hollingdale, the author of a brilliant philosophical biography of 
Nietzsche, will be used to extend or support the main line of argumentation.18 
When referring to the Nietzschean text, I will mostly be focusing on a brilliant 
series of Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy under the general supervi-
sion of Karl Ameriks and Desmond M. Clarke, which provides professionally and 
academically edited recent translations of Nietzsche by such distinguished scho-
lars and translators as Judith Norman, Carol Diethe or Adrian Del Caro. In certain 
cases where there arises a risk that a translated text may not give full credit to the 
original by Nietzsche, I intend to support my argument by references to the Ger-
man versions from the collected edition of Nietzsche’s works by the already men-
tioned Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari.19 For the needs of the present thesis, 
which is after all a study of the English Renaissance drama not a philosophical 
treatise, the above arrangement seems to be most reasonable – especially given 
the already discussed “instability” of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
At this stage, having gone through the above lengthy exposition of the 
Nietzschean scholarship, one may wonder why such a detailed outline should 
even be necessary if the final choice is limited to two or three well-known Nietz-
schean scholars. I would argue that the afore-presented introduction does not 
only serve for “navigation” purposes. The long Nietzsche-reception involves a 
great deal of distortion or evasion; however, there is no question about the vast-
ness and importance of the field. Through the engagement with various faces of 
Nietzschean scholarship one experiences the expansion of possible fields of 
inquiry and realizes the ever-progressing growth of Nietzsche as a potential 
  
18 For a good biography, see: Hollingdale, R.J. 2001. Nietzsche. (translated by 
Władysław Jeżewski). Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy. An introduction to 
Nietzsche’s philosophy worth recommending is Hollingdale, R.J. 1973. Nietzsche. London 
and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  
19 See: Colli, Giorgio and Mazzino Montinarri (eds.). 1980. Sämtliche Werke: kritische 
Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden. München: Deutscher Teaschenbuch Verlag Walter De 
Gruyter. For the original Nietzschean text, on-line sources are also highly recommended e.g. 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/ where the entire Colli/Montinarri edition can be found as 
well as digitalized versions of all documents from the Weimar Archiv established first by 
Nietzsche’s sister. It seems noteworthy to quote a fragment from the Nietzsche Source mis-
sion statement: “Nietzsche Source is a web site devoted to the publication of scholarly con-
tent on the work and life of Friedrich Nietzsche, under the editorial and scholarly direction of 
Paolo D’Iorio. The content of the site and its internet addresses are stable and can be freely 
consulted and used for scholarly purposes. The website is managed by the Association Hy-
perNietzsche, a non-profit organisation hosted at the École normale supérieure in Paris. The 
Association HyperNietzsche is a growing scholarly community of leading experts from differ-
ent countries. It promotes research on Nietzsche through conferences and scientific events. 
Its main purpose is to continue work on the edition, commentary and interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s work” (http://www.nietzschesource.org/documentation/en/home.html). 
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methodological tool. As seen, there is nowadays no single Nietzsche – if indeed 
there ever was such a unified portrayal of his thought. The immense dispersion 
of Nietzscheanism may be roughly ordered by a working division into the Ger-
man, French and Anglo-American wing of Nietzscheanism, but within these 
sub-groups scholars and philosophers are driven by different “wishes of the 
heart” (Herzenswunsch), while their research fruits go beyond solely philosoph-
ical reflection (Nietzsche, as quoted in Pickus 2007: 6). German philosophers 
like Jaspers or Heidegger developed intimate relations with Nietzschean philos-
ophy that became the seed of existentialism, which, in turn, also travelled into, 
shaped and transformed literature of the twentieth century, starting from Jean 
Paul Sartre, through Samuel Beckett and Harold Pinter to even John Fowles – 
all in some or other way linked to the existentialist thought. “The French 
Nietzsche”, in the guise of Derrida, Deleuze or Bataille, became a springboard 
for intensely personal philosophising. The Nietzsche-infused French philoso-
phising inspired the development of the Theory, whose chief exponent Michel 
Foucault is unquestionably Nietzschean in spirit. So, as can be seen, Nietzsche’s 
thought, despite its elusiveness (or maybe paradoxically thanks to it!), finds its 
way into the study of the early modern. The in-depth inquiry into the meander-
ings of modern theory unveils Nietzsche’s, so far unacknowledged, however, 
firm position. One may risk stating that behind each and every influential theo-
retician of literature there lingers the gloomy shadow of Nietzsche’s majestic 
philosophical persona. The thinkers are either haunted or obsessively fascinated 
by his contentious thought and stylised language. Some are frightened, some 
repelled – nonetheless, they feel compelled to engage with the heritage of his 
thought, even if only in an attempt to surpass it. Faced with such a conflicting 
yet rich heritage, one feels that there is a burning need to give back to Nietzsche 
what is really Nietzschean. If indeed the giant Nietzsche stands next to most of 
the acknowledged literary scholars, it is not enough to just acknowledge his 
presence there. Rather it seems more important to go back to the roots of the 
original Nietzschean thinking – or in other words – to perform a Nietzschean 
literary analysis. Ultimately one may hope that the analysis serves “both par-
ties” – it deepens and expands the analytical possibilities encapsulated in 
Nietzsche as well as brings in a new perspective to the study of the early mod-
ern. The aim of this dissertation is to apply Nietzsche’s ideas to the study of 
ambition in the early modern plays of Shakespeare and Marlowe. However, 
knowing that Nietzsche was a very erudite and multi-perspective thinker, he 
naturally held views on the Renaissance and Shakespeare. Having finally 
worked through one’s way towards a fairly stabilised method, it seems worth-
while to cast a glance at the vision of the Renaissance and Shakespeare that 
Nietzsche presented in his own writings. It is important to note that for 
Nietzsche literature as much as life constituted a kind of laboratory for the psy-
chological analysis of human motivations and behaviours. Nietzsche occasional-
Philosophical Shakespeare … 59 
ly makes insightful comments on the Renaissance, which often run parallel to 
his philosophical reflections. Moreover, in The birth of tragedy he emerges as 
an innovative theoretician of tragedy. For these reasons it seems necessary to 
investigate the vision of the Renaissance that Nietzsche himself held. 
1.6. The Nietzschean vision of the Renaissance  
and Shakespeare 
Nietzsche begun his academic career as a classical philologist, and even long 
after he had moved into the practice of philosophy it was Ancient Greece which 
provided him with an ever inspiring ideal of a creative singular existence as well 
as an “agonistic” social structure far surpassing, in his view, the modern model 
of social relations. Nevertheless, Nietzsche, being an erudite and naturally in-
quisitive thinker, ventured to comment on historical periods as well as litera-
tures other than the Ancient. In the extensive Nietzsche canon one can find 
several instances where Nietzsche discusses acclaimed early-modern figures e.g. 
Martin Luther, Michel de Montaigne, Francis Bacon and William Shakespeare. 
In comparison with other figures and periods prominent in the aphorisms, the 
Renaissance does not necessarily stand out. Nonetheless, the firmness and deci-
siveness in Nietzsche’s comments on the early modern make one believe that he 
had a well-established belief on the significance of the Renaissance in the cul-
tural history of Europe. It is important to note, however, that Nietzsche’s views 
on the Renaissance to an extent were, unlike many of his later original insights, 
a product of his personal acquaintance with Jacob Burckhardt and a part of a 
wider phenomenon present in Germany at the close of the nineteenth century.  
From 1869 onwards Nietzsche worked at the University in Basel where 
he developed an acquaintance with Jacob Burckhardt, a much older professor 
and the author of a ground-breaking book The civilization of the Renaissance in 
Italy. As Julian Young (2010: 103) suggests, Burckhardt hugely influenced 
Nietzsche who “came to worship him, not only as a towering intellect but also as 
a great teacher and great human being.” Though Nietzsche obviously longed for 
intimacy with Burckhardt, the latter seems to have treated him with relative 
distance. There is no question about the substantial degree of psychological 
influence that Burckhardt exerted on Nietzsche. In terms of intellectual devel-
opment, however, the issue seems to be slightly more complicated. As Kauf-
mann suggests, it is really hard to say who actually influenced whom. He (1975: 
28) summarizes the dilemma by saying that: “[t]his problem has never been 
solved conclusively – but it is hardly very important: for it appears that neither 
of them was detracted from his own path or greatly helped by the other, and the 
ideas of each can be explained in terms of his own background.” So, as Kauf-
mann posits, looking globally at the Nietzsche canon it seems that Burckhardt 
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had little impact on the thinker’s development. However, when one looks close-
ly at Burckhardt’s book on Renaissance Italy and compares its message with 
some of Nietzsche’s views, the picture does not seem to be that clear any longer. 
Referring to the Renaissance, there exists substantial material to suspect a de-
gree of mutual influence.20 Also, in terms of their opinions on Ancient Greece, 
the minds of Burckhardt and Nietzsche ran parallel. Jacob Burckhardt, along 
with the historian Jules Michelet, is believed to be responsible for the populari-
zation of the term “Renaissance” first proposed by Giorgio Vasari to speak of a 
group of Italian artists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries (Walter-Busch 
2012: 196). With the publication of the 1860-book The civilization of the Re-
naissance in Italy, Burckhardt is credited for the proposal of the notion of Re-
naissance subjectivity, which set the tone for the studies of the Renaissance for 
almost an entire century to come. Even nowadays when attempting to disman-
tle subjectivity as illusory, the critics refer to the most-often quoted passage 
from the book, where Burckhardt heralds the re-awakening of human indivi-
duality in Italy from its medieval slumbers. He writes:  
[i]n the Middle Ages both sides of human consciousness – that which was turned 
within as that which was turned without – lay dreaming or half awake beneath a 
common veil. The veil was woven of faith, illusion and childish prepossession, 
through which the world and history were seen as clad in strange hues. Man was 
conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family or corporation 
– only through some general category. In Italy this veil first melted into air; an ob-
jective treatment and consideration of the state and of all the things of this world be-
came possible. The subjective side at the same time asserted itself with correspond-
ing emphasis; man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such. 
(Burckhardt 2004: 98)  
It is crucial to note that Burckhardt’s notion of subjectivity has nothing to do 
with the serene vision of the Italian Renaissance as the epoch of artists and a 
peaceful revival of Ancient patterns. Quite the contrary, in his book early-
Renaissance Italy is a seat of constant, bloody squabbles for power and influ-
ence between viscous noble family members, as well as a sudden rise of the 
  
20 Detailed accounts of the possible mutual interdependencies between Jacob Burck-
hardt and Friedrich Nietzsche worth recommending are: Von Martin, Alfred. 1942. Nietz-
sche und Burckhardt. München: Verlag Ernst Reinhardt. or Walter-Busch, Emil. 2012. 
Burckhardt und Nietzsche im Revolutionszeitalter. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag. Wal-
ter-Busch’s book is an interesting work as it is based on the newest research in the topic. 
The author points out that the previous authors writing in the 1930s and 1940s lacked suffi-
cient freedom of expression to pursue the topics at liberty. For instance, Von Martin saw 
Burckhardt’s humanism as a counterbalance to the misunderstood Nietzschean philosophy. 
This idea did not escape the notice of the Gestapo who in 1943 burned his two books about 
Burckhardt (Walter-Busch 2012: 8). 
Philosophical Shakespeare … 61 
condotierre “who, whatever may have been his origin, raised himself to the po-
sition of an independent ruler” (Burckhardt 2004: 30-31). Burckhardt sees the 
viscous political circumstances as requiring the utmost adaptability skills and 
energy from the ruler himself, but also his circle. He revels in the descriptions of 
gory acts of barbarity on the part of Italian princes and lords, but at the same 
time he sees these extreme conditions as fertile ground for the development of 
human singularity and, thus, as the seed of artistic creativity. He calls the state 
“the object of art”, and in his narrative, ruthless politics goes hand in hand with 
individualism. As he points out:  
[d]espotism, as we have already seen, fostered in the highest degree of individuality 
not only of the tyrant or condotierre himself, but also of the men whom he protected 
or used as his tools – the secretary, minister, poet and companion. These people 
were forced to know all the inward resources of their own nature, passing or perma-
nent; and their enjoyment of life was enhanced and concentrated by the desire to ob-
tain the greatest satisfaction from a possibly very brief period of power and influence 
(Burckhardt 2004: 99).  
In his account, a certain vision of moral relativity is conducive to the increase of 
power and creativity. 
Burckhardt’s portrayal of moral relativism in the Italian Renaissance, 
understood as an epoch of the strong, is reminiscent of the Nietzschean vision. 
In one of the fragments in Nietzsche’s Nachlass one reads: “Was macht denn 
die Überlegenheit der Kultur gegen die Unkultur aus? Der Renaissance z.B. 
gegen das Mittelalter? – Immer nur Eins: das große Quantum zugestandener 
Immoralität” (Nietzsche 2013).21 In Nietzsche’s view, it is a degree of immorali-
ty that decides on the creative potential of a person or an entire period. The 
“quantum of immorality” or the positioning of one “beyond good and evil” stirs 
greater energy and enables one to grow. So Nietzsche, possibly following Burck-
hardt, also credits the Renaissance for the introduction of individualism when, 
in Human, all too human, he idealizes the period by saying:  
[t]he Italian Renaissance contained within it all the positive forces to which we owe 
modern culture: liberation of thought, disrespect for authorities, victory of education 
over the arrogance of ancestry, enthusiasm for science and the scientific past of 
mankind, unfettering of the individual, a passion for truthfulness and an aversion to 
appearance and mere effect (which passion blazed forth in a whole host of artistic 
characters who, in an access of moral rectitude, demanded of themselves perfection 
in their work and nothing but perfection); indeed, the Renaissance possessed posi-
  
21 The passage could be roughly translated as follows: “What then accounts for the su-
periority of civilization against barbarism? The Renaissance, for example, over the Middle 
Ages? – Always only one: the great quantum of the acknowledged immorality” (My transla-
tion KB).  
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tive forces which have up to now never reappeared in our modern culture with such 
power as they had then. All its blemishes and vices notwithstanding, it was the 
golden age of this millennium. (Nietzsche 2005a: 113) 
Naturally as was already presented, the research of the second half of the twen-
tieth century, including the contributions of new historicism and cultural mate-
rialism, would contest such a vision of the Renaissance. Acts of disobedience 
would be read as subversion, contained by the workings of the established sys-
tem. The individual would be lost to the social processes and overpowering ide-
ology. However, at the turn of the nineteenth century Renaissance subjectivity 
as presented in Burckhardt’s book was a new and fresh take on the period. The 
highly acute individualism attributed to Italian despots was also intriguing for 
Nietzsche when, in a truly Machiavellian manner, in Beyond good and evil, he 
praises Cesare Borgia as a fusion of lowly and sophisticated impulses. In a simi-
lar tone Burckhardt (2004: 28) sensed the Italian circumstances of moral rela-
tivity when he says that:  
[g]ood and evil lie strangely mixed together in the Italian states of the fifteenth cen-
tury. The personality of the ruler is so highly developed, often of such deep signifi-
cance, and so characteristic of the conditions and needs of the time, that to form an 
adequate moral judgment on it is no easy task.  
Both for Burckhardt and Nietzsche the moral assessment of the Renaissance is 
inconclusive. Nevertheless, the conditions of wild competition and power strug-
gle prove culturally fertile. Nietzsche seems to share Burckhardt’s ideas on indi-
viduality and he potentially borrows them and weaves them into his structure of 
der Übermensch. Similarly, Nietzsche’s belief in the creative potential of con-
flict seems to be of Burckhardtian origin. Burckhardt naturally connects the 
flourishing quality of Italian art with the revival of Ancient texts. He writes:  
[t]o the discovery of the outward world the Renaissance added a still greater 
achievement, by first discerning and bringing to light the full, whole nature of man. 
The period, as we have seen, first gave the highest development to individuality, and 
then led the individual to the most zealous and thorough study of himself in all 
forms and under all conditions. Indeed, the development of personality is essentially 
involved in the recognition of it in oneself and in others. Between these two great 
processes our narrative has placed the influence of ancient literature because the 
mode of conceiving and representing both the individual and human nature in gen-
eral was defined and coloured by that influence. But the power of conception and 
representation lay in the age and in the people. (Burckhardt 2004: 199) 
So as can be seen, in Burckhardt’s terms, the ancients profoundly influenced the 
development of individualism, but the creativity was inherent in the people 
amidst the conflicts and struggle of their times. Such an embrace of conflict as a 
source of intense creativity is an underlying motif of Nietzsche’s The birth of 
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tragedy, where one encounters the clash of Dionysian and Appolonian elements 
as the source of power in Ancient Greek tragedy. In later Nietzschean texts the 
creative potential of the Agon – a state of competition between the most noble 
Greeks – is praised; however, it is The birth of tragedy where the motif is espe-
cially prominent. Interestingly, the book was written in the Basel years of 
Nietzsche’s life, during the time when he might have been under the spell of 
Burckhardt’s brilliant intellect.22 As Kaufmann (1992: 297) summarizes the 
ultimate message of The birth of tragedy: tragedies “suggest to us that life and 
the world are beautiful in spite of all the suffering, cruelty, and terrors of exis-
tence. […] We are made to feel that suffering is no insuperable objection to life, 
that even the worst misfortunes are compatible with the greatest beauty.” 
Nietzsche fuses Ancient Greek tragedy with the power and energy of individual 
existence, which is best communicated through suffering. At the same time, he 
sees competition and conflict as life powers that drive creativity. The Ancient 
Greeks, in his vision, were not peaceful and idyllically cultured citizens, but 
rather rough warriors sublimated into men of culture. Similarly, Burckhardt’s 
Italian despots, though placed beyond moral codes, emerge as the cultivators of 
higher culture. Surprisingly, Nietzsche’s book was met in an atmosphere of 
scandal. In the introduction to Nietzsche’s unfinished Philosophy in the tragic 
age of the Greeks Marianne Cowan (1998: 4) writes that:  
The Birth of Tragedy presented a view of the Greeks so alien to the spirit of the time 
and to the ideals of its scholarship that it blighted Nietzsche’s entire academic ca-
reer. It provoked pamphlets and counter-pamphlets attacking him on the grounds of 
common sense, scholarship and sanity. For a time Nietzsche, then professor of clas-
sical philology at the University of Basel, had no students in his field. His lectures 
were sabotaged by German philosophy professors who advised their students not to 
show up for Nietzsche’s courses.  
In this context, it is more surprising that Burckhardt’s book on the Renaissance, 
after all communicating an illusion-free vision of the Renaissance, was a huge 
success and never went out of print. Of course, Nietzsche’s book is actually his 
first philosophical work, thus ignoring the accepted procedures of academic 
research in the field of classical philology. Burckhardt’s The civilization of the 
Renaissance in Italy is unquestionably a historical handbook following con-
temporary academic guidelines. It is, however, important to note that is does 
communicate a philosophically-stirred message of the creative potential of con-
  
22 It is interesting to note that Burckhardt himself was a great admirer of Ancient 
Greece. He also wrote a book on the Greek culture, which was posthumously published as 
Griechische Kulturgeschichte. According to Kaufmann, the book was written much later 
than Nietzsche’s. In some of the parts Burckhardt acknowledges the influence of Nietzsche. 
For more details, see: Kaufmann, Walter. 1974. Nietzsche – philosopher, psychologist, 
Antichrist. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p. 27-28. 
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flict. Its insistence on the birth of individuality in the Renaissance Italy is also 
unquestionably a premise of historical philosophising rather than just a pure 
record of facts. The fact that Burckhardt’s book was more easily “swallowed” by 
the public may be partly explained by Burckhardt’s more optimistic or positivist 
outlook, realized in his focus on humanism. His message is, in a way, softened 
and tempered, and in such a form it becomes a basis for further idealization of 
the period by the contemporary reading public. However, it is definitely the 
spirit of individuality, power struggle and moral relativity that connects Burck-
hardt’s and Nietzsche’s understanding of the Renaissance. 
As mentioned, the revived interest in the period of the Renaissance, which 
can be seen in Nietzsche’s commentary on the period becomes eventually a part of 
a bigger phenomenon. As Emil Walter-Busch (2012: 196-197) points out already 
around 1841 Heinrich Heine wrote with nostalgia about the Renaissance and 
longed for a new rebirth. However, it is Jacob Burckhardt and Jules Michelet who 
authorized the term “Renaissance” and inaugurated a change of atmosphere 
around the period. Around the turn of the century one could already speak of a 
certain “Renaissancekult” in German-speaking countries, expressed in the use of a 
new term “Renaissancismus”, an amalgam of “Renaissance” and “Klassizismus” 
[Classicism]. So Heine, whom Nietzsche (2006c: 91) extols in Ecce Homo as the 
one who “provided [him] with the highest concept of lyric poetry” is partly respon-
sible for the birth of the cult. Surprisingly, next to the aforementioned acclaimed 
historians – Burckhardt and Michelet – the name of Friedrich Nietzsche becomes 
associated with the new fashion circling round the revival of Renaissance ideals. 
As Walter-Busch underscores, Nietzsche was deemed “a prophet of ‘Renaissan-
cismus’” (Walter-Busch 2012: 196). Combining Nietzsche with the new trend can 
obviously be linked with the growth of his “mythology” after his mental break-
down. Nonetheless, the above discussion demonstrates that Nietzsche had a firm 
and decisive view of the period of Shakespeare – partly shaped by his acquain-
tance with Jacob Burckhardt, partly a product of his own philosophical reflection. 
In the course of his psycho-historical reflection he deemed the Renaissance the 
period of strong individualities born in the friction of extreme conditions and in 
the midst of an internal and external struggle for power. As it seems, Nietzsche’s 
vision of the Renaissance runs parallel to his more general reflection on human 
nature. After all, he praises the same qualities of the Renaissance men he would 
generally be in favour of, namely, free-spiritedness, mental strength in the face of 
suffering, intellectual independence etc. This in turn, makes a Nietzschean analy-
sis of Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s plays even more justified as one may suspect 
that the circumstances of the English Renaissance would suit Nietzsche’s vision of 
the Renaissance in general. In other words, the aspects of his vision on the indi-
vidual in general go hand in hand with his reflection on the early modern. Ob-
viously, the accuracy of Nietzsche’s reading of the period is a matter for another 
lengthy theoretical discussion; nevertheless, having read Nietzsche, one may be 
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sure that he himself believed the Renaissance a conducive environment for the 
development of the Overman. It is now our task to carry his reflection further and 
seek the “overman” or “overwoman” in Shakespeare or Marlowe. However, before 
that is done, it seems also interesting to cast just a cursory glance at Nietzsche’s 
utterances devoted specifically to Shakespeare. It is rather improbable that 
Nietzsche knew other Elizabethan or Jacobean playwrights, neither was he an 
expert on the English Renaissance. Yet, being an avid reader, he definitely knew 
Shakespeare’s tragedies as well as Shakespeare’s sonnets – as the selection of his 
aphorisms demonstrates. The material where he refers to those Shakespearean 
works seems worth investigating as, to my mind, it may unveil clues as to the Sha-
kespearean overhuman potential encapsulated in Shakespeare’s plays as well as 
analogous to this – Marlowe’s Übermensch. 
1.7. Nietzsche about Shakespeare  
Just as in the case of the aphorisms devoted to the Renaissance, the number of 
direct references to William Shakespeare is not astonishing in the hugeness of 
the Nietzsche canon. Nevertheless, what Nietzsche had to say about Shake-
speare is, in its entirety, rather of a praising nature. Knowing Nietzsche’s scepti-
cal and often bitingly critical method, one may say that the Shakespeare-
aphorisms are rare instances in Nietzsche’s writings where he openly expresses 
praise. What is also crucial to note is the fact that the modest number of refer-
ences to the Renaissance or Shakespeare is no proof for Nietzsche’s lack of in-
terest in the period or the author. Succinctness of the published fragments 
would rather serve to demonstrate that Nietzsche had a well-thought out view of 
Shakespeare. Along with Julius Caesar, Napoleon and Goethe, Shakespeare 
belongs to those figures who constantly recur in Nietzsche’s reflection, proving 
Nietzsche’s undying fascination with the Bard. A relatively bigger number of 
instances where Nietzsche calls Shakespeare’s name forward in his unpublished 
notes also suggests that the playwright and his works presented Nietzsche with 
a riddle, a kind of an enigma that haunted him throughout his philosophical life. 
Nietzsche mentions Shakespeare as early as Autumn 1869, in connection with 
his reflections on Ancient tragedy. One of the last mentions of Shakespeare can 
be found in his philosophical autobiography Ecce Homo, prepared for publica-
tion and dated the second of January 1889 (Nietzsche 2013).23 The beginning of 
  
23 There are in total 91 fragments where the name of William Shakespeare is mentioned 
in the Digitale Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Friedrich Nietzsche, Digital critical edition of the 
complete works and letters, based on the critical text by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Ber-
lin/New York, de Gruyter 1967-, edited by Paolo D’Iorio). The majority of references come 
from Nachlass (the so called Nachgelassene Fragmente), unpublished notes collected by 
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January 1889 is also the time of Nietzsche’s mental break-down from which he 
never recovered and which ultimately led to his death. So it is evident that 
Shakespeare accompanied him from the very beginning of his philosophical 
path up to the very end.  
With his characteristic disarming megalomania, in Ecce Homo 
Nietzsche documents his artistic and philosophical development. Trying to get 
down to the bottom of his intellectual roots he refers to the literature, music and 
art that shaped him and accompanied him throughout his life. Nietzsche 
(2006c: 89) confesses that literature has an alleviating and healing role as it 
“recuperates” him from his “seriousness”. Among the few books that travelled 
with him he enumerates Shakespeare, whom he calls “a wild genius” (Nietzsche 
2006c: 90). I would argue that from the few instances where Nietzsche does 
comment on Shakespeare or his works, one may sense an existence of a creative 
bond between him and the playwright. Nietzsche seems to be pleading an artis-
tic brotherhood with Shakespeare when he prophetically fears his own “great-
ness”. In Ecce Homo (2006c: 143-144) he writes:  
I know my lot. One day my name will be connected with the memory of something 
tremendous – a crisis such as the earth has never seen, the deepest collision of con-
science, a decision made against everything that has been believed, demanded, held 
sacred so far. I am not a human being, I am dynamite. – And yet I am not remotely 
the religion-founding type – religions are the business of the rabble, I need to wash 
my hands after coming into contact with religious people... I do not want any ‘true 
believers’, I think I am too malicious to believe in myself, I never speak to the 
masses... I have a real fear that someday people will consider me holy: you will guess 
why I am publishing this book beforehand; it is supposed to stop any nonsense as far 
as I am concerned... I do not want to be a saint, I would rather be a buffoon... per-
haps I am a buffoon... [original German word: Hanswurst] 
As can be seen, Nietzsche understands the appealing nature of his works but, at 
the same time, he knows how easily misunderstood his words can be. For this 
reason he frames himself as “the buffoon”, partly to discourage all-too hasty 
believers, partly to alleviate the profoundness of his own message in the final 
attempt at an affirmation of life. Shakespeare’s works definitely emerge for him 
as the highest forms of the love of life he himself professes. So he weaves in his 
own future greatness with that of Shakespeare when he claims:  
[w]hen I look for the highest formula for Shakespeare, the only thing I can find is 
that he conceived the type of Caesar. You cannot guess at this sort of thing, – either 
you are it or you are not. Great poets create only from their own reality – to the point 
where they cannot stand their work anymore afterwards... Whenever I glance 
                                                                                                                                        
Nietzsche throughout his entire life. To see all the references, go to: http://www. 
nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB (date of access: 05.11.2013). 
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through my Zarathustra, I walk around the room for half an hour, sobbing uncon-
trollably. – Shakespeare is the most poignant reading I know: how much suffering 
does it take for somebody to need to play the clown [original German word: Han-
swurst]! – Have people understood Hamlet? It is no doubt, it is certainty that drives 
people mad... But you need to be deep, an abyss, a philosopher, to feel this way... 24 
(Nietzsche 2006c: 91-92)  
One can see that Nietzsche places himself on an equal level with Shakespeare – 
but the common denominator is not only the greatness of his and Shakespeare’s 
works but also a shared anguish that finds its vent in the transfiguration of 
thought into art. Moreover, Nietzsche does not only see Shakespeare as an artist 
but predominantly as a philosopher, who builds his intellectual empire on the 
debris of his personal suffering. Having a little knowledge on Nietzsche’s personal 
life, one is tempted to suggest that he identifies his own fate with the presumably 
suffering and overly sensitive artist-philosopher. For Nietzsche Shakespeare poses 
a mystery – he inquires about the man that lurks behind genius. In Shakespeare 
he senses rivalry with “his bad angel” or a battle with his own weaknesses, which 
are both inherent in the process of artistic creation. When Nietzsche performs his 
“psychoanalysis” on Shakespeare, at the same time admiring the character of 
Brutus from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, one can read in-between the lines about 
his own intellectual battles for independence. He exclaims:  
[w]hat is all of Hamlet’s melancholy compared to that of Brutus! And perhaps 
Shakespeare knew the latter as he knew the former – through – first hand experi-
ence! Maybe he also had his dark hour and his dark angel, like Brutus! But whatever 
such similarities and secret references there may have been: before the whole figure 
and virtue of Brutus, Shakespeare threw himself to the ground and felt unworthy 
and distant – he wrote the evidence for his own tragedy. (Nietzsche 2008: 94)  
  
24 In both quotations I am referring to, Nietzsche uses the same word Hanswurst 
(clown, fool but also a popular comic figure presented by touring theatres of the 16th and 
17th centuries), so it is indeed a strange choice on the part of the translator to use two 
different equivalents within the space of the same work where Nietzsche evidently aimed 
at a connection between the two thoughts. He both sees Shakespeare-the-playwright and 
Shakespeare-the-actor as well as himself as “Hanswurst”. Moreover, in the context of the 
present dissertation a note on the word seems reasonable as the character of “Han-
swurst” relegates us to the world of the 16th and 17th century popular theatre in the Ger-
man-speaking world. “Hanswurst” was traditionally a coarse type of a character provid-
ing the audience with crude humour. Johann Christoph Gottsched and Friederike Caro-
line Neuber “banished” the character form the stage in order to refine comedy, but their 
attempts met with resistance. However, it is believed that the dispute marks a shift from 
improvised popular comedy to a more ‘fixed’ bourgeois theatre (Jürs-Munby 2007: 125). 
To read more see: Jürs-Munby, Karen. 2007. “Hanswurst and Herr Ich: Subjection and 
Abjection in Enlightenment Censorship of the Comic Figure”, in: New Theatre Quarterly 
2, vol. 23. 124-135. 
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Kaufmann sees Nietzsche’s admiration for Brutus in Shakespeare as being in-
dicative of his personal battle for intellectual independence.25 It may seem naïve 
to try to read Nietzsche’s philosophical journey through his own personal up-
heavals; nonetheless, the tempestuous relationship and subsequent break with 
Richard Wagner, often interpreted as the father-figure for Nietzsche, in Kauf-
mann’s view, provide an interesting interpretative key for Nietzsche’s passion-
ate engagement with this particular play (Kaufmann 1974: 36). However, in the 
context of Nietzsche’s project the two – life and philosophising – are indivisible. 
For Nietzsche, philosophy is life, while life is philosophy-incarnated. So Kauf-
mann’s track of thought is most probably correct, though without it Nietzsche’s 
vision of Shakespeare is also philosophically clear and direct. It can be read 
within a wider context of Nietzsche’s body of thinking that, after all, revolves 
around the significance of the personal development of the individual. Hence, 
one may say that Shakespeare’s highly individualised protagonists serve as a 
working laboratory for the shaping of Nietzsche’s acute individualism.  
Nietzsche’s insistence on the independence of the individual is inextric-
ably linked with his theory on moral valuations. An individual in order to grow 
must be placed beyond good and evil and allow himself to listen intently to the 
wild sound of his instincts and passions. No wonder, then, that what Nietzsche 
admires in Shakespeare’s plays is the intensity with which the playwright por-
trays the characters’ emotional lives. In Daybreak, commenting on Macbeth, 
Nietzsche (2006a: 141) writes that poets “especially Shakespeare, are ena-
moured of the passions”. Later in the same work he (2006a: 221) claims: “if one 
is Shakespeare, one is satisfied only with being dissolved into images of the 
most passionate life”. In Human, all too human Nietzsche observes an intellec-
tual parallel between the works of Shakespeare and Montaigne. He again 
attributes Shakespeare’s ability to capture the storm of passion to the author’s 
own supposed intensely passionate life. What is more, he acknowledges Sha-
kespeare’s capacity to infuse his characters with a philosophical reflection that 
is a product of an intensely emotional life. Nietzsche states that:  
Shakespeare reflected a great deal on the passions and from his temperament 
probably had very intimate access to many of them (dramatists are in general some-
what wicked men). But, unlike Montaigne, he was incapable of discoursing on them; 
instead of which he placed observations about the passions into the mouths of im-
passioned characters: a practice which, though counter to nature, makes his plays so 
full of ideas they make all others seem empty and can easily arouse in us a repug-
nance to them. (Nietzsche 2005a: 91) 
  
25 The notion of intellectual independence (or free-spiritedness) proves profoundly im-
portant in Nietzsche’s philosophy. I will pay more attention to this issue as well as 
Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the Shakespearean Brutus in my analysis of Julius Caesar 
in Chapter 3. 
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So, as evidently seen, Nietzsche sees Shakespeare’s superiority over other 
dramatists in Shakespeare’s portrayal of convincing, passionate lives. In his 
aphorisms Nietzsche praises the construction of such “impassioned characters” 
as Macbeth, Othello and Brutus (For instance: Brutus in The gay science Book 
II Aphorism 98, Macbeth in Daybreak Book IV Aphorism 240, Othello in Hu-
man, all too human Section three: “Religious life” – Aphorism 125). In each 
instance, Nietzsche uses Shakespeare’s protagonists in order to render or sup-
port his line of argumentation. Apart from the plays, in Daybreak Nietzsche 
also proves his knowledge of the Shakespearean Sonnets, when he takes advan-
tage of the poems to communicate his philosophical message. He (2006a: 45) 
admires “the courage of Shakespeare to confess his Christian gloominess”. In 
his handling of the Sonnets, Nietzsche takes up a motif characteristic for himself 
of the Christian supposedly pious denial of bodily passions. Throughout his 
entire philosophical career Nietzsche bashes Christianity for its counter-
intuitive rejection of natural instincts such as sexual desire, which so often is 
seen as an evil temptation instead of a source of energy and inspiration. In 
Nietzsche’s vision, the cold, emasculated, and finally sick Christian morality 
breeds “gloominess” and “diabolizes” Eros, making it a part of a famous trinity 
of human earthly enemies; the world, the Devil and the flesh. Nietzsche writes:  
[t]he passions become evil and malicious if they are regarded as evil and malicious. 
Thus Christianity has succeeded in transforming Eros and Aphrodite – great powers 
capable of idealisation – into diabolical kobolds and phantoms by means of the tor-
ments it introduces into the consciences of believers whenever they are excited sexu-
ally. Is it not dreadful to make necessary and regularly recurring sensations into a 
source of inner misery, and in this way to want to make inner misery a necessary and 
regularly recurring phenomenon in every human being! (Nietzsche 2006a: 45) 
According to Nietzsche, Shakespeare through his cult of bodily passions in the 
Sonnets makes his readers acutely aware of this “Christian” gloominess. In his 
immediate context, such a depiction of the passions requires the utmost courage 
from Shakespeare, which Nietzsche so appreciates. Shakespeare emerges as a 
free spirit who is implicitly capable of criticizing the limiting circumstances of 
his existence. Hence, in the eyes of Nietzsche (2005a: 68), Shakespeare belongs 
to an artistic hall of fame, along with Aeschylus, Aristophanes and Goethe – the 
poets – who all poetically and aesthetically revelled in their portrayal of the 
guardians of morality – the Gods – but who themselves must have been “pro-
foundly unreligious”. According to Nietzsche, great poets, or great artists in 
general, see popular belief as “horrible superstition” (Nietzsche 2005a: 68). By 
reading Shakespeare as an atheist, or at best as a sceptic, Nietzsche opens up a 
precursory discussion on the moral message of Shakespeare’s plays outside 
Christian valuations. Nietzsche’s atheistic perception of Shakespeare is taken up 
later by Kaufmann (1980: 4), who seems to be echoing Nietzsche when he says:  
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[w]e have been told that Shakespeare was a Christian. Some say that he was a Prot-
estant; others he was a Catholic. Some say that he extolled the Christian virtues. 
Faith? Hardly. Hope? Certainly not. But love, of course. In the end, the whole sug-
gestion is reducible to the absurd assumption that a man who celebrates love must 
have been a Christian. […] Shakespeare is closer to Goethe than he is to Luther, 
Aquinas, or the Gospels – and still closer to Sophocles. (Kaufmann 1980: 4) 
Contrary to the views held by the new historicists or cultural materialists Kauf-
mann capitalizes on the earth-bound message of Shakespeare’s plays that, 
above all, celebrate life in its entirety – including both suffering and pleasure. In 
this respect, Nietzsche would also agree to count Shakespeare into the ranks of 
life affirmers. As Kaufmann summarizes:  
Shakespeare is – at this point, too – far closer to Socrates and Nietzsche, to Aristotle and 
Goethe than he is to the evangelists or St. Augustine, to Aquinas, Calvin, Kierkegaard, or 
T.S. Eliot. His work stands as a monument of a tradition that is frequently forgotten to-
day, and it celebrates the riches of the world without God. (Kaufmann 1980: 22) 
The absence or silencing of God in Shakespeare’s plays and poetry is not neces-
sarily a consequence of the appraisal of passions. It seems to be the other way 
round; it is the questioning of the moral metaphysical imperative that brings 
about the embrace of the earthly emotions. As Nietzsche would hint in his re-
flections on Shakespeare, there is an entirely separate moral dynamics behind 
the great artistry of the Elizabethan playwright.  
A closer analysis of the “Shakespeare aphorisms” allows one to see that 
it is not only the portrayal of the passions in Shakespeare that makes Nietzsche 
praise the poet and the playwright so much. Nietzsche seems to be admiring 
Shakespeare’s investment in the passions on a far more philosophical level. An 
indebtedness to active instinct-driven existence is indicative of a free-
spiritedness, while the latter is a measure of the individual’s greatness. The cre-
ative transfiguration of the instincts requires going beyond the accepted codes 
of conduct – so the characters of Shakespeare who let themselves be carried 
away by their passions are driven by an entirely different morality. This differ-
ent moral outlook seems to be pushing one into a conflict with the accepted 
modes of behaviour held by the majority, but it is the hot-temperedness of the 
great man that lets him be devoured by passion. Reflecting on Shakespeare’s 
Othello and Sophocles’ Ajax, Nietzsche (2005a: 43) comments: “[p]assion will 
not wait; the tragic element in the life of great men often lies not in their con-
flicts with their age and with the lowness of their fellow men, but in their inabil-
ity to put off their work for a year or two years; they cannot wait.” Nevertheless, 
from Nietzsche’s conceptualization of greatness, including Shakespeare’s ge-
nius, one reads that the ingredients of an affirmative character are: free-
spiritedness, the embrace of the passions and going beyond the accepted moral 
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codex. However, transgression in Shakespeare does not have an easily sensed 
“cheap” didactic purpose – it does not serve as a warning or does not contain a 
clear-cut moral judgement. It might be indeed guilt caused by the transgression 
(e.g. of Macbeth) that drives the action of the tragedy, yet as Nietzsche (2006a: 
140) claims: “[h]e who is really possessed by raging ambition beholds this its 
image with joy; and if the hero perishes by his passion this precisely is the 
sharpest spice in the hot draught of this joy.” Transgression, even with its con-
sequences, is a source of freedom and thus energy and creativity. For this rea-
son the so called “evil” characters in Shakespeare like Macbeth or Edmund 
seem, nonetheless, most captivating. I would argue that it is because, as 
Nietzsche only hints, the plays seem to be driven by a different moral outlook 
that does not draw lines between good and evil that easily. This suspension of a 
too-hasty and simplistic moral judgement is a basis of life affirmation, which 
eventually encapsulates the essence of the tragic catharsis. Nietzsche (2006a: 
140-141) summarizes his comment on “the morality of the stage” in Shakes-
peare’s England (or maybe rather “immorality”) by saying that:  
[t]he tragic poet has just as little desire to take sides against life with his images of life! 
He cries rather: ‘it is the stimulant of stimulants, this exciting, changing, dangerous, 
gloomy and often sun-drenched existence! It is an adventure to live – espouse what 
party in it you will, it will always retain this character!’ – He speaks thus out of a rest-
less, vigorous age which is half-drunk and stupefied by its excess of blood and energy – 
out of a wickeder age than ours is: which is why we need first to adjust and justify the 
goal of a Shakespearean drama, that is to say, not to understand it. 
Kaufmann, in his reappraisal of Shakespeare, again echoes Nietzsche by saying: 
“Shakespeare’s poetry is the poetry of abundance. There is laughter in it and 
despair but no resentment or self-pity” (Kaufmann 1980: 3). So, not only do 
Shakespearean plays espouse the cult of a passionate existence but also, para-
doxically, the restraining and limiting morality of the Renaissance seems to 
emerge as fertile ground giving birth to resistance and newly-inspired creativity. 
In this judgement Nietzsche seems to be echoing Burckhardt by capitalizing on 
the Burckhardtian Renaissance individualism. However, Nietzsche builds on 
Burckhardt’s optimistic vision by reading Shakespeare as belonging to the 
“wickeder” period where resistance erupts in an excess of cruelty. This excess is 
a positive outcome, despite the negative side-effects, as it is a monument to life 
itself. Such is a context in which one should read Macbeth or King Lear through 
Nietzschean philosophy. Naturally, Nietzsche’s interpretation of Shakespeare 
and the Renaissance is a product of his own theory on moral valuations, as 
Nietzsche reads supposedly “evil” affects as stimulants to life. But as can be 
seen, Nietzsche uses examples from the Renaissance to illustrate the dynamics 
of his revaluation of morality, where the individual outside morality is the 
measuring standard.  
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Nietzsche’s focus on the greatness of the individual runs parallel with 
his views on the exclusiveness of moral judgements, as opposed to the univer-
sality of morality. Nietzsche’s ideas on the importance of rank and aristocratic 
dignity make him a contentious critic of democracy and the notion of equal 
rights. Recent scholars like Frederic Appel criticise the attempts at the utiliza-
tion of Nietzschean philosophy in modern political science. For Appel (1999: 5-
6) Nietzsche emerges as the philosopher of privilege and rank, so the cause of 
the defence of democracy seems to be totally out of Nietzsche’s philosophical 
perspective. Appel’s “aristocratic” reading of Nietzsche is critical of contempo-
rary efforts to make the philosopher an apostle of equal rights. Yet if one is to 
apply Nietzsche to the reading of a highly stratified and hierarchical early-
modern society his vision seems to be fitting just all right. Knowing Nietzsche’s 
admiration for royalty, rank and self-discipline, Nietzsche’s interest in the Sha-
kespeare authorship controversy should not really be surprising at all. With all 
the aforementioned admiration that Nietzsche held for Shakespeare, he did 
have doubts whether it was indeed the son of a glover from Stratford upon Avon 
that grew into the giant of the Elizabethan and Jacobean stage. In his writings 
there are at least a couple of instances where he refers to the fashionable theory 
at the time and his views on the matter. Around the time of writing of The twi-
light of the idols (1889) Nietzsche was interested in Francis Bacon and, as 
Kaufmann (1974: 265) suggests, he suspected Bacon to be the author of Shakes-
peare’s texts. These suspicions were also expressed in some of his unpublished 
notes which found their way into The will to power. In some of the notes from 
the Spring-Fall 1887 Nietzsche praises authors who are able to be “classical” 
and possess certain “loftiness” but at the same time communicate ideas con-
trary to popular morality. For Nietzsche (1968: 447), Shakespeare was exactly 
such an author but only on the condition that he was really Lord Bacon. In Ecce 
Homo Nietzsche (2006c: 92) seems to be less certain, but he nevertheless says: 
“[w]e are all afraid of the truth… and to confess, I have an instinctive certainty 
that Lord Bacon was the author, the self-torturer of animals who is behind the 
uncanniest type of literature.” Interestingly enough, despite his ‘aristocratic’ 
views, Nietzsche never associates Bacon’s potential role as the author of Sha-
kespeare’s texts with his position, status or aristocratic bearing. He strongly 
believes that Bacon might have been Shakespeare because the Lord was an apt 
and ambitious philosopher, with horizon-stretching philosophical goals. So it is 
ambition and vision that make him an appropriate candidate to communicate 
Shakespeare’s philosophy-infused plays. Of course, one could reproach 
Nietzsche for the very fact of doubting Shakespeare’s authorship, yet one has to 
bear in mind a reservation. At the time – at the peak of Victorianism in England 
– the conspiracy theory was indeed gaining ground, so Nietzsche’s interest can 
be partly excused by the fashionable status of the conspiracy. Obviously, one 
may also see Nietzsche’s own slightly snobbish and megalomaniac views on the 
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“aristocracy of the spirit” as responsible for his interest in the matter in the first 
place. Nevertheless, I do not think there is any reason to believe that Nietzsche 
deemed the original, historical Shakespeare as an inappropriate author for the 
great tragedies. Nietzsche’s musings on Bacon and Shakespeare rather pose 
evidence for Nietzsche’s general interest in the Renaissance as well as his admi-
ration for ambition and striving for over-reaching goals, which were memorable 
qualities of Lord Bacon himself. In Ecce Homo, with his characteristic megalo-
mania, Nietzsche (2006c: 92) concludes his remarks on the authorship theory 
by saying: “And damn it, my dear Mr Critic! If I had published my Zarathustra 
under a different name, ‘Richard Wagner’, for instance, the collective acuity of 
two hundred years would not have been enough to guess that the author of 
Human, all too human was the visionary of Zarathustra.” So, as can be seen, 
though there is a lot of material suggesting that Nietzsche believed Bacon to 
have been Shakespeare, one may assume that he held the critical debate on the 
identity of the author as potentially incorrect. Nietzsche evidently doubts the 
fruits of the analysis of his contemporary literary critics and the conclusion that 
one may eventually draw is that the exact name of the author is beside the point.  
It is worth pointing out that, according to Nietzsche, great individuals 
are to be met where the greatest resistance is to be faced. Striving after one’s 
goals, whether political or philosophical, is always a form of the will to power. 
Thus, one should not be surprised that Nietzsche found the ambitious Lord 
Bacon a fascinating figure. Some critics suggest that Nietzsche’s theory of Wille 
zur Macht can be derived from his study of the early modern philosophy. Both 
Kaufmann and Hollingdale mention Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes as po-
tential sources of inspiration.26 The will to power is inextricably connected to 
the human need to seek truth but, for Nietzsche, an egalitarian or pragmatic 
attitude towards the notion of truth distorts and misshapes the very idea. If 
Nietzsche was ever inspired by Renaissance philosophy, it must be underscored 
that his conception of power eventually radically deviated from Bacon’s and 
Hobbes’s ideas – on the level of this fundamental motivation of truth. As Kauf-
mann (1974: 360) explains:  
To Bacon, knowledge meant power over nature, and truth could thus be utilized as a 
means to new comforts. For Hobbes, too, power was essentially a tool, an instru-
ment, a means for security. Nietzsche, on the other hand, values power not as a 
means but as the state of being that man desires for its own sake as his own ultimate 
end. And truth he considers an essential aspect of this state of being. Self-perfection 
  
26 Hollingdale distinguished between Hobbes’ and Nietzsche’s theory of power. To read 
more see: Hollingdale, R.J. 2001. Nietzsche. (Translated by Władysław Jeżewski. Warsza-
wa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 144-145, 161. Kaufmann compares all three: Bacon, 
Hobbes and Nietzsche. For more details, see: Kaufmann, Walter. 1974. Nietzsche – philo-
sopher, psychologist, Antichrist. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 360.  
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and ultimate happiness are not compatible with self-deception and illusion. Petty 
pleasures may depend on illusions, and truth may spell discomfort and suffering – 
but renouncing truth for that reason would be a sign of weakness and preclude our 
attainment of that state of being short of which we can never find lasting and sur-
passing happiness.  
So there seems little wonder when Nietzsche (2006c: 92) in Ecce Homo claims 
that we all fear truth, for truth very well might be a source of disappointment or, 
even worse, suffering. Yet it is in the resistance and over-coming of suffering 
that an individual is born. Shakespeare’s plays, regardless of whose plays they 
really are, pose for Nietzsche the perfect tragic expression of this fierce indi-
vidualism that will go beyond what is considered good and evil in order to attain 
its independence. One may only suspect that Marlowe’s mighty “amoral” figures 
could have captivated Nietzsche’s imagination too.  
In the light of the above presentation, the rationale of the present dis-
sertation is hopefully clear by now. As I have argued, Nietzsche’s embrace of 
Burckhardtian individualism, with his own moral twist on the notion, strongly 
suggests that if Nietzsche himself had known Marlowe, he could have incorpo-
rated Tamburlaine or Barabas into the canon of his overhuman figures along 
with Julius Caesar or Cesare Borgia. The same applies to Shakespearean figures 
whom Nietzsche himself uses as literary examples for his philosophical reflec-
tions. In this context, the reversed project to read Shakespeare and Marlowe 
through Nietzsche’s uncompromising unsheathing of traditional morality seems 
to be well-grounded. I do strongly believe that, before one can plunge into the 
depth of the literary analysis of the plays by Marlowe and Shakespeare, it seems 
necessary to turn one’s attention to the philosophical, social and political condi-
tions in which the plays were written and performed.  
Chapter Two 
The awakening of early-modern subjectivity: 
ambition, aspiration and over-reaching  
in the Renaissance 
As outlined in the previous chapter it is the experience of transcendence that 
renders the cancellation of subjectivity in the early-modern impossible. It is 
this common philosophical condition of existence that firstly forces a revalua-
tion of our research premises, and secondly makes us constantly go back to 
the solid foundation the individual represents. The Renaissance has always 
been and, I am sure, will always be distinguished from the Middle Ages by the 
acute and intense rebirth of individualism, interiority, subjectivity, and finally 
a sudden sense of intellectual freedom, resulting in the human need to aspire 
and over-reach. With the tool of a combined method in hand – new historical 
philosophising – I want to turn the attention to the creative historical and 
cultural background of Shakespeare and Marlowe. So this chapter addresses 
ideas on the individual, or “overhuman”, to use Nietzsche’s term – their po-
tential – and tries to re-evaluate some early-modern views in terms of their 
“individualizing” or “overhuman” power. In a period so rich and diversified, 
in the creative blend of the vestiges of the Middle Ages and the rebirth of An-
tiquity, the arrival at a definitive vision of what really constitutes the Renais-
sance man seems to be an ill-judged and futile attempt. The aim of this disser-
tation is not to attempt arriving at such a totalizing and limiting in its totality 
picture. Walter Kaufmann (1974: 285) writes of Nietzsche’s philosophy as 
communicating “aristocratic” values, thus pointing to the exclusiveness of the 
Nietzschean overman. Overhuman potential is not something shared by all, 
but rather a small handful of those capable of over-coming their weaknesses. 
Building on this notion, one can say that the Renaissance is not a period of 
individuals, though notions of individuality are implicit in numerous Renais-
sance texts. Yet, due to certain historical and cultural circumstances the pe-
riod has more “specimens” of such individuals to offer. As Nietzsche (2006c: 
4-5) himself suggests in The Antichrist, overmen appeared in history, espe-
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cially during the Renaissance, as a consequence of some favourable condi-
tions. The goal of this chapter is exactly to scrutinize those conditions in order 
to investigate sources of overhuman potential. Moreover, as it appears, a fur-
ther analysis of dramatic overmen also deserves grounding in the proper his-
torical and cultural background. One instinctively feels that these overhuman 
protagonists have their origins in the creative ferment of the English and 
European Renaissance. Thus, I intend to scrutinize the views of key intellec-
tual forces whose philosophical output resonated with, what I would cau-
tiously call, “proto-Nietzschean” notions. I wish to focus on the writings of 
such influential philosophers as the Ancient philosopher Lucretius, rediscov-
ered in the Renaissance, Pomponazzi, a religious philosopher and a precursor 
of scepticism, and early-modern sceptic Montaigne. Then I move onto the 
discussion of the political theory, focusing mainly on Machiavelli’s texts, and 
finally discuss central notions of aspiration and ambition. Although seeking 
Nietzschean ideas in the intellectual output of the Renaissance men of letters 
may seem risky, I strongly believe that the combined method I proposed en-
ables one to build a comprehensive matrix for further analysis.  
2.1. Individualism and the early-modern  
2.1.1. Philosophical and religious reflection 
In line with Nietzsche’s Antichrist I would like to open the discussion on indi-
vidualism by looking at the realm of social activity which shapes the develop-
ment of individuals (or rather societies, as post-Marxist materialists would 
insist) from early stages of their social engagement. Therefore, as a back-
ground to the analysis of Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s dramatic overmen I 
deem it reasonable to start with the early-modern, vastly understood, intellec-
tual life. On the surface, the importance of religion and the Church in the lives 
of early-moderns does not seem to have changed significantly since the Mid-
dle Ages. However, the Renaissance was the period of great upheavals in the 
Catholic Church, which changed the face of Christendom once and for all. The 
central position of religion cannot be disputed even if the essence of this cen-
trality is seen through reformatory conflict and counter-reformatory struggle 
rather than stability and unity. Yet within the general attempts to maintain 
conformity and medieval tradition, many men swam against the current, 
questioning the foundations of existing morality or the intellectual status quo. 
Therefore, I want to start my discussion on “intellectual overreachers” by 
having a look at influential thinkers who shaped the development of self-hood 
in the Renaissance.  
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 2.1.1.1. Early-modern death of God: Renaissance scepticism  
Eric S. Mallin, the author of a recent analysis of Shakespeare’s plays in the light 
of atheism, recalls in his book Godless Shakespeare his conversation with 
Stephen Greenblatt, in which the latter expressed his doubt of the possibility of 
atheist stances in the Renaissance. Greenblatt is believed to have said: “But 
doesn’t every gesture of unbelief articulate itself within the frame of a sectarian 
structure that determined it?” (Greenblatt as quoted in: Mallin 2007: 2). To 
formulate it differently, what Greenblatt had in mind was the suggestion that 
any act of subversion realizes itself against the backdrop of a social structure 
which it resists. Mallin (2007: 3) goes on to reformulate this idea by asking: 
“isn’t the idea of Renaissance unbelief artificial at best, in that it only arises 
within the conceptual borders of religion itself – as a heresy, a perversion, or 
some other already summoned, negated, and reviled possibility?” His book, 
however, appears to attempt to refute this idea, being an innovative and daring 
interpretation of Shakespeare’s characters, who “dwell in a universe not pre-
sided over by a knowable deity” (Mallin 2007: 1). Thus, Mallin’s vision seems to 
admit a self-sufficient or interiorized atheism, which grows out of an individual, 
as opposed to Greenblatt’s idea of disbelief as a product of resistance towards 
the containing society. Whatever is the source of disbelief or doubt in the Ren-
aissance, there is no question that these phenomena surfaced in the period. 
Greenblatt’s argument in the conversation with Mallin prompts one to ponder 
upon the nature of Renaissance disbelief. Though Mallin’s book tries to prove 
otherwise, one cannot escape the urge to ask oneself whether atheism is even a 
possible conceptualization in the mind of a Renaissance man as, after all, the 
Renaissance world, burdened with the heritage of the Middle Ages, is so in-
tensely infused with religion. Maybe it is indeed true that Renaissance scepti-
cism or atheism are only cracks on the monumental block of orthodoxy? I per-
sonally believe the opposite; denying the early-moderns mental capacity of har-
bouring and construing religious disbelief is equal to depriving them of their 
early-modernity. It may be true that for the majority of Renaissance people 
religion provides the only imaginable conceptual framework within which they 
can function. Nevertheless, for the exceptional few, scepticism becomes a vista 
to a new and fresh vision of the Universe and the individual within it, to a 
deeper, more intense, but sometimes sadder appreciation of life and human 
capacity for greatness. In order to fully understand this notion, it is necessary to 
look at the European and English sources documenting disbelief.  
When speaking about Renaissance scepticism, one needs to realize that 
the foundations of the atheistic and sceptical outlook were already laid by the 
Ancients. The Renaissance, being a period extensively drawing on newly redis-
covered Ancient philosophy, revives old dilemmas in the completely new cir-
cumstances of the Orthodox Church, on the one hand, and fervent waves of the 
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Reformation on the other. George T. Buckley, the author of a classic work en-
titled Atheism in the English Renaissance, highlights that the influence of the 
ancients cannot be overestimated in shaping Renaissance views on disbelief. 
Mediaeval scholars worked very hard on the task of appropriating authors of 
Antiquity such as Aristotle, Plato, Seneca or Cicero to the theology of Christiani-
ty, but as Buckley (1965: 2) writes: “the pagan writers who could not be recon-
ciled to Christian thought were, as minions of Satan, to be accursed and 
damned and if possible run to earth and slain”. Therefore, many suspect and 
free-thinking authors such as the Pre-Socratic Democritus or materialist Epicu-
rus were subsequently forgotten and revived only at the dawn of the Renais-
sance. It is the heritage of ancient freethinkers, then, that is partly responsible 
for the outburst of Renaissance individualism.1 And, as seen above, though 
Greenblatt at some point questions the plausibility of early-modern atheism, he 
makes Poggio Bracciolini’s rediscovery of Lucretius’ deeply sceptical poem On 
the nature of things a vehicle of modernity in the Renaissance. Greenblatt’s 
most recent book The swerve – how the world became modern seems to com-
bine the Burckhardian belief in the sudden awakening of mental capabilities 
with the typical for himself preoccupation with the suspect and the subversive. 
However, as it seems, this fervent outburst of human individuality in the Re-
naissance is inextricably coupled with the dawn of scepticism, or even atheism, 
even if Greenblatt (2011: 1-13) does not state it explicitly. The phenomenon of 
the Renaissance scepticism has been an object of numerous critical treaties – 
though, as far as I have observed, no critic has attempted to combine Renais-
sance thinkers’ ideas with the fruits of Nietzsche’s philosophical endeavours. 
Nietzsche himself seems to have been more preoccupied with the ancient, ra-
ther than the Renaissance, philosophy. However, if Nietzsche’s initial impulse 
to question metaphysics goes back to his fascination with the Pre-Socratics, 
while the Renaissance “modernity” is born out of the contact with rediscovered 
works of the Ancients, the parallels that emerge are striking. These parallel 
planes when combined, might prove more than illuminating, especially when 
applied to Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s overreachers. Among the most ac-
claimed Renaissance sceptics, which might have influenced both Elizabethan 
playwrights, Sukanta Chaudhuri, the author of the study of Shakespeare’s and 
  
1 Interestingly enough, in the course of his academic career, Nietzsche, a classical phi-
lologist, dealt with Pre-Socratic philosophers. His admiration for Greek freethinkers must 
have had a profound influence on the development of his aversion to Plato’s metaphysics and 
consequently let him shape his criticism of Christianity. Here it is worth mentioning his 
unfinished work Philosophy in the tragic age of the Greeks where he dealt with Thales, 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Anaxagoras. On Nietzsche’s criticism of meta-
physics, see: Kuderowicz, Zbigniew.1979. Nietzsche. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna p. 57-
65. To learn more about the “ancient atheist”, go to BBC Religions: http://www. 
bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/atheism/history/ancient.shtml (date of access: 29 April 2014). 
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Marlowe’s plays in the light of scepticism, analyses the works of Cornelius 
Agrippa, Rabelais, Montaigne, Neo-Platonists e.g. Pico della Mirandola as well 
as some theologians – both scholastic and protestant. Out of his analysis there 
does not seem to emerge a consistent portrait of the Renaissance scepticism but 
rather a plethora of diverse authors whose views move down the spectrum from 
more devout to less intensely religious, and from more optimistic to more pro-
found in their world-pictures. What these authors all have in common is their 
distrust towards absolute knowledge and an intense preoccupation with the 
individual, both being crucial themes in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Some of the 
authors analysed by Chaudhuri recognize the illusion of the infinite potential of 
man and thus call for blind faith (Agrippa), while others herald human weak-
ness as the reason to overcome and as an element of human divinity (Mirando-
la). Some like Rabelais, when faced with the vanity of human endeavours, in-
dulge in the fullness and pleasure of life, while others advise to put oneself at 
the mercy of God’s grace (Chaudhuri 1981: 5-51). A detailed explication of all 
forms of scepticism and their comparison with Nietzsche’s views far exceed the 
limits of this dissertation. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to look at the views 
of those thinkers who had the most profound impact on the English Renais-
sance, and thus more or less directly might have also influenced Shakespeare 
and Marlowe. According to Buckley (1965: 20-25), the spirit of doubt permeated 
from Antiquity to the early Renaissance Italy and later France through the Arab 
translations and appropriations of ancient texts by Averroes and his circle. It 
seems that it was the Arab philosophers who initiated an Aristotle-based discus-
sion on the question of the immortality of the soul which was later taken up by 
Pietro Pomponazzi, an Italian father of scepticism. In France, one of the most 
influential sceptical thinkers would obviously be Michel de Montaigne, influ-
enced heavily by, already mentioned, Lucretius and his poem On the nature of 
things. Along with them one could enumerate Italians – Cardano and Vanini – 
as well as the French Charron and Bodin.2 Yet again for reasons of expediency a 
thorough analysis of all the aforementioned thinkers is not possible, but I am 
strongly convinced that a juxtaposition of the three most acclaimed personages, 
namely, Pomponazzi, Montaigne and Lucretius with Nietzsche’s philosophical 
tenets can sufficiently demonstrate the Nietzschean quality of the Renaissance 
free-thinking. I decided to discuss Pomponazzi because his writing unveils a 
dynamite content, taking into account the circumstances of their creation.3 
  
2 To read a detailed analysis of the Italian and French Renaissance atheists, see: Chap-
ter 2 (28-74) and Chapter 3 (75-110) in: Allen, Don Cameron. 1964. Doubt’s boundless sea – 
skepticism and faith in the Renaissance. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.  
3 Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1524), being a precursor of the Renaissance, did not live to 
see the creation of the The Roman Inquisition and, thus, luckily did not share the tragic fate 
of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) who was found guilty of heresy and burned at the stake for 
views, in my opinion, far less contentious than Pomponazzi’s. Pomponazzi’s book De Immor-
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Montaigne seems to be an obvious choice for his extensive influence on Shakes-
peare and possibly Marlowe. Lucretius’ free-thinking message resonates in 
Montaigne and, as Greenblatt (2011: 244) suggests, even in Shakespeare. In my 
opinion, this trinity, unified by a common energy and mental interdependen-
cies, also best represents ideas close to Nietzsche’s heart. 
 2.1.1.2. Lucretius: existentialist sceptic 
In the eyes of Stephen Greenblatt, it is Titus Lucretius Carus, the Roman poet, 
who is the father of the Renaissance sceptics. Moreover, as the cover of The 
Swerve announces, Lucretius seems to take the role of the father of the Renais-
sance and, thus, it is possible to risk claiming that indirectly the father of mod-
ernity and implicitly – individualism too. Lucretius’ only poem De rerum 
natura, better known as On the nature of things, is a lyrical explication and a 
direct statement of Epicurus’ philosophy. As Buckley (1964: 4) posits: “it can be 
said with confidence that the skeptics of classical antiquity were one of major 
sources of religious disbelief in sixteenth-century England.” So it is no wonder 
that Lucretius’s poem as well as Epicurean philosophy is seen as carrying dy-
namite and a highly subversive message.4 According to Greenblatt, in Italy this 
free-thinking message is responsible for leading Giordano Bruno to the scaffold. 
However, as Greenblatt (2011: 242) writes: “silencing Bruno proved far easier 
than returning On the nature of things to the darkness. The problem was that, 
once Lucretius’ poem re-entered the world, the words of this visionary poet of 
human experience began to resonate powerfully in the works of Renaissance 
writers and artists, many of whom thought of themselves as pious Christians 
[…] And before long the ideas surfaced as well far from Florence and Rome”. 
Interestingly enough, it is worth remembering that Bruno spent a creatively 
fruitful period of 1583-1585 in England, where he met for example Sir Philip 
Sydney and some of the people from John Dee’s circle. Now, since the influence 
of Lucretius’ poetry on the development of Renaissance individualism cannot be 
overestimated, it seems reasonable to cast a glance at Lucretius poem first and 
try to read it through Nietzsche’s philosophy.  
The thematic extent of On the nature of things, like Nietzsche’s philoso-
phy, is indeed astounding – as Lucretius is more than a poet and a philosopher; 
                                                                                                                                        
talitate Anime [Immortality of the Soul] was burnt in Venice in 1516 but he himself avoided 
death, though he had to write Apologia in which he philosophically tried to explain some of 
his ideas. For more information see: Perfetti, Stefano, “Pietro Pomponazzi”, in: Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/fall2008/entries/pomponazzi/ (date of access: 29 April 2014).  
4 Allan (1964: 5) ironically refers to Epicurus as “impious” and calls him a “patron-saint 
of medieval heretics”.  
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he takes up a challenge of a scientific explanation of the Universe. He opens his 
poem with an invocation to Venus, the goddess of sensual and physical love, by 
which he already signals the direction of his philosophical enterprise. He is, like 
Nietzsche, mostly interested in the realm of physicality and, though his goal to 
explain the nature of phenomena is incredibly ambitious, he wants to reach it 
without the recourse to metaphysics. In his invocation Lucretius points to the 
petty condition of humans but at the same time he warns against superstition 
and all-too easy answers, as he says: “[w]hilst human kind/ Throughout the 
lands lay miserably crushed/ Before all eyes beneath Religion— who/ Would 
show her head along the region skies,/ Glowering on mortals with her hideous 
face” (Lucretius 2008, loc. 62-63). One cannot escape realizing that in his harsh 
assessment of religion, whose persona carries a “hideous face”, Lucretius points 
to the essential hypocrisy of religious belief and his reluctance to acknowledge 
metaphysical reality as a potent answer to pending questions about the Un-
iverse. As an alternative to blind faith Lucretius proposes reason, to which he 
frequently refers e.g. when he says: “I own with reason: for, if men but knew/ 
Some fixed end to ills, they would be strong/ By some device unconquered to 
withstand/ Religions and the menacings of seers” (Lucretius 2008, loc. 89-91). 
Obviously, as can be seen, Lucretius understands that it is insufficient know-
ledge and fear that paralyses and diminishes Man. Yet he praises a brave Greek 
who was bold enough to overcome this paralysing fear:  
[a] Greek it was who first opposing dared 
Raise mortal eyes that terror to withstand, 
Whom nor the fame of Gods nor lightning’s stroke 
Nor threatening thunder of the ominous sky 
Abashed; but rather chafed to angry zest 
His dauntless heart to be the first to rend 
The crossbars at the gates of Nature old.  
And thus his will and hardy wisdom won;  
And forward thus he fared afar, beyond 
The flaming ramparts of the world, until 
He wandered the unmeasurable All. (Lucretius 2008, loc. 63-67)  
The “angry zest” and “dauntless heart” are undoubtedly the same key features 
Nietzsche praises in his writings. Following the dictates of reason, Lucretius 
calls for the overcoming of fears and sets about dismantling the world as known 
and understood by the Greeks and the Romans.  
The founding principle out of which Lucretius’ argument arises is: 
“[n]othing from nothing ever yet was born” (Lucretius 2008, loc. 104-105)5. 
  
5 It is hard not to recall a mirroring line of Shakespeare’s, namely Lear’s response 
to Cordelia’s silence in King Lear Act 1.1 and Act 1.4, when he says “[n]othing will 
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This idea is a point of departure for Lucretius’ belief in eternal matter as a basis 
for all animate and inanimate bodies. The Universe is built of “Procreant atoms, 
matter, seeds of things,/ Or primal bodies, as primal to the world” (Lucretius 
2008, loc. 78-79). The diversity of these particles as well as their potential mu-
tability decide upon the abundance of life forms and variety of matter forma-
tions. For Lucretius also the nature of the human mind and soul are of material 
origin. Along the particles of matter the second ingredient of the Universe (as 
seen through the eyes of Epicurus and recorded poetically by Lucretius) is “the 
Void” or, in other words, insubstantial emptiness in which the atoms revolve 
and swerve. These accidental movements underscore the random nature of 
earthly and universal occurrences. So in the poem “[b]odies of solid, everlasting 
frame—/ The seeds of things, the primal germs” are contrasted with the volatile 
changeability of their forms (Lucretius 2008, loc. 262-263). Lucretius – the 
scientist who embraces the diversity of life forms and conceptualizes their des-
cent as a long and gradual process – seems to fore-run Darwin, Nietzsche’s near 
contemporary. It seems also that both Lucretius and Nietzsche would not share 
the superficial enthusiasm of Darwin’s contemporaries, who would embrace the 
“scientific” dethroning of God and the rejection of his grand plan.6 Both in the 
nihilistic Nietzsche as well as the sceptical Lucretius the clash of infinite, muta-
ble matter and contingent human existence is not only an acknowledgement of 
anxiety but also a call for the overcoming of fear. Lucretius in his treatment of 
the random swerves of atoms in the void is more than a scientist – he actually 
emerges almost as an existentialist philosopher, in the vein of the 20th century 
existentialism, of which Nietzsche was a precursor. After all, his “place intangi-
ble, a void” is reminiscent of Jean Paul Sartre “nothingness” that devours life 
and prays on human anxiety and dread (Lucretius 2008, loc.186).7 Yet neither 
Nietzsche nor Lucretius let themselves be engulfed by the despair caused by the 
silence of the deaf Gods (or non-existent God for that matter). Just like 
Nietzsche, Lucretius sees the deafness of the Gods as an unavoidable human 
                                                                                                                                        
come of nothing, speak again”. One may suggest that this sole sentence is no evidence 
for Shakespeare’s knowledge of Lucretius but it is an interesting and tempting notion 
to believe that Shakespeare was acquainted with the poem, be it directly or through 
other thinkers (e.g. Montaigne).  
6 It is noteworthy that Nietzsche embraced Darwin’s evolutionary theory but unlike 
his many contemporaries saw its dynamite potential and its possible negative conse-
quences. When criticising David Strauss in his first Untimely meditation (David Strauss, 
the confessor and the writer) he doubted Darwin’s place as “as one of the greatest bene-
factors of mankind” Section 7 (Nietzsche 2007a: 29). Just like the “enthusiastic” atheism 
of his age, blind embrace of Darwin’s discoveries was not for Nietzsche a source of smug 
optimism but rather a sign of a great crisis of humanity and a call for “overcoming” of 
these “philistine” tendencies.  
7 Jean Paul Sartre devotes his opus magnum to the idea of Nothingness. For more details 
see: Sartre, Jean Paul. [1943] 1965. Being and Nothingness. New York: The Citadel Press. 
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condition with which Man has to come to terms. Lucretius takes his time to 
explicate the material nature of the human soul, mind and body as well as their 
inseparability. In the context of this view “the folly of the fear of death” becomes 
more apparent as he says: “[t]herefore death to us/ Is nothing, nor concerns us 
in the least,/ Since nature of mind is mortal evermore” (Lucretius 2008, loc. 
1525-1526). Thus, one needs to realize that religion is a source of primordial 
fear that can only be overcome when confronted with an intellectual realization 
of the pettiness of the fear. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that the “over-
coming” in question has eventually a slightly different hue in Nietzsche and 
Lucretius. While the latter sees the rejection of metaphysics as a reason for calm 
and informed withdrawal from hectic life in the vein of Epicurean teachings, the 
former would never accept a repudiation of the primitive instincts, even those 
lurking in the darkest corners of the human mind. Lucretius holds these pri-
mordial fears of death or the Gods responsible for the human drive to accumu-
late riches and power, but he seems to see these drives as potentially evil when 
he says: “[d]riven by false terror, and afar remove,/ With civic blood a fortune 
they amass,/ They double their riches, greedy, heapers-up/ Of corpse on corpse 
they have a cruel laugh” (Lucretius 2008, loc. 1172-1174). The realization of the 
“true” nature of things makes one want to withdraw from these human occupa-
tions and struggles. For Nietzsche, the seemingly negative impulses are an inse-
parable part of life and provide a basis for a creative transformation into a being 
of higher nature.  
Despite the differences between Nietzsche and Lucretius concerning 
their outlooks on human instincts, one sees that the spirit of intellectual free-
dom and a free-thinking attitude is a common quality of both thinkers. In his 
evolutionary portrayal of life and his atomistic vision of the Universe, Lucretius 
seems to emerge as a fore-runner of the modern perception of reality. Though 
the “scientific” world-picture he devised, following Epicurus, is at points incom-
plete or distorted, it is unquestionably an astounding piece of poetry expressing 
the cult of the lonely individual faced with the contingency of his being. The 
details of Lucretius’ world-picture if scrutinized by modern-day scientists, 
would most probably be contested, but as Greenblatt (2011: 185) writes: “many 
of the work’s core arguments are among the foundations on which modern life 
has been constructed”. So, as a whole, the poem deals with surprisingly modern 
human maladies similar to the ones Nietzsche addressed in his philosophical 
quests. Knowing that Lucretius’ poem was retrieved and popularized in the Re-
naissance, one can yet again suspect that its ideas penetrated the minds of the 
early moderns. Greenblatt enumerates distinguished Renaissance figures who 
were familiar with the contents of On the nature of things or even owned a copy 
of the text. Among them were the already mentioned Giordano Bruno but also 
Michel de Montaigne and Ben Jonson, whose private copy of the text is nowa-
days kept in Houghton Library at Harvard. Those who, according to Greenblatt 
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(2011: 185, 243), were interested in “Lucretian materialism” include Machiavel-
li, Galileo and on the English soil Spenser, Donne, and Bacon. Now if Ben Jon-
son was familiar with and had a copy of Lucretius’ work we can only speculate 
whether, in the spirit of the creative collaboration of the Elizabethan theatre, he 
shared his knowledge with other playwrights of his time. The question whether 
Shakespeare or Marlowe knew Lucretius’ philosophy forever remains sus-
pended in the realm of speculation. What is certain is the fact that Shakespeare 
experienced Lucretius through his favourite Michel de Montaigne and his es-
says. We may yet again speculate that Marlowe, being a well-educated author, 
was familiar with Montaigne and, thus, indirectly with Lucretius. What is also 
noteworthy is that the manuscript of Lucretius’ text was discovered by Bracci-
olini in 1417. So, by the year 1516 when Pomponazzi, an Italian precursor of 
Renaissance scepticism, published his tract on the immortality of the human 
soul (or to be more precise “mortality”), Lucretius’ text had been long in circula-
tion, radiating its “subversive” energy in Italy, which was apparently still at the 
crossroads of scholasticism and free-thinking impulses.  
 2.1.1.3. Pomponazzi: moral relativity 
Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) seems to have been caught between this twilight 
of medieval scholasticism and the dawn of Renaissance humanism. He appears to 
have grown discontented with the contemporary readings of Aristotle and was 
determined to reach Aristotle’s original message (Perfetti 2004). In his passionate 
interest in astrology he seemingly kow-tows to superstition, but his insistence on 
the scientific approach to the topic truly testifies to his precursory contribution to 
the development of the Renaissance philosophy. As Antonino Poppi (1988: 654) 
writes: “Pomponazzi seems […] to have had the single aim of eliminating any su-
pernaturalism whatsoever, so as to be able to ascribe everything to natural forces.” 
And despite the grounding of his whole philosophy in the metaphysical framework 
of Christianity, Pomponazzi emerges as a key sceptic of his period, questioning the 
fundamental premises of Christianity, namely, the immortality of the soul in his 
contentious Tractus de immortalitate animae (1516), or doubting the existence of 
angels and demons in his De naturalium effectuum causis sive de incantationibus 
(1556). I would like to argue that the individualist strain in Pomponazzi’s philoso-
phy as well as the sceptical nature of his inquiry makes his philosophy to an extent 
reminiscent of Nietzsche’s and thus to illustrate the Nietzschean nature of Renais-
sance thought. 
The assumption of the impossibility to know fully oneself is a starting 
point for Pomponazzi. It is an intellectual spark that makes him question the 
notion of the immortality of the human soul. As Allan (1964: 34) explains, 
Pomponazzi’s line of argument is based on the assumption that man can only 
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learn about his nature through direct experience, in other words, through the 
knowledge of the other. Consequently, the individual or personal soul must be 
mortal if it is inextricably linked with earthly experience. The human soul, as it 
is equipped with intelligence and reason, can instinctively feel the universal, but 
is capable of comprehending only its representation. It is possible to risk a 
statement that in this sense Pomponazzi distantly heralds Shopenhauer’s will 
and representation, but to my mind, the experimental, scientific nature of his 
philosophising makes him a Nietzschean philosopher as well. According to 
Pomponazzi, with his limited vision man is a creature suspended between more 
ideal and baser beings combining materiality and immateriality in one. As he 
(1600: 48) writes: “anima humana simpliciter materiale et secundum quid im-
materiale […] humanus intellctus est immeterialis & materialis.”8 This state-
ment in itself can be easily inscribed within a more general body of Renaissance 
thought. However, Pomponazzi’s boldness in affirming the mortality of the hu-
man soul is, in my opinion, a perfect piece of evidence for the philosopher’s 
free-thinking spirit resembling Nietzsche’s denial of metaphysical reality. And 
though Pomponazzi, like other Renaissance sceptics, eventually relies on divine 
grace as the only sure thing in human life, his intellectual acuity is far ahead of 
his piety, especially when he unveils his cold calculations concerning religions. 
In a very witty passage from Immortalitate animae Pomponazzi suggests that if 
there are three major religions (Christ’s, Moses’ and Mohammed’s), then the 
whole world is cheated when all three are in error. Possibly one of them is true – 
then it still means that a greater part of the world lives in error as the other two 
are wrong (Pomponazzi 1600: 107). Pomponazzi’s resort to reason in his evalua-
tion of religion unveils a multiplicity of “truths” and invites yet again a compari-
son with Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Pomponazzi also resembles Nietzsche in his 
down-to-earth attitude towards morality. For instance, he openly states that 
people are virtuous for fear of punishment or that patriotism is driven by self-
interest or ambition (Allan 1964: 34-35). What is more, Pomponazzi, like 
Nietzsche, questions the idea of accountability for one’s actions. As Allan (1964: 
40) underscores, in Pomponazzi’s philosophy moral judgements turn out to be 
absurd. He seems to unveil man’s “illusion of interior freedom and of making 
his own decisions” (Poppi 1988: 655-656). Obviously, as he frequently unders-
cores in his writings, he writes as a philosopher and scholar, possibly trying to 
distance any accusations of heresy. Nevertheless, in his book De naturalium 
effectuum causis sive de incantationibus he undertakes a risky task of de-
constructing the belief in supernatural phenomena such as angels, demons and 
miracles. In his pursuits he is able to advance even more subversive ideas, sug-
  
8 Pomponazzi’s paradoxical statement “simpliciter materiale et secundum quid imma-
teriale” can be rendered as “simply material and relatively immaterial” though Allan (1964: 
34) translates it as “unqualifiedly material and relatively immaterial”.  
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gesting even the contingency of religious systems in general. Concerning super-
natural agents, Pomponazzi does not attribute the occurrence of seemingly 
transcendental events to supernatural interventions, but rather wants to see 
them as perfectly natural and explainable by scientific means. In his view, the 
miraculous aura of certain occurrences can be attributed to their rarity, as Pom-
ponazzi (1600: 294) writes himself: “Non secundum communem naturae cur-
sum, sed in longissimis periodis.” Speaking of religions, he also surprises the 
reader with his open-mindedness and a very modern quality of his scepticism. 
In his reason-permeated vision, he sees the history of mankind in the context of 
“an undulation, a rise and fall”. This sine wave of the Universe is true for Chris-
tianity as well, which is apparently in the state of crisis (Allan 1964: 44). Yet 
again a comparison with Nietzsche seems more than welcome. In a sense Pom-
ponazzi’s understanding of the contingency of the Universe resembles 
Nietzsche’s version of eternal recurrence in its insistence on the cyclical nature 
of things.  
As shown in the above analysis, Pomponazzi, a leading representative of 
Renaissance scepticism, has a great deal in common with Nietzsche’s philosoph-
ical vision. There are no records to prove that the Italian sceptic was familiar to 
either Shakespeare or Marlowe, which naturally does not exclude the possibility 
of the intellectual affinity between these great minds. As Buckley (1965: 26) 
suggests, both Italian and French sceptical philosophers’ influence was getting 
stronger and stronger in England from Elizabeth’s ascension to the throne on-
wards. England had been lagging behind in sceptical reflection due to its refor-
matory conflicts, which prevented such reflection. The first mention of the issue 
of the soul’s immortality, which is after all a key question in Pomponazzi’s phi-
losophy, can be found in the Fourth sermon of Hugh Latimer, delivered as early 
as 1549 (Buckley 1965: 30). So, one may suspect that the ideas developed in 
Pomponazzi’s treaties directly or indirectly reached England. Therefore, though 
this cannot be anything more than a pure conjecture, one may risk a statement 
that apart from a mere intellectual proclivity for scepticism that could be attri-
buted to Shakespeare and Marlowe, there might have existed authentic know-
ledge of the texts on the part of both dramatists. There is no doubt that the writ-
ings of the most acclaimed French sceptic, Michel de Montaigne, were available 
in the England of Shakespeare, and were known to the dramatist. Thus, it seems 
more than reasonable to now move on to the analysis of Montainge’s writings.  
 2.1.1.4. Montaigne: active nihilism 
The affinity of the key French Renaissance sceptic Michel de Montaigne and 
Nietzsche is multifaceted and multi-layered, both on the level of form as well as 
content. In my opinion, just as Montaigne and Shakespeare have been fre-
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quently identified as kindred spirits, so could Nietzsche be seen as Montaigne’s 
successor in many respects.9 Just a cursory look at the aphoristic, experimental 
style of Nietzsche and Montaigne’s Essays enables one to instinctively see this 
affinity, but a more thorough analysis of Montaigne’s writings unveils a well of 
similarities. As Pincess and Lockyer (1990: 18) suggest, Montaigne’s coinage 
“essais” accurately expresses his philosophical method as “essais” are exactly 
“tests, trials attempts, or samplings”. In this sense Nietzsche’s aphorisms serve 
the same function, as they are, above all, philosophical experiments which are 
aimed at an arrival at certain conclusions.10 Nietzsche, critical of totallizing 
systems like those of Hegel’s or Kant’s, never attempted to build one, instead he 
decided to approach single problems from various angles. He never started with 
a hypothesis because that would, in his view, force yielding specific results de-
fending that hypothesis. Like Socrates he was a question and problem-oriented 
thinker. As Richard Schacht (2005: IX) suggests, Nietzsche was impressed by 
Montaigne’s and La Rochefoucauld’s style and decided to imitate their style. So 
one sees that not only did he know and admire the works of Montaigne but also 
he emulated his style of writing and methods of reaching his philosophical 
goals. However, just as Nietzsche is Montaigne’s follower on the level of form, 
so too is, as far as I am concerned, Montaigne Nietzsche’s philosophical precur-
sor on the level of content.11  
Montainge is one of the most acclaimed Renaissance sceptics as in his 
Les Essais he underscores the human inability to reach absolute knowledge, 
and the relativity of human experience and opinion.12 If one looks at one of his 
most famous essays – Of cannibals, which interestingly enough is believed to 
have inspired numerous passages in Shakespeare’s The Tempest – one sees how 
modern and open-minded Montaigne really is in the face of the changing world 
in which he lived – in the midst of great geographical discoveries. Montaigne 
(1990b: 2011) rejects the unsubstantiated fears of the other by calmly stating:  
I find (as far as I have been informed), there is nothing in that nation [the natives of 
Brazil] that is either barbarous or savage unless men call that barbarism which is not 
  
9 Nietzsche is of course more than just that as he is a thoroughly original thinker whose 
philosophy eventually deviates into directions and spheres unimaginable to Montaigne. 
Nevertheless, early Nietzsche, who has just realized the power of the succinct aphorism and 
revels in his new found philosophical energy in Human, all too human (1878) unquestiona-
bly resembles Montaigne.  
10 To read more on Nietzsche’s experimental and aphoristic style see: Hollingdale, R.J. 
2001. Nietzsche. Warszawa: Państwowy Iinstytut Wydawniczy, 140-141.  
11 In Human, all too human, volume II Assorted Opinions and Maxims Nietzsche 
(2005a: 299) poetically acknowledges his indebtedness to Montaigne in his aphorism De-
scent into Hades (408).  
12 See: e.g. Chapter XVVIII Of the uncertainty of our judgement, XXV Of the education 
of children or the most famous of Montaigne’s writings An apology of Raymond Sebond.  
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common to them. As indeed, we have no other aim of truth and reason than the ex-
ample and idea of the opinions and customs of the country we live in.  
Montaigne points out a crucial characteristic of the early-modern European way 
of thinking as he observes that the Europeans assess other civilisations by their 
own standards, which they see as absolute and final. But at the same time, he 
reviles the European intellectual and moral conceit and its superficiality. The 
diversity of civilisations as well as variety of customs, cultures and moralities of 
the world, serves his project to unveil the contingency of morality, which is by 
no means a universal code but rather a mere human construct. Relativity of 
morality or, in other words, morality as custom and habit, is one of the most 
significant fruits of Nietzsche’s philosophical reflection, the beginning of his 
battle with Christian morality. In the course of his experiments in Human all 
too human and Beyond good and evil, Nietzsche arrives at the realisation of the 
superficial nature of human morality and in The genealogy of morality he ex-
ploits this idea in order to present his theory on the development of morality 
and its functions in general.13 Though Montaigne never grows as infuriated with 
his contemporaries as Nietzsche does, nevertheless his “optimistic” scepticism 
in many respects reminds one of Nietzsche’s “active nihilism”.14  
Montaigne’s optimism lies in the fact that, despite seeing man as a “mi-
serable and wretched creature”, he manages to find value in life itself (Mon-
taigne 1990b: 28). In this respect he is also very Nietzschean as Nietzsche fre-
quently highlights human wretchedness as opposed to life abundance and ener-
gy. According to Nietzsche, human life is scarred with suffering, which is an 
indispensable ingredient of happiness. Nietzsche (2007: 192) ironically writes: 
“Oh, how little do you know of the happiness of man, you comfortable and 
good-natured ones! For happiness and misfortune (Glück und Unglück) are two 
siblings and twins who either grow up together or – as with you – remain small 
together!”. Montaigne would definitely agree with this statement of Nietzsche. 
With similar irony Montaigne (1990b: 28) also criticizes human delusions and 
misunderstandings as well as the illusory belief in limitless capabilities when he 
writes:  
[p]resumption is our natural and original infirmity. Of all creatures man is the most 
miserable and frail, and therewithal the proudest and disdainfullest. Who perceiveth 
and seeth himself placed here amidst the filth and mire of the world, fast tied and 
nailed to the worst, most senseless, and drooping part of the world in the vilest cor-
ner of the house and fartherst from heaven’s cope with those creatures that are the 
  
13 To read more about Nietzsche’s experiments on moral/immoral stances, see: Holl-
ingdale, R.J. 2001. Nietzsche. Warszawa: Państwowy Iinstytut Wydawniczy . 142-148, 163-
170, 210-222 
14 To read more about “active” versus “passive” nihilism, see: Kuderowicz, Zbigniew. 
1975. Nietzsche. Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 57-65.  
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worst of the three conditions and yet dareth imaginarily place himself above the cir-
cle of the moon and reduce heaven under his feet. It is through that vanity of the 
same imagination that he dare equal himself to God, that he ascribeth divine condi-
tions unto himself, that he selecteth and separateth himself from out of the rank of 
other creatures; to which his fellow bretheren and compeers, he cuts out and shareth 
their parts and allotteth them portions of means or forces he thinks good. How 
knoweth he by the virtue of his understanding the inward and secret motions of 
beasts? By what comparison from them to us doth he conclude the brutishness he 
ascribeth unto them? When I am playing with my cat, who knows whether she have 
more sport in dallying with me than I have in gaming with her? We entertain one 
another with mutual apish tricks.  
Here Montaigne dismantles the idea of the great chain of being and one is 
struck with the affinity of the lines in Thus spoke Zarathustra where Nietzsche 
speaks of man as “a laughing stock or a painful embarrassment” to the overman 
(Nietzsche 2006c: 6). Montainge’s famous reference to his cat, where he won-
ders if it is he who plays with the cat or maybe the cat who actually plays with 
him, seems to be the ultimate expression of relativity, bordering on Nietzschean 
perspectivism. Montaigne, though he always acknowledges divine grace as a 
prerequisite of human existence, is bold enough to imagine a godless reality 
when he says: “[l]et us now consider man alone without other help, armed but 
with his own weapons and unprovided of the grace and knowledge of God...” 
(Montaigne 1990a: 27). Obviously, his conclusion is that without God’s grace 
man is nothing and, thus, it is necessary to lean on the belief in God’s wisdom. 
In a perverse sense, Montaigne’s fantastical invitation to imagine life without 
God is a harbinger of Nietzsche’s “death of God”. Montaigne prefigures 
Nietzsche as for Nietzsche godless reality is also a source of hopelessness and 
misery. Montaigne offers his vision as a warning against excessive pride and 
ambition of man, while for Nietzsche it is a beginning of man’s over-coming of 
suffering and a point for departure to build a new morality. In The apology of 
Raymond Sebond Montaigne gets close to Nietzsche’s over-coming when he 
quotes Seneca, who in Natural questions, book 1, says: “Oh, what a vile and 
abject thing is man, unless he raise himself above humanity” (Seneca as quoted 
in: Montaigne 1990a: 32). Knowing of Nietzsche’s admiration for the Stoic phi-
losophers, it is hard to imagine a more telling expression of man’s over-coming 
in the search of the overman. Nevertheless, Montaigne stops short of granting 
man the opportunity of raising himself above mere humanity as for him this 
notion appears absurd and is an expression of unthinkable bravado, especially 
in the light of the relativity of knowledge and man’s limited vision. So, though 
the ends seem different, the point of departure for both philosophers is similar. 
Montaigne’s intellectual boldness is also, in my opinion, an unquestionable 
proof for the existence of a deeply existentialist strain in his philosophy as well 
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as evidence of his modernity. Though, as Allen (1964: 80) suggests, Montaigne 
rejects Seneca’s ideas, he arrives at the realization of relativity. So, his “death of 
God” never goes beyond a dangerous proposition, a warning against ambition. 
As it seems, it is Nietzsche who carries this idea further and this chapter of phi-
losophy belongs to Nietzsche.  
The affinity between Montaigne and Shakespeare is nowadays a well-
established fact in the academia.15 Interestingly enough, this affinity seems to 
have been analysed academically for the first time during Nietzsche’s lifetime by 
Jacob Feis in his book Shakespeare and Montaigne; an endeavour to explain 
the tendency of ‘Hamlet’ from allusions in contemporary works, published in 
1884. According to Feis (1884: 67, 107), Shakespeare renders all the complexi-
ties and contradictions of “Montaigne’s complex being” in Hamlet. In a very 
lengthy essay Feis meticulously traces Montaigne’s thoughts, using John Flo-
rio’s translation, the one that Shakespeare most probably used, in the character 
of the Danish Prince.16 Whether Nietzsche knew Feis’ book is highly debatable, 
but, what is crucial is the fact that roughly in the same temporal frame (1887) 
Nietzsche himself also recognized the intellectual closeness of Shakespeare and 
Montaigne, though he capitalized on the differences in the presentation of ideas 
by both authors. In Human all too human (1887) Nietzsche (2005a: 91) speaks 
of Montaigne as the author who presented “serious ideas in a polished form”, 
while of Shakespeare as a playwright who “placed observations about the pas-
sions into the mouths of impassioned characters”. The effect is that despite the 
totally different form, Montaigne and Shakespeare seem to speak the same 
voice through totally different media, Montaigne through his essays, while Sha-
kespeare through his theatre. Indeed, the indebtedness of Hamlet’s speeches to 
Montaigne has been numerously pointed out by critics. The most famous exam-
ple of the Montaigne-rooted scepticism of Shakespeare is probably Hamlet’s 
speech starting with the words: “What a piece of work is a man! How noble in/ 
reason, how infinite in faculty!” and ending in: “And yet to me, what is this 
quintessence of dust?” (Hamlet, 2.2.285-300). Though Marlowe’s connection to 
Montaigne’s Essays has not been so intensely researched as Shakespeare’s, 
there seems no reason to doubt in Marlowe’s familiarity with the French philo-
sopher, given the fact that he was a Cambridge University graduate. Thus, as 
  
15 Next to the book of Jacob Feis (described above) another classic source on the topic is 
John M. Robertson’s Montainge and Shakespeare and other essays on cognate questions 
from 1909 (London: Adam and Charles Black). From fairly recent analyses it is worth look-
ing at Tetsuo Anzai’s Shakespeare and Montaigne Reconsidered. 1986. Tokyo: The Renais-
sance Institute Sophia University Shinkoshasyoku Printing Co. Ltd. Stephen Greenblatt also 
investigates the relation between the two in The Swerve, 243-249.  
16 For more details, see: Feis, Jacob. 1884. Shakespeare and Montaigne an endeavour 
to explain the tendency of ‘Hamlet’ from allusions in contemporary work. London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench & Co.  
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shown, it is possible to draw lines connecting the most prominent Renaissance 
sceptic with Shakespeare and Marlowe. What is more, as it appears, the views of 
all three in many respects turn out to be surprisingly Nietzschean. 
2.1.1.5. Atheist/sceptical stances in England 
As has hopefully been demonstrated, the influences of the Ancient and Renais-
sance sceptics were permeating the English intellectual circles from Italy and 
France as early as 1530. As Buckley (1965: 61) suggests, though there are no 
written records of openly atheist stances, the sustained wave of texts opposing 
atheist and sceptical notions gives us ample evidence of the existence of indi-
viduals who must have held such subversive and dangerous views. This situa-
tion illustrates the already mentioned subversion/containment tension, as ap-
parently these free-thinking agents were infiltrating the body of the English 
orthodoxy from inside out, threatening and undermining conformity. Having in 
mind the dynamite qualities of certain views, it is no wonder that, apart from 
rumours, no texts survive. It is also quite understandable that since scepticism 
was not a desirable world-view, the term “atheist” came to be more often a slan-
der term or as Allan (1964: 1) phrases it, “a majestic term of reproach and con-
demnation”. Thus, for those who could easily become objects of such slanderous 
attacks, because of their positions of power and influence, it was safe and desir-
able to fence off any such potential suspicions. Among such figures one can 
enumerate Sir Walter Raleigh or Sir Francis Bacon.  
Raleigh had been frequently an object of attacks in which “the atheist” 
card was pulled. He was rumoured to have been a host of the “school of athe-
ism”, of which Marlowe was supposed to be a member too. In the Catholic 
pamphlet entitled “The Advertisement” one reads that “unbelievers” were tu-
tored in “Sir Walter Rawley’s school of atheism” (Honan 2005: 239). It is also 
believed that the “Schoole of night” mentioned in the King’s speech to Biron is a 
reference to Raleigh’s atheist discussion group. Park Honan (2005: 239) himself 
questions this conjecture as, according to him, the word “schoole” might very 
well be a printer’s mistake, who mixed up the words “school” and “style”. Also 
the context of the speech does not seem to be in favour of the reference (Honan 
2005: 239). Honan’s doubts seem to underscore the gossipy nature of the accu-
sations against Raleigh (and Marlowe too). Buckley (1965: 145) claims that the 
texts Raleigh wrote in his lifetime give little clue on his religious views and none 
of them communicates openly atheist ideas. The two essays The skeptic and 
Treatise of the soul, rather show, which might seem interesting, that Raleigh 
might have had a philosophical attitude towards religion, which was manifested 
in his taste for discussions or disputes (Buckley 1965: 146, 149). Buckley (1965: 
151) suggests that Raleigh spent six years in France (1569-75) at the height of its 
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speculative hype on “atheism” so he must have heard the discussions and was 
familiar with the arguments. Greenblatt (1973: 7), on the other hand, unders-
cores the theatricality of Raleigh’s behaviour e.g. during his trials. He (1973: 7) 
points to “artifice” as a defining quality of Raleigh’s identity. This, in turn, sug-
gests that he might have been willing to dismiss the accusations by hiding his 
true feelings and through cunning political self-fashioning. Yet, as it seems, any 
attempt to ascribe sceptic or atheist views to Raleigh always delegates research-
ers to the realm of speculation, as the written records leave no evidence on the 
actual ideas held by him. Still, the rumours surrounding his persona testify to 
the diffusion of the sceptical thought in the Elizabethan society.  
Sir Francis Bacon’s response to atheism seems to be yet another exam-
ple proving scepticism had penetrated early modern minds. Bacon’s Essay of 
atheism is one of many English Renaissance texts which try to demonstrate the 
falseness of doubt and unbelief. Yet paradoxically it is also a defence of the free-
thinking spirit. Bacon’s line of argumentation is conventional and reminiscent 
of other texts critical of atheist tendencies. He sees the diversity of life and com-
plexity of the Universe as evidence for the existence of the divine architect and 
his divine plan. As he writes: “[a]nd therefore, God never wrought miracle, to 
convince atheism, because his ordinary works convince it. It is true, that a little 
philosophy inclineth man’s mind to atheism; but depth in philosophy bringeth 
men’s minds about to religion” (Bacon 2009, loc. 601-602). What is interesting 
is that in order to support this view he calls upon such names as Epicurus, Cice-
ro and Plato. Epicurus, the greatest influence on Lucretius and other sceptics, is 
called by Allan (1964: 5) a “patron saint of medieval heretics”. Bacon, who, after 
all, sees disbelief as plain stupidity, unexpectedly praises Epicurus’ words as 
“noble and divine” (Bacon 2009, loc. 615). The point I am trying to make is not 
that Bacon may be counted as a Renaissance sceptic along with Montaigne or 
Pomponazzi, but rather that even in his apparently conventional essay the seeds 
of subversion lurk. Bacon, being a distinguished man of letters, obviously be-
longs to the enlightened and open-minded elite of his period and, thus, is able 
to appreciate the beauty of Ancient texts. The author of The advancement of 
learning is aware of the creativity and the intellectual fervour of his age. Within 
the bounds of academic dispute, he is bold enough to praise authors and texts of 
sceptic content. And in a perverse and paradoxical way he can use them as evi-
dence of divine presence and as a tool to praise God’s works. Hence, despite his 
critical attitude to scepticism per se, Bacon partly unawares emerges an eulogist 
of free-thinking. 
It is important to notice that in the Elizabethan England not only the 
distinguished courtiers and politicians in the services of the Monarch engaged 
in sceptic/atheist debate. Among the noble section of society, the somewhat 
dubious world of theatre also led ferocious and heated exchanges. As it seems, 
within the closely-knit community of University Wits, “atheism” was an all-too 
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frequently used word of abuse and an effective tool in unfair competition. The 
group of playwrights engaged in different ways with the question of atheism 
includes: Gabriel Harvey, Robert Greene, Thomas Nashe and Christopher Mar-
lowe. As Buckley (1965: 80) writes: “Harvey repeatedly accused Nashe and oth-
ers, tossing the charge about in a reckless way; Greene was a confessed atheist 
on his death-bed and accused Marlowe; and Nashe himself wrote a stirring at-
tack on atheism, giving its causes and minute directions for its suppression.” It 
is hard to escape the impression that in the squabbles of the playwrights there is 
an element of personal jealousy and of self-fashioning on the part of the writers. 
There seems also little point in going into a detailed analysis of The repentance 
of Robert Greene (1592) or Nashe’s Pierce Penilesse (1592) or Christs teares 
over Jerusalem (1593) as these texts capitalize on the conventional condemna-
tion of atheism as a source of moral decay and degeneration. There is, in my 
opinion, also no point in discussing the occurrences surrounding Marlowe’s 
accusations of atheism and his mysterious death, as the content of the so called 
Baines note is widely known. Further conjectures always involve speculations 
and do not fundamentally affect the meaning and force of Marlowe’s works.17 
Marlowe himself openly never took part in the debate or responded in any way 
to the accusations, unlike his fellow playwrights such as Nashe or Greene. What 
is, however, crucial is the fact that these texts and occurrences all testify to the 
subversive element present within the texture of the Elizabethan society, while 
e.g. the personal note of Greene’s pamphlet manifests ambition, albeit clumsily 
concealed. In the larger context, the pamphlets pointing out Epicurus or Ma-
chiavelli as supporters of debauchery and loose morals, signal a far more signif-
icant phenomenon. They, yet again, underscore the contemporary friction be-
tween free-thinking impulses and conformity, between a crypto-rebellion rea-
lized in the overcoming of conformity and this philistine conformity itself. One 
may say that in the midst of these cultivated “cultural philistines” like Nashe or 
Greene, the figures of Shakespeare and Marlowe stand out.18 Though Marlowe 
  
17 For a brief but very informative account of facts and speculations see: Hopkins, Lisa. 
2008. Christopher Marlowe – Renaissance Dramatist. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. Hopkins makes a very important point in the conclusion of her chapter on Marlowe’s 
life, underscoring the subversive element in Marlowe even further. She says: “attempts to 
argue for an orthodox Marlowe are essentially as desperate as arguments for a heterosexual 
one” (Hopkins 2008: 22).  
18 “Cultural philistine” is obviously a term taken from Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditation 1, 
where he defines the new type of man emerging among his contemporaries. He writes: “[t]he 
cultural philistine, however – the study of whom, and the hearing of whose confessions when 
he makes them, has now become a disagreeable duty distinguishes himself from the general 
idea of the species ‘philistine’ through a superstition: he fancies that he is himself a son of the 
muses and man of culture; an incomprehensible delusion which reveals that he does not even 
know what a philistine, and the antithesis of a philistine, is: so we shall not be surprised to 
find that usually he solemnly denies he is a philistine” (Nietzsche 2007a :7). The comparison 
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was dragged into (or dragged himself into – one cannot be certain) the athe-
ist/sceptical debate with quite spectacular and gory consequences, there is no 
reliable record of his active involvement in the bickering of others. His works on 
the other hand are undeniably the fruits of a free-thinking and maybe even wild 
and untamed spirit who openly espouses human instincts and looks down on 
conformity. Shakespeare’s non-presence in the squabbles may have various 
explanations but could be summarised by the words of John Aubrey, who de-
scribed him as the one who “wouldn’t be debauched” (Aubrey as quoted in: Ack-
royd 2005: 162). At the same time, Shakespeare’s works also testify to the 
openness of his mind and illustrate the frictions between the over-coming of 
conformism and free-thinking impulses.  
2.1.1.6. Shakespeare, Marlowe and the Elizabethan  
world-picture  
The positioning of Shakespeare and Marlowe within the religious and philoso-
phical framework of their period is a tricky task taking into account the complex 
circumstances accompanying forms of worship, their political underpinnings 
and current philosophical thought. As Greenblatt argues in his numerous writ-
ings, the mechanisms stirring character motivations in the plays of both drama-
tists are subject to the subversion/containment opposition.19 The processes 
identified by Greenblatt and further analysed by Hansen have much in common 
with the motivations expounded by Nietzsche in his genealogy of morality. If 
this indeed be true, both the Shakespearean and the Marlovian “Nietzschean 
overreaching” is a consequence of the religious and intellectual climate of the 
period and cannot be analysed outside this climate. The analysis of their plays 
within the context of the period seems to be more than justified. However, when 
one is fully aware of the complex and often contradictory nature of the intellec-
tual scene in the Elizabethan period – burdened with a dynamite mixture of 
theology, free-thinking and politics – the task of seeing Shakespeare’s and Mar-
                                                                                                                                        
of Nashe and Greene to Nietzsche’s “cultural philistines” is, I am afraid, burdened with nega-
tive connotations that the term itself carries, but still the parallel is more than tempting as 
both Greene and Nashe go hand in hand with the spirit of conformism that is permeated in 
the period. On the opposite pole I would position Shakespeare and Marlowe.  
19 For a more detailed description of mechanisms of subversion and its containment, 
see: Greenblatt, Stephen. 1985. “Invisible bullets” in: Erickson, Peter and Coppélia Kahn. 
1985. Shakespeare’s ‘Rough Magic’ – Renaissance essays in honour of C. L. Barber. New-
ark: University of Delaware Press, 297-298. On Marlowe’s subversion, see: Greenblatt, 
Stephen. 1984. “Marlowe and the will to absolute play”, in: Renaissance self-fashioning. 
1985. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 193-222. On a parallel mechanism of dis-
covery and its resistance, see: Hansen, Elizabeth. 1998. Discovering the subject in Renais-
sance England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2-3.  
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lowe’s characters as over-reachers, over-coming and transforming the heritage 
of Judeo-Christian morality, becomes more problematic. Numerous critics over 
the years have been investigating the connections between Shakespeare’s drama 
and religion. The outcomes of their inquiry yielded very different results be-
cause Shakespeare’s works have been both read as intensely religious as well as 
sceptical, if not even atheist.20 Marlowe’s religious identity has been under simi-
lar critical scrutiny though his more daring characters have been more often 
identified with the atheist stance. It is, however, undoubted that Marlowe’s 
atheist identity has been notoriously attributed to him due to rumours and ac-
cusations surrounding his life. For instance, the analysis of Dr Faustus without 
recourse to Marlowe’s biography leaves one at a loss as how to interpret the 
ultimate message of the play. The morality play pattern and its religious preoc-
cupations enable Christian interpretation, but the explicit criticism of institu-
tionalized religion as well as the personage of the great scholar yield atheist 
interpretation equally convincing. One could say the same thing about Shake-
speare’s King Lear which might be read as a play about existentialist despair 
but also as a reinvention of the Christian Book of Job. Shakespeare’s and Mar-
lowe’s possible familiarity with the works of Renaissance sceptics and the way 
their ideas directly or indirectly found their way into their works renders them 
plausible candidates for a convincing analysis in the spirit of scepticism.21 One 
then, might say, following Alison Shell (2010: 19), that a great dramatist is “su-
premely interested in exploiting past and present religions for intellectual and 
emotional effect.” This dramatist grows out of the religious and intellectual 
background of his times and is influenced by the processes shaping the climate 
of worship, but he treats it all as material for creative transformation. Shell 
(2010: 19) summarizes this line of argument by saying:  
where religion and aesthetics start pulling apart is where a creative artist, without 
necessarily forswearing religious matter, sees religion not as something that artistic 
endeavour should serve, but as raw material like anything else. Shakespeare’s writ-
ing draws upon Christianity, but does not concede to it, or to any of the other relig-
ions he uses. All are subsumed to the specific demands of the aesthetic artefact, rais-
ing the earthly creator to a position where he jockeys for position with God – or, as 
some would see it, is made into a god himself.  
  
20 For instance, on Shakespeare and Christianity, see: Shaheen, Naseeb. 1999. Biblical 
references in Shakespeare’s plays. Newark: Delaware University Press/ London: Associ-
ated University Press., Marx, Steven. 2002. Shakespeare and the Bible. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press., Hunt, Maurice. 2002. Shakespeare’s religious allusiveness: its play and 
tolerance. Aldershot: Ashgate. On Shakespeare and atheism, see: Mallin, Eric. Godless 
Shakespeare. 2007. London: Continuum. Or a classic book on atheism: Buckley, George T. 
[1932] 1965. Atheism in the English Renaissance. New York: Russell & Russel. 
21 A perfect example here would be Stanley Cavell’s sceptical analysis of the five plays 
by Shakespeare in his Disowning Knowledge. 
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Shell’s conclusion might very well be applied to Marlowe too, while her ap-
praisal of the dramatist’s creative powers runs parallels with Nietzsche’s admi-
ration for creative strength and over-human potential. The authors are able to 
creatively transform not only religion but also the philosophy of their period 
and reconcile often conflicting positions. In this sense both Marlowe’s and 
Shakespeare’s plays eclipse Nietzsche’s perspectivism as their plays constitute 
kaleidoscopes of religious and philosophical ideas; each and every turn renders 
completely new but symmetrical figures. Moreover, it is undeniably true that 
the works of Shakespeare and Marlowe explore moral questions, becoming in 
this way forms of philosophising. The intense questioning of moral stances in 
Shakespeare, and the more “rough” morality of Marlowe, as I will try to demon-
strate, have both a Nietzschean basis. Nevertheless, in the intricate creative 
arena of the Elizabethan stage it is not only religion and philosophy that influ-
ences the playwrights. Politics, driven by Nietzschean impulses, also enters the 
plays of Shakespeare and Marlowe.  
2.1.2. Political theology, political theory and political reality  
As mentioned, the task of combining the Elizabethan world with Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is tricky for several reasons. One of the less conspicuous is the in-
debtedness of great Elizabethans to the world of politics. The intersection of the 
realm of politics and Nietzschean philosophy has always been an object of a 
heated debate. In his writings Nietzsche frequently condemns political activity 
as being creatively void and even vulgar.22 Kuderowicz (1975: 139) argues that 
Nietzsche’s overman is more of an artist, rather than a politician. He is sup-
posed to be a human being of the greatest creativity. Kaufmann (1974: 308-310) 
mentions such creative overmen as Goethe, while Hollingdale (2001: 124-125) 
underscores the importance of Shopenhauer for Nietzsche’s formation of der 
Übermensch. Despite his apparent aversion to politics, Nietzsche himself at-
tributes overhuman potential to skilful, though often controversial, politicians 
like Julius Caesar, Cesare Borgia or Napoleon.23 So it is no wonder that numer-
  
22 E.g. when in The gay science he ponders on politics as no longer being practised by 
noblemen and potentially turning into “prostitution of the spirit” (Nietzsche 2007b: 52-53).  
23 Caesar is mostly prised in The twilight of the idols while Boriga’s overhuman po-
tential is acknowledged in Beyond good and evil and later elaborated on in The twilight 
of the idols. I develop the argument of “overhuman” Caesar in the chapter on Shake-
speare’s Julius Caesar. Cesare Borgia as a potential “overman” is discussed in the follow-
ing sections of the present chapter. Napoleon features frequently in The will to power 
(though sometimes also in a critical vein) e.g. when Nietzsche (1969: 65-66) writes: “The 
two great tentative ones, made to overcome the eighteenth century: Napoleon, by awak-
ening again the man, the soldier, and the great fight for power – conceiving Europe as a 
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ous scholars want to read his philosophy through the political dimension.24 It is 
crucial to note that Nietzsche in his preoccupation with human psychology, 
though suspicious of definitive truths, attempted to unveil the mechanisms 
behind human behaviour – hence he was interested in the totality of human 
experience, not excluding aspects of political life. Moreover, in the Elizabethan 
period where the life of great men is inextricably linked with the court, everyone 
is willy-nilly a politician. So, in the reality shaped by courtiers, these aristocrats 
and the clergy as well as playwrights dependent on their patronage become 
culture sculptors. In this world, politics and culture are one because they are 
shaped by the same Renaissance figures. Though this group of culture sculptors, 
having the means and independence required in their pursuits, may seem to be 
an exclusive elite, important but rather small, these are people who actually 
have a prerogative to shape politics and culture. In this sense, Marlowe, the 
playwright and the alleged spy for the Queen’s Privy Council, as well as Shake-
speare, the author of Richard II and the panegyric sonneteer writing for his 
patrons, are both unwilling courtiers and politicians on the stage of life – the 
shapers of culture. And obviously it is this culture, understood by the totality of 
human creative endeavours, that is for Nietzsche the most important aspect of 
human life. One can thus suspect that had Nietzsche known more about the 
Elizabethan reality, he most surely would have marvelled at the extent of fasci-
nating material for his psychological observation. He might have also suggested 
that it was the will to power that pushed these “artists-politicians” to greatness. 
The political arena of the Elizabethan and Jacobean England, as I would like to 
argue, just like the sphere of religious and theological investigation paradoxi-
cally promotes Nietzschean over-reaching and strengthens overhuman tenden-
cies. The very ideological proximity of religion and politics, that was already 
underscored, makes one suspect that similar mechanisms drive both these 
spheres. In order to illustrate that the Elizabethan and Jacobean State in a per-
verse manner supports Nietzschean impulses, I would like to yet again lean on 
the subversion/containment paradigm. The body of the prevailing contempo-
rary political theory on kingship and leadership equips the monarch with su-
perhuman qualities through its divine underpinnings and at the same time, in a 
                                                                                                                                        
political unit; Goethe, by imagining a European culture that would harvest the full in-
heritance’ of attained humanity.”  
24 One has to do with what Ted Sadler (225) calls, “the postmodernist politicization of 
Nietzsche” when Nietzsche is used as a frame of reference for various political agendas. This also 
includes e.g. the project of modern democracy. Frederic Appel in his Nietzsche contra democ-
racy strongly opposes this idea, basing his line of argument on Nietzsche’s “aristocratic” moral-
ity, while Lawrence J. Hatab (2002: 132) tries to re-open the discussion on the intersection of 
Nietzsche and democracy in his exploration of “a democratic agon” e.g. 225-243. For more 
information on Nietzsche and political theory, see: Ansell-Pearson, Keith (ed.). 1997. An intro-
duction to Nietzsche as political thinker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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very propagandist manner, condemns the ambition and aspiration of the com-
mon man. The popular metaphors of the macrocosm and microcosm interde-
pendency as well as the great chain of being serve to remind each and every 
subject of their rightful place and the bleak consequences of any over-reaching 
attempts. Yet again the current political events of the period such as the afore-
mentioned numerous plots to depose Elizabeth or the Essex rebellion demon-
strate that ambition in the Renaissance could not be easily curbed. Thus, the 
available historical material shows that the attempts at conformity frequently 
erupt in subversion. Robin Headlam Wells (2009: 198), who in his Shake-
speare’s politics tries to point to the weaknesses of the subversion/containment 
paradigm, claims that: “Elizabeth I and James I had no need to provoke dissi-
dence: it was an ever-present threat. That threat was not of their own making, 
but was the inevitable fallout of Henry VIII’s Reformation.” Wells is unques-
tionably right in attributing Henry’s Reformation with the seeds of conflict but, 
in my opinion, his argument only strengthens the ideological credibility of the 
discussion. It seems that it is not really the point of whose making the conflict 
was, but rather what lasting consequences it had. As I see it, these are mainly 
connected with the mental transformation of the Renaissance individual, who is 
made capable of seeing his singularity.  
As Andrew Hadfield (2004: 1) writes: “the over-riding political issue of 
the time was the question of sovereignty and the legitimacy of the monarch. 
While it is undoubtedly true that most people – some historians would argue all 
– accepted the need for a sovereign as ruler, the question of which sovereign 
was a thorny one.” Hadfield definitely raises a crucial aspect of the English ear-
ly-modern political discussion, namely, its subversive potential. The body of 
political thought in the Renaissance predominantly capitalizes on the legitimacy 
of the ruler currently yielding the sceptre. The most recognizable political 
theory of such a kind would definitely be the “body politic” theory famously 
expounded in the Reports by Edmund Plowden (2009: 136) who writes:  
The King has in him two bodies […] a body natural and body politic. His body natu-
ral (if it be considered in itself) is a body mortal, subject to all infirmities that come 
by nature or accident, to the imbecility of infancy or old age, and to the like defects 
that happen to the natural bodies of other people. But his body politic is a body that 
cannot be seen or handled, consisting of policy and government, and constituted for 
the direction of the people and the management of the public weal, and this body is 
utterly void of infancy and old age and other natural defects and imbecilities which 
the body natural is subject to. And for this cause, what the king does in his body poli-
tic cannot be invalidated or frustrated by any disability in his natural body.  
The “body politic” theory, in other words, equips an otherwise mortal and weak 
human monarch with an “overhuman” political body that can go far beyond the 
limitations of the all-too human body. As Kantorowicz (1957: 13) writes: “this 
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‘incarnation’ of the body politic in a king of flesh not only does away with the 
human imperfections of the body natural, but conveys ‘immortality’ to the indi-
vidual king as King, that is, with regard to his superbody.” Thus, in a slightly 
superficial sense, the Elizabethan political theory approximates the Nietzschen 
overman theory in its key mystical conception of the divine monarch. 
Nietzsche’s conception of the overman transcending weakness is not entirely a 
full-fledged philosophical construct and remains in his philosophy an unful-
filled aspiration of the incapable humanity, a kind of a longing which becomes a 
starting point and a call for “over-coming”. The mystical “body politic” theory, 
called by Kantorowicz (1957: 5) “that kind of man-made irreality”, when applied 
to authentic legal situations often yields absurd results.25 Also, as it seems, the 
recourse to this theory by e.g. Elizabeth, unveils its subversive load, as it actu-
ally underscores the singularity of the monarch as a mortal being. The argu-
ments of the theory, after all, prevent Elizabeth from recovering the lands given 
away by the under-aged Edward. When Elizabeth addresses her troops at Til-
bury in the crucial year of 1588 – the year of the Armada – she says: “I know I 
have the body but of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart and stom-
ach of a king – and a king of England too” (Elizabeth I 2009: 33). In this case, as 
Elizabeth tries to illustrate, the heart of the King (the body politic) cannot be 
hindered by the body natural. However, the question concerning the disunity of 
the two bodies was a hotly debated one, especially by those who would disfavour 
the monarch. So the subversive crack of the whole theory lies in the very divi-
sion of the monarch’s body because the failing or unsuitable physical body may 
be replaced if such a need arise. Thus, on the one hand the theory equips a liv-
ing monarch with superhuman qualities but, on the other, by dividing his/her 
body into the everlasting and all-powerful body-politic and the mortal human 
body, it underscores the subversive message that the King/Queen is replaceable. 
The existing body of propagandist texts condemning rebellion and disobedience 
seems to prove the existence of this lurking subversion. Among these texts one 
can enumerate Richard Hooker’s The laws of ecclesiastical polity (1593) or the 
Homilies of the Church of England e.g. Against disobedience and wilful rebel-
lion, dating back to the times of Henry VIII (1547) or James I’s texts e.g. The 
speech to parliament regarding monarchy (1610) or The true law of free mon-
archies (1598).26 In James’ speech to Parliament (1610) the King says: “[t]he 
  
25 For more details on the application of the theory in the legal environment, see: Kan-
torowicz, Ernst H. 1957. The King’s two bodies – a study in mediaeval political theology. 
New Yersey: Princeton University Press or Axton, Marie. 1977. The Queen’s two bodies – 
drama and the Elizabethan drama. London: Royal Historical Society. In order to pursue 
outcomes of newer research, see: Rolls, Albert. 2000. The theory of King’s two bodies in the 
age of Shakespeare. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press.  
26 To refer to the texts, see: Pinciss and Lockyer “Homilies”, 35-43 or Richard Hooker, 
in: Aughterson, 102-104.  
Chapter Two 100 
state of monarchy is the supremest thing upon earth. For kings are not only 
God’s lieutenants upon earth and sit upon God’s throne, but even by God him-
self they are called gods” (James VI and I 2009: 36). It seems that in his insis-
tence on the divine role of the King as an anointed servant of God upon Earth 
James is referring to a long-standing tradition dating back to the Middle Ages. 
Yet his speech appears to go one step further, as he frames himself no longer as 
a servant but God himself equal to the one in heaven. He goes on by adding: 
“kings are called gods, and so their power after a certain relation compared to 
the divine power […] And lastly, kings are compared to the heads of this micro-
cosm of the body of man” (James VI and I 2009: 36). So the King inscribes him-
self within a widely accepted and traditional perception of kingship but he adds 
a new layer to it by equipping himself with the overhuman potential of a meta-
physical (and thus unquestionable) significance. I would, however, argue that 
James’ actual attribution of divine power borders on blasphemy and hence is 
tinged with an atheist overtone as it shifts the centre of gravity from the meta-
physical realm to the purely physical one. Wells argues that both Elizabeth and 
James were moderate and tolerant rulers in comparison with the tyrant Henry 
VIII. According to Wells (2009: 8), Elizabeth and James “adopted ruthless 
measures when national stability was at threat.” Still, reading James’ speeches 
makes one wonder if he had overhuman or maybe tyrant leanings, especially 
when in The true law of free monarchies (1598) he says: “the king is overlord of 
the whole land, so is he master over every person that inhabiteth the same, hav-
ing the power over the life and death of every one of them” (James VI and I 
2009: 140). In the closing of his text James adds a crucial line, which, in my 
opinion, is quite accidentally very subversive. He claims: “a good king, although 
he be above the law, will be subject and frames his actions thereto, for example’s 
sake to his subjects, and of his own free will, but not as subject or bound 
thereto” (James VI and I 2009: 141). Despite the focus on the King’s independ-
ence of the law, James raises two key issues, namely, the idea of “free will”, and 
the subjects’ well-being. By referring to his will, James acknowledges his human 
singularity and inherent in it – his fallibility. More importantly, by underscoring 
the subjects’ sake, probably unwillingly, he establishes raison d’état as society’s 
prerogative. So one may yet again risk claiming that subversion often lurks at 
the very heart of attempts at the enforcement of conformity. As it seems, even in 
the Monarch’s speech the veil of divinity can be unwillingly dropped and the 
workings of the state uncovered. In his writings Nietzsche, a great critic of the 
state, often unveils such mechanisms. Already in his early work Human, all too 
human (1878) he mirrors Marx by uncovering the role of religion as a cynical 
tool in the hands of the government.27 In a lengthy aphorism entitled Religion 
and government he writes:  
  
27 It is, however, important to note that for Nietzsche the struggle for power is not an ef-
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For religion quietens the heart of the individual in times of loss, deprivation, fear, dis-
trust, in those instances, that is to say, in which the government feels unable to do any-
thing towards alleviating the psychical sufferings of the private person: even in the case 
of universal, unavoidable and in the immediate prospect inevitable evils (famines, fi-
nancial crises, wars), indeed, religion guarantees a calm, patient, trusting disposition 
among the masses. Wherever the chance or inevitable shortcomings of the state gov-
ernment or the perilous consequences of dynastic interests force themselves upon the 
attention of the knowledgeable man and put him in a refractory mood, the unknowl-
edgeable will think they see the hand of God and patiently submit to instructions from 
above (in which concept divine and human government are usually fused): thus inter-
nal civil peace and continuity of development is ensured. The power that lies in unity of 
popular sentiment, in the fact that everyone holds the same opinions and has the same 
objectives, is sealed and protected by religion, apart from in those rare cases in which a 
priesthood cannot agree with the authorities as to the price of its services and enters 
into conflict with them. (Nietzsche 2005a: 170-171) 
It seems that the attempt of the English Renaissance monarchs to attribute 
divine sanction to their regimes illustrates the same propagandist mechanism 
that Nietzsche discusses in his analysis of the interdependency of religion and 
the state. In this take on the matter, the case in which a disagreement occurs 
between the clergy and the monarch always means a highly volatile situation. 
Knowing the complex and delicate nature of religious agreement in the after-
math of the English Reformation, there seems little doubt that both Elizabeth 
and James had to recourse to what Nietzsche terms the “unity of popular senti-
ment”. The divinity of the monarch can be, thus, seen as such a unifying con-
cept. To summarize this argument, it is worthwhile looking at the concluding 
passage by Nietzsche (2005a: 172-173) in the same aphorism, where he says:  
[t]o repeat in brief what has just been said: the interests of tutelary government and 
the interests of religion go hand in hand together, so that when the latter begins to 
die out the foundations of the state too are undermined. The belief in a divine order 
in the realm of politics, in a sacred mystery in the existence of the state, is of reli-
gious origin: if religion disappears the state will unavoidably lose its ancient Isis veil 
and cease to excite reverence. 
The inextricable unity between religion and politics in the Elizabethan and Ja-
cobean regime has already been articulated, but it seems important to capitalize 
on its crypto-subversive message. To my mind, the speeches of James illustrate 
how the self-interested state in its attempt at enforcing conformity actually un-
dermines its very foundations. As it seems, this happens by a subliminal utter-
ance of personal singularity and individuality of the monarch, which paradoxi-
                                                                                                                                        
fect of class divisions but rather a result of an instinct – natural to all humans “the will to 
power” – Wille zur Macht.  
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cally may become the articulation of the individuality of every single subject in 
the realm. Historical events seem to testify to such an interpretation as the al-
ready mentioned numerous attempts to dethrone Elizabeth as well as the noto-
rious Gunpowder Plot during James’ reign prove that some early moderns were 
bold enough to raise their hand to hit the “divine” monarch in an attempt to 
defend their “intellectual freedom”.28 So, one may suggest that this politically 
dangerous idea was planted in the minds of the English subjects despite intense 
propagandist attempts to curtail its spread. Apart from the political theology 
expressed in the body politic theory there can be found more material that capi-
talizes on the idea of individuality and fuels expressions of singularity. Machia-
velli’s works do not only seem to subliminally communicate the aforementioned 
valuations of human potential but rather they lay bare the instincts of the hu-
man will to power.  
2.1.2.1. Niccolò Machiavelli – will to power and overhuman 
potential 
It seems undoubted that Machiavelli, the author of The prince and Discourses 
on the first ten books of Titus Livy, more widely known simply as Discourses, is 
one of the most influential political theoreticians of the age, and at the same 
time one of the most controversial Renaissance figures. Machiavelli’s notoriety 
in the period can be best summarized by the words of Buckley (1965: 31), who 
claims:  
[p]oets, diviners, scholars, pamphleteers – all expressed themselves with remarkable 
unanimity of opinion. Machiavelli was for them the arch-atheist, the devil who had 
taught men to use religion for political ends, who had corrupted France and brought 
about St. Bartholomew’s Day, who taught simple Englishmen to be atheists, and 
who, unless his works were put down or effectively combated, would certainly be the 
ruin of Christendom. His name, Niccolò (“Old Nick”), at the time became and has 
ever since remained a synonym for the devil. 
  
28 Such a treatment of the events is more than controversial as the plots against the 
monarchs can be seen in the words of Wells (2009: 8) as “extreme counter-measures” or in 
modern understanding as terrorist attacks threatening the stability of the state. Yet, all 
these plots have as their origin a break with the ancient Catholic faith. Thus, in a sense all 
are driven by conviction or as a response to brutal treatment of Catholics in England. So 
one may risk stating that in the minds of the plotters they were seen as rightful acts of nec-
essary rebellion in the name of “intellectual freedom”. I have written “intellectual freedom” 
in inverted commas as a passing reference to Nietzsche’s treatment of such a rightful rebel-
lion in his Twilight of the idols (1889). For more details, see the chapter on Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar in the present work or Nietzsche’s The twilight of the idols (1889).  
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This highly exaggerated portrayal can be at least partly attributed to the influ-
ence of Innocent Gentillet’s Contra-Machiavel (1576), a misused exploitation of 
Machiavelli’s text, through which the original was mostly known. Nevertheless, 
even when one pushes aside the misreadings and abuses of the original Machia-
velli, still one cannot oversee his deeply rooted subversive message, that so out-
raged his contemporaries. It seems that the inherent subversion of Machiavelli’s 
The prince does not lie in its political pragmatism but rather in the author’s 
immaculate grasp of human psychology. Machiavelli, unwillingly heralded as 
the Antichrist of his time, bears much resemblance to the self-proclaimed Anti-
christ of the nineteenth century – Friedrich Nietzsche. Both unquestionably 
emerge as acute observers of human psychology and skilled commentators on 
human nature.  
Machiavelli’s practical guide for rulers makes a crucial differentiation as 
it offers advice on politics to hereditary princes as well as new princes who es-
tablished themselves as monarchs through their own ingenuity, or in Machia-
velli’s (2009: 141) own words  
those who by wicked means have attained to a principality.” This distinction is of 
great significance as evidently Machiavelli does away with the mystical or theological 
justification of the divine rule of Princes. He admits and even justifies a “usurper” on 
the throne. What is more important, Machiavelli does not rule out the “usurper’s” 
potential to become a successful ruler. As it turns out, his Prince may very well 
emerge as a product of self-overcoming and sublimation, as he says “the usurper 
thereof ought to run over and execute all his cruelties at once, that he be not forced 
often to return to them. 
In Machiavelli’s vision, like in Nietzsche’s, cruelty is permitted as long as it is 
only incidental, in this case a by-product of power struggle and not pure calcula-
tion. Thus, just like Nietzsche, Machiavelli seems to cultivate a complete man 
who embraces both his lower and higher instincts, while his Prince is an effect 
of self-overcoming and sublimation of impulses, in other words a self-made 
man – or even overman. In the light of such an understanding of a complete 
man, there is no wonder that for both Machiavelli and Nietzsche Cesare Borgia, 
traditionally a figure condemned and held in much contempt, received close 
inspection and even admiration. As Pincess and Lockyer (1990: 98) note: “of all 
political leaders Cesare Borgia (1476-1507) receives the closest attention in The 
Prince, for he had many of the qualities Machiavelli most admired.” He writes:  
Cesare Borgia was accounted cruel, yet had his cruelty redressed the disorders in 
Romania, settled it in union, and restored it to peace and fidelity – which, if it be 
well weighed, we shall see was an act of more pity than that of the people of Florence 
who to avoid the term of cruelty suffered Pistoia to fall and destruction. (Machiavelli 
1990: 98)  
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Here Machiavelli’s attitude perfectly illustrates how cruelty can be creatively used 
for good ends. In this sense, Nietzsche’s attitude is similar. It would be a misun-
derstanding to claim that Nietzsche unquestionably admired Borgia but, as Kauf-
mann (1975: 224) explains, he believed “that there was more hope for the man of 
strong impulses than for the man with no impulses.” In aphorism 197 in Beyond 
good and evil Nietzsche makes a comparison between types of climate and human 
nature. Cesare Borgia is for him a “tropical man” – a man of heat, passion – totally 
opposed to other “temperate zones”. These “temperate zones” stand for all those 
that are incapable of evil – not thanks to their strong moral backbone, but because 
of weakness and “timidity” (Nietzsche 2002: 84-85). In The twilight of the idols 
Nietzsche (2006c: 211), in response to criticism of his seeming “abolition of all 
decent feelings” through the praise of Cesare Borgia, claims that the modern age 
has not really become more moral as his contemporaries would like to believe but 
rather “weaker, more sensitive and, more vulnerable”. For Nietzsche, incapacity 
for evil is not equal with a moral imperative because morality only begins when 
man overcomes his impulse to commit an act of cruelty. As Nietzsche (2006c: 211) 
writes of his contemporaries:  
[i]f we were to abstract from our sensitivity and maturity, our physiological ageing 
process, then our ‘humanizing’ morality would immediately lose its value too – mo-
rality never has an inherent value –: it would even conspire our contempt. On the 
other hand, we should be under no illusion that Cesare Borgia’s contemporaries 
would not laugh themselves to death at the comic spectacle of us moderns, with our 
thickly padded humanity, going to any length to avoid bumping into a pebble.  
According to Nietzsche, the moderns had lost their vitality, which is inextricably 
combined with natural instincts. These were still being utilized by such people 
like Cesare Borgia in order to reinforce his own power but also, as Machiavelli 
argues in The prince, to yield some greater good in the form of the restoration of 
peace, law and order. The Renaissance, which gave birth to such figures as Bor-
gia is, then, “the last great age” as opposed to “a weak age”, in which “virtues are 
conditioned and prompted by our weakness” (Nietzsche 2006c: 212). Machia-
velli himself does not venture to comment on the nature of his age, but like 
Nietzsche, he is a skilful psychologist who comments on the nature of humanity, 
in which he senses the division of men into those who embrace their impulses 
and those who, out of fear or scruple, stop short of utilizing their potential. In 
his Prince, Cesare Borgia emerges as a figure who has an instinctive grasp of 
what humanity really is and makes the most of this knowledge. His actions are 
ultimately better, albeit cruel, because their outcome is far more positive.  
It may be, then, suggested that Machiavelli’s Prince emerges as an insa-
tiable creator who is fully aware of his nature and is not afraid to acknowledge 
it. He might resort to necessary cruelty but his actions can be redeemed if they 
are part and parcel of the creative process. The most serious of accusations le-
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velled at Machiavelli are actually calculation and cynicism, but when one looks 
at his theory of power in the context of Nietzsche’s theory of morals, one sees 
that Machiavelli is more of a realist than a cynic. As Pinciss and Lockyer (1990: 
94) write in their introductory remarks on The prince, Machiavelli’s treatise 
“neither offers a theory of government nor assumes a belief in natural law.” If it 
is indeed less of a political treatise on the nature of government, one may read it 
as a philosophical investigation into the depths of human nature. By rejecting a 
comfortable belief in the existence of the inherent and universal moral code, 
Machiavelli lays the foundations of the genealogy of morality that would be later 
recreated by Nietzsche in his writings. Machiavelli (1990: 97) ruthlessly tears off 
the veil of hypocrisy from human morality by saying:  
I know that everyone will confess it were exceedingly praiseworthy for a prince to be 
adorned with all these above-named qualities that are good. But because this is not 
possible, nor do human qualities admit such perfection in virtues, it is necessary for 
him to be so discreet that he know how to avoid the infamy of those vices which 
would thrust him out of his state and, it is be possible, beware of those also which 
are not able to remove him thence. 
The political implications of Machiavelli’s view on the nature of human beings 
seem to be well-known. However, the pioneering basis on which he builds his 
theory is, in my opinion, underestimated. Not only does Machiavelli account for 
the low and primitive aspects in human nature, but he also embraces and takes 
advantage of these instincts. What is more, by acknowledging “the evil” in hu-
man nature Machiavelli, similarly to Montaigne in his Essays, points to a very 
Nietzschean notion concerning morality, namely, the fact that moral codes are a 
result of custom, tradition and, thus, subject to evolution and transformation. 
In the chapter of Human, all too human entitled On the history of the moral 
sensations Nietzsche (2005a: 51) posits:  
He is called ‘good’ who does what is customary as if by nature, as a result of a long 
inheritance, that is to say easily and gladly, and this is so whatever what is customary 
may be (exacts revenge, for example, when exacting revenge is part of good custom, 
as it was with the ancient Greeks). He is called good because he is good ‘for some-
thing’; since, however, benevolence, sympathy and the like have throughout all the 
changes in customs always been seen as ‘good for something’, as useful, it is now 
above all the benevolent, the helpful who are called ‘good’. To be evil is ‘not to act in 
accordance with custom’, to practise things not sanctioned by custom, to resist tradi-
tion, however rational or stupid that tradition may be; in all the laws of custom of all 
times, however, doing injury to one’s neighbour has been seen as injurious above all 
else, so that now at the word ‘evil’ we think especially of voluntarily doing injury to 
one’s neighbour.  
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As it seems, Machiavelli implicitly underscores a similar notion of moral relativ-
ity. In the spirit of Nietzschean perspectivism, Machiavelli (1990: 97) claims:  
I say that all men, whensoever mention is made of them, and especially princes, be-
cause they are placed aloft in view of all, are taken notice of for some of these quali-
ties which procure them either commendations or blame. And this is that some one 
is held liberal, some miserable – miserable, I say, not covetous, for the covetous de-
sire to have though it were rapine, but a miserable man is he that too much forbears 
to make use of his own; some free givers, others extortioners; some cruel, others 
piteous; the one a league breaker, another faithful; the one effeminate and of small 
courage, the other fierce and courageous; the one courteous, the other proud; the 
one lascivious, the other chaste; the one of fair dealing, the other wily and crafty; the 
one hard, the other easy; the one grave, the other light; the one religious, the other 
incredulous, and suchlike. 
In this lengthy passage Machiavelli evidently testifies to the unlimited diversity 
of human nature, which in turn requires numerous attitudes and approaches in 
its handling. If human morality is a mere man-made construct and human na-
ture an unknown and moody ocean, then the notions of right and wrong, justice 
or, more importantly, accountability for one’s actions all become blurred and 
hard to outline. Nietzsche who would recapitulate such ideas in the nineteenth 
century would call for the revaluation of all values in order to account for the 
fickle human nature. Machiavelli also seems to teach new morality; however, he 
applies his new ethics to the ruler, who, as Buckley (1965: 32) writes, would 
need to profess “Real-Politik, a subordination by a prince of everything, even, 
religion, to his good and that of the state.” In a similar vein, Nietzsche would 
also place his over-man beyond the restraints of conventional morality. Obvi-
ously, in my comparison of Nietzsche and Machiavelli I am not taking an anti-
essentialist stance by claiming, following the cultural materialists, that Machia-
velli absolutely rejected any claims of the universality of human nature. I partly 
agree with Wells (2009: 193) saying: “to claim, for example, that Machiavelli 
was a radical anti-essentialist is to make nonsense of his entire philosophy of 
history. For Machiavelli the past has a lesson for the present because human 
nature is fundamentally the same in all ages.” However, it is crucial to qualify 
Wells’ statement with a note that a common denominator of human nature 
stems from all the instincts that traditional morality condemns. So, in other 
words, what makes humans human are the impulses lurking in the darkest cor-
ners of the mind, whose existence preachers and moralists simply fear to admit.  
For Nietzsche this aforementioned denominator of human nature would 
be the will to power, the underlining and general feature of human nature. Ma-
chiavelli does not enclose human nature within one driving force like Nietzsche, 
yet he underscores the existence of human instincts and the free will which may 
control them. In the chapter entitled How great power fortune hath in human 
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affairs, and what means there is to resist it Machiavelli opposes classical views 
on the inevitability of fortune which shapes human existence. Machiavelli, simi-
larly to Nietzsche, evidently praises the individual who takes his fate into his 
own hands and shapes his life according to his own devices. As Pincess and 
Lockyer (1990: 102) summarize: “fortune gives a man of ability the occasion to 
prove himself; if he is lucky enough to have the chance, a leader with intelli-
gence and drive (virtù) can achieve success.” So, in his analysis of human nature 
he holds a deeply existentialist conviction that the external world in its essence 
is chaotic and hostile towards man, but at the same time acknowledges the hu-
man capability to over-come adversity. Machiavelli (1990: 104) claims:  
not to extinguish quite our own free will, I think it may be true that fortune is the 
mistress of one half of our actions, but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half 
or little less. And I liken her to a precipitous torrent, which when it rages overflows 
the plains, overthrows the trees and buildings, removes the earth from one side and 
lays in on another. Everyone flies before it; everyone yields to the fury thereof, as 
unable to withstand it; and yet, however it be thus, when the times are calmer, men 
are able to make provisions against these excesses with banks and fences so that af-
terwards when it swells again it shall all pass smoothly along within its channel, or 
else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtful. In like manner be-
falls it us with fortune, which there shows her power where virtue is not ordained to 
resist her, and thither turns she all her forces where she perceives that no provisions 
nor resistances are made to uphold her.  
Nietzsche would claim that nature (also human nature) and man are essentially 
constantly in a state of flux, in a never-ending process of over-coming. As 
Kaufmann (1975: 260) summarizes: “nature and life are not stable norms but 
dialectical forces: they are, as Nietzsche sees them, processes of self-
differentiation and self-overcoming. In that sense, living ‘according to nature’ 
means trying to overcome nature.” Thus, as one can see, this tension or a dialec-
tical relation between fickle Fortune and the human will, demonstrated in Ma-
chiavelli, is also present in Nietzsche. What is more, both Nietzsche and Ma-
chiavelli promote the attitude of boldness and force in the handling of Fortune’s 
moods. Machiavelli (1990: 105) concludes his chapter with a valuable state-
ment, albeit tinged with with a sexist or misogynist overtone: “it is better to be 
heady [headstrong, bold, impetuous – Pinciss and Lockyer] than wary because 
fortune is a mistress, and it is necessary to keep her in obedience, to ruffle and 
force her. And we see that she suffers herself rather to be mastered by those 
than by others that proceed coldly.” Machiavelli’s insistence on assertiveness 
and courage in the face of destiny reminds one of Nietzsche’s focus on self-
mastery, which in his writings emerges as a significant measure of the strength 
of character. The principal drive which Machiavelli develops in his writings, 
encapsulated in the Italian word virtù, might be read as reminiscent of 
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Nietzsche’s will to power, especially in its emphasis on the strength of the indi-
vidual’s will. This aspect, in turn, becomes a crucial element in the development 
of tragedy in the Elizabethan period (Pinciss et al. 1990: 104). Though virtù is 
not a universal principle, it is portrayed as a drive to overcome and over-reach, 
both of which become essential in Shakespeare’s great tragedies of ambition 
and Marlowe’s tragedies of great individuals.  
2.1.2.2. Shakespeare, Marlowe and political theory  
So, as can be seen, despite the fact that Nietzsche was not intentionally a politi-
cal thinker but rather a teacher of new morality, it is possible to seek parallels 
between his views and Machiavelli’s political treatise. This can be done mostly 
because Machiavelli turns out to be so much more than just an architect of a sly 
political theory. He emerges as an acute and realistic observer of human nature 
and in this aspect he fore-runs Nietzsche and his theory of the overman. Ma-
chiavelli’s influence on his contemporaries is profound and, thus, his impact on 
both Shakespeare and Marlowe cannot be overlooked. As Andrew Hadfield 
(2004: 11) writes:  
Machiavelli’s legacy and influence is complex and controversial. He was studied in 
Renaissance England as an advocate of oligarchical, republican government, which 
he argued was the best and most stable form of political existence (Discourses), as 
well as a sly adviser to princes, telling them how to circumvent traditional ethical re-
straints and pursue their own interests in the name of realpolitik (The Prince).  
The very fact that Machiavelli was skilled enough to defend and substantiate 
both of these positions is, to my mind, yet again very telling about his open-
mindedness and realism. Moral relativism was frequently attributed to the au-
thor of The prince back in the Renaissance as well as nowadays. Yet in the Ren-
aissance, Machiavelli’s mental flexibility was seen as a sign of moral depravity 
and decay. Numerous, sometimes dubious, figures of the Elizabethan theatre 
world e.g. Robert Greene, refer to him as a corrupting and dangerous influence 
(Buckley 1965: 81). However, when seen at the backdrop of the 19th century 
ruthless attack by Nietzsche on the hypocrisy of religion and government, Ma-
chiavelli emerges as a precursor of Nietzsche’s moral relativism in its insistence 
on the realistic approach to power relations. The struggle for power and its 
maintenance are undoubtedly important themes both in Shakespeare’s and 
Marlowe’s plays. The presence of the character of Machiavel in The Jew of 
Malta proves that Marlowe knew and utilized the works of Machiavelli, even if 
only through the eyes of Gentillet. The strong individuals who are always at the 
heart of Marlowe’s plays testify to his deep interest in the theme of over-coming 
and growing in might. As Hadfield (2004: 11) suggests Shakespeare most 
The awakening of early-modern subjectivity … 109 
probably knew Machiavelli, while his plays manifest an interest in both strong 
leadership as well as republican leanings. Shakespeare’s intense preoccupation 
with the idea of kingship and the legitimacy of the regime (Histories but also 
e.g. Julius Caesar etc.) prove his intense interest in the matter of politics and 
morality too. It seems that Machiavelli’s works functioned as a catalyst for those 
who harboured great aspirations and had the courage and the means to realize 
them. The preoccupations of Shakespearean or Marlovian characters encapsu-
lated in their works also constitute living proof of the authentic struggles and 
tensions that fuelled the powerful and the ambitious. The plays of the two play-
wrights under consideration very often function as the sole material to work on 
when considering ambition in its more vibrant and implicitly subversive guise.  
 2.2. Ambition in early-modern England  
Machiavelli’s The prince was a work designed as a practical guide for rulers, and 
thus, “intended only for the eyes of the ruler” (Pinciss et al. 1990: 94). One of its 
functions was to teach those in positions of power how to manoeuvre to main-
tain their own influence and curb the ambition of others. In its purpose The 
prince emerged then as a double-edged sword because, in its highly subversive 
nature, it turned out to be also a manual for those nurturing their personal 
dreams of greatness. Thus, in Machiavelli’s The prince, in its reception, its use 
and misuse, yet again a tension between subversion/containment or discov-
ery/resistance can be manifested. It seems, hence, that the dawn of Machiavel-
lian thinking reinforced the already strong state propaganda against overreach-
ing and excessive ambition. The wealth of source texts on the so called “ortho-
dox view of ambition” is indeed immense. Martin Esler (1966: 24-50), in his 
brilliant book The aspiring mind of the Elizabethan younger generation, 
analyses these numerous documents by categorizing them into perspectives on 
ambition conceived as “a social evil, a religious sin, an unnatural rebellion and a 
futile passion”. The texts in question range from homilies and sermons, through 
political treaties to ancient texts. There seems little point in going into a de-
tailed analysis of these sources because they mostly express an explicit and 
strict condemnation of overreaching or ambition. Yet, out of the most well-
known, it is worth enumerating the already mentioned Mirror for magistrates, 
employing the all-too-powerful Elizabethan metaphor of the fickle wheel of 
Fortune, or sermons praising the virtue of obedience and dismissing rebellion 
as beastly and unnatural e.g. sermons of the “Elizabethan best-selling preacher” 
Henry Smith e.g. A memento for magistrates, The pride of Nebuchadnezzar 
(Esler 1966: 32, 35). Of course, what is most crucial about such texts is that, 
though they warn governors and kings against tyranny and pride, foremost they 
reinforce the legitimacy of the existing social order in the highly stratified class 
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society. That is why even the notorious fallen angel of the Elizabethan theatre 
world Robert Greene, in his play A pleasant conceyted comedie of George A 
Greene, the pinner of Wakefield (1599) makes his protagonist George decline a 
knighthood from King Edward out of humility and fear of unnecessary social 
climbing. The conversation between George and the King perfectly reflects the 
propagandist overtone implicit in it:  
Edward: […] Kneele downe, George.  
George: What will your Maiestie do?  
Edward: Dub thee a knight, George.  
George: I beseech your grace, grant me one thing.  
Edward: What is it?  
George: Then let me liue and die a yeoman still:  
So was my father, so must liue his sonne.  
For tis more credite to men of base degree,  
To do great deeds, than men of dignite. (A pleasant conceyted comedie of George A 
Greene, the pinner of Wakefield 5.1.1191-1199, 216-217).  
The stance taken by Greene’s protagonist of common origins sets an example 
for other Elizabethans. The above fragment underscores the intended total im-
mobility of the class system and constitutes a strong voice against ambition, 
which was supposed to be imprinted in the minds of the Elizabethans. Nietzsche 
would later claim that such an imprint is not really hard to achieve as it already 
belongs to human nature. In his criticism of convictions in Human, all too hu-
man he says:  
one usually prefers to surrender unconditionally to a conviction harboured by people 
in authority (fathers, friends, teachers, princes) and feels a kind of pang of con-
science if one fails to do so. This tendency is quite comprehensible, and its conse-
quences give us no right to any violent reproaches against the way human reason has 
evolved. (Nietzsche 2005a: 200)  
It seems just this embryo of an idea in his early work that would later develop in 
his writings into what he termed the “herd instinct” or “herd morality” (Kud-
erowicz 1979: 114-120). In Nietzsche’s (2005a: 202) view, only few people have 
what he terms an “instinctive mistrust of devious thinking” which seems a nec-
essary defence technique against “the fire of convictions”. Yet the early-modern 
England seems to provide an interesting plain where the containment tech-
niques of the aforementioned propagandist imprints succeed only up to a lim-
ited degree, because, after all, it is a period of intense mobility, both social and 
spacial. In the creative ferment of the early-modern period, the desperate at-
tempts at containment very often fail as ambition becomes the hallmark of the 
so called great Elizabethans.  
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The Elizabethan and Jacobean England is a fascinating paradox in its 
handling of the question of ambition, be it for power, riches or knowledge. The 
body of mainstream texts, as exemplified above, presents an outward condemna-
tion of ambition. Yet the biographies of many distinguished Elizabethans tell us a 
quite another story. Anthony Esler notices this fascinating contradiction interna-
lized in the minds of the early modern ambitious men. He points out that men like 
Sir Robert Cecil, Robert Devereux (the infamous Earl of Essex), Francis Bacon or 
Sir Walter Raleigh all constitute a seemingly irreconcilable amalgam of a materia-
listic and often cruel drive to power together with an idealistic nobility of mind 
and certain mental loftiness. He goes on even to suggest that the high ambition of 
these men becomes a kind of “secular religion” (Esler 1966: 161-163). As he (1966: 
184) writes: “this generation of Elizabethans possessed a unique capacity for 
merging the crudest of material goals with the loftiest idealistic aims. The most 
gallant Elizabethan cavaliers looted Spanish churches; the most unscrupulous 
Elizabethan political schemers were capable of poetry”. It is enough to collate 
Francis Bacon’s biography with some of his essays to see this paradox with all its 
perplexing clarity. For instance, when Bacon (2009, loc. 1365-1367) opens his 
essay On ambition he declares: “Ambition is like choler; which is an humor that 
maketh men active, earnest, full of alacrity, and stirring, if it be not stopped. But if 
it be stopped, and cannot have his way, it becometh adust, and thereby malign 
and venomous.” It seems hard to look for a more orthodox opinion on ambition 
than Bacon’s statement. He acknowledges the heightened mobility and a more 
acute vision of aspiring minds, yet he perceives these qualities as morbid or patho-
logical at best. In his essay, he seems to excuse only those who have “the ambition 
to prevail in great things” but even in them ambition appears a subversive quality 
(Bacon 2009, loc. 1386). As Esler (1966: 184) points out, Bacon’s brilliant political 
career, his meticulous and gradual climb towards the highest offices, all pose quite 
a riddle for those who would like to see him mostly as a noble thinker and author 
of The great instauration. Yet, even if one puts aside Bacon’s participation in the 
vicious scheming of the fraction-ridden court life, his works themselves speak of 
his immense ambition. Instauratio Magna, the sweeping revolution in science or 
its rebirth, is, after all, meant to be an imitation of the divine creative act. The 
work is subdivided into six parts like the six days of creation. The process is meant 
to lead up to the creation of The college of the six days’ works or The Solomon’s 
house, a founding institution of the new science, of which Bacon writes in the New 
Atlantis (Bacon as quoted in: Bruce 1999: 151, 183). As Benjamin Farrington 
(1964: 22) writes, The Great Instauration is: “explicitly named with reference to 
the divine promise in Genesis of dominion over all creatures.” Bacon undoubtedly 
embeds his ambitious project within a biblical framework; still, his work testifies 
to an immense desire to overreach and is an expression of his personal ambition 
to frame himself as the father of modern science who dares to imitate, if not im-
prove God’s creative acts. One is really only just short of saying that Bacon’s need 
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to “serve” mankind is a veiled expression of his strong will to power. What seems 
clear is that Bacon’s grand plan along with his ruthless political career make him a 
suitable candidate for the title of “Tamburlaine of the Mind”, which Anthony Esler 
(1964: 181) rightly attributes to him. However, a man who would resemble Tam-
burlaine in his grand dreams of exploration and conquest, even more closely is 
obviously Sir Walter Raleigh.  
Outwardly, as already mentioned, anything Raleigh ever wrote (or to be 
more precise what is attributed to him) bears no signs of the subversion and 
blasphemy of which Raleigh was accused of and tried for (Buckley 1965: 145). 
Yet, as Esler (1964: 170) suggests: “Sir Walter Raleigh was the Marlovian mind 
par excellence”. There is no question about the fact the Raleigh was a man of 
great ambitions, wild passions, and additionally, acute vision. Just as Bacon’s 
attempt to reinvigorate scientific inquiry can be counted as one of the “grand 
Elizabethan schemes, impossible to accomplish”, so can Raleigh’s search for El 
Dorado, or the Guiana Project (1595 and the second voyage) can be seen in the 
same light (Esler 1964: 165). In the figure of Raleigh the aforementioned mate-
rialistic drives and noble ideals also clash to form almost a paradigmatic model 
of the Elizabethan ambition. Raleigh’s amazement with the beauty and abun-
dance of life mix with his incessant pursuit of and undying obsession with the 
gold and riches of the famed El Dorado. In The discoverie of Guiana he (2006: 
6) writes: “Many years since, I had knowledge by relation, of that mighty, rich, 
and beautifull Empire of Guiana, and of that great and Golden City, which the 
Spanyards call El Dorado.” Though Raleigh failed to find his dream city of gold, 
his account is infused with longing for it. With reverie and often unconcealed 
envy Raleigh recounts Spanish conquests and seems to set the Spaniards as 
examples for his own pursuits. He says:  
If Peru had so many heapes of Golde, whereof those Ingas were Princes, and that 
they delighted so much therein, no doubt but this which nowe liueth and raigneth in 
Manoa, hath the same humour, and I am assured hath more abundance of Golde, 
within his territorie, then all Peru, and the west Indies. (Raleigh 2006: 203)29  
Raleigh’s description is undoubtedly downright pragmatic, yet it is also perme-
ated with a sense of aristocratic superiority when he claims that “those Ingas” 
could be actually Princes. As Joyce Lorimer (2006: LXIII), the editor of the 
manuscript, points out:  
  
29 Manoa is an imaginary kingdom full of riches and gold which Raleigh was in search 
for. For more details see: Lorimer, Joyce (ed.). 2006. “Introduction to Sir Walter Raleigh’s 
Discoverie of Guiana”, in: Walter Raleigh. 2006. Discoverie of Guiana, in: Lorimer, Joyce 
(ed.). 2006. Sir Walter Raleigh’s Discoverie of Guiana. Aldershot Hants or Burlington: 
Ashgate for The Hakluyt Society London. XVII-XCVII. 
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it is difficult to reconcile Raleigh’s views. His expressed efforts to form alliances with 
indigenous leaders, and to ensure that none of their peoples were offended by as-
saults or thefts committed by his men, ‘sorted ill’ with his concluding characteriza-
tion of Guiana as the kind of place where ‘the meaner sorte’ might well eat, drink, 
smoke and womanize to their hearts’ content and find gold for the asking.  
Yet, as Greenblatt (1993: XIV) underscores: a “conjunction of apparently con-
tradictory impulses is no accident; it is built into the structure of much of the 
period’s colonialist discourse.” Therefore, Raleigh’s description is at points full 
of fascination and astonishment for the world of Guiana, testifying to his aes-
thetic sensitivity and mental loftiness. On the other hand, Raleigh’s plans of 
conquest and exploitation are also made pretty clear. So Raleigh (2006: 49), 
like Bacon, also fuses the Elizabethan mental sophistication with a ruthless 
embrace of quite lowly instincts. In his account, the recurring image of the na-
tives’ naked bodies sprinkled with gold dust “shinning from the foote to the 
head” indulging in drinking and merry making, arouses almost atavistic long-
ings. One cannot escape an impression that the natives emerge almost as Dio-
nysian satyrs. Thus, as I would argue, in Raleigh the intellect blurs with atavistic 
instincts, which the speaker desperately tries to sublimate and transfigure into a 
higher value. Almost a decade later, Greenblatt (1973: 158) points out: 
“[i]mages of the New World haunted Ralegh in the Tower” as the descriptions of 
Eden in The history of the world are modelled on his memories from Guiana. In 
section VIII: Of their opinion that seat paradise under the equinoctial: and of 
the pleasant habitation under these climates (Chapter III) of Book I he writes:  
Now we find that the hottest regions of the world seated under the equinoctial line, 
or near it, are so refreshed with a daily gale of easterly wind, […] that there is any in-
convenience or distemperate heat found thereby. […] I know no other part of the 
world of better, or equal temper […] But (for the greatest part) those regions have so 
many goodly rivers, fountains, and little brooks, abundance of high cedars, and other 
stately trees casting shade, so many sorts of delicate fruits, ever bearing, and at all 
times beautified with blossom and fruit, both green and ripe, as it may of all other 
parts be best compared to the paradise of Eden. (Raleigh 1829: 89)  
Yet, despite the fact that Raleigh seems to have found the garden of Eden in 
Guiana, resting on the laurels of this aesthetic and also intellectual discovery 
was not enough for him. It is rather the Machaivellian virtù, understood as the 
“heroic strength of will that strong men exercise to oppose envious fortune” that 
was closer to his heart and pushed him forward in his incessant pursuit of the 
golden city (Greenblatt 1973: 159). Raleigh’s admiration for the extent of the 
Spanish overcoming in their conquests is expressed in The history of the world 
e.g. Book V, Chapter I when he (1829: 114) says:  
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Here I cannot forbear to commend the patient virtue of the Spaniards: we seldom or 
never find that any nation hath endured so many misadventures and miseries as the 
Spaniards have done, in their Indian discoveries; yet persisting in their enterprises 
with an invincible constancy, they have annexed to their kingdom so many goodly 
provinces, as bury the remembrance of all dangers past.  
Raleigh’s argument is followed by a long list of obstacles that had to be over-
come, but what emerges as the most crucial is the “invincible constancy” of the 
Spanish, which Raleigh definitely wants to imprint as a crowning quality of his 
own character. The moral implications of the Spanish and the English colonial 
ambitions are, of course, quite another matter. However, it is undoubted that 
Raleigh’s rhetoric expresses his Nietzschean in spirit longing to transfigure and 
over-come in order to frame one’s own greatness. Thus, Sir Walter Raleigh, 
along with Francis Bacon, deserves the title of the Tamburlaine of his age.  
As portrayed, the great men of the Elizabethan and Jacobean England 
are ridden by internal contradictions and tensions, between ennobling and de-
grading instincts. In my opinion, in their embrace of seemingly mutually exclu-
sive impulses they become model specimens of Nietzschean overhuman poten-
tial, as they do not repudiate their passions but rather attempt to transfigure 
them into tools of creation. The apparently irreconcilable dissonances between 
their biographies and works seem to make their attempts at self-overcoming 
more authentic. Their ambition to outshine and tower over their contempora-
ries is unquestionable, while their engagement with the rough reality of court 
politics approximates them to the Nietzschean vision of Renaissance “overmen”. 
It seems reasonable to suspect that just as Nietzsche (2002: 85) idolized Cesare 
Borgia as a complete Renaissance man, so would he praise Raleigh or Bacon as 
“these healthiest of all tropical monsters”. What some people perceive as inter-
nal contradiction at the heart of the nature of these passionate men, in 
Nietzsche’s vision becomes merely “nature”. It seems that Renaissance men, not 
only Raleigh or Bacon, but also Shakespeare or Marlowe, lived in accordance 
with different “harsh and horrible ethics”, which for Nietzsche (2006c: 212) is a 
“consequence of a surplus of life”; and because Elizabethans lived in a reality in 
which “a lot can be risked, a lot can be challenged, a lot can also be squandered” 
(Nietzsche 2006c: 212). Yet, where risk and challenge are everyday ingredients 
of life, creativity thrives – as the works of these men testify. Bacon’s Instauratio 
Magna, and Raleigh’s The history of the world or Guiana project, are only a few 
of the many fruits of Elizabethan creativity.  
In this light, Elizabethan theatre and its literature becomes also the 
voice of its period. As Esler (1966: 146) argues:  
For a clear understanding of the forms of power as the Elizabethan younger genera-
tion conceived of them, the most useful sources of data are not to be found in the 
lives of this generation, but in their artistic creations. Source material on the real at-
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titudes of Elizabethans toward political power is extremely limited; for unlike the 
semi-legitimate ideal of honour, power was not something one generally discussed 
even in private. If we are to comprehend the forms which the lust for dominion as-
sumed in the minds of these ambitious young Elizabethans, it will therefore be ad-
visable to focus our attention, not on men, but on literary stereotypes.  
Of course, the figures Esler has in mind are for example Marlowe’s Tamburlaine 
or even Shakespeare’s Macbeth. And though Esler seems to be talking solely 
about very down-to-earth political power, this Elizabethan will to power he 
points to may very well refer to a wider phenomenon of over-reaching which is 
prevalent in the period and of which literature is so often a faithful portrayal. 
Marlowe’s mighty Tamburlaine thunders on stage and delivers his credo on 
“aspiring minds” (Tamburlaine, the great part 1, 2.7.11-29). Macbeth reaches 
his crown through his “vaulting ambition which o’erleaps itself, ” (Macbeth, 
1.7.25-28), while George Peele’s Tom Stukley proclaims outwardly:  
My chiefest companie shall be with kings, 
And my deserts shall counterpoise a kings, 
Why should not I then looke to be a king? 
I am the marques now of Ireland made, 
And will be shortly king of Ireland, 
King of a mole-hill had I rather be, 
Than the richest subject of a monarchie, 
Huffe it brave minde, and never cease t’aspire, 
before thou raigne sole king of thy desire” (The Battle of Alcazar, 2.2.459-467).  
A cry: “never cease t’aspire,/ before thou raigne sole king of thy desire” unques-
tionably expresses Zeitgeist, which resonates much further than only the aristo-
cratic circles. It is hard to imagine a more assertive and confident act of the self-
definition of an individual. At the same time, Peele’s statement is an overt invi-
tation to Nietzschean over-coming, almost a Zarathustran imperative: “I teach 
you the overman. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you 
done to overcome him?” (Nietzsche 2006b: 5). Thus as it seems, it is ambition and 
aspiration, a deeply Nietzschean desire to transfigure one’s physis and over-
come its short-comings, that becomes a medium of establishing singularity. The 
already well-established idea of Renaissance mobility, both social and special, 
can be read as one of many examples of the contagious nature of Elizabethan 
over-reaching. The ambition and pride of exceptional individuals are means and 
ends of over-coming, which resurfaces as a more mature expression of individu-
ality. One could seek in vain those among Elizabethan overmen who would de-
clare war on their passions and cravings. Elizabethan “aspiring minds” would 
not try to repudiate them, they would thrive on them. Thus, they would encap-
sulate Nietzschean complete men with their lowly instincts and lofty aspirations 
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moulded into singular, only seemingly contradictory existences. Functioning in 
the stiflingly conformist state, they would have to acknowledge the subversion 
inherent to their natures and struggle with external attempts at its containment. 
The excess, extravagance and pride of these Elizabethan and Jacobean overmen 
would be an outward demonstration of their free-thinking impulses. And I 
deeply believe that it is exactly in this explosive tension between the risk of los-
ing and desire to gain, the tension between required conformity and lurking 
subversion, that the Nietzschean spirit of the age is expressed. Nietzsche, de-
spite his slightly idealized vision of the Renaissance, saw this seeming paradox 
with all its clarity.  
Hopefully, as demonstrated, the Nietzschean reading of Shakespeare’s 
and Marlowe’s period opens a new vista that might capture the very discordia 
concors inherent to the early-modern mind. I strongly believe that Nietzsche, in 
his vision of the Renaissance, reached the crux of the early modern morality. In 
The twilight of the idols he deemed the Renaissance “the last great age”, not 
because of its harmony and serenity, but because of its “might is right” morality 
(Nietzsche 2006c: 212). With an acute feeling for human psychology and the 
historical process Nietzsche sensed the brutal and stifling reality of the early-
modern life when he idealized figures such as Cesare Borgia, who would not 
stop short of cruelty or barbarity. Yet, in people who would embrace their pas-
sions and use them to their advantage, Nietzsche saw specimens of the greatest 
health and strength. His vision of the Renaissance is based on the material that 
was available to him at the time, namely, the famous Civilisation of the Renais-
sance in Italy (1860) by Jacob Burckhardt. However, as I have argued, his pers-
pective is translatable to the reading of the Elizabethan and Jacobean England 
as well as the interpretation of key conflicts inherent in the plays of Marlowe 
and Shakespeare. It happens to be so because it is in the oppressive nature of 
the Elizabethan and Jacobean period that the greatest creativity lies. The philo-
sophical contributions of key Renaissance thinkers e.g. Montaigne, Pomponazzi 
or Machiavelli unveil the raw physicality of human instincts, while the speeches 
of those in power try to utilize and take advantage of this previously unacknow-
ledged singularity. Nietzsche’s philosophy becomes a path that leads one 
through the meanderings of the early-modern tensions as he is one of the first 
philosophers in the history of modern philosophy who acknowledges the bar-
baric or the demonic as a subversive, albeit creative, element of human nature. 
He dismantles the illusory idea of Greek serenity when discussing ancient Greek 
culture in The birth of tragedy, arguing that the development of culture is pre-
dominantly based on conflict. Had Nietzsche been more interested in the stu-
dies of the early modern period than those of Antiquity, possibly he would have 
embarked on a voyage against a faulty portrayal of the Renaissance as a period 
of the peaceful revival of the Ancient learning and a smooth project of the dis-
covery of the world, just as new historicists and cultural materialists did in the 
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early 1980s. For this reason, I venture to say that in his instinctive feel for the 
early-modern ethics of struggle, tension and conflict he pre-dated the writings 
of Greenblatt or Dollimore. Nietzsche undoubtedly saw the state as an arch-
enemy of human individuality and creativity. Yet, he also understood that hu-
man action requires suffering and limitation to over-come circumstances, trans-
figure them, and emerge stronger. Thus, Elizabethan creativity is born in the 
struggle between subversion and containment, discovery and suppression. Just 
to quote a few examples, Raleigh’s History of the world was produced during 
the author’s containment in the Tower. After its publication it was soon sup-
pressed “for divers exceptions, but especially for being too saucy in censuring 
Princes” (Dangerous ideas 2009). The author himself, just like his contempo-
rary Francis Bacon, was steeped in the struggles of contemporary politics and 
threatened by their pitfalls. Yet their free-thinking impulses found vent in their 
grand schemes – scientific, intellectual and explorative in nature. In the given 
circumstances, these men, in the course of embracing their natures and their 
over-coming, emerged as close to the Nietzschean overmen.  
 Nevertheless, even those who would profess independence of the con-
temporary political struggles were also, often unwillingly, dragged into the 
midst of the raging fire. In the heart of the post-reformation paranoia of torture, 
persecution, rake and stake, some had to sacrifice a lot in the defence of their 
intellectual freedom. Though in my analysis I focus mostly on sceptics from the 
outside of England, as I have tried to show, these thinkers had the most pro-
found impact on the development of the English sceptical and atheist thought. 
The English scepticism, as shown, is often veiled as a ferocious and aggressive 
attack on the indecency of free-thinking, or in other words, it rather constitutes 
a response towards the external influx of the foreign body of thought. This can 
be seen in the violent response towards Machiavelli’s The prince or numerous 
aforementioned attacks on the free-thinking or atheist stances. Thus, the Eng-
lish scepticism is born out of the friction between the intellectual free-thinking 
discovery, and indignation at its subversive nature. This phenomenon in itself 
seems to be deeply Nietzschean as yet again one can witness culture as a fruit of 
bitter conflict. For these reasons, I would risk a statement that the Elizabethan 
and Jacobean England is indeed a battlefield driven by the Nietzschean “harsh 
and horrible ethics” (Nietzsche 2006c: 212). The war that ensues is finally a 
“consequence of a surplus of life” rather than its degeneration (Nietzsche 
2006c: 212). This vitality becomes food for the further creativity of which Eliza-
bethan drama might be arguably the finest example. As I would argue, in the 
following chapters the similar deeply Nietzschean mechanism functions in the 
works of both Shakespeare and Marlowe. Drama of the period is the first-hand 
voice of the period, it grows out of it and at the same time it shapes its own envi-
ronment. It becomes a living monument to the living Elizabethan over-men and 
becomes an inspiration for the new to be born. As I argued before, Nietzsche’s 
Chapter Two 118 
idealization of the Renaissance is really a so called “negative idealization”, be-
cause it often becomes an outward cult of barbaric creativity and cruel indivi-
duality. There is no escaping from the encounters with such mighty, but often 
also frightening, figures in both Marlowe’s and Shakespeare’s plays.  
 
Chapter Three 
Vicious greatness: Tamburlaine and Barabas 
Christopher Marlowe and his plays seem to be at the very heart of the Renais-
sance subversion. With his ground-breaking essay “Marlowe and the Will to 
Absolute Play”, Stephen Greenblatt (1980: 222) established Marlowe as the 
arch-overeacher of the English Renaissance when he claimed that: “Marlowe 
sees identity established at those moments in which order – political, theologi-
cal, sexual – is violated.” Even when one casts a glance at the bunch of contra-
dictory and inconclusive facts surrounding his semi-criminal and controversial 
life, one sees the aptness of Greenblatt’s definition. Obviously, Marlowe – the 
playwright was as much “over-reaching” as Marlowe – the man, which Green-
blatt’s “will to absolute play” perfectly captures. Interestingly, Greenblatt’s term 
“the will to absolute play” is a pun on Nietzsche’s idea of “the will to power”, an 
overwhelming force, both destructive and constructive, shaping existence and 
giving it its poignancy. Though Greenblatt himself does not acknowledge 
Nietzsche as a source of inspiration or a methodological tool in his investigation 
of Marlowe and other early modern figures, the parallel does seem to suggest 
itself. In a truly Nietzschean spirit, Marlowe’s plays question dogmas and de-
molish existing political and religious orders. At the same time, they respond to 
the early modern crisis of identity in the reality of budding imperialism and 
consumerism. Both parts of Tamburlaine as well as The Jew of Malta consti-
tute strong statements of singular identities, where the protagonists – Tambur-
laine and Barabas – assert their singularity in unprecedented circumstances as 
the plays dissect what for the Elizabethans were contentious political and ideo-
logical matters. Tamburlaine’s conquests of vast and exotic lands address the 
newly-emerging imperialist aspirations of the key players on the political arena 
of early-modern Europe e.g. Catholic Spain – an ever more threatening enemy 
to England in the 1580s and 1590s; while The Jew of Malta adds a fresh dimen-
sion to political struggle in the form of new challenges in the early capitalism. 
With the introduction of the Turks, as a substantial political force, into the intri-
cate fabrics of the plays, both works also act out religious tensions underscored 
by the clash of Christianity and the ever increasing influence of The Ottoman 
Empire. Turkish religious “otherness” is not merely a touch of exoticism that 
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permeates Marlowe’s plays, but a reflection of an authentic European mood at 
the dawn of the Islamic rise. Moreover, Marlowe’s exploitation of cultural and 
religious stereotypes, rather than affirming their currency, actually contests 
them. The widening of possible religious perspectives as well as the instrumen-
tal use of religion in the political struggle underscores Renaissance scepticism 
and/or Marlowe’s moral relativity. In the plays under my scrutiny, the protago-
nists seem to be aliens in their capacities – removed from the surrounding real-
ity, yet simultaneously so steeped in the circumstances of their existences. 
Tamburlaine, originally a shepherd of modest means, fashions himself into the 
most powerful ruler of the East, while Barabas, a Jew surrounded by corrupt 
Christians and threatening Turks, emerges as the master of puppets on the is-
land of Malta. They seem to function within, at the same time contesting, the 
established social make-up: the patriarchal system of rank and privilege, a set of 
expected religious practices and, finally, supposedly natural moral laws – all 
this in the pursuit of their individual aspirations. Finally, Marlowe’s evaluation 
of their moral conduct is more than inconclusive as their deaths do not seem to 
be inscribed within a providentialist framework.  
For these reasons, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine and Barabas appear to be ap-
propriate candidates for Nietzsche’s overmen. It is hardly plausible that Nietzsche 
ever heard about Marlowe and his plays but, in my opinion, it is safe to say that he 
would have applauded Marlowe’s protagonists as substantial statements of indivi-
duality, if not egoism. He would have been gripped by their daring and aspiring 
natures as well as their chaffing at conventional morality. Their inherently scep-
tical natures constitute a basis for their rampant individualism, very much in line 
with Nietzsche’s insistence on self-creation. I would also argue that Tamburlaine’s 
incessant and stubborn pressing in his further conquests is a demonstration of his 
substantial will to power. Similarly Barabas’s hunger for, first, vengeance and, 
then, control is also a demonstration of Barabas’s embrace of primeval instincts. 
However, though communicating moral relativity (also a crucial Nietzschean te-
net), I see Marlowe’s plays as lacking in moral reflection. Unlike Shakespeare, 
Marlowe rarely lets his protagonists ponder on the consequences of their actions. 
Thus, his characters, being self-created and self-asserted singular identities lack 
the heightened interiority of Shakespeare’s mature tragic heroes e.g. Brutus or 
Macbeth. Yet the dimension of the social interchange of Marlowe’s protagonists is 
quite substantial; they are, in a way, terrifying children of the oppressing systems 
in which they live. Finally, I would even venture saying that they emulate Nietz-
schean “Antichrist” figures in their megalomania and disregard for socially-
constructed morality. Such are the general directions my analysis – in the spirit of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy – follows. However, before I embark onto a full-fledged 
discussion of Marlowe’s notorious protagonists, I first intend to address the exist-
ing body of criticism on Tamburlaine and Barabas. Because the question of Mar-
lowe’s highly individualist characterization has already been frequently addressed 
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by scholars, such a procedure seems reasonable. Hence, each analysis is preceded 
by a short section in which I critically evaluate the interpretative paths explored so 
far in an attempt to emulate the best practices and possibly combine relatively 
“old” criticism (e.g. Levin, Steane) with the fruits of more contemporary research 
(e.g. Bartels, Shepherd). This procedure is also in line with my aim to find a gol-
den mean between the “idealized” cult of Renaissance individualism by early 
twentieth-century critics and the “decentred” subject chained to limiting ideology 
promoted by cultural materialists. Lastly, because this is the first out of the three 
analytical chapters utilising Nietzscheism (or its compromised version worked out 
in Chapter 1, to be more precise) in the analysis of Shakespeare’s and Marlowe’s 
drama, I will occasionally deviate from my main line of argument in order to ex-
plain certain pertinent Nietzschean tenets e.g. “self-overcoming” or “sublimation” 
etc. Later on, as these notions become clearer, I will leave them without additional 
commentary, instead I will use them as analytical tools or contrast their meaning 
with typically early modern conceptualizations. Within my Nietzschean frame-
work, source material is also incorporated in order to open discussion on the te-
nability of Renaissance overhuman potential, and more specifically its demonstra-
tion in Marlowe’s astounding protagonists. There have been numerous critical 
responses to Marlowe’s controversial morality, but it seems that the complexity of 
the plays welcomes yet another rereading, one that would attempt to free Mar-
lowe’s subversive vision from the burden of widely-accepted ethical frameworks. 
As I will be arguing, the plays, despite being a product of the Elizabethan mind, 
seem to be driven by a different philosophy, perplexing to both early-modern and 
modern audiences. Having in mind Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the claim that 
the existing morality is by no means universal or untimely (Kaufmann 1974: 81, 
114), I open my analysis with a look at Tamburlaine. I believe that within a totally 
opposite frame of mind – that of a Nietzschean perspectivist stance – Tambur-
laine’s towering ambition, pride and insatiable hunger for power emerge as over-
human qualities.  
3.1. Tamburlaine (Tamburlaine, the great)  
3.1.1. Critical responses to Tamburlaine, the great  
and interpretative paths 
The Prologue to the first part of Tamburlaine, the great proscribes the audience 
to “[v]iew but his picture in this tragic glass” (Tamb. 1, The Prologue 7). Yet, the 
opening already signals that one has not encountered a typical tragedy, as one is 
expected to “applaud [Tamburlaine’s] fortunes” (Tamb. 1, The Prologue 8). So 
one is indeed more than perplexed at the closing of Part 1 when the mighty 
Tamburlaine leaves the stage unconquered with his captive wife now Queen of 
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Persia and his empire stretching “from the bounds of Afric to the banks/ of 
Ganges” (Tamb. 1, 5.2.456-457). Despite Tamburlaine’s sudden death closing 
Part 2, the play is undoubtedly a story of personal success and military glory. 
Marlowe’s Tamburlaine diptych has long perplexed and confused critics not 
only because it is a presentation of persistent victory and almost inexhaustible 
vitality, but because this unfailing energy and glory belongs to someone who, by 
traditionally-conceived morality standards, both early modern and modern, 
appears as an evil figure, worth condemnation. As mentioned, Tamburlaine 
poses numerous troubles for critics. As J.B. Steane (1970: 62) aptly points out 
“the essential working of the drama impels admiration for the super-humanity 
of one who by Christian values is detestable as subhuman.” The deeds of Tam-
burlaine that appear detestable to Steane obviously include the merciless killing 
of the virgins of Damascus or the cruel treatment of Bajazeth and his wife Sa-
bina. In the course of his analysis, Steane (1970: 62-64) underscores the moral 
ambiguity of the play, but at the same time he claims that the play constitutes 
an important debate on morals. For instance, he believes Zenocrate, the wife of 
Tamburlaine, to be a moral counterbalance to his rough and uncontrollable 
character, forgetting somewhat that Zenocrate is after all a faithful companion 
in most of Tamburlaine’s deeds (Steane 1970: 82). It is worth underscoring that 
even, faced with a train of massacred dead bodies with her former betrothed 
King of Arabia dying at her feet, when moral reflection stirs her indignation at 
Tamburlaine’s murderous deeds she remains passive and, above all, loyal to 
him (Part 1 Act 5 scene 2). Pointing to the moral ambiguity of Marlowe’s pro-
tagonist, Steane’s analysis remains inconclusive. Among major studies of Tam-
burlaine, the Great, the analysis by Roy Battenhouse also seems worth consid-
eration as it links Marlowe’s play with Renaissance moral philosophy. Batten-
house believes that it is absolutely necessary to look at the play with the eyes of 
the Elizabethan audience. Legitimate as this claim seems to be, he nevertheless 
sees Tamburlaine as a didactic piece in which the death of the protagonist can 
clearly be seen as a punishment for his sins. Battenhouse (1941: 2-3) accuses 
other scholars (e.g. Boas, Ellis-Fermor, Ingram) of “romanticizing” Tamburlaine 
by reading his energetic striving for power as an expression of Marlowe’s “mod-
ern” spirit. He himself insists on a close reading of the Elizabethan circum-
stances of the play’s production, namely, a close reading of the source material. 
However, his interpretation is as yet a far cry from the cultural materialist pro-
ject as he sees the Elizabethan condemnation of ambition as a universally and 
unquestionably accepted fact. My discussion of “overreaching” personalities in 
Chapter 2 hopefully demonstrated that despite the “official” propagandist per-
spective on ambition as an arch-sin, the English Renaissance cultural and po-
litical arena swarmed with ambitious men and women who challenged the exist-
ing order with their subversive stances, while plays such as Tamburlaine testify 
to this phenomenon. Battenhouse (1941: 16, 12), insisting on the affinity be-
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tween the didactic mode of Mirror for magistrates and Marlowe’s purpose, 
resolves to present Tamburlaine as a play whose aim is “to combine the morality 
play with the dramatization of history.” Indeed, he studies Renaissance source 
texts along with Marlowe’s own sources with the utmost diligence but, in his 
stubborn insistence that Tamburlaine is a tragedy with a moral lesson, he seems 
to oversee the fact that Marlowe’s plays subvert rather than confirm dogmas 
presented to the Elizabethans as “moral philosophy”. As I will try to show, Mar-
lowe evidently rejects the moralism of his sources e.g. Fortescue or Whetstone 
by skipping details that undermine Tamburlaine’s overhuman potential. Al-
though Battenhouse justifiably points to Renaissance humanism as a source of 
Tamburlaine’s strong individuality, it seems doubtful that the immense popu-
larity of the play stemmed from the fact that it communicated fear and pro-
moted humility, especially that, as mentioned, it is a story of the ever-repeating 
cycle of victory in battle and the glory of power. The idea of Tamburlaine’s death 
as a punishment for his sins also seems to be wide of the mark because his death 
seems sudden, accidental and it is not preceded by any substantial suffering 
that could entail punishment. After all, the passing away of Tamburlaine is felt 
by his companions as the end of a great era, and it is imbued with the atmos-
phere of unrivalled loss as Amyras says: “For earth hath spent the pride of all 
her fruit, /And heaven consum’d his choicest living fire! /Let earth and heaven 
his timeless death deplore, /For both their worths will equal him no more!” 
(Tamb. 2, 5.3.250-4). George Whetstone, who adapted Pedro Mexía’s Silva de 
Varia Le Leción (1540), originally a Spanish historical account of Tamburlaine’s 
life and conquests, in The English mirror (1586) presents his version of Tam-
burlaine’s rule in a didactic tone and clearly aims for it to be an exemplar. 
Vivien Thomas and William Tydeman (1994: 74) identify The English mirror as 
the key source text for Marlowe and term it “a kind of prose Mirror for magis-
trates in which the blessings of the Elizabethan polity were extolled.” Whet-
stone (1994: 91, 96) raves at Machiavelli and his “policy un[be]seeming of a 
Christian prince”, yet he praises Tamburlaine because it is “by his cruelty that 
God raised him to chasten the kings and proud people of the earth.” Neverthe-
less, the lack of military and political skill in Tamburlaine’s sons leads to the fall 
of his empire to the sons of those Princes that Tamburlaine had himself first 
subdued (Whetstone 1994: 95-96). Sir Thomas Fortescue in The forest or col-
lection of histories (1571), possibly Marlowe’s source and also an adaptation of 
Mexía, does not directly refer to Tamburlaine as a tyrant, but underscores a 
similar mechanism to the one mentioned by Whetstone. He announces that 
tyrants, who fashion themselves as “the ire of God” will be themselves punished 
by God (Fortescue 1994: 82-83). He also mentions the disintegration of Tam-
burlaine’s empire due to the discord of his sons (Fortescue 1994: 89). Finally, 
John Bishop (1994: 141) in Beautiful blossoms (1577) colours the story of Tam-
burlaine by claiming that before his death Tamburlaine saw the ghost of Ba-
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jazeth, or the Devil himself, who said: “[n]ow it shall not be long, villain, but 
thou shalt worthily be paid for thy manifold outrages, and I too shall be re-
venged for the wearisome wrong that thou diddest to me, making me to die unto 
a beast in mine own dung”. Marlowe, who might have known or used all these 
sources, rejects the typically Elizabethan providentialism inherent in them. 
With a very Nietzschean spirit, he deprives Tamburlaine of any deeper meta-
physical reflection, and instead makes him focus on the earthly domain. He lets 
Tamburlaine die a natural and a peaceful death, unconquered, surrounded and 
revered by his companions and sons. His death is nothing like the sudden and 
violent death of the King of Persia in Thomas Preston’s Cambises, a kind of 
theatrical model for Marlowe. In Preston’s play, the King suffers “odious death 
by gods iustice appointed” (Preston 2007). Marlowe gives Tamburlaine a good 
death which should not be read as a retribution for his deeds (Rutter 2012: 25). 
Moreover, he does not leave the audience even with a hint of possible future 
discord. Instead, being “a drama of empire”, as Bartels (1993: 53) points out, it 
communicates a sense of melancholy that there is still “all the world” to conquer 
(Tamb. 1, 5.3.124).1 So, as one can see, moralistic accounts of the Tamburlaine 
plays do not give justice to the originality of Marlowe’s message – that actually 
stands out from the midst of early modern didactic tracts condemning ambition 
or pursuits of power and influence.  
One of the few early critics who actually attempted to approach Mar-
lowe’s plays in a totally new light was Harry Levin, the author of an influential 
study Christopher Marlowe – the overreacher. Levin seems to have been the 
first critic to fully realize the “over-reaching” nature of Marlowe’s characters, 
or in other words, their subversive and original nature that escapes conven-
tional moralities. As Levin (1961: 43) writes about Marlowe:  
[h]is protagonist is never Everyman, but always l’uomo singlore, the exceptional 
man, who becomes king because he is a hero, not hero because he is a king; the 
private individual who remains captain of his fate, at least until his ambition over-
leaps itself; the overreacher whose tragedy is more of an action than a passion, 
rather an assertion of man’s will than an acceptance of God’s.  
  
1 Emily Bartels puts forward the thesis of Tamburlaine being an expression of Eng-
land’s early imperialist leanings and aspirations. The play fuels the early modern audience’s 
imagination with visions of imaginary conquests of ‘other’ worlds. Bartels (1993: 3) writes: 
“This preoccupation with the ‘other’, coming as and when it does, is no accident. For Mar-
lowe’s representations respond to an increasingly dominant cultural obsession with foreign 
worlds and peoples, emerging with England’s nascent imperialism. As society attempted to 
come to terms with competing cultures and to establish its place beside and above them, it 
produced a discourse of difference, a discourse that interrogated and enforced the crucial, 
self-affirming distinctions between self (Europe, England, ‘representative man’, the status 
quo) and other foreign cultures, nonconformists, alternative values.” 
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It is actually Harry Levin (1961: 48), in his influential Overreacher, who con-
trasts Tamburlaine, the great with, the already mentioned, Mirror for magis-
trates and openly declares:  
[Marlowe’s] heroes make their fortunes by exercising virtues which conventional 
morality might well regard as vices. For the most part, they are self-made men; 
and, to the extent that they can disregard the canons of good and evil, they are su-
permen. They are continually active and, up to a point, incapable of suffering. 
Levin, writing against the background of such critics as Battenhouse, capitalizes 
on the “immorality” of Marlovian protagonists, hitting at the very core of their 
subversion. However, having acknowledged Marlowe’s “overreaching” poten-
tial, he does not seem to seek reasons for Marlowe’s subversion. He sees that 
Marlowe does not fit the didactic and providentialist strain of writing yet he 
never ventures to investigate deeper the geo-political context of Elizabeth’s 
reign in the 1580s and 1590s. The political climate obviously heavily influenced 
cultural life and, to my mind, a look at the central political directions as well as 
prevalent beliefs helps to draw a plethora of suggestive parallels and tensions. 
Recent materialist critics of Marlowe have resolved to do just this when they 
have again immersed Tamburlaine into the circumstances of its production. As 
its seems, the plays’ immediate context is the freshly emerging need for geo-
graphical expansion of the English, where Tamburlaine stands as the original 
colonist. The play was written when the first English settlers were establishing 
the colony of Virginia in the new world (Rutter 2012: 33). Explicit expressions 
of ethnic and racial prejudice uttered by both Tamburlaine and his opponents 
capture the colonial stance of superiority taken for granted by the first coloniz-
ers. For many critics the racial labels represent “nations colonized by or traded 
with by the Elizabethans” (Burnett 2004: 130). Ethnic tensions are played out 
by the shifts between centrality and marginality as well as monstrosity commu-
nicated by the themes of barbarity and otherness (Burnett 2004: 129-130). Ex-
ploiting further the theme of otherness, Tamburlaine, the great also manifests 
unclear standpoints on religion, as the Christian-Muslim relations appear more 
than troubled (Burnett 2004: 135). Marlowe’s plays seem to reflect certain dou-
ble-dealing concerning the perception of the Turks in England. On the one 
hand, as critics point out, the increasing power of the Ottoman Empire was a 
source of great concern for the Christian Europe. In 1453, the Turks conquered 
Constantinople and, as a consequence, they found themselves very close to 
Europe – posing a constant threat. On the other hand, the emergence of the new 
power on the political arena provided the English with a potential ally against 
the Spanish as well as it initiated more intense trade relations and an increased 
interchange of goods and services (Rutter 2012: 32). If one follows a negative 
and prejudiced perspective on the Turks as “infidels” who pose a danger to 
Christendom, then Tamburlaine’s fashioning into “the scourge of God” can be 
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read positively as it is him who is the enemy of the threatening Turks (Rutter 
2012: 32). However, it is worth noticing that Tamburlaine, though instrumen-
tally using various notions of God or gods for his political aims, is himself no 
Christian, but rather Muslim. With his aspirations to whole-world conquest he 
also communicates a subversive idea and may be read as a threat to both Chris-
tianity and European civilisations. Simon Shepherd also at length explains the 
issue of double “Turkishness”, where the word “Turk”, depending on the con-
text, connotes positive and negative values. As “non-Christians” and a military 
threat to Europe, they were imbued with cruelty and barbarity. As Shepherd 
(1986: 142) writes, “[t]he idea of cruelty was probably produced by the Turks’ 
distant foreignness combined with an absence from their lives of comprehensi-
ble Christian ethics, but more importantly by their military threat […].” How-
ever, England, being a Protestant country, was characterized by a long-standing 
enmity towards Catholic Spain. Elizabethan propaganda shaped the Spaniards 
as “infidels” who posed an equal danger to the “real” faith just as the Islamic 
Ottoman Empire. At the same time, seeing the Turks as a viable political and 
military counterbalance to Spain, the Queen was willing to oversee religious 
differences between the Turks and the English, or actually underscore possible 
similarities.2 So, as Shepherd (1986: 145) aptly points out:  
[c]learly the two senses of the word ‘Turk’ were far apart: while Leicester fought 
‘Turkish’ Spaniards in the Netherlands, he had dealings with the court at Constan-
tinople (and Turks encouraged the Netherlands’ resistance to Spain). In the word 
‘Turk’ there was a potential contradiction of meanings which, if consciously ar-
ticulated, could lead to a knowledge of the discursive operation of ‘faith’ and ‘infi-
del’ within material economic and political practices. 
So as can be seen, Tamburlaine’s victory of the Turks can very well be seen as 
emulating the victory over the Spanish. Nevertheless, this is by no means 
equal with Marlowe conforming to the dominant ideology and Elizabethan 
propaganda as, subliminally, the play undermines rather than strengthens its 
tenets. The Anglo-Spanish crisis evoked a deep need for national heroes while 
the fight with them was seen as a holy crusade (Shepherd 1986: 149). As 
Shepherd (1986: 150) claims:  
  
2 Shepherd (1986: 145) gives a quite concrete example when he writes: “By insisting on 
the corrupt Catholic religion as the fundamental enemy a useful, ideologically justifiable, 
rapprochement between Islam and Protestantism could be constructed: in 1577 Elizabeth’s 
ambassador to Morroco, Edward Hogan, said the king bore ‘greater affection to our nation 
than to others because our religion, which forbiddeth worship of idols’ […].” It is interesting 
to note that, at the beginning of her reign, when the Queen was determined to keep good 
relations with Philip of Spain, she frequently made attempts to oversee doctrinal differences 
between Protestantism and Catholicism so her use of religion in her policy was very much 
like that of Tamburlaine – very instrumental.  
Vicious greatness: Tamburlaine … 127 
[w]ith the uncertainty about succession and Elizabeth’s policy of pacifying where 
possible, the ideology of protestant aggression produced the need for heroes: 
Leicester tried for the role with his processions and acceptance of governorship in 
the Netherlands, and under his wing he had Essex, on whom many hopes were 
fixed after Leicester’s death in 1588. 
However, all these potential heroes, with their supposedly righteous aims and 
nationalistic stances, were more of a threat to the stability of the realm rather 
than guarantors of the peace that Elizabeth so desperately tried to protect. They 
grew into authentic threats to the Crown. Elizabeth, who was getting older and 
had by this time no chance for an heir, was in a precarious position. Obviously 
Essex’s failed coup gave substance to all her anxieties. If looked at from this 
perspective, Tamburlaine fits the description of such a hotly-sought hero – a 
never failing conqueror – who dismantles “Turkish” tyranny. Yet, it is worth 
noticing that Tamburlaine deconstructs the Elizabethan world-picture at a 
deeper and more basic level. Historical claimants to the role of national heroes 
and possibly builders of a new order may be said to have had some right in 
claiming their positions. Men like Leicester or later Essex, being privy council-
lors, aristocrats and close confidantes of the Queen, basking in her favour and 
serving her faithfully, must have cherished hopes of their bright future in the 
event of the Queen’s death. None could be presented as the demolisher of the 
old order. In other words, none could really claim the path of success from a 
shepherd to King as Tamburlaine does in Marlowe’s play. Tamburlaine’s singu-
larity does not only abolish the medieval theory of the divine rights of kings (a 
key tool in the creation of the Tudor myth) but it undermines Elizabethan hier-
archical order as a whole. The play corroborates class orthodoxies realized in 
Tamburlaine’s “gentrification” or, in other words, his ascent from a simple 
shepherd to the King (Burnett 2004: 29-30). In my opinion, having in mind the 
intransgressible hierarchy of Elizabethan society, Tamburlaine is no hero. He 
may be admired by his closest followers but it is crucial to note that the world he 
conquers hates him unanimously. They capitalize on his lowly background and 
sneer at it. As M.T Burnett points out, Tamburlaine’s unclear ethnicity 
(“Scythian”, “Tartarian”) is meant to “appear synonymous with racially adverse 
slurs” (Burnett 2004: 130). One may assume that attempts at demeaning Tam-
burlaine are a reaction to his real power. In Nietzschean terms it seems a typical 
reaction of the weak towards the strong. Tamburlaine gives his opponents as 
good as he gets in terms of verbal racially-tinged assaults. However, what seems 
crucial is the fact that seen as a source of evil, a demolisher of the existing order 
and a relentless conqueror, he emerges more of a Nietzschean overman rather 
than an Elizabethan hero. It is true that Marlowe’s plays respond to the hero 
ideology, that Shepherd mentions, as well as the appeal of the imperialist pro-
ject, that Bartels capitalizes on, but I would argue that the plays feed on the 
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subversive effect these phenomena might possibly have on the Elizabethan au-
dience. As presented, the Tamburlaine plays are at the very heart of Elizabethan 
propagandist and political tensions, but they both corroborate and subvert 
them, to which the indeterminacy of the perspective on the Turks as well as on 
Tamburlaine himself testify. As it seems, these background traces in the plays 
do not present a universal key to their message but rather “generate ideological 
irresolution and confusion” (Burnett 2004: 130). I strongly believe that the 
ideological and moral indeterminacy of Marlowe’s Tamburlaine constitutes its 
Nietzschean potential and its utilization enables a perspectival combination of 
the old critical stances and the new. Even critics of a materialist or new histori-
cal background, professing the decentralization of early modern identity, grant 
Tamburlaine his exceptional urge in self-fashioning. The already mentioned 
Greenblatt but also Bartels refer to this urge as some form of a Nietzschean will 
to power, though neither of them acknowledges Nietzsche as a source.3 Thus, I 
will be arguing for Tamburlaine as a potential overman driven by an intense 
form of the will to power. His will to power is, in my view, an identity-shaping 
process. Tamburlaine embraces his most lowly instincts at the background of 
other “exhausted” seats of power. He emerges as a reaction to a crisis of a meta-
physical dimension. This does not mean that he is any more cruel than his op-
ponents, but he willingly acknowledges his barbarity – unlike those who claim 
to belong to a “stable” and “civilized” order of things.  
Tamburlaine’s acknowledgment of his intense desires are acted out in 
his relentless conquest and his speeches voicing his supposed fury. Tambur-
laine, the great is, according to Levin (1961: 48), “a resonant fanfare and a 
pictorial spectacle, pure action uninhabited by passion.” From other charac-
ters of the play one learns that it is Tamburlaine’s fury or wrath that is his 
driving force. In Act 1, Scene 2, Theridamas says: “His looks do menace hea-
ven and dare the gods,/ His fiery eyes are fixed upon the earth, as if he now 
devised some stratagem” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.155-159). Later in Act 2, Scene 7, 
Meander complements Theridamas portrayal of Tamburlaine by hinting at 
some supernatural powers that played a role in the “creation” of the protagon-
  
3 Such a procedure underscores my argument in Chapter 1 that some of Nietzsche’s 
tenets (e.g. the will to power) are so engrained in the philosophical and literary discourse 
that many scholars take them for granted or in certain cases do not identify them as 
Nietzschean at all. By using covertly Nietzschean terminology Greenblatt (1980: 193) and 
Bartels (1993: 61) also underscore the idea that Marlowe’s plays are inherently Nietzschean 
in spirit. As mentioned, Greenblatt terms Marlowe’s self-fashioning as the “will to absolute 
play”, while Bartels calls his relentless striving “a desire for empire”. Bartels (1993: 61) also 
points out the elusive nature of Tamburlaine’s desire when she says: “Though he is obvi-
ously driven by a desire for empire, each time he articulates the desire behind the desire, he 
articulates it differently, embracing successively a series of all-consuming ends […].” The 
way in which his desire can be so variously expressed and presented under so many guises 
proves, to my mind, that it is the will to power manifested in its manifold forms.  
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ist: “Some powers divine, or else infernal, mixed/ Their angry seeds at his 
conception:/ For he was never sprung of human race,/ Since with the spirit of 
his fearful pride,/ He dares so doubtlessly resolve of rule,/ And by profession 
be ambitious” (Tamb. 1, 2.7.9-14). Finally, Agydas, trying to warn Zenocrate 
against Tamburlaine, speaks of: “the fury of his heart” (Tamb. 1, 3.3.73).4 
Tamburlaine’s anger might seem to be well-staged but is inextricably coupled 
with his life energy, or will to power, that seems to be a direct reason for his 
unflagging success (Tamb. 1, 3.3.73). Tamburlaine’s “valour and excess of 
strength” definitely approximate him to the ideal of the “overman” (Tamb. 1, 
2.1.28). Tamburlaine’s identity, almost entirely built on military expression, 
makes the comparison slightly risky as the overly militaristic interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy oversimplifies the subtlety and grandeur attributed to 
his Übermensch. However, it is necessary to highlight again that those im-
pulses conventionally deemed negative, or even evil, gain a totally new di-
mension in Nietzsche’s philosophical works. Already in The birth of tragedy 
Nietzsche (2000: 19) repudiates the so called “concept of Greek serenity”, in 
favour of the ever-lasting struggle and conflict of the Apollonian and Diony-
sian forces. Although still tied to the duality of these senses, Nietzsche (2000: 
27) already speaks of “an existence in which everything is deified, regardless 
of whether it is good or evil”, thus suspending moral valuations in the realm 
of aesthetics and pointing to the creative potential of conflict. For Nietzsche 
(2000: 38) “only as an aesthetic phenomenon are existence and the world 
justified to eternity”. In Tamburlaine, the great barbarity and cruelty are 
turned into a story of glory, aesthetic values often prove to be sufficient 
excuse for violence, while old values turn out to be a sham emptied of their 
meaning. In this context Tamburlaine’s deeds, traditionally deemed evil as 
well as his wrathful heart, do not rule out the overhuman potential. On the 
contrary, only through this “amoral” lens is this potential fully realized.  
3.1.2. “And in his eyes the furies of his heart/  
That shine as comets, menacing revenge” – Tamburlaine 
(Tamb. 1, 3.2.72-73) 
Throughout the play Tamburlaine presents himself as “the Scourge and Wrath 
of God” (Tamb.1, 3.3.44). His words are repeated so frequently by him and his 
opponents as to make them almost synonymous with his first name. “The 
scourge of God” becomes thus a shortcut for his identity. Though Marlowe’s 
  
4 It might be noted here that anger, expressed in a pompous and lofty language, is care-
fully staged and seems to be symptomatic of the Elizabethan love for spectacle and sensa-
tion. 
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plays are loosely based on the historical accounts of the 14th-century Asian 
conqueror Timur and his contemporary Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, many crit-
ics have identified influences of earlier plays associated with allegorical mo-
rality patterns e.g. Robert Wilson’s The three lords and ladies of London 
(1590). Tamburlaine’s insistence on limiting his identity to the single charac-
ter trait expressed in a notion of “the scourge of God”, which in Rutter’s 
(2012: 23) view communicates “military valour and destructiveness”, enables 
one to treat Tamburlaine as if he “personified a concept”. In this sense, Mar-
lowe’s play emulates the allegorical tradition of a morality play. However, 
despite Marlowe’s indebtedness to the early tradition, it quickly becomes 
clear that in spite of this “concept personification”, Tamburlaine does not 
communicate the prevalent moral message. As hinted, the notion of the 
“scourge of God” was mentioned in Marlowe’s sources to the play. Both 
Fortescue (1994: 82) and Whetstone (1994: 92) recall an anecdote from the 
life of the historical Tamburlaine: when asked why he treated his prisoners so 
cruelly, he answered that it was his due as “the ire of God”. Tamburlaine’s 
cruelty was hence meant to be a safeguard against the sinfulness of the other 
nations he subdued. His wrath is presented in source texts as a reserved retri-
bution that should be borne with God-fearing and humility. This should, 
however, be done with a reservation that Tamburlaine (or any other cruel 
tyrant) will also be severely punished in the afterlife by mighty God. So, the 
moralism of Marlowe’s sources is quite straightforward. The retribution motif 
clearly belongs to slave morality or the morality of the weak as Nietzsche 
would term it. In his view, the weak thrive on a hopeless belief that their 
wrong doers will be punished, exposing at the same time the hypocrisy of 
their religion as love, which in reality is a hunger for bloody vengeance. Mar-
lowe’s Tamburlaine, though a self-anointed “scourge of God”, is free from the 
moral message communicated by the source texts. As mentioned, never is 
Tamburlaine sufficiently “punished” for his cruelty. Neither are his opponents 
forced into silent acceptance of their plight and God-fearing humility. On the 
contrary, Bajazeth and Zabina roar with open hatred, even when their posi-
tions are totally hopeless. Moreover, I would argue Tamburlaine styles him-
self as a God himself, rather than a mere tool in God’s hands. Interestingly, 
Tamburlaine fashions himself as “the scourge of God” against the Turkish 
Emperor Bajazeth in Part 1 and his son Callapine in Part 2. Perversely, in a 
providential historical framework it was the Ottoman Empire that was ini-
tially termed “the scourge of God” in the Christian Europe. As Simon Shep-
herd (1986: 143) writes: “Historians saw the European divisions as a sign of 
the decay of Christendom which the Turks had been sent – as the scourge of 
God – to punish: thus Luther (at first) recommended only passive resistance 
to them.” Marlowe’s ‘reversed’ portrayal, in which it is Tamburlaine who 
scourges ‘infidels’, might be seen as Elizabethan wishful thinking, especially 
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in the light of Turkish military might. As Shepherd (1986: 143-144) points 
out, contemporary sources mentioning the Turks e.g. A short treatise upon 
the Turks’ chronicles (1546) or Greville’s A treatie of wars (1633), demon-
strate that regardless of their religion, they thrived military, which was a 
source of concern for the rest of Europe. So, Marlowe’s play rather than acting 
out a fantasy of bringing the Turks to their knees (as Tamburlaine does when 
he humiliates Bajazeth), communicates a dangerous sceptical tenet of moral 
relativity. As it seems, God does not shower the faithful with his favour but 
those who are skilful, apt and ruthless enough to claim their title to might and 
glory. In the light of such a subversive meaning implicit in Marlowe’s plays, 
there seems little surprise that the plays were charged with atheism. Numer-
ous critics recall Robert Greene’s dismay at Marlowe “daring God out of 
heaven with that Atheist Tamburlan” (Greene as qouted in: Thomas and Ty-
deman 1994: 69).5 Tamburlaine fashions his identity in relation to the “ge-
neric” God or Gods present in the text of Part 1 and 2, either by allying him-
self with or distancing himself from him/them. Bartels points out that it is not 
only Tamburlaine who claims to have been graced by God. Others also try to 
legitimize their deeds by appealing to the Absolute. As she writes at length:  
It is impossible to know from these and similar examples precisely where mispri-
sion stops and manipulation begins; yet either way, these evocations of divinity 
stand out as obviously self-serving. Though critics have railed like Robert Greene 
against Tamburlaine’s atheism, overturned here is not the authority of god (of any 
particular sort) but such self-authorizing appropriations of that god. And what 
gets subverted and brought down to earth along with them are Tamburlaine’s 
claims to divine right and purpose, which no longer mean anything in a world 
where everyone – and consequently no one – has dibs, conveniently if not strate-
gically, on such sanction. (Bartels 1993: 76)  
If indeed the appeal to divinity is truly devoid of meaning, then Tamburlaine 
is a seat of a great metaphysical crisis. This may be indeed so as all the seats 
of actual power turn out to be ineffective e.g. Mycetes is a weak king who is 
supplanted by his brother, and Bajazeth and later Callapine are crushed by 
  
5 In an introduction to the anthology of Marlowe’s sources, Vivien Thomas and William 
Tydeman (1994: 69) write: “Certainly by 1588 Robert Greene, in the letter prefacing his 
Perimedes the Blacksmith, could allude to Marlowe ‘daring God out of heaven with that 
Atheist Tamburlan’, a far less ambiguous reference to the scene in which Tamburlaine fol-
lows the murder of the Governor by ordering the destruction of the Koran and defiantly 
daring Mahomet to come down and punish him for impiety.” Tom Rutter (2012: 26) also 
refers to Greene’s accusations of atheism directed at Marlowe’s Tamburlaine plays. Writing 
about the real charges of atheism Marlowe himself had to face Bartels (1993: 12) says: 
“Though such charges were made to stand alone, together they expand Marlowe’s subver-
sivness into uncertain but limitless proportions, making one thing perfectly clear: that Mar-
lowe was outrageously other.” 
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Tamburlaine’s forces. I would not quite agree with Bartels that all authoriza-
tions of godly power are meaningless as Tamburlaine’s fashioning into a godly 
figure is ever successful. However, Tamburlaine’s divine appropriation is dif-
ferent to the one practiced by his opponents. He does not ‘use’ God in order to 
legitimize the existing world order as others do; on the contrary, he wants to 
demolish it. Hence, like Nietzsche’s overman he needs to dismantle the old 
law in order to propose the new one, whose only author he will be. In this 
sense he is a representative of Nietzschean experimental atheism.6  
In The gay science, in the “Madman” parable, “the death of God” is 
equalled with madness as it brings a radical devaluation of human life and loss 
of all meaning (Kaufmann 1974: 101). However, simultaneously, Nietzsche’s 
proposal opens up his mind for his central aim which is “to establish values that 
are not based on any supernatural sanction” and consequently to grant these 
values to the “overman” (Kaufmann 1974: 102). In this sense, Marlowe’s sub-
versive protagonist approximates Nietzsche’s ideal as he himself becomes a 
dialectical and Godless experiment. In the play, Tamburlaine frequently refers 
to God or the gods; however, his attitude has nothing to do with traditional 
Christian humility or humbleness. As Steane (1970: 78) suggests, the only God 
that is present in the play “is the god who made the disruptive Nature of which 
Tamburlaine is a triumphant part.” In Part 2 Tamburlaine is even more radical 
as he says: “[t]here is a God full of revenging wrath,/ From whom the thunder 
and the lightening breaks,/ Whose scourge I am, and Him will I obey” (Tamb.2, 
5.1.181-183). Although in this particular fragment Tamburlaine professes ob-
edience to the god of war and wrath, a few lines later he mocks Mahomet as 
unworthy of any worship and only “a godhead to adore” (Tamb. 2, 5.1.198). This 
statement in itself would not have to be necessarily equal to the rejection of the 
  
6 The turning point in Nietzsche’s philosophising is his well-known proclamation of the 
death of God, first presented in The gay science (Nietzsche 2007b: 120). Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy appears atheistic in spirit, but it is important to differentiate Nietzsche’s atheism 
from Descartes’ rationalism or the atheism of the Enlightenment. It is crucial to see 
Nietzsche’s godless philosophy in the context of his philosophical method to fully under-
stand the philosophical ramifications of the death of God. It seems that the radical ques-
tioning of the Absolute emerges as the very first step towards the creation of the “overman” 
and thus it is justifiable to compare Nietzsche’s “experimental” atheism with the alleged 
atheism of Tamburlaine, who is frequently referred to in the text of the play as “the scourge 
of God” (Tamb. 2, 1.3.44 or 4.3.9). As Walter Kaufmann (1974: 100) highlights, Nietzsche 
would not build his entire philosophy on the premise that God did not exist as his method 
was rather to question all ready-made assumptions. Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death 
of God is, therefore, not equal with straightforward atheism. It is an invitation to philoso-
phical experimentation, which, according to Hollingdale (2001: 133) was Nietzsche’s great-
est strength. By his philosophical Versuch he proposed “dialectical experimentation” with 
various points of view (Hollingdale 2001: 132). I strongly believe that such is also Marlowe’s 
method in his plays.  
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Absolute as such if it was not for the following lines of Tamburlaine, ultimately 
questioning its existence. After all Tamburlaine says: “The God that sits in hea-
ven, if any god” (Tamb. 2, 5.1. 199). The “if any god” qualification seems to be 
Tamburlaine’s expression of his radically compromised faith. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noticing that, although Tamburlaine seems to be more and more radical 
on the question of his faith as the play progresses, the general message is that of 
a constant intellectual pushing and shoving in the style of Nietzsche’s philo-
sophical method. On the one hand, Tamburlaine frequently presents himself as 
God’s ally e.g. when he speaks about himself as “crowned and invested by the 
hand of Jove” (Tamb. 2, 4.1.149) or “termed the Scourge and Wrath of God” 
(Tamb. 1, 3.3.44). By means of such statements, he legitimises his military suc-
cess and his growing power by the might normally attributed to the Creator. On 
the other hand, Tamburlaine evidently wants to present himself as God’s equal, 
which does not only appear blasphemous but also atheistic. His mentioning of 
God’s might is always compromised by a reaffirmation of his own power e.g. 
“Nor am I made arch-monarch of the world” (Tamb. 2, 5.1.147) or “The only fear 
and terror of the world” (Tamb. 1, 3.3.45). When Tamburlaine invites Therida-
mas to join his forces, and consequently to betray his own King, he says: “May 
we become immortal like the gods” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.201). It seems that by measur-
ing himself equal with the Gods, Tamburlaine renders them redundant and 
superfluous. He literally seems to propose himself as a viable alternative to the 
traditional way of embracing reality – as a potential overman he basically takes 
their place and seems to echo Nietzsche’s (2006b: 27) words: “Ah, brothers, this 
God that I created was humans’ – work and – madness, just like all Gods!”. So, 
Theridamas is definitely right when he says that “His looks do menace heaven 
and dare the Gods/ His fiery eyes are fixed upon the earth” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.157-
158). Simultaneously, he points to an important aspect of Tamburlaine’s beha-
viour, namely, his focus on earthly glory. Tamburlaine’s atheism, which 
emerges as his celebration of earthly power, constitutes the core of his subver-
sion as it disrupts the Elizabethan world picture and its accepted notions.  
Tamburlaine’s actions and his self-authorization is plagued within inter-
nal paradox, which must have been felt by the Elizabethans. If indeed Tambur-
laine’s aim is to propose himself as an alternative to divinity, the only way to do 
that is to invest himself with an earthly crown. For the Elizabethans the closest 
one can possibly get to divinity is actually to be King – God’s representative on 
earth. Elizabeth’s (as well as James’s) official policy promoted their divine rights 
of Kings. However, their Godly invested position of an anointed Prince was based 
on the continuity of royal lines. The Tudors in particular made efforts to legitimize 
their reign by deriving their origin from King Arthur and New Troy; “a rule 
blessed by Christ and permanent as nature, always already there” (Shepherd 
1986: 148). In a rapidly shrinking and changing world their absolutist reigns, 
though resembling other European regimes, sharply contrasted with e.g. the Tur-
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kish political system. To the utmost surprise of the contemporary observers (e.g. 
Bodin or Smith) the Turks did not have “inherited rights of property” (Shepherd 
1986: 147). Theirs was a system based on “human decisions, where the form of 
government is shaped by economic and social needs” (Shepherd 1986: 148). 
Shepherd (1986: 148) writes, supporting himself with a quotation from Cambini 
(1562), that “[t]he successful Turkish empire could manage without kings, for they 
‘appointed to every faction and country his governor, and in this sort governed for 
a long time, having among them neither king nor any man endued with title of 
sovereignty other than of captain’”. One could say that Tamburlaine, who fights 
the Turks, simultaneously makes the most of their political style as he also chooses 
his faithful companions to govern the subsequent kingdoms and lands he subdues 
with their help. However, in his pursuits he promises the glory of the crown to his 
faithful companions whom he lures with his rhetorical questions “Is it not brave to 
be a king […] Is it not passing brave to be a king […]?” (Tamb. 1, 2.5.51-53). He 
himself capitalizes on the mystical qualities of the earthly crown as he frames him-
self as “the monarch of the East” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.185). So, one could say that in his 
politics he is in-between, choosing those aspects of respective systems that fit his 
imperial project. Tamburlaine’s effective argumentation, by means of which he 
wins Theridamas, might then be seen as either Nietzschean experimentation or a 
rhetorical game, cunningly calculated to bring political gains. Either way, not only 
his deeds but also his speeches are extremely effective and make him appear like a 
God himself. Theridamas confirms this claim by saying: “Not Hermes, prolocutor 
to the gods, Could use persuasions more pathetical” (Tamb. 1, 2.3.25). As M.T. 
Burnett suggests: “[t]he implication is that Tamburlaine is beyond even the most 
rhetorically skilled of the deities and thus functions as a type of god himself” 
(Burnett 2004: 128). Tamburlaine, as mentioned, toys with divinity as it pleases 
him, but he takes full advantage of the deified condition of an earthly Prince. Eliz-
abeth I (1998), who frequently underscored her regal authority, nevertheless said 
in her famous “Golden Speech” (1601):  
I know the title of a King is a glorious title, but assure yourself that the shining glory 
of princely authority hath not so dazzled the eyes of our understanding, but that we 
well know and remember that we also are to yield an account of our actions before 
the great judge. To be a king and wear a crown is a thing more glorious to them that 
see it than it is pleasant to them that bear it. For myself I was never so much enticed 
with the glorious name of a King or royal authority of a Queen as delighted that God 
hath made me his instrument to maintain his truth and glory and to defend his 
kingdom as I said from peril, dishonour, tyranny and oppression.  
Elizabeth, in her firm belief in the righteousness of her position, demanded 
obedience and loyalty from her subjects but she was realistic about the daily 
drudgery of kingship as well as her necessity of serving her people in the exe-
cution of the law. The nature of Tamburlaine’s kingship has nothing to do 
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with any service towards the people. Actually those who could theoretically 
fulfil the role of Tamburlaine’s subjects become an inconvenient burden to be 
disposed of e.g. the inhabitants of Damascus. His fantasy of kingship is real-
ized through a ceaseless conquest of nations, who are really deprived of any 
voice in Marlowe’s play, while Tamburlaine’s position places him beyond any 
notions of law or morality. Both Elizabeth’s and Tamburlaine’s visions of 
kingship are grounded in earthly glory, but the moral justifications behind 
them are radically different. Elizabeth assumes a role of God’s servant, legis-
lator and guardian for her people – ultimately with peace and stability in 
mind. Her sovereignty is guaranteed by and executed through God’s legitimi-
zation. Tamburlaine, “fixed upon the earth”, is mainly interested in the here 
and now, in the actuality of his existence, abandoning the belief in the tran-
scendent reality traditionally coupled with religious faith. The grounding of 
Tamburlaine in the actuality of the “here and now” and his substitution of 
God for himself, seem to push Tamburlaine to the deeds that are morally 
questionable, if not wholly condemned. However, his soaring self-esteem 
makes him believe in his moral superiority and his “godly” condition as, in the 
scene of killing his unfaithful son, he says: “That I might move the turning 
spheres of heaven,/ For earth and all this airy region/ Cannot contain the 
state of Tamburlaine” (Tamb. 2, 4.1.116-118). Interestingly enough, within the 
space of the play, other characters seem to provide moral justification for 
Tamburlaine’s amoral deeds by referring to his Godly condition. Usumcasane 
says: “To be a king, is half to be a god” to which Theridamas replies:  
A god is not so glorious as a king: 
I think the pleasure they enjoy in heaven 
Cannot compare with kingly joys in earth 
To wear a crown enchased with pearl and gold, 
Whose virtues carry with it life and death, 
To ask and have: command, and be obeyed: 
When looks breed love, with looks to gain the prize. 
Such power attractive shines in princes’ eyes” (Tamb. 1, 2.5.56-64).  
Not only do Tamburlaine’s companions give the reader a confirmation of his 
deified condition, but they also shift the centre of gravity yet again to earthly 
life, dismissing metaphysics once and for all. Just as Elizabeth would recourse 
to metaphysics for the repeated legitimization of her reign, in the reality of 
Tamburlaine “Jove’s investiture” ultimately emerges as an empty rhetorical 
embellishment. One of the reasons why Nietzsche condemns religion was 
that, in his opinion, dual metaphysics seeks values beyond actual reality 
(Kuderowicz 1979: 58). In other words, faith always entails the belief in an-
other, better world beyond the reality of the senses, which always leads to the 
negligence of earthy life that is, after all, the only life a human being knows 
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for certain. In Thus spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche (2005b: 28) ironically ex-
presses his criticism by saying: “But the ‘other world’ is well concealed from 
humans, that dehumaned unhuman world that is a heavenly nothing; and the 
Belly of Being does not speak to humans at all, except as a human.” The Eliza-
bethan world picture at its foundations is undoubtedly a reality of dual meta-
physics; however, I would argue that Marlowe’s Tamburlaine plays heavily 
compromise it. Both Tamburlaine and his companions are evidently not in-
terested in the “other world”, while their longing for earthly power testifies to 
their life affirmation rather than any religious underpinning.  
Marlowe’s earlier critics suggest that the strong emphasis on the indi-
vidual as well a shift towards individual existence may be directly linked to the 
philosophical atmosphere of the English Renaissance. For instance, Harry Levin 
highlights the influence of early modern philosophers, who esteemed individual 
existence and its inherent value on Marlowe’s Tamburlaine. Levin recalls, for 
instance, Sir Philip Sidney and his term Arkitecktonike, the highest type of 
knowledge man can acquire, mentioned in his Apology for poetry, or Sir Fran-
cis Bacon and The advancement of learning, which also places great emphasis 
on personal intellectual cultivation. The texts, pointed out by Levin, are strongly 
grounded in the ideals of humanism, which shifts interest from God to human 
matters. However, it needs to be reiterated that this shift by no means equals 
the belittlement of God. So, as important as the Renaissance background may 
be for the creation of Tamburlaine, the great, the inherent message of the play 
goes beyond its philosophical source, in a way becoming a precursory vision for 
future philosophical enterprises. Therefore, Levin deems the content of Tam-
burlaine, the great heretical by early modern standards. He summarizes his 
analysis of Theridamas’ appreciation of the King’s life, by pointing out that 
“whereas, a heavenly crown was the pious hope of every Christian, an earthly 
crown is the notorious emblem of worldliness, heterodoxy, and pride of life. In 
short, it is not bathos but blasphemy” (Levin 1961: 57). The comparison of The-
ridamas’s ideas on monarchy with Elizabeth’s evaluation of her role as Queen, 
also underscores the disruptive nature of ideas implicit in Tamburlaine. Thus, 
in my view, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine is not so much Renaissance in spirit but 
rather Nitzschean with its “experimental” atheism, appreciation of earthly pow-
er and human vitality. Elizabeth’s policy throughout her reign demonstrated her 
appreciation of the Apollonian values of order, stability and rank, while Mar-
lowe’s Tamburlaine is really an unruly Dionysian Barbarian. Though he pro-
fesses the Apollonian glory of kingship, in his actions he disentangles its effec-
tive value, diminishing the role of a King to raw might. However, this parallel is 
by no means a springboard for a theoretical discussion over points of view as 
the plays in reality touch politically contentious issues. The Tudor regime, as 
mentioned, was built upon a supposedly natural and primeval order and hie-
rarchy while Marlowe gave his Elizabethan audiences a “Scythian shepherd” 
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who made himself a King. As Rutter (2012: 31) aptly points out: “The two Tam-
burlaine plays make the radical suggestion that rather than monarchs being 
made by God, a commoner can make himself a monarch through military va-
lour, tactical acumen and sheer power of will (as well, as the weakness of his 
adversaries) […]”. Knowing that Elizabeth’s rule was seen as unlawful by some 
(e.g. the Pope) and remembering numerous plots to depose her with a view of 
placing Mary, Queen of Scots on the throne, it becomes evident that the Tam-
burlaine plays are indeed driven by sheer subversion (Rutter 2012: 31). Despite 
the ideology of the divine rights of kings promoted by the Queen, the idea of 
“making” kings must have been particularly captivating for the Elizabethan 
minds in the light of the English unsecure succession. By the 1580s it became a 
particularly hotly debated issue as there were no natural heirs to the throne and 
so “[…] the institution of a ‘personal’ monarchy could be ensured only by com-
pliance of its officers, and the ‘natural’ royal line continued only by negotiation 
over the rights and suitability of possible candidates” (Shepherd 1986: 157). The 
Elizabethan reality thus presented the same paradox as that captured in Mar-
lowe’s plays. Tamburlaine is not the only character that violates the sanctity of 
kingship, as one remembers Cosroe who deposes his own brother and takes the 
throne or Theridamas who breaks the allegiance to his king in order to become 
Tamburlaine’s companion. Hence, Marlowe’s plays are a ground where individ-
ual choice, up to a certain degree, decides upon self-assertion and self-
determination. However, it is important to note that self-assertion, in a very 
Nietzschean spirit, becomes a privilege of the strong, while the weak are 
stripped of this individualizing will. Elizabeth held tightly to her throne and 
avoided war at all costs. As Shepherd (1986: 151) points out, her propaganda 
was successful in peace but, being a woman, she could not lead her own army. 
The prospect of the Spanish invasion as well as Catholic plots aimed at her de-
position unveiled her vulnerability and the weaknesses of her political self-
fashioning. Moreover, perversely even those who were there to strengthen her 
position could equally weaken it. Armed gentry who vowed to protect her posi-
tion as well as noblemen fighting for her “undermined her strategy for absolut-
ism” (Shepherd 1986: 151). When looked at from this perspective, Marlowe’s 
centralization of the earthly crown voices internal paradoxes of the Elizabethan 
accepted political standards: a king may be a near-deity, but it is nevertheless a 
human-made king – sacred yet all-too human.  
As hinted, the subversive, very Nietzschean nature of the plays, lays in the 
questioning of the widely accepted world picture. I strongly believe that Marlowe 
seems to be communicating a disruptive and revolutionary idea that the Elizabe-
than world order is painfully human rather than divinely underpinned. This is 
also encapsulated in Tamburlaine’s rise from a simple shepherd to a king, where 
in the process he also undermines the Elizabethan hierarchical order – believed to 
be ordained by God and hence natural. When speaking about “kingly joys in 
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earth”, more glorious than those of gods, Tamburlaine’s men do not only blas-
pheme but also capitalize on the aristocratic dimension of the might in question 
(Tamb. 1, 2.5.59). The ideals of humanism appear to highlight human potential in 
general, while Nietzschean philosophy emerges as deeply elitist. One could sug-
gest that Elizabethan society blends these two modes into a seemingly coherent 
whole. On the one hand, by medieval precepts all men of Christendom as God’s 
creations are equal before the Almighty; on the other, everyone has his immovable 
station outlined by rank and status. The paradox is dexterously weaved into a 
theory of the Great Chain of Being; with the same relations reflected in macro-
cosm and microcosm. Those who dare transgress their position outlined for them 
within this intricate social structure are bound to be severely punished. Such a fall, 
in turn, would be conceptualized by a swift turn of the wheel of fortune. However, 
as Rutter (2012: 25) aptly points out: “the same logic, however, does not seem to 
apply to Tamburlaine, whose journey on fortune’s wheel is only upwards.” Mar-
lowe’s Tamburlaine explodes this seemingly coherent order of things as it 
presents a story of an exceptional individual, of humble origins, who sets ambi-
tious goals and, despite adversaries and obstacles on the way, reaches them with 
success. Tamburlaine’s story of success presents almost a modern, rather than 
early modern, pattern. However, Marlowe’s characterization does not support the 
view that Tamburlaine’s potential is inherent in every human being. Quite the 
contrary, one learns that Tamburlaine has “the face and personage of a wondrous 
man”, while “Nature doth strive with Fortune and his stars/ To make him famous 
in accomplished worth” (Tamb. 1, 2.1.32-34). So, Tamburlaine’s qualities are spe-
cial, while in the eyes of his enemies he is even a non-human creature. As Meand-
er says “he was never sprung of human race” (Tamb. 1, 2.6.11). Tamburlaine’s 
ascent deconstructs the old order, where hereditary aristocracy rules for the sake 
of the new elite of the mighty and militarily savvy. Obviously, within this new aris-
tocracy he is primus inter pares. One might risk a statement that Tamburlaine is a 
representative of the Master Race. Nietzsche’s dynamite theory of the Über-
mensch and the Master Race, contrary to popular opinions, is not racist or biolog-
ical, but it definitely is aristocratic (Kaufmann 1974: 285). Nietzsche renounces 
the idea of equality between people as he believes that only some have it all in 
them to become “overmen”. In Tamburlaine, the Great this notion is testified to 
by Theridamas. When he presents his Godly vision of a King, Tamburlaine asks 
him: “Why say Theridamas, wilt thou be a king?”; to which he answers: “Nay, 
though I praise it, I can live without it” (Tamb. 1, 2.6.65-66). His answer seems to 
underscore the plays’ underlying message that glory is not everyone’s fate. Also, by 
his own moving into the shadow, he leaves the stage for the only Übermensch in 
the play – Tamburlaine. 
Tamburlaine’s rejection of God’s supremacy and the plays’ alleged athe-
ism might be treated as an opening to an analysis in the context of Nietzsche’s 
theories. Nevertheless, in order to reinterpret Tamburlaine as an overman, it is 
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necessary to look at the way he presents himself and how he is perceived by other 
characters in the play. Unlike in Shakespeare’s plays, Marlowe does not grant his 
audience any “private” insight into the mind of Tamburlaine as the play lacks soli-
loquies such as Shakespeare would later use in his “overhuman” plays e.g. Julius 
Caesar or Macbeth. So it is through his relations with others that Tamburlaine’s 
persona is constructed. The opening scenes unveil Tamburlaine as a figure of to-
wering ambition with no regard for class limitations. His enemy Meander calls 
him a “sturdy Scythain thief” (Tamb. 1, 1.1.36), while he introduces himself to 
Zenocrate by announcing: “I am a lord, for so my deeds prove,/ And yet a shephe-
rd by my parentage:/ But lady, this fair face and heavenly hue/ Must grace his bed 
that conquers Asia:/ And means to be a terror to the world” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.34-38). 
Techellas complements his words, saying: “Methinks I see kings kneeling at his 
feet/ And he with frowning brows and fiery looks,/ Spurning their crowns from off 
their captive heads” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.55-57). So, on the basis of the text, it is possible 
to say that Tamburlaine, despite his low birth, has an air of dignity and power that 
instantly wins people over. As Steane (1970: 65) suggests, the play “intensifies 
admiration for the man who without advantage of birth has achieved so much”. 
From the start Tamburlaine is racially and socially marked as inferior. He is re-
ferred to in the text as a “Scythain thief” (Tamb. 1, 1.1.36), while his train as “Tar-
tarian rout” (Tamb. 1, 1.1.71). As mentioned, Nietzsche’s concept of the overman is 
not constructed on a racial, biological or class basis. Its elitist or “aristocratic” 
dimension is founded on the idea that only selected individuals are mentally and 
physically powerful enough to “overcome” their infirmities and weaknesses in 
order to tower over the rest of the petty and the weak. As Nietzsche (2005b: 233) 
writes in Thus spoke Zarathustra, “the human is something that must be over-
come”. Along with the rejection of the divine sanction of morality and Christian 
morality as such, the so called Überwindungsmotif constitutes a crucial step in 
the creation of Nietzsche’s overman. Überwindungsmotif is inextricably linked 
with Nietzsche’s will to power, a basic force underlying and stirring any activity in 
the Universe, which in humans manifests itself under the guise of various instincts 
e.g. libido or an aspiration to self-mastery. Over-coming, in his view, then, is the 
proper channelling of one’s instincts, by sublimating them instead of extirpating 
them (Kaufmann 1974: 223). As it seems, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine effectively over-
comes the drawbacks of his birth, class and low social standing. Actually, to follow 
Steane’s line of argument, he uses them to his advantage, as he turns these faults 
into stepping stones marking his ambition and pride. This is exactly why Theri-
damas exclaims in admiration: “Tamburlaine?/ A Scythian shepherd, so embel-
lished/ With nature’s pride, and richest furniture” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.154-156). Howev-
er, Tamburlaine’s overcoming does not stop at the achievement of his position and 
wealth. As Christopher G. Fanta (1970: 16) observes, “Marlowe as yet admits no 
split between the aspiration and the achievement; and in the end, as Tamburlaine 
wins both the Queen of beauty [Zenocrate] and the crown of war, one is left with a 
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sense of wonderment at this celebration of mortal man’s indomitability.” Tambur-
laine’s aim is to rule the world and he gradually achieves his aims, getting rid of 
the obstacles on the way. However, as a prototypical overman he appears to be 
well-equipped to reach his goals. Nietzsche’s idea of “self-overcoming” also refers 
to the mental and physical strength “the overman” accumulates in the process. As 
Nietzsche (2007c: 72) announces in The twilight of the idols: “First principle: a 
man must need to be strong, otherwise he will never attain it”, which, in other 
words, means that one has to be strong in order to become stronger. So, as it 
seems, physical fitness is an element that accompanies shaping overmen and, in 
this respect, Tamburlaine definitely reflects Nietzsche’s way of thinking. Just as 
Nietzsche testifies in his writings to his fascination with masculine hardness and 
virility, so too does Marlowe. It seems that in no other character under my scruti-
ny is physical fitness so heavily underscored as it is in Marlowe’s Tamburlaine. For 
instance, when Shakespeare invites other characters to speak of Macbeth, they 
focus on his military valour. However, the valour is coupled with a sense of ho-
nour and prowess. The overhuman potential of Tamburlaine is encapsulated in 
the raw physicality of Tamburlaine’s body that resembles a godly stature and de-
mands admiration for its sheer perfection.7 The very first longer description of 
Tamburlaine by Menaphon to Cosroe testifies to this notion. One learns that 
Tamburlaine is:  
Of stature tall, and straightly fashioned, 
Like his desire lift upward and divine, 
So large of limbs, his joints so strongly knit, 
Such breadth of shoulders as might mainly bear 
Old Atlas’ burden;—’twixt his manly pitch, 
A pearl, more worth than all the world, is placed, 
Wherein by curious sovereignty of are 
Are fixed his piercing instruments of sight, 
Whose fiery circles bear encompassed 
A heaven of heavenly bodies in their spheres, 
That guides his steps and actions to the throne, 
Where honour sits invested royally: 
  
7 Interestingly, Marlowe’s descriptions celebrating the beauty of Tamburlaine’s body 
expressed by other male characters may be read within the intricate homoerotic and homo-
social framework of the relations between them. The world of Tamburlaine is definitely a 
realm of homosocial bonds between males as some critics have demonstrated in their 
analyses. Kate Chedgzoy (2004: 245) analyses Marlowe’s plays in the light of the “all-male 
preserve”. To read more about the possible links between Marlowe’s alleged homosexuality 
and his status in the Elizabethan society it is worth looking at Jonathan Goldberg’s article 
“Sodomy and society: the case of Christopher Marlowe”, where the author scrutinizes the 
notorious Baines’ note and the possible reception to the accusations made against Marlowe 
(Goldberg 1999: 54-61).  
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Pale of complexion, wrought in him with passion, 
Thirsting with sovereignty and love of arms; 
His lofty brows in folds do figure death, 
And in their smoothness amity and life; 
About them hangs a knot of amber hair, 
Wrapped in curls, as fierce Achilles’ was, 
On which the breath of Heaven delights to play, 
Making it dance with wanton majesty.— 
His arms and fingers, long, and sinewy, 
Betokening valour and excess of strength;— 
In every part proportioned like the man 
Should make the world subdued to Tamburlaine (Tamb. 1, 2.1.7-30). 
Though this laudatory description is quite lengthy, it is worth recalling in its 
entirety as it seems to be a hymn celebrating Tamburlaine as an Alpha male 
equipped with super-human physical attributes. It is the bodily perfection and 
its potential that decide on his majestic ambition. Also, Tamburlaine’s over-
human potential fuses animalism with godliness as Tamburlaine is both like a 
bear and Achilles, while his features invoke heavenly vitality and death at the 
same time. In a truly Elizabethan spirit, he blends the beastly with the godly 
“in every part proportioned like the man”. However, in a very subversive 
manner, within him this combination of a beast and an angel decides upon his 
success rather than degeneration or sin. Just as other elements of Tambur-
laine’s characterization may leave one with a sense of indeterminacy, his out-
ward appearance of strength and energy is a visible and tangible proof for his 
overhuman potential.8 Marlowe evidently wanted Tamburlaine to thrive on 
the potential his admirable physique unfolds before him as he passed over the 
fact that the historical Tamburlaine was most probably lame (hence his other 
recorded name – Timur, the Lame). John Bishop’s (1994: 139) Beautiful blos-
  
8 As I have already hinted, Tamburlaine lacks the interiority characteristic of the 
great heroes of Shakespeare’s later tragedies. Critics have thus often concluded that his 
persona may be interpreted in terms of self-fashioning, a Greenblattian famous Renais-
sance procedure of self-creation and self-identification (Greenblatt 1984: 195). Emily 
Bartels (1993: 60) capitalizes on the incompleteness of Tamburlaine who veils “inward-
ness” under the “outward habit”. She writes: “Importantly, too, although he presents his 
selves as self-interested and self-sustaining, what determines the shape of his ‘outward 
habit’ is, to a significant degree, his audience. For Tamburlaine tailors his image to the 
needs and expectations of his contenders, answering their desires and outdoing their 
resistance. To those who would be wooed and whom he would woo, he displays divinity, 
and wealth; to those who would destroy and whom he would destroy, barbarity and ire” 
(Bartels 1993: 62). There might indeed be little inwardness in Tamburlaine to build a 
“modern” identity. However, I personally believe his singularity is played out on an in-
stinctive or affective plain. His physicality is a living material with which he realizes his 
affects and makes a ‘singular’ statement.  
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soms (1577) explains the etymology of the name “Tamerlane” by capitalizing 
on the physical infirmity of “lameness”. Though he claims it had no bearing 
on Tamburlaine’s luminous career as “he came to be Lord of all the Orient 
and a terror unto the whole world”, it anyway was his distinctive feature 
(Bishop 1994: 139). It seems that contemporary historians were more willing 
to grant such individualizing touches to the “all too human” Tamburlaine, 
while Marlowe fashioned his hero into an overman – a paragon of masculine 
values.9 It seems that the decision to free his Tamburlaine from physical im-
perfection also underscores Marlowe’s a-moralism. On an Elizabethan stage a 
visible infirmity of a character would implicitly reflect his moral shortcom-
ing.10 Though frequently blasphemous in his vision and morally dubious in 
his actions, Marlowe’s Tamburlaine towers over all others anyhow. Sublimi-
nally his robust health and strength seem to underscore the righteousness of 
his project of overcoming. Bartels suggests that the extent of Tamburlaine’s 
self-fashioning actually serves his enemies, because by extenuating his might 
they also prove their own power. As she claims:  
For while he builds his own incontestable singularity out of and against their 
predilections, they prove their own supremacy by imposing their own construc-
tions of difference upon him. Circumscribed thus, he becomes not just an imperi-
alizing subject of Orientalist discourse but also its imperialist object, a convenient 
other whose godlike or fiendlike nature can justify his competitors’ triumphs or 
defeats and testify finally to their, rather than his, power (Bartels 1993: 67).  
I do not quite agree with Bartels’s argument. Tamburlaine may indeed be an 
object of others’ “imperializing” discourse, while the audience might have 
little insight into his inward self. Nevertheless, it is hard not to see that in this 
game of the empire it is Tamburlaine who defeats countless armies and con-
quers new lands. Even Tamburlaine’s bitter enemies admire his success and, 
possibly, they do so in order to minimise the impact of their own defeats un-
  
9 Interestingly, if one were to follow Nietzsche’s understanding of strength more closely, 
a lame Tamburlaine conquering the world might have actually satisfied him better. For 
Nietzsche the real extent of strength was manifested in the ability to overcome weakness. 
Therefore, Nietzsche admired Julius Caesar, who despite his physical infirmities (Nietzsche 
had Caesar’s epilepsy in mind) managed to emerge as a great conqueror and military man 
(see: The twilight of the idols IX 38). I will also return to this argument when I discuss 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar in Chapter 4.  
10 Characters presented as evil were very often scarred with severe physical infirmity 
with their illness or handicap underscoring God’s punishment for their sins. Shakespeare’s 
Richard III is a perfect example here as his crookedness perfectly reflects his evil character. 
Middleton’s and Rowley’s Deflores in The changeling is also constructed with this preju-
diced Elizabethan (or actually medieval) view in mind. I will return to this argument when I 
discuss Edmund and his “bastard” status in Chapter 4 as some of the theatrical bastards are 
also burdened with a physical infirmity reflecting their presumed moral shortcoming.  
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der his strength. Yet physically it is Tamburlaine who draws new boundaries 
on the map of the Far East and it is his physical strength that reflects his men-
tal indomitability and majestic bearing. However, Menaphon’s speech, to a 
degree legitimizing or justifying his own inability to measure against his op-
ponent, shows that it is not solely Tamburlaine’s strength or his military skill 
that makes him such a powerful and persuasive figure.  
The extent of Tamburlaine’s self-overcoming is manifested through his 
insurmountable ambition. It is his aspiration, bordering on bravado or even 
insanity, that fills others with awe. In Act 2, Scene 7 Tamburlaine presents his 
most famous and most frequently quoted speech of “aspiring minds”, which, to 
my mind, can be seen as his “overman” manifesto (Tamb. 1, 2.7.12-27). Tam-
burlaine’s celebration of nature, specifically human nature, demonstrates that 
he is, above all, a man of immensely wide intellectual horizons besides being the 
rough barbarian others would like to see. Michael Goldman (1977: 22) reads the 
infinite appetites of Marlowe’s characters in terms of “ravishment”. As he 
writes: “[t]he ravished man’s desire swells beyond any specific goal, though all 
the time seeming to promise a surfeit of pleasure of broadly enough achieved” 
(1977: 22). Indeed, Tamburlaine’s understanding of nature is unspecific as it 
centralizes on relentless striving forward in one’s goals and “climbing after 
knowledge infinite” (Tamb. 1, 2.7.22). Against the backdrop of the theory of 
humours, Tamburlaine seems to be celebrating giving in to natural appetites – 
in Nietzschean terms, listening to the whispers of the will to power. Yet again 
subversively he combines the beastly and the angelic, where the two are inter-
dependent and both necessary. The Elizabethan thinkers would definitely pro-
scribe the rejection of the beastly in the pursuit of the angelic, whereas for Tam-
burlaine both are crucial. His speech appears to be a subversive combination of 
Machiavellian yearnings for power and an oracle of the most noble humanist 
ideals. In the first part of his speech Tamburlaine, within a divine frame of ref-
erence, declares it completely natural that the young and powerful take over 
positions of power. In his belief he seems to prefigure Shakespeare’s Edmund 
who would also raise his hand against his father and brother, breaking the pri-
meval laws of progenitors. Yet again, he frames himself as a god-like figure by 
recalling the example of Jove. The beauty of Marlowe’s poetry starkly contrasts 
with the fact that the words are delivered over the body of Cosroe who, mortally 
wounded, is dying at Tamburlaine’s feet. Here is a Nietzschean fusion of the 
lowly instincts and aesthetic beauty at its fullest – encapsulated in Tambur-
laine’s cruel and amoral celebration of the human. Goldman (1977: 31) aptly 
points out that critics often interpret this passage as if it were a soliloquy, 
though Tamburlaine speaks to the man in agony. The speech seems to function 
as a soliloquy because it gives more insight into Tamburlaine’s mind. It appears 
less calculated and less performative than any other. Yet because in reality there 
are listeners present, what it actually unfolds is the extent of Tamburlaine’s 
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immorality. The pursuit of knowledge is a means to amass power and might. 
His praise of the daring take-over of power seems to allude to Machiavelli’s 
Prince, while his affirmation of truth appears to emulate the style of Pico della 
Mirandola’s Oration on the dignity of Man.11 In this dynamite mixture, Tam-
burlaine seems to embrace his low instincts and aesthetically transform them 
into something of greater worth, namely, the value of his “aspiring mind”. In his 
credo he seems to echo Nietzsche’s cult of self-realization. Zarathustra says: 
“Once I have overcome myself in that, then will I overcome myself in something 
even greater; and a victory shall be the seal of my perfection!” (Nietzsche 
2006b: 140). These words parallel Tamburlaine’s manifesto, but he aims even 
higher as his internal voice says “never rest”. Marlowe’s Tamburlaine mirrors 
the Nietzschean Übermensch as he definitely shares his dignity, pride and over-
coming potential. Nietzsche does not offer in his writings a cult of physical 
strength for the strength’s sake. His vision of a mighty overhuman is always 
coupled with creativity and mental capabilities. Nevertheless, it is the ultimate 
towering over others that is the aim, as Nietzsche does not seem to proscribe 
equality between great minds but always being the first among the mass. Tam-
burlaine celebrates human faculties, but he leaves no illusions as to the methods 
of self-realization and its ultimate end when he sees “[t]hat perfect bliss and 
sole felicity” in “[t]he sweet fruition of an earthly crown”. (Tamb. 1, 2.7.12-27). 
The body of Cosroe, as Goldman (1977: 31) observes, becomes “a sight of power 
– the trash above which, from which, Tamburlaine’s bliss is rising.” This partly 
explains the “soliloquy” confusion, as Tamburlaine’s speech is such a strong 
statement of singularity that the others’ presence is made redundant. Tambur-
laine establishes his superiority over all the spectators present to his perfor-
mance, but it is important to note that his companions willingly take up the 
imperialist project he offers to them. Nietzsche (2007c: 71) believes that the 
truly strong people do not need to prove their might just as they do not need to 
maintain their power artificially so “[t]he highest type of free man would have to 
be sought [...] five paces away from tyranny on the very threshold of the danger 
of thraldom.”. Although frequently referred to as a tyrant by his enemies, para-
doxically Tamburlaine seems to be quite willing to share his “excess of strength” 
with his followers, provided that they are loyal to him (Tamb. 1, 1.2.28). He 
openly invites Theridamas as well as his other companions to share his glory 
(e.g. Act 1, Scene 2. 155-250 or Act 2, Scene 5.50-105). Also, unlike his enemies, 
Tamburlaine does not associate material wealth with power. On a couple of 
occasions he proves he is not interested in the gold that his enemies offer either 
to delude him or to buy themselves out of captivity (e.g. Meander who plans to 
present camels laden with gold to distract Tamburlaine’s soldiers in battle, his 
plan fails obviously Tam. 1, Act 2, Scene 69-73 or Bajazeth who offers gold to 
  
11 The link with Mirandola can also be found in Rutter (2012: 35).  
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buy himself out of captivity Tam. 1, Act 3, Scene 3, 261-265). Tamburlaine 
ceaselessly pushes forward in his fantastical vision of ruling over the whole 
world when he announces: “So from the East unto the furthest West/ Shall 
Tamburlaine extend his puissant arm./ And by this means I’ll win the world at 
last” (Tamb. 1, 3.3.244-260). On the map of his empire there is Africa, Persia 
and even Mexico. However, the un-changing stamp of singularity on the ever 
changing map is his leadership.  
Tamburlaine’s almost stifling over-presence is carried into Part 2, 
where further battles and conquests again bring success to Tamburlaine. Bar-
tels suggests that the multiplication of arms, people and lands is finally 
brought to such an excess that numbers becomes meaningless. As she writes:  
[i]nstead of measuring power, the seemingly infinite numbers of men and nations 
that Tamburlaine and his opponents continually display no longer mean anything, 
because of their commonality, the variability of how they are perceived, and their 
arbitrary relation to triumphs and defeats. The rhetoric of power emerges as just 
that, a rhetoric of power, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing – or at least 
nothing singular. (Bartels 1993: 174)  
Indeed, in the midst of the masses singular identity is devoid of all meaning. 
However, this does not apply to Tamburlaine, who seems to be still the same 
“scourge of God”, as he features in the conversations of his opponents equally 
prominently. I would suggest that against this mass of meaninglessness, Tam-
burlaine’s singularity is actually underscored even further. Yet, though Tambur-
laine’s presence is equally overbearing, Part 2 brings a change. As Rutter (2012: 
38) observes: “[…] the ascending movement of Part One gives way to a sense of 
limitation and the constriction of possibilities.” This time not everything bends 
to Tamburlaine’s indomitable will. He may still be successful on the battlefield, 
but this time he cannot force his will onto the undisputable existential facts e.g. 
the death of his wife, his son’s insubordination, and finally his own illness and 
death. In Nietzsche’s vision it is the project of self-overcoming that enables one 
to shape and create the self in the face of life’s inherent suffering. The extent of 
Tamburlaine’s self-overcoming can be seen in his perseverance in fighting in-
herently human weaknesses. However, having overcome the difficulties of Part 
1 and having emerged successful in his project of self-creation, he needs to rec-
reate discomfiture and inflict pain on himself. Although the deed might seem 
sensational and exaggerated, the scene in which Tamburlaine inflicts a wound 
by cutting his arm illustrates his desperate and almost obsessive need to prove 
himself in over-coming physical pain in order to prove his overhuman qualities. 
Tamburlaine says: “A wound is nothing, be it ne’er so deep;/ Blood is the god of 
war’s rich livery” (Tamb. 2, 1.2.115-116). Tamburlaine realizes Nietzsche’s ideal 
of pain as a factor stimulating strength, rather than draining it. This ideal is best 
captured in Nietzsche’s (2007c: 5) famous aphorism from The twilight of the 
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idols when he says: “that which does not kill me, makes me stronger” and thus 
underscores the importance of suffering in the creation of the overman. 
Nietzsche (2004: 12) also declares in Ecce Homo: “to an intrinsically sound 
nature, illness may even constitute a powerful stimulus to life, to a surplus of 
life.” Moreover, as it seems, Tamburlaine believes his wounds ennoble him and 
grant him even more grandeur. This is a lesson he tries to teach to his sons, 
albeit emerging for the first time not entirely successful. Tamburlaine’s over-
human potential is put to the test when he has to face the death of Zenocrate. 
This time the pain is no longer self-inflicted or a consequence of one’s own pro-
ject. M. T. Burnett (2004: 136) suggests that Tamburlaine’s attitude towards 
Zenocrate is artificial as he “fetishizes” Zenocrate and she is presented as one of 
his many military conquests and gains. Burnett is definitely right in saying that 
Tamburlaine’s perception of Zenocrate is a consequence of his “rhetorical devis-
ing”; however, Tamburlaine’s expression of suffering after her unexpected death 
seems genuine.12 In his famous speech over Zenocrate’s dead body Tamburlaine 
orders the burning of the entire city in which they currently dwell, as it is the 
seat of her death and his suffering. On the surface, it may seem as a desperate 
act aimed at a hopeless expatriation of suffering, which is at this moment im-
possible to be beaten. However, his act of destruction is an expression of the will 
to power, as Tamburlaine yields to his lowest instinct of revenge and fury. Per-
versely, seemingly unnecessary destruction becomes simultaneously the act of 
aesthetic creation and thus his further self-overcoming. Levin (1961: 58) claims 
that Tamburlaine is a figure incapable of suffering as he is “aesthetically – [...] 
not morally – sensitive”. This may be true, but his aesthetic sensitivity does not 
exclude genuine suffering in the face of the aestheticized object’s loss. Tambur-
laine’s suffering is expressed in a way known only too well to him, namely, by 
means of military destruction. However, paradoxically the act is aesthetically 
creative as Tamburlaine’s orders the building of “a pillar in memory of her” 
(Tamb. 2, 3.2.125). On the pillar there is a caption saying that the town was 
burnt down by Tamburlaine, who forbids to rebuild it. The order to embalm 
Zenocrate’s body also underscores his attempt at transforming her into an eter-
nal, aesthetically-touching object. So, although the town is destroyed, her body 
is eternalized and it remains a living sign of his immense sorrow and a place of 
remembrance, and in Tamburlaine’s imagination also a future destination of 
pilgrims, who would arrive only to cast a glance at the beauty of Zenocrate 
(Tamb. 2, 3.2.25-450). I would suggest that Tamburlaine’s Eros and Tanathos 
is an effort at Nietzschean sublimation, the channelling of low instincts into 
more creative and artistic powers. The destruction of the city is undoubtedly an 
  
12 This is a topic that certainly deserves more attention, and so I will come back to 
Tamburlaine’s relationship with Zenocrate in Chapter 5 when I discuss Marlovian and 
Shakespearean “overwomen”.  
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act of violence and hence a realization of the lowest impulses possible – hate 
and fury. On the other hand, such emotions are more than natural according to 
Nietzsche (2005b: XVIII), as “the way to overcome the human is to acknowl-
edge and emulate the non-human nature […] of which we consist…” Moreover, 
it appears that the act of destruction turns into an act of creation. What is cru-
cial is that the death of Zenocrate does not mark the end of mighty Tambur-
laine. He overcomes his suffering and treats it as a springboard to further con-
quest. Once violence is transfigured into creativity, he is ready to welcome a 
new challenge: “But now my boys, leave off, and list to me,/ That mean to teach 
you rudiments of war” (Tamb. 2, 3.2.3-4). Tamburlaine wants to pass on his 
energy and vitality onto his sons who would fight with him and continue his 
project later on. By smoothly shaking off his suffering, Tamburlaine yet again 
seems to echo Nietzsche (2005b: 97), who through his prophet Zarathustra 
says: “How did I make use of and overcome such wounds? How did my soul rise 
again from these graves? Yes, something invulnerable, unburiable, is within me, 
something that explodes rock: that is my will…” As it seems, Tamburlaine’s will 
to power is strong enough to lead him ever further. This time he invests a lot of 
trust in his sons, whom he desperately wants to see as an extension of himself. 
As it appears, his failure to make Calyphas a mirror image of Tamburlaine 
proves Nietzsche’s point that “overhuman” potential is not a question of birth or 
heredity but rather self-realization or, in other words, self-overcoming. Caly-
phas is a total opposite of Tamburlaine. His lack of interest in “the rudiments of 
war” would not be such a stain on Tamburlaine’s honour if he was not such a 
petty figure in general. Calyphas wants to take advantage of Tamburlaine’s suc-
cess, but he has no will to contribute to it in any way. He seems to manifest his 
pacifist feelings only to veil his lack of courage. For his lack of loyalty, in an act 
of ultimate fury, Tamburlaine stabs his own son. Even though Calyphas emerges 
as a particularly despicable character, Tamburlaine’s deed strikes one as horri-
fying. This time it is hard to speak of any sublimation or aesthetic creativity as 
the murder appears way beyond justifiable. However, it demonstrates the extent 
of Tamburlaine’s self-assertion that will not accept any questioning of his 
empery. In the world of Tamburlaine, sacrifice, even of your loved ones, seems 
necessary for the sake of the ultimate face of the “overman”. As Nietzsche 
(2007b: 93) writes in The gay science, ultimate sacrifice is necessary to achieve 
independence of the soul. It is important to note that it does not mean that 
Nietzsche prescribes cruelty or violence as a means to shape the overman. What 
he is saying, is just that in some cases suffering or sacrifice is incidental in the 
process (Kaufmann 1974: 194). For Tamburlaine, the stabbing of his son ap-
pears as a necessary step in getting rid of the weakest link in his limitless vision. 
He sees Calyphas’ “folly, sloth and dammed idleness” as dangerous, and only 
when this danger is removed may he say again to his sons and indirectly to his 
enemies “Now you shall feel the strength of Tamburlaine, / And by the state of 
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supremacy,/ Approve the difference ‘twixt himself and you” (Tamb. 2, 4.1.124, 
133-135), trying to ultimately highlight the necessity of killing Calyphas. In his 
process of building the “self” and ever overcoming of this “self” “[g]ood and evil, 
and rich and poor, and high and lowly, and all the names of values: weapons [...] 
shall be and clashing signs that life must itself overcome again and again! Into 
the heights life wants to build itself with pillars and steps...” (Nietzsche 2005b: 
87). In other words, those impulses and deeds normally deemed despicable find 
their place in the reality of Tamburlaine. It is interesting to note that Barabas, 
like Tamburlaine, will also turn out as a stiflingly patriarchal overman who 
would not let anyone undermine his meticulously crafted position of power.  
As it seems, Tamburlaine, whose position in the Elizabethan world pic-
ture actually explodes its seemingly stable foundations, bears much resem-
blance to the “overman”, a crowning conception of Nietzsche’s philosophy. 
However, the question whether Tamburlaine fully encapsulates the ideal of 
Übermensch still remains pending. As presented, Tamburlaine is definitely an 
immensely strong and powerful personality with an ever “aspiring mind”. How-
ever, it is important to bear in mind the fact that he realizes his aspiration 
through political and military conquest. In his writings Nietzsche frequently 
underscores that political power is a form of barbarism and he condemns it 
altogether (Kaufmann 1974: 197). Although he highlights the necessity to em-
brace low instincts, he is in favour of channelling the individual will to power 
into the creative realm of human existence. Though one can occasionally see 
Tamburlaine’s aesthetic and more sensitive side, especially in his treatment of 
Zenocrate, there is no question that he is, above all, the god of war. Nietzsche’s 
style of philosophizing is characterized by his strong emphasis on the concept of 
war, struggle and military vocabulary, but one has to remember that he values 
the overman as the embodiment of artistic creativity. Marlowe’s Tamburlaine 
appears to possess the overhuman potential realized in his ambition. His hori-
zons seem limitless and, many a time, he proves that his conception of power 
has nothing to do with the accumulation of goods and material power. Never-
theless, his cruel treatment of his political opponents (e.g. Bajazeth and Zabina) 
emerges as unnecessary cruelty – a wild performance of boasting triumph and 
“sensational” staged fury. Tamburlaine is definitely a figure who embraces his 
low animal impulses and, at times, tries to creatively transfigure them into 
higher ends. For this reason I see him as the first character who opens the ca-
non of the Nietzschean “beasts of prey”, men who first have to stoop to their 
lowest “natural” affects in order to open their project of self-overcoming.13 In 
  
13 Here I refer once again to the passage from Beyond good and evil where Nietzsche 
“defends” Cesare Borgia, who emerges for him more of a human being than his contempo-
raries. I believe this passage perfectly illustrates the power dynamics driving Marlovian 
protagonists as well as some Shakespearean characters.  
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the Nietzschean vision such men, “these healthiest of all-tropical monsters”, are 
infinitely better than those who would hypocritically veil or try to expatriate 
their impulses (Nietzsche 2002: 84-85). Tamburlaine may not be a fully subli-
mated individual who lacks interior reflection, but he does yield to his exube-
rant and blind will to power. Barabas, the protagonist of The Jew of Malta, re-
sembles Tamburlaine in his will to power. Moreover, here Marlowe gives us a 
protagonist who reflects more intensely on his process of self-creation.  
3.2. Barabas (The Jew of Malta) 
3.2.1. Critical responses to The Jew of Malta  
and interpretative paths 
The Jew of Malta, like Marlowe’ Tamburlaine plays, portrays an outstanding 
and attention-gripping figure that fits Levin’s classic expression “an over-
reacher”. Though Barabas never becomes King per se, he indeed reaches the 
highest position on his home island of Malta and successfully pursues all his 
goals until his inexhaustible ambition overleaps itself. His robust and imposing 
vitality is reminiscent of Tamburlaine’s intense “ambitious” singularity and so 
are some of the crucial tensions implicit in the play. Despite the intricate mesh 
of religious interdependencies and theological complexities, the play emerges 
not only as sceptical but actually adamantly critical of Christianity, if not relig-
ion in general, rendering the message of the play atheistic. Moreover, like the 
Tamburlaine diptych it celebrates the protagonist, who by all conventional mo-
ralities is a wicked and despicable character, hardly inspiring any pity in the 
audience. Marlowe’s Barabas thrives on his pride, ambition and his villainy. As I 
will be arguing, Barabas, like Tamburlaine, in his rejection of traditionally-
conceived morality, proves to be an antecedent of Nietzsche’s overman, while in 
his cult of life he encapsulates the Nietzschean life affirmation. However, it is 
important to note that the characterization of Barabas is clearly a development 
on the part of Marlowe, as not only did he introduce an element of the comic 
and inward reflection, but also even further he nuanced the background against 
which Barabas’s singularity flourishes. Although Barabas is no warrior but a 
prosperous merchant, he does conquer Malta using the means of capitalist ex-
change and trade. Bartels (1993: 83), implicitly referring to Nietzsche, points 
out that “the will to profit” is stronger in this play than “the will to power” as 
“Marlowe couples imperialism more explicitly to profit […]” This seems only 
partly true, however, as Barabas revels in his machinations and ability to trick, 
in his view, the far intellectually inferior inhabitants of Malta, who clearly lack 
his enterprising nature and business acumen. To complicate matters further, 
Marlowe makes his morally dubious protagonist Jewish. Indeed, it is not only 
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the clash of imperialism and capitalism that complicate Barabas’s Malta, but 
also its contentious religious environment – steeped in early-modern prejudice 
and the stereotype of the unknown other. Bartels (1993: 97) aptly observes that 
“what The Jew of Malta dramatizes is not the criminal history of a diabolical 
Jew in a less diabolical Christian society, but rather the strategies of negotiation 
and domination in an international marketplace, where imperialism and capi-
talism inevitability collide.” In Marlowe’s play, the discourse of religion indeed 
hypocritically becomes a tool in self-fashioning, though it is not only Barabas 
that indulges in such self-creation. As I will be arguing, his initial victimization 
is inextricably connected to his Jewishness but, in his overhuman self-definition 
he distances himself from it, rather treating it as a first step in his self-
overcoming. In its complex religious relations The Jew of Malta, like Tambur-
laine, also takes advantage of the fear the Ottoman Empire inspired in Renais-
sance rulers as well as the popular imagination. It presents the Turkish power as 
a threatening element emerging to destabilise the seemingly orderly social rela-
tions on Malta.14 Although the events in the play are fictional, they seem to al-
lude to the unsuccessful siege of Malta in 1565, when the Turks attempted to 
gain control over the Mediterranean sea (Rutter 2012: 62).15 Their bold attempt 
must have still been fresh in the memory of European powers. Had they been 
successful, the balance of power in Renaissance Europe would have been radi-
cally different, as they would have gained upper hand in trade and defence 
(Bartels 1993: 88). On top of that, there was a prevalent belief that Jewish 
bankers aided the Turks financially in the siege of Malta (Ide 2006: 260). Mar-
lowe’s Barabas represents values widely rejected as evil, but what makes his 
figure even more contentious is the fact that it is the Jew that is the villain.16 
The poetical ingenuity and the lasting influence of Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta 
  
14 As Shepherd observes, plays with a “Turkish”/ Arab theme were in fashion on Eliza-
bethan stages (Shepherd 1986: 142). The vogue seems to have started with Marlowe’s Tam-
burlaine, though there are earlier examples like the aforementioned Cambyses, King of 
Persia by Thomas Preston. Post-Tamburlaine plays, partly trying to emulate its style and 
repeat its success include, among many, The battle of Alcazar (1594) attributed to George 
Peele, Selimus, Emperor of the Turks (1594) attributed to Robert Greene and Thomas 
Lodge, or Robert Greene’s Alphonsus, King of Aragon.  
15 Arata Ide (2006: 260) suggests that Marlowe might have encountered accounts of 
the 1565 siege of Malta when he was researching the character of Tamburlaine and his fight 
with the Turkish Bajazeth.  
16 If one then takes into consideration the historical distortion of Nietzsche’s philoso-
phical tenets, the matter becomes even more delicate. Although Nietzsche’s philosophical 
legacy has been already cleansed from the unfortunate and totally abortive affiliations with 
Nazism by the professional philosophy academia, for a reader unfamiliar with Nietzsche’s 
writing the mental link seems to be still very vivid. Recalling the name of Nietzsche often 
stirs the feeling of discomfiture, but so does Marlowe’s play The Jew of Malta. In my opin-
ion, the clash of these two problematic domains makes the whole issue call for an interpre-
tative intervention. 
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(as well as Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice) have made critics like James 
S. Shapiro (Shakespeare and the Jews) or Stephen Greenblatt (Marlowe, Marx 
and Anti-Semitism) feel obliged to address the issue of apparent anti-Semitism 
implicit in Marlowe’s portrayal.  
In his essay Marlowe, Marx and Anti-Semitism, Stephen Greenblatt 
(1999: 141) suggests that Marlowe’s villain – the Jew – is really “a powerful 
rhetorical device” or “a 16th century trope” and consequently “a way of mar-
shalling popular hatred and clarifying its object.” So, the prejudice is not reli-
gious but rather social, while the choice of the figure of the Jew is pretty acci-
dental. Marlowe uses “mass psychology” by framing a semi-mythical figure 
that stirs the popular imagination (Greenblatt 1999: 142).17 Nevertheless, 
numerous critics point to The Jew of Malta “as a key contribution to Euro-
pean representations of the Jews” (Lupton 2004: 144). Julia Reinhard Lupton 
(2004: 149) traces the Jewish position of exclusion from various European 
communities to the symbolical meaning of the name Barabas, who is seen as 
“the one-who-did-not-die-in-the-place-of-Christ, the one who was not substi-
tuted for Jesus” like his Biblical counter-part Barabbas. Against Greenblatt’s 
view that the prejudice was more of a social phenomenon, Bartels catalogues 
stereotypes associated with the Jews that were powerfully present in the pop-
ular imagination, many of which were clearly and inextricably linked with 
their religion. She writes that:  
When religion was called into play, Jews were of course demonized as the Anti-
christ or devil, and accused of carrying out ritual murders, especially of Christian 
children, desecrating the Christian host, blaspheming, and the like. On the eco-
nomic front, they were criminalized as usurers; on the social front, they were as-
signed a variety of vices and misdemeanours, such as cheating, or having a pecu-
liar smell (Foetor Judaicus). (Bartels 1993: 84)  
These stereotypes were reinforced through the Elizabethan stage as well as 
popular and widely circulated pamphlets. Stephen Gosson in his pamphlet 
  
17 In a footnote to his main line of argumentation, Greenblatt adds that Anti-Semitism 
can never be merely a trope or a device as it is always inextricably linked with irrationality 
and bad faith. He underscores Marlowe’s immense cruelty in the presentation of the Jew. 
For more information see: Greenblatt, Stephen. Marlowe, Marx and Anti-Semitism, in: 
Wilson, Richard (ed.). 1999. Christopher Marlowe. London and New York: Longman. 140-
158. It is worth mentioning that the Jew-baiting found its real expression in the condemna-
tion of Rodrigo López, the Queen’s physician, Jewish by origin, though a converted Chris-
tian. López was accused of being entangled in the conspiracy to poison the Queen. She 
herself was not entirely sure of his guilt and waited with the execution, but she yielded 
under pressure. Lopez was most probably innocent and a faithful servant to the Queen, but 
his protestations of his innocence only strengthened the belief in his guilt due to his sup-
posed power of dissimulation. For more information see: Weir, Alison. 2008. The life of 
Elizabeth I. New York: Random House Inc. 416-419.  
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The schoole of abuse (1579) spares no effort in criticizing the revels of theatri-
cal plays as causing social unrest. However, he does exempt plays with a 
moral point and here he gives an example of a play he himself saw at The Bull 
which centralized the characters of an evil Jew. The play supposedly con-
demns “the greedinesse of worldly chusers, and bloody mindes of usurers” 
(Gosson 1841: 30). Of course, by presenting the Jew as the greedy usurer Gos-
son proves the anti-Semitic sentiment of the Elizabethan society.18 George 
Whetstone’s English mirror (1586), Marlowe’s source for Tamburlaine and, 
hence, possibly for The Jew of Malta also perpetrates anti-Semitic prejudice. 
However, Bartels’s insightful investigation of source texts e.g. Holinshed’s 
Chronicles, demonstrates that in reality there was no unified portrayal of the 
Jews or Judaism in the early modern England. This applies also to the por-
trayals on stage, where positive representations also occasionally happened 
(Bartels 1993: 84-85). One could refer here to the already mentioned Robert 
Wilson’s The three ladies of London (c. 1584), which offers an interesting 
reversal of moral dynamics as Gerontius, the Jewish moneylender, emerges as 
a kind-hearted fellow, albeit slightly gullible. The play partly testifies to the 
uneven attitude towards Jewishness, which Bartels (1993: 87) summarizes by 
observing that “[t]hough England’s historical record does not and could not 
erase the more diabolical socioreligious profile disseminated beside (and in 
some paces within it), it nonetheless displays the Jews as the offended and as 
offenders, used by as well as using the state in ‘gréevos’ and ‘wicked’ ways”. 
Marlowe’s Barabas, though evil by accepted morality standards, is free from 
the traditional stereotypical traits of “Jewishness”. The audience is expected 
to laugh with him when he tricks his opponents rather than laugh at him. As 
Shepherd (1986: 175) claims:  
The self-presentation as racial stereotype is marked as performance: Abigail is 
told to behave ‘like a cunning Jew’ The audience is not privileged to watch an ig-
norant alien unwittingly conforming to stereotype, but the fictional character 
looks back at them when he consciously performs a role they expect: the stereo-
type is thus not naturalised but acted. 
Finally, Greenblatt (1999: 146) points out that “Barabas’s avarice, egotism, 
duplicity, and murderous cunning do not signal his exclusion from the world 
of Malta but rather his central place within it”. This obviously does not “signal 
a turning away from Jew-baiting”, but Marlowe’s portrayal of social relations 
intensifies the hostility towards Christians as well (Greenblatt 1999: 146). So, 
as it seems, Marlowe never openly rejects anti-Semitism but he paints Chris-
tians in the same light, portraying them as equally corrupt. Barabas himself 
  
18 Interestingly, Gosson (1841: 30) includes the plays which portray the “treachery of 
Turks” into a section subtitled “tolerable at sometime”.  
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comments: “Some Jews are wicked, as all Christians are” (Jew, 1.2.112). 
Christopher G. Fanta’s (1970: 23) words round up Barabas’s comment as he 
says: “Marlowe exempts neither Turks nor Christians nor Jews from the sin of 
avarice.” All in all, Marlowe rather paints a gloomy picture of the universal 
wickedness inherent in every human being, and such a presentation approxi-
mates him to Nietzsche’s illusion-free vision of man. Sadly accepting Darwin’s 
theory evolution, Nietzsche’s (2005b: 11) Zarathustra speaks to people: “You 
have made your way from worm to human, and much in you is still worm. 
Once you were apes, and even now the human being is still more of an ape 
than any ape is.” Indeed, one gets an impression that the characters of The 
Jew of Malta, regardless of their religious affiliation, are predominantly 
driven by primitive instincts; first of all – survival – and second of all – the 
accumulation of material wealth. This is why the Turks attack and demand 
money while the Governor robs the Jewish community of half of its wealth to 
save the city, while the Jew who loses all, takes bloody revenge. Both the 
Christian Friars and Muslim slave Ithamore blackmail the Jew to extract 
money from him. So, none of the characters follow the ethical codes as out-
lined in their sacred books, be it The Bible or Quran. It is against this intricate 
backdrop that Barabas’s villainy is acted out. Barabas is not any more villain-
ous than any of his opponents, but he is definitely more clever and cunning. 
As Ide Arata (2006: 259) observes: “[h]is remarkable dexterity as a player of 
roles transforms Barabas from a Jewish merchant into a superhuman villain.” 
Barabas indulges in, what Goldman (1977: 32) calls, the “infinite richness of 
deception”. However, as I will be arguing, it is not the power of Barabas’s 
deception or his material wealth that make him a potential overman, but his 
sense of intellectual superiority. I would suggest that Barabas expresses 
Nietzsche’s megalomania par excellence as he seems to be equipped with the 
most subversive of Nietzschean qualities such as contempt for religion and 
herd instincts implicit in it, and the sense of utmost superiority and egocen-
trism. Therefore, despite the grounding of the play in the religious context of 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the play seems to explode the ethical core 
these three religions share. Thus, my assumption is that, just like in the case 
of Tamburlaine, the great, The Jew of Malta is driven by a totally different 
morality framework that is truly Nietzschean in spirit. Naturally, the protago-
nist can be inscribed within this framework too as, to my mind, in his actions 
he goes far beyond his “Jewishness”. In Marlowe’s spectacle of wickedness, 
Barabas “sparkles” as a “good devil”, “the man you love to hate and hate to 
love – though with the other side of your mind you do that too” (Steane 1970: 
175) and you would feel exactly the same if you ever met Nietzsche’s overman. 
Undoubtedly, Barabas, in spite of all his wickedness, stirs simultaneously 
admiration and hate just like Nietzsche’s Übermensch.  
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3.2.2. “Barabas is born to better chance,/ And framed of finer 
mould than common men” – Barabas (Jew, 1.2.218-219)19  
As mentioned, the events of Marlowe’s play unfold a pretty bleak reality of 
materialist society in which “ideology is clearly subordinated to considera-
tions of profit” (Greenblatt 1999: 145). If Greenblatt (1999: 145) be right in 
saying that in the play “the dominant mode of perceiving reality is contempt”, 
then Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta communicates an almost existentialist de-
spair and the utmost contingency of human life, probably only fully sensed by 
the innocent Abigail who observes: “But I perceive there is no love on earth,/ 
Pity in Jews, nor piety in Turks (Jew, 3.3.52-53). Except for a sad reflection 
on humanity in general, Abigail’s comment points to the implicit criticism of 
the religions in question. Abigail as a victim of her Jewish father’s and his 
Muslim slave’s plotting, turns to Christianity just before her premature death. 
However, it is undoubtedly true that in Marlowe’s vision Christians are 
painted equally unfavourably as the Jews or Muslims. I believe that, even 
more than Tamburlaine, the great, the play communicates a scepticism 
pushed to the extreme as it emulates a subversive, unacknowledged atheistic 
spirit. Paralleling Nietzsche’s (2007b: 120) famous maxim, Marlowe presents 
a reality where “God is dead”. This underlying atmosphere of the play is en-
capsulated and first signalled in the Prologue presented by stage-Machiavel 
(Machevill or Machevil depending on the edition), as numerous critics have 
observed – a metaphorical heir to the philosophical legacy of Machiavelli’s 
famous Prince and simultaneously a reworking of and development on the 
morality character of Vice (cf. Rutter 2012: 61, 65). As Rutter (2012: 61) 
points out, the modified spelling of the Italian thinker’s name becomes a pun 
in English as “Machevil” is actually a contraction meaning “Make-evil” or 
“Much-evil”. This intended misspelling underscores the notorious reputation 
of being an immoralist and atheist that the real Machiavelli had in the Ren-
aissance England. In the Prologue, Machiavel presents Barabas, the Jew, as 
his follower although Barabas does not seem interested in the political power 
as outlined in Machiavelli’s Prince. Nevertheless, as he suggests, the rich Jew 
“favours” him (Jew, 1.1.34). Rutter claims that Marlowe’s Machiavel, instead 
  
19 An earlier version of my reflections on Marlowe’s Barabas can be found in: Burzyń-
ska, Katarzyna. 2014. “‘Barabas is born to better chance, and farm'd of finer mould the 
common men’: The analysis of Christopher Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta in the light of 
Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas on morality”, in: Liliana Sikorska, Anna Chudzińska-
Parkosadze, Joanna Jarząb and Marta Frątczak. Clash(es) and new beginnings in literature 
and culture, Poznań: Wydział Anglistyki, 95-104. Since the publication of the article my 
analysis has been enriched by an in-depth reading of source texts, which can be seen in the 
present volume.  
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of recalling Machiavelli’s Prince, actually speaks Innocent Gentillet’s anti-
Machiavellian words from his 1576 treatise (Rutter 2012: 61). I myself believe 
that Marlowe’s irony goes much deeper than that. There are, in my view, two 
levels on which the character of Machiavel (and hence Barabas too) can be 
read. On the surface, Machiavel emerges as an exaggerated and almost ridicu-
lous bogeyman whose role is to scare the public with his outrageous “atheist” 
ideas, and such is also Barabas’s subversive role in the seemingly ordered 
society of Malta. In this sense, they are both more the incarnations of medie-
val Vice figures from morality plays rather than followers of Machiavelli. In 
his direct and joyously malicious address to the audience, Marlowe’s Machia-
vel reminds one of the allegorical figure of Vice in Mankind. So does Barabas, 
who plays tricks on other characters and enjoys watching his success, while 
inviting the audience in sharing his malicious joy (Rutter 2012: 65-66). Tho-
mas and Tydeman (1994: 299) identify the allegorical character of Avarice in 
the Tudor political morality Respublica attributed to Thomas Udall (c. 1553) 
as the antecedent of Marlowe’s Barabas, who similarly to him also clutches 
lovingly his bags of gold. The parallel is indeed quite striking when Avarice 
addresses his gold by saying: “Come on, sweet bags of gold, come on good 
will,/ I on you so tender and ye so forward still?/ Come forward, I pray you 
sweet bags” (Respublica, 3.4.1-3). Having recovered his wealth with the aid of 
Abigail, Barabas exclaims: “My gold, my fortunate, my felicity,/ Strength to 
my soul, death to mine enemy!” (Jew, 2.2.47-48). One could be deceived for a 
second that Barabas means his daughter had not he been simultaneously 
hugging his bags of gold instead of her. This seems to be Barabas at his most 
despicable and at the same time the most exaggerated allegorical guise of 
Avarice. However, the parallels do not end here as Avarice presenting itself 
for the first time to the audience announces: “My very true unchristian name 
is Avarice,/ Which I may not have openly known in no wise;/For though to 
most men I am found commodious/ For those that use my name is odious” 
(Resp, 1.1.13-16). The covert way in which Avarice establishes a rapport with 
the audience as well as his position of a figure both loved and hated, admired 
and feared, very much resembles Machiavel’s introductory speech in The Jew 
of Malta. An allegorical Vice figure in a morality play has such a double recep-
tion. It is a despicable and condemnable figure but also a source of most of 
the comic load in an otherwise harshly didactic morality play. Machiavel sets 
the scene for Barabas who later on acts his part of a Vice figure, who is, to use 
Nietzsche’s expression, “schadenfroh” – maliciously proud of his subversive 
and demolishing control over the island of Malta (Nietzsche 2007a: 141).20 In 
  
20 Nietzsche uses the German term “schadenfroh” (malicious or gleeful in the face of 
others’ failures) a couple of times. For instance, in one of the aphorisms from The gay sci-
ence when he announces: “Laughter. – Laughter means: to gloat, but with a good con-
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other words he acts as a buffoon; a role Nietzsche himself frequently assumed 
(e.g. in Ecce Homo or Thus spoke Zarathustra).21 However, as already out-
lined, Nietzsche’s laughter or bitter irony is many a time a response to the 
deep metaphysical crisis of his age. Recalling Barabas’s abilities of dissimula-
tion, one sees that the parallel with the Nietzschean buffoonery mask is two-
fold. Barabas mocks the hypocrisy of his environment, deconstructs the val-
ues on which it is built and proposes himself as a viable alternative to the 
surrounding decay. In this superficial stage Machiavel role, he remains the 
buffoon of the play but his circumstances and the way he overcomes them do 
stir admiration for a man who holds all values as nothing – mainly because 
these values are indeed devalued.  
It is on this other, more Machiavellian level, that the Marlovian Machia-
vel signals the aforementioned crisis of metaphysics that permeates the play. In 
his speech, Machiavel briefly presents his philosophical agenda and says “I 
count religion but a childish toy,/ And hold there is no sin but ignorance” (Jew, 
1.1.14-15). With these words he seems to be communicating Nietzsche’s godless 
reality and at the same time dismissing religion as the realm of superstition and 
benightedness. According to Nietzsche, metaphysics constitutes the negation of 
the world of phenomena, the only one that humans have access to and the only 
one that can be empirically checked (Hollingdale 2001: 193). Since this is the 
only empirically viable reality, anything man tries to infer about the “other” 
world is always a mere representation. Then it seems a grave mistake to 
attribute values to reality beyond human reach, namely, beyond the actual 
physical reality (Kuderowicz 1979: 58). Machiavel apparently emerges as a critic 
of this metaphysical duality and an opponent of tearing “physis” into “the physi-
                                                                                                                                        
science” (Nietzsche: 2007b: 141). The original by Nietzsche is as follows: “L a c h e n –
Lachen heisst: schadenfroh sein, aber mit gutem Gewissen” (In The Nietzsche source mar-
ked as: eKGWB/FW-200 – Die fröhliche Wissenschaft: § 200. Erste Veröff. 10/09/1882. at 
http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/FW-200) (date of access: 29 March 2014). 
Josephine Nauckhoff translated the passage by changing the structure of the whole sen-
tence. Hence, she did not maintain the adjectival quality of “schadenfroh” – instead chang-
ing it into an infinitive “to gloat”. The option, successful as it is, does not seem to capture 
fully the meaning of “schadenfroh” which, in my opinion, perfectly illustrates the 
Nietzschean side of the Marlovian Barabas who does not gloat over the failure of others for 
gloating’s sake but himself is a cunning and successful agent. The one who utilises his in-
stincts in the pursuit of his goals may feel his conscience too good.  
21 In Ecce Homo Nietzsche (2007d: 88) famously claims: “I don’t want to be a saint, 
and would rather be a buffoon... Perhaps I am a buffoon... And nevertheless—or rather not 
nevertheless, for till now there has never been anyone more hypocritical than saints—the 
truth speaks from me.—But my truth is terrifying, for lies were called truth so far.—
Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for the highest act of self-reflection on the part 
of humanity, which has become flesh and genius in me.” It is hard not to notice that on 
Marlowe’s Malta lies have been so far called truth and it is Barabas who seems to be the first 
to openly acknowledge the hypocrisy of Malta’a reality.  
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cal” and “the metaphysical”. Paradoxically, as much as Machiavel might con-
demn duality, his speech “sets the pattern of dramatic doublethink” as he 
speaks with the egoism of a villain and at the same time with the dignity of a 
hero (Steane 1970: 173). He condemns ignorance, simultaneously underscoring 
the importance of the Renaissance cult of knowledge and the aspirations of 
science. His vitality is highlighted by his implicit irony and pride, fused to 
present “the paradox of the ‘good devil’” whom Barabas later seems to mirror 
(Steane 1970: 173-175). Machiavel’s words belittling religion seem to constitute 
quite a straightforward opposition to metaphysics, but the play is also rich in 
numerous implicit criticisms of religious institutions. The first hand example is 
obviously the “theft” of Barabas’s fortune. In an exchange with the Governer, 
Barabas asks: “Is theft the ground of your religion?” to which Ferneze answers 
“No, Jew; we take particularly thine,/ To save the ruin of a multitude:/ And 
better one want for a common good,/ Than many perish for a private man” 
(Jew, 1.2.96-99). In his answer, Ferneze evidently presents the most basic tenet 
of Christian morality which is the pursuit of the so called “common good”, but 
somehow one cannot escape the impression that his motives are not fully al-
truistic and one feels pity for Barabas – who loses everything. What is, then, the 
reason for this uncomfortable feeling that is stirred by this seemingly necessary 
intervention to rescue multitudes of innocent people? Nietzsche’s adamant crit-
icism of Christian morality seems to provide one with an answer to this ques-
tion. First of all, the governor’s reaction poses a plain negation of the worth of 
an individual for the sake of the community. As Nietzsche (2006c: 5) observes 
in The Antichrist:  
You should not beautify Christianity or try to dress it up: it has waged a war to the 
death against this higher type of a person, it has banned all the basic instincts of 
this type, it has distilled ‘evil’ and ‘the Evil One’ out of these instincts – the strong 
human being as reprehensible, as ‘depraved’. Christianity has taken the side of 
everything weak, base, failed, it has made an ideal out of whatever contradicts the 
preservation of instincts of a strong life; it has corrupted the reason of even the 
most spiritual by teaching people to see the highest spiritual values as sinful, as 
deceptive, as temptations. 
For Nietzsche it is absolutely unacceptable to blindly try to attribute universal 
value to the “herd” at the cost of an individual. Barabas appears a successful 
merchant and businessman, the embodiment of an enterprising and inde-
pendent character. It seems that he is punished for his success. Obviously the 
real reason is veiled by a doctrinal explanation as the Governer – a truly Pi-
late-like figure – dismisses his responsibility by saying: “Excess of wealth is 
cause of covetousness:/ And covetousness, O, ‘tis a monstrous sin” (Jew, 
1.2.122-123), while the knight adds “‘Tis not our fault, but thy inherent sin” 
(Jew, 1.2.109). Taking the side of the weak in itself would not be a real prob-
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lem, but the premise of the decision appears dishonest. Nietzsche’s point is 
that the automatic higher valuation of the community is a mistake as it is 
purely arbitrary. Since God is dead, while metaphysics cancelled, it seems 
evident that the morality system of a given community is a result of custom or 
tradition, not a universal God-given code of conduct. Nietzsche (2006a: 105-
106) explains his view in Daybreak: thoughts on the prejudices of morality:  
[m]oral fashion of a commercial society. – [...] ‘moral actions are actions per-
formed out of sympathy for others’, I see the social effect of timidity hiding behind 
an intellectual mask: it desires, first and foremost, that all the dangers which life 
once held should be removed from it, and that everyone should assist in this with 
all his might: hence only those actions which tend towards the common security 
and society’s sense of security are to be accorded the predicate ‘good’.  
The complex socio-economic life in the city seems to testify to this. Although 
“the prevailing morality is that of Al Capone’s Chicago”, it is tuned to provide 
at least an illusion of security (Steane 1970: 169). The Nietzschean (2006a: 
106) “tyranny of timidity” turns out to be true for Barabas, as the authorities’ 
references to sin are obviously a mask for their own weakness and baseness. 
This weakness is presented as a universal prescription, “supreme moral law” 
to use Nietzsche’s words, when Ferneze says: “If thou rely upon thy right-
eousness,/ Be patient, and thy riches will increase” (Jew, 1.2.120-121). In the 
spirit of Nietzschean individuality, Barabas strongly opposes “the tyranny of 
timidity” by saying: “Why, I esteem the injury far less, To take the lives of 
miserable men/ Than be the causers of their misery. You have my wealth, the 
labour of my life, The comfort of mine age, my children’s hope; And therefore 
ne’er distinguish of the wrong” (Jew, 1.2.146-151) Nietzsche’s immoralism is 
even further underscored by Barabas’s final comment: “Your extreme right 
does me exceeding wrong”, also pointing out the relativity of moral choices 
(Jew, 1.2.153). Marlowe’s play abounds in numerous situations similar to the 
one that drives the “revenge tragedy” potential of the play. Among them one 
may enumerate the nuns comments on not wanting to get involved with “the 
multitude” (“The better; for we love not to be seen/ ‘Tis/ thirty winters long 
since some of us/ Did stray so far amongst the multitude”) (Jew, 1.2.306-308) 
or the Friars attempting to blackmail Barabas using their knowledge gained 
during confession (Act 4 Scene 1). One may argue that Marlowe’s implicit 
critical remarks on the institutions of the Catholic Church might be connected 
with the Anti-Catholic sentiment predominant in post-reformatory England. 
As Lupton (2004: 154) remarks: “The public theatre is given a Protestant 
frame – the same frame that allows Marlowe to couch his corrosive represen-
tation of Christian hypocrisy under the neutralizing rubric of anti-Catholic 
satire. These Christians might be nasty, but after all, they are Spanish Catho-
lics, not English Protestants...” This is of course true; however, I would still 
Vicious greatness: Tamburlaine … 159 
argue that Marlowe’s rebuttal of Catholicism is a part of a more large-scale 
project of the denunciation of Christian morality. When Barabas says to Abi-
gail “for religion/ Hides many mischiefs from suspicion” he refers to religious 
practice in general, not only Catholicism (Jew, 1.2.283). All in all, in The Jew 
of Malta, religion, and consequently the values inherent in it, emerge as a 
plain, on which human corruption is even strongly realized as the moral codes 
laid down by it become a mask to hide falsehood. Moreover, religion provides 
each group in the play with a moral prerogative to tyrannize others e.g. the 
Turks harass the Christians, in turn the Christians harass the Jews, while the 
cunning Jew decides to take revenge on all of them. In the face of such a value 
crisis, his schadenfroh attitude of a Vice figure seems to be the only reason-
able reaction. Bartels (1993: 92) believes that as an heir to the teachings of 
Machiavelli  
Machevill’s prologue is in some ways a ‘false start’, its exclusive rights to the Jew 
denied. Malta is filled with hard-core policy-making Machiavels, as critics have 
noted, and Barabas stands out as the least Machiavellian among them, having lit-
tle or no interest in the citadels, Caesars, and public/political policies that interest 
Machevill.  
It is indeed true that Barabas is not interested in purely political power, dis-
missing it as primitive.22 At the closing of the play he is all-too powerful, but 
he plans to relinquish his hold over Malta and negotiates with the governor. 
However, it is crucial to note that he only does relinquish power being in its 
full possession. So, one can see that he is only satisfied with a position of an 
ultimate master of puppets. His generous act of relinquishing power is unfor-
tunately not accepted as such by Ferneze, who decides to get rid of Barabas, 
proving to be a truly Machiavellian politician.23 Barabas, on the other hand, 
  
22 Interestingly, this makes him even more Nietzschean as Nietzsche did not seem to 
hold politics and politicians in high regard. For instance, in Beyond good and evil he im-
plicitly criticises “great politics” and patriotic leanings as hostile to truly great individuals 
(Nietzsche 2002: 131-150).  
23 Arata Ide (2006: 265) in her brilliant article “The Jew of Malta and the diabolic 
power of theatrics in the 1580s” couples the Governor’s hypocritical Machiavellian tech-
niques with the workings of the Elizabethan regime in the persecution of “Jesuits’ shape-
shifting”. She associates Barabas’s self-fashioned persona with the Catholic priests who 
came to England in disguise, while the Governor’s appeal to providentialism in the face of 
Barabas’s fall she parallels with the hypocrisy of the Elizabethan government that suppos-
edly also utilized the “theatrical” tricks of deception in its anti-Catholic propaganda (Ide 
2006: 268). Ide (2006: 269) aptly observes: “The government itself, in creating anti-
Catholic discourse, actually applied the same theatrical strategy as that of common play-
wrights and seminary priests by manipulating the public with dexterous fictions in order to 
uphold the national polity. While highlighting the diabolic power of theatrics in resonance 
with popular anxiety and outwardly endorsing divine retribution against protean Barabas, 
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emerges more of a Nietzschean rather than Machiavellian figure though one 
may, at points, sense the overlap between the two. However, the conclusion 
seems to be that “all these motives, whatever exalted names we may give 
them, have grown up out of the same roots as those we believe evilly poi-
soned; between good and evil actions there is no difference in kind, but at the 
most one of degree” (Nietzsche 2005a: 58). Even those human impulses con-
sidered empathic, might be a veil for the human drive towards mastery, or in 
other words – the will to power. Once humans understand that goodness is 
only a sublimated form of evil, they might free themselves from the shackles 
of false moralities and start over-coming them. In Marlowe’s play the one 
character who instinctively seems to sense this idea is Barabas, who becomes 
“the breaker, the lawbreaker”, demolisher of the current morality who “can 
give [himself his own] evil and [his own] good and hang [his] will over [him-
self] as a law”. (Nietzsche 2005b: 21, 55).  
Men who are great in Nietzsche’s (2008: 11) view can be described as 
“the noble, the mighty, the high-placed and the high-minded”. Undoubtedly, 
pride is one of the characteristic features of Nietzsche’s dignified over-men. In 
this respect, in the opening scenes Barabas approximates Nietzsche’s ideal. In 
his vivid speech in Act 1, Scene 1 he speaks of his “infinite riches” (Jew, 1.1.7), 
but one can sense that the money Barabas celebrates is really a mental short-
cut for his control, influence and the power he holds over the island of Malta. 
He mocks Christian piety and identifies himself with the chosen people, or in 
his particular understanding “the Master Race”. It is important to note that 
Barabas explicitly identifies himself with the doctrine of Judaism as long as 
he is successful. His subsequent choices, already when he has lost everything, 
morally exclude him from the Jewish community. As Bartels (1993: 93) points 
out: “[a]lthough Barabas first appears as a greedy Jew, fondling his money 
bags, his career is initiated by an event that sets him in the middle of the en-
suing imperialist competition between Christians and Turks and makes clear 
that this “tragedy of a Jew” is not about a Jew.” He emerges as a stereotypical 
Jew only to subvert the stereotype in the course of the play. Barabas is proud 
of his success and perfectly aware of the jealousy his wealth might stir in oth-
er people as he says: “Who hateth me but for my happiness?” (Jew, 1.1.111). 
Steane (1970: 174) observes that in this comment he mirrors Machiavel, who 
also points out: “Admir’d I am of those that hate me most” (Jew, Prologue 
10). Machiavel also poses a crucial question about Julius Caesar: “What right 
had Caesar to the empery?/ Might first made kings, and laws were then most 
sure” (Jew, Prologue 20). It seems that a parallel question could be posited 
                                                                                                                                        
Marlowe seems to throw doubt obliquely on the legitimacy of the English Protestant nation 
by disclosing that the same power facilitates the nation in forging an image of a divinely 
sanctioned regime.”  
Vicious greatness: Tamburlaine … 161 
about Barabas – what is the legitimate reason that makes him a representa-
tive of a higher class? He himself points to his Jewishness, but I would argue 
that it is his enterprising nature and insurmountable ambition that makes 
him tower over others. Just like Tamburlaine who presents his “overman” 
manifesto in Act 2, Scene 7, when he speaks of “aspiring minds” and “the 
wondrous architecture of the world” (Tamb. 1, 2.7.12-27), so does Barabas 
present the extent of his ambition in his own assertion of power and control 
in Act 1, Scene 1 (Jew, 1.1.2-47). Barabas is himself overwhelmed by the 
wealth he has accumulated, but he quite explicitly says that he finds counting 
the money tedious when he says: “Fie; what a trouble ‘tis to count this trash” 
(Jew, 1.1.7). His money is ultimately “trash”, which quite clearly points to the 
fact that it is not the mere accumulation of funds that brings him joy, but the 
possibilities his wealth opens before him. As he says: “Beauteous rubies, spar-
kling diamonds, […]/ May serve in peril of calamity/ To ransom great kings 
from captivity” (Jew, 1.1.27-32). So it is rather the possibility to buy a King 
out of captivity that is more exciting than the diamonds or rubies themselves. 
In the case of Barabas his wealth is a measure of his immense will to power 
and his success in exercising it. Barabas’s great merchant fleet literally holds 
control over the entire Mediterranean sea, transporting precious stones and 
commodities. “Spanish oils and wines of Greece” travel on Persian ships from 
Arabia to Egypt (Jew, 1.1.5). It seems that the entirety of the known world is 
encapsulated in the hands of Barabas so that he can enclose “[i]nfinite riches 
in a little room” (Jew, 1.1.37). One expects a portrayal of a pity miser, but to 
my mind, the dazzling enumeration of exotic places and fantastic treasures 
expresses the intellectual horizons Barabas is not afraid to reach. Thus, one 
encounters a man of an “aspiring mind” who revels in the growth of his power 
and control just like Tamburlaine, the Great.  
As already hinted, in one of the initial soliloquies Barabas links his life’s 
success with his Jewish origin. He inscribes himself within the framework of “the 
chosen people”, but as soon as the first signs of trouble loom on the horizon and 
his fellow Jewish citizens arrive at his house to inform him of the need to appear 
at the meeting with the city authorities, he instantly disassociates himself from his 
Jewishness by saying (in an aside): “If any thing shall there concern our state,/ 
Assure yourselves I’ll look – unto myself” (Jew, 1.1.172-173). His individuality is 
underscored by him saying: “Ego mihimet sum semper proximus”, which could be 
translated as “I am my own best friend” (Jew, 1.1.188). In his project of revenge, 
Barabas goes beyond his Jewish origin even further, rejecting the morality of Ju-
daism and instead turning more into the realm of Nietzschean morality or rather 
immorality. Paradoxically, it is his Jewish background that metaphorically crams 
him into the role of the relentless avenger. As Steane (1970: 168) observes: “Bara-
bas is the most successful representative of a materialist society which also victi-
mises and condemns him.” The official reason for his condemnation is naturally 
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his Jewishness. However, as it seems, Barabas’s reaction is not “Jewish” in spirit. 
Barabas turns out to be an active agent already during his meeting with the gover-
nor. Unlike his humble Jewish companions, he adamantly opposes the obvious 
injustice that befalls his community. For his act of defiance he is punished by con-
fiscation of his fortune. Barabas demands a reciprocal reaction from his fellows as 
he says: “Why stand you thus unmov’d with my laments?/ Why weep you not to 
think upon my wrongs?/ Why pine not I, and die in this distress? (Jew, 1.2.171-
173). He bitterly reproaches the other Jews’ passivity by saying: “Why did you 
yield to their extortion?/ You were a multitude, and I but one:/ And of me only 
have they taken all” (Jew, 1.2.177-179). Though evidently Barabas’s verbal rebel-
lion against the governor’s decisions is driven by his egoistic impulses, it neverthe-
less proves his mental courage to resist injustice and to go against the flow, unlike 
his humble or, rather one should say, weak friends. In his resistance Barabas, 
possibly unintentionally, frames himself as the commander of the community. As 
Nietzsche (2006b: 89) posits:  
commanding is harder than obeying. And not only that the commander bears the 
burden of all obeyers, and that this burden easily crushes him: – In all command-
ing it seemed to me there is an experiment and a risk; and always when it com-
mands, the living risks itself in doing so. Indeed, even when it commands itself, 
even then it must pay for its commanding. It must become the judge and avenger 
and victim of its own law.  
These words definitely prove right for Barabas as he himself solely bears the 
burden of his commanding. In the aforementioned scene Barabas definitely 
consolidates the dividing line between his strong Nietzschean individuality, his 
“master” spirit and other weak and petty men. Naturally, the other Jews suggest 
the teachings of the Scriptures as a recipe to deal with the situation. The hum-
bleness of Job, his patient and unquestioning passivity in the face of adversity, 
seems to them a role model of behaviour they recommend to Barabas. For 
Barabas, Jewish by origin but Nietzschean in spirit, his suffering is a great 
stimulant to act and creatively transform his unhappiness. As Walter Kaufmann 
(1974: 276) writes, for Nietzsche happiness is supposed to be the process of 
conquering your own suffering. Barabas seems to be aware of the creative po-
tential of his suffering as, when he is left alone, in his, what I would call, “second 
overman” manifesto, he celebrates his urge to action and he announces his su-
periority over those who cannot creatively embrace adversity:  
See the simplicity of these base slaves,  
Who, for the villains have no wit themselves,  
Think me to be a senseless lump of clay,  
That will with every water wash to dirt!  
No, Barabas is born to better chance,  
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And fram’d of finer mould than common men,  
That measure naught but by the present time.  
A reaching thought will search his deepest wits,  
And cast with cunning for the time to come;  
For evils are apt to happen every day (Jew, 1.2.215-223).  
For Nietzsche, the true measure of individual power is not entirely linked with 
his worldly might, or worldly success, as these might “cloak the most abysmal 
weakness” (Kaufmann 1974: 280). The more authentic power of the individual 
is measured by his ability to overcome adversity, so it seems that the formation 
of Barabas as the “overman” actually begins with his lost fortune. He does not 
decide to follow Job’s example as that would mean resignation of the control he 
had possessed so far and embracing a degenerated and weakened form of life. 
Instead, he seems to creatively embrace the bitter ingredient of life – the adver-
sity that befalls him. Instead of patient acceptance, he chooses revenge. Adver-
sity then becomes a springboard for action and the process of self-overcoming. 
In his conversation with Abigail he resists succumbing to despair by saying:  
You partial heavens, have I deserv’d this plague?  
What, will you thus oppose me, luckless stars,  
To make me desperate in my poverty?  
And, knowing me impatient in distress,  
Think me so mad as I will hang myself,  
That I may vanish o’er the earth in air,  
And leave no memory that e’er I was?  
No, I will live; nor loathe I this my life:  
And, since you leave me in the ocean thus  
To sink or swim, and put me to my shifts,  
I’ll rouse my senses, and awake myself.— (Jew, 1.2.260-269)  
For Barabas the heavens seems to be silent, while the stars “luckless”. However, 
this is no reason to despair. Suicide is out of the question as Barabas is too 
proud to die without leaving a heritage testifying to his greatness. In this respect 
he is again very similar to Tamburlaine who is equally determined to leave a 
testimony of greatness behind. Just as Tamburlaine resolves to overcome the 
circumstances of his lowly background, Barabas distances himself from his Jew-
ishness and the constraints of Jewish morality in the face of adversity. Barabas’s 
speech illustrates a Nietzschean life affirmation, namely, the approach realized 
in the acceptance of life’s inherent suffering and happiness stemming from the 
over-coming of suffering. In his philosophy Nietzsche promotes the idea of life 
affirmation by referring to Amor fati, or in other words, the love of fate. It is an 
attitude which embraces life as a whole with everything that is happy and sor-
rowful, as well as good and evil in it. Nietzsche (2007b: 157) calls himself in The 
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gay science “a Yes-Sayer” and he announces: “I want to learn more and more 
how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus I will 
be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from 
now on!”. By “seeing what is necessary” Nietzsche also wants to communicate 
that what people consider evil and ugly in other humans is inescapable, as it 
belongs to human nature. Nietzsche seems to promote a more faithful and illu-
sion-free picture of humanity. I would argue, that so does the reality of The Jew 
of Malta as it leaves the spectator with no illusions as to the “inherent” good-
ness of people, after all here “Every one’s price is written on his back” (Jew, 
2.3.3). In this sense, Barabas is the exponent of Amor Fati as he is fully aware of 
the dangerous human potential as well as the chaotic and contingent nature of 
existence. It is not enough just to drift in these wild waters. The only way to deal 
with bleak reality is to live your life to the full and that, in turn, means to gather 
more power and might even at the cost of overturning the existing order of illu-
sory values.  
As Levin (1961: 79-80) suggests, The Jew of Malta inscribes itself 
thematically within the pattern of a revenge tragedy, at least at the opening of 
the play. Barabas appears a character ennobled by his suffering and justified 
in his revenge project; however, his subsequent deeds transform him into a 
villain rather than strengthen his moral right to revenge. Although avengers 
in revenge tragedies seem to desire relatively more blood and more suffering 
than they themselves incurred – for Levin (1961: 80), Barabas still emerges as 
“the very incarnation of sin, the scapegoat sent out into the wilderness bur-
dened with all the sins that flesh inherits.” As Levin (1961: 80) claims, Bara-
bas is “more consistently and more superficially diabolical.” What Levin 
seems to be trying to say is that Barabas’s plan of revenge gets out of hand, 
that its cruelty is qualitatively disproportional to the offence. Barabas’s ac-
tions are not driven so much by passion but rather calculation and opportun-
ism. It seems that if the revenge impulse is not acted out instantly with one 
swift thrust of a dagger, once it becomes a meticulously crafted policy, once 
the urge is unnaturally stretched in time, the vividness of injustice, at least in 
the audience’s eyes, becomes blurred and consequently the revenge is no 
longer justified. Though Hieronimo in the classic revenge tragedy by Thomas 
Kyd The Spanish Tragedy stretches his revenge plan in time, his wounds after 
the death of his son seem fresh enough. Barabas launches his revenge plan 
when he is yet again a rich and an influential citizen, so the justification of 
vengeance is qualitatively and quantitatively diminished. Thus, within the 
Christian framework of reference, his actions seem indeed diabolical. Howev-
er, if one stops seeing Barabas as an avenger but rather a man of soaring am-
bition who consistently acts upon his impulse to strengthen his will to power, 
Barabas suddenly becomes an overman in the making. Barabas seems to 
share potential qualities with the overman such as his aforementioned intelli-
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gence, ambition and pride, the ability to embrace life even in the face of ad-
versity, the strength and determination to expose the falsehood of the current 
morals and, above all, his lack of esteem for any rules whatsoever. Barabas’s 
consecutive actions may be seen in the light of his meticulous revenge or his 
individual ambition to tower over those whom he despises or maybe the com-
bination of the two. Regardless of one’s interpretation, the grand scale of Ba-
rabas’s plan to punish the despised governor astonishes with its immense 
scope. In the course of the play, the list of casualties gets longer and longer. It 
includes all the nuns living in Barabas’s old house, his daughter Abigail, the 
Arab slave Ithamore (whom Barabas at one point adopts as his own son), the 
two Friars who tried to blackmail him, the whole Turkish army and many 
more who more or less accidentally get caught in the way. Out of all these 
deaths, the one that strikes one as particularly cruel is the death of Abigail. 
Barabas decides to poison her, and along with her the whole nunnery, when 
she turns Christian. Barabas’s killing of Abigail resembles the murder of Ca-
lyphas by Tamburlaine. In an act of fury Tamburlaine kills his own child. 
However, as much as Tamburlaine’s son Calyphas emerges as an openly des-
picable character, there is no doubt that Abigail is a pure and innocent figure 
who does not seem to deserve to die in such gory circumstances. Neverthe-
less, in this respect Barabas strongly reminds one of Tamburlaine, who also 
demands ultimate loyalty. After all, Abigail, despite her best intentions, 
proves disloyal to her father as she goes to the nunnery and, additionally, on 
the verge of her death, confesses her father’s sins to the friar. According the 
Christian moral code, her behaviour may be seen as immaculate, but one 
needs to bear in mind the truth about the brutal reality of Marlowe’s Malta. 
For Barabas, Abigail’s behaviour emerges as an act of dishonesty and disobe-
dience. It is possible to risk a statement that, by Nietzsche’s standards, her 
death is a necessary sacrifice in the name of Barabas’ mental independence. 
In a somewhat perverse way Barabas simply gets rid of his weakest link. His 
daughter provides the last connection with the values he eventually dashes to 
pieces, namely, compassion, mercy and forgiveness. When Ithamore becomes 
his servant, he instructs him by saying: “First, be thou void of these affec-
tions,/ Compassion, love, vain hope, and heartless fear;/ Be mov’d at nothing, 
see thou pity none” (Jew, 2.3.171-173). The lesson Barabas teaches Ithamore 
seems to be his own credo – the credo of an immoralist. As Nietzsche (2006a: 
10) writes: “The free human being is immoral because in all things he is de-
termined to depend upon himself and not upon a tradition: in all the original 
conditions of mankind, ‘evil’ signifies the same as ‘individual’, ‘free’, ‘capri-
cious’, ‘unusual’, ‘unforeseen’, ‘incalculable’.” The other deaths to which Ba-
rabas leads seem to testify to him acting upon his basic instincts and they 
seem to be purely incidental in the course of his project. The exposure of the 
falsehood of existing morals and their denunciation is for Nietzsche a first 
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step to the creation of new ones. The Nietzschean overman, in the face of the 
relativity of current morality, is supposed to be an individual value-maker. 
Thus, a crucial question comes to mind, whether Barabas is actually a value-
maker. He definitely is a demolisher of the existing order. His notorious life 
history that he presents to Ithamore during their first meeting testifies to 
both his ingenuity and his destructiveness. Barabas confesses to killing the 
sick and poisoning wells, but also to some medical experiments, a career as a 
physicist, usurer, servant to Charles V, as well as some engineering experience 
(Jew, 2.3.177-202). Some critics see the instruction as an element of a farcical 
construction of the play or Barabas’s gradual shift into the realm of carica-
ture.24 Bartels sees his extravagant credo of an immoralist as part of his self-
fashioning as an “evil Jew”. As she observes: “Barabas’s career is thus shaped 
by a series of performances in which he plays the Jew (as Tamburlaine plays 
the barbarian/hero) his spectators want and need to see, a Jew who ironically 
tells us more about them than about him” (Bartels 1993: 106). To this selec-
tion of guises that Barabas offers his audience belongs also his fake death, 
which is “a supreme and supremely manipulative fiction that works through 
alienation to overcome and overthrow” (Bartels 1993: 104). Bartels sees Bara-
bas in a similar light to Tamburlaine. Barabas appears as a constructed public 
self, or a series of selves where the possibility of ever reaching his true, inner 
self is cancelled. It may be, as Bartels believes, a project of self-fashioning that 
Barabas carries out – or a Nietzschean self-overcoming. Whatever one wishes 
to call his identity building process, one thing remains constant – the fact that 
he makes himself into what he becomes. Regardless of its function, the exag-
gerated and bombastic enumeration of his crimes presented to Ithamore is, 
nevertheless, a declaration of a brilliant but definitely morally twisted mind. 
Hence, Barabas, to my mind, possesses overhuman potential, though its full 
realization is a debatable question. On the one hand, he seems to be an embo-
diment of a free mind as he rejects the accepted morality standards and 
chooses the professions that suit his individual needs for self-realization. On 
the other hand, in numerous deeds he is evidently a source of unnecessary 
cruelty. According to Nietzsche, a truly powerful human being has no need to 
cause pain, while Barabas seems to derive pleasure from cruelty. As Nietzsche 
(2006a: 169) writes: “The evil of the strong harms others without giving 
thought to it – it has to discharge itself; the evil of the weak wants to harm 
others and to see the signs of the suffering it has caused.” So, if a strong man 
causes pain, it is only out of necessity or accident but never for the sake of 
  
24 For more information on The Jew of Malta as a farce, see J.B. Steane’s Christopher 
Marlowe – a critical study or consult Eder, Katharina T. S. Eliot, The Jew of Malta: Farci-
cal and symbolical elements, anti-Christian elements, anti-Muslim elements, dramatic 
technique. 
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seeing suffering. In Barabas’s actions one senses not only a will to tower over 
others, but also the disturbing pleasure derived from inflicting pain. Though 
eventually shunning “real” politics, throughout the play Barabas seems to be 
promoting a two-faced policy, in the spirit of Machiavelli’s Prince, for in-
stance when he says:  
We Jews can fawn like spaniels when we please;  
And when we grin we bite; yet are our looks  
As innocent and harmless as a lamb’s. 
I learn’d in Florence how to kiss my hand, 
Heave up my shoulders when they call me dog, 
And duck as low as any bare-foot friar; 
Hoping to see them starve upon a stall. (Jew, 2.3.20-26)  
Paradoxically, in this speech Barabas cancels his individuality by inscribing 
himself yet again within the stereotypical presentation of the Jewish commu-
nity. At the same time, on the level of an inherent moral message, Barabas’s 
speech mirrors Machiavelli’s heavily quoted passage where he recommends to 
resort both to human and beastly means in one’s actions. Machiavelli (2006, 
loc. 1026-1028) writes:  
so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that 
one without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled know-
ingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion 
cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against 
wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to 
terrify the wolves. 
As much as Nietzsche would call for the embrace of the beastly in one’s na-
ture, he would not advocate political opportunism, condemning hypocrisy 
whenever possible. Nietzsche’s overman, full of pride and dignity, could never 
stoop so low as to herd instincts as Barabas does. The core of the Nietzschean 
overman is, above all, self-overcoming and the creative sublimation of im-
pulses. Nietzsche promotes his concept of “the blond beast” which is not con-
structed racially but directly alludes to the colour of the lion, symbolically the 
bravest of all animals (Kaufmann 1974: 225). So for Nietzsche, if the man 
must be an animal, then he should definitely be a lion rather than a fox. 
Unlike Tamburlaine, who is not only politically conscious, but also aestheti-
cally sensitive, Barabas unfortunately falls short of fully realizing his creative 
potential. He seems to share overhuman potentiality but stops at the level of 
embracing his lowest instincts. As Kaufmann (1974: 224) underscores: 
“Nietzsche believed that a man without impulses could not do the good or 
create the beautiful any more than a castrated man could beget children.” 
Thus, the acknowledgement of human primordial impulses and acting upon 
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them might actually lead man to greatness. But that can only be possible 
when man learns to sublimate his instincts, only then can they be creatively 
transformed. With Barabas, as it seems, this process never begins. Although 
he is ready to relinquish his ultimate power over the city of Malta when he 
finally reaches it, his motivation seems to be driven by his survival instinct 
rather than the “overhuman” excess of power. Paradoxically, he himself falls 
prey to his own scheming and dies a terrible death. Although his death does 
not stir sorrow like the death of Tamburlaine, neither does it bring relief as 
one feels that those who are left among the living are hypocrites and criminals 
who veil their natures under the guise of the so called morality. In The will to 
power Nietzsche (1967: 530) says:  
the greater and more terrible the passions are that an age, a people, an individual 
can permit themselves, because they are capable of employing them as means, the 
higher stands their culture; the more mediocre, the weaker, the more submissive 
and cowardly a man is, the more he will posit as evil: it is with him that the realm 
of evil is most comprehensive. The basest man will see the realm of evil (i.e. of 
that which is forbidden and hostile to him) everywhere.  
His words seem to provide an apt comment on the reality of Marlowe’s Malta, 
which appears a mediocre and weak place after all. Barabas may not be fully a 
Nietzschean overman but he sparkles in his world as he seems a man of in-
tense instincts who is not afraid to embrace them.  
As it appears, neither Barabas nor Tamburlaine may be seen in terms 
of finished overmen as Nietzsche would conceptualize his Übermensch. How-
ever, as shown, they both definitely expose many overhuman qualities – like 
pride and insurmountable ambition, wide intellectual horizons, as well exube-
rant ingenuity. In the gloomy reality of Malta Barabas is undoubtedly the 
most brilliant of characters – uncouth, but witty and intelligent. Unlike other 
characters, he consciously rejects the morality that limits him and openly 
embraces his newly found “immorality”. Tamburlaine also surpasses others in 
his military acumen and charismatic bearing. He, too, subversively under-
mines and later overcomes his limiting circumstances. Moreover, though 
Marlowe never grants us access to his interior self, Tamburlaine emerges as 
an aesthetically sensitive “barbarian” who attempts to sublimate his instincts, 
albeit not entirely successfully. Barabas turns out to be more of an inward 
man. Yet his manifold guises may confuse the audience as to his real inten-
tions and motivations. The deeds of both characters are morally dubious, 
though they willy-nilly stir admiration even in their opponents and enemies. 
They emerge as formidable fathers, each of such strong character that any 
opposition or disobedience on the part of their children is met with ruthless 
reaction. Their robust individuality would not accept any acts of self-assertion 
from those who are expected to be ultimately loyal and obedient. The break-
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ing up of filial relations seems to underscore the subversive moralities of Mar-
lowe’s plays. Although the patriarchal make-up of the plays would justify the 
demands of loyalty and obedience, both Tamburlaine’s and Barabas’s indivi-
dualities are so stifling that the sympathy moves to the side of the wronged 
children. Barabas and Tamburlaine are, above all, explosions of an immense 
will to power. They are men of instinct, to which their numerous and excep-
tional mental faculties are subjected. They are principally driven by the will to 
power, which is not equal to blind passion. After all, they are calculating and 
reasonable, but their reason is subjected to the project of ever surpassing and 
overcoming. However, their projects of self-overcoming are not coupled with 
deeper moral reflection, which means that, being demolishers of existing 
moral orders, they never emerge as builders of new moralities. Their singular-
ity may be exorbitant, but they remain Nietzschean “beasts of prey” 
(Nietzsche 2002: 84). Shakespearean candidates for overmen, as I will be 
arguing, possess similarly intense wills to power. However, being equipped 
with more developed interiority, their Nietzschean potential is enriched with 
deeper and more profound moral reflection. This does not mean that they are 
morally superior to the Marlovian protagonists as their deeds are frequently 
as morally questionable as Barabas’s or Tamburlaine’s. Yet, with Macbeth, 
Edmund or Brutus, it is self-interrogation that becomes the vehicle of action. 
The Shakespearean will to power is, thus, interiorized and rationalized. Inte-
restingly, just as Marlowe’s overmen are domineering fathers who do not 
stand opposition, Shakespeare offers a new type of Übermensch – a son (or 
daughter) who raises his (her) hand against the stifling father. Shakespearean 
overmen, as I will be arguing, will raise their hand to hit their real or symboli-
cal fathers and break the original progenitor’s bonds in their process of self-




Breaking the bonds of progenitors:  
Brutus, Macbeth and Edmund 
It is common knowledge that Shakespeare was under the spell of Marlowe’s 
“mighty line” as well as his mighty characters. He himself frequently resorted to 
a presentation of equally ambitious characters. However, Shakespeare deep-
ened the psychological load of his overmen by burdening them with con-
sciences. If Nietzsche’s overcoming of impulses is meant to be a conscious effort 
on the part of the overman, Shakespeare’s characters may well indeed constitute 
far more interesting specimens of overhuman potential. In this chapter I intend 
to look at three of his ambitious men: Brutus as an instance of Shakespeare’s 
relatively early tragic hero, as well as Macbeth and Edmund who belong to 
Shakespeare’ more mature tragedies. The three men, as I will be arguing, share 
degrees of quite an intense will to power which is demonstrated in their ambi-
tions to topple mighty patriarchal figures. They all have to overcome their cir-
cumstances of subservience to their metaphorical or real fathers in an act of 
self-determination and eventually self-creation. In an act totally “beyond good 
and evil” they decide to circumvent the laws of their progenitors. I will follow 
these general interpretative directions in my subsequent analyses of Brutus, 
Macbeth and Edmund. However, each analytical section will be proceeded by a 
brief account of previously utilized analytical tools. I intend to address existing 
criticism on these three characters in order to compare and contrast it with my 
view of the plays. Also, such a procedure seems reasonable in the light of the 
wealth of critical responses to Shakespeare’s plays, some of them being almost 
classical interpretative loci. The critical accounts of the plays help me also to 
work a critical edge for each of the characters. Analyses per se employ the ma-
trix of Nietzschean thought as presented in Chapter 1 and 2, along with the ap-
propriate source text backbone. Though I maintain that all three characters 
represent specimens of overhuman potential, each is defined in the light of a 
different key feature. Brutus, who opens my discussion, is caught up in the 
midst of an agonistic competition in a supposedly “brotherly” community; the 
interpretative key to Macbeth’s failed political ambitions lie in his highly phi-
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losophical nature; while Edmund struggles against an oppressive and limiting 
environment that stigmatizes his bastardy. What brings all these characters 
together is their burning need to top their progenitors in the pursuit of mental 
liberty and the right to self-determination.  
4.1. Brutus (Julius Caesar) 
4.1.1. Critical responses to Julius Caesar  
and interpretative paths 
Julius Caesar is traditionally seen as the first “great tragedy” opening the 
Shakespearean canon, believed to be immediately followed by Hamlet. Both its 
thematic as well as tragic scope seem grand. The play portrays events of great 
historical import, well known to the Elizabethan audience yet surely inflaming 
the imagination through their politically subversive potential. At the same time, 
the play marks Shakespeare’s growing interest in an intensified investigation of 
human interiority and the emotional load implicit in it. Critics have often seen it 
as a work heralding the fully-fledged internalized reflection of Hamlet, as well 
as the first play exploring profound moral dilemmas.1 Indeed, the events as well 
as dramatic techniques Shakespeare uses in Julius Caesar prefigure some of the 
crucial themes later to surface in Macbeth or King Lear. At the same time, as it 
appears, Julius Caesar is a play that stirs different, often contradictory emo-
tions for a couple of reasons. First of all, the reader stumbles upon the well-
known problem of the tragic hero – supposedly Julius Caesar, who is killed in 
scene 1, Act III. Shakespeare’s ambiguous presentation of Caesar raises the 
question of the legitimization of Caesar’s power and it calls for reference to the 
contemporary Elizabethan understanding of the presented dilemmas. Finally, 
the righteousness of the murder itself and the raison d’état of the conspirators 
surface as the key tensions of the play. The existing analyses of the play are of-
ten heavily influenced by the readings of the historical figure of Julius Caesar. 
So, as Henryk Zbierski (1988: 373-374) points out, there is no other Shake-
speare play that divides critics, readers and theatrical audiences so strongly into 
two opposing camps as Julius Caesar. The two groups could be roughly identi-
fied as “against Caesar, for Brutus” and “against Brutus, for Caesar”. David 
Daiches (1976: 9) refers to these divergences of opinions by drawing a sharp line 
  
1 This as well as other issues I am referring to in the introduction to my analysis of the 
play are addressed in detail in David Daniell’s “Introduction” to Julius Caesar, the newest 
Arden Shakespeare edition of the play (Daniell 2006: 1-3). For more information see: 
Daniell, David. 2006. “Introduction”, in: David Daniell (ed.). Julius Caesar. London: The 
Arden Shakespeare. 1-147. 
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between the Medieval and Elizabethan interpretations of the figure of Caesar. 
He says: “On the first view, Caesar was a hero and Brutus and Cassius, his mur-
derers, were deep-dyed villains […]. On the second view Caesar was a tyrant and 
his murderers were liberators.” Paradoxically, with Shakespeare’s neutrality, 
both views could be more or less substantiated by examples from the text of the 
play. This slightly crude critical division gives one insight into the play’s moral 
and political complexity. It seems difficult to embark upon the analysis of Julius 
Caesar without first casting a cursory glance at some of the problems inherent 
in the play itself. For this reason, I intend to briefly sketch the key critical ques-
tions that give rise to an ever hot debate concerning Julius Caesar.  
Though Shakespeare used historical material to present his version of 
the twilight of the Roman Republic at the brink of civil war, critics have often 
sought source material for the play in Elizabethan England rather than Rome on 
the eve of Caesar’s assassination. The Elizabethan England of 1599, the year 
when Julius Caesar was most probably written, was a country suffused by polit-
ical anxiety, where the ageing and childless Queen had to rule her faction-
ridden court with a rod of iron. Robin H. Wells points out the resemblances 
between the volatile Roman politics and the situation in England at the time of 
the play’s performances. He writes:  
[w]ith its ailing, autocratic ruler toppled by a Machiavellian rebel who looks back to an 
heroic age when men were more war-like (1.3.80-4), and its talk of a group of ‘noblest-
minded’ aristocrats (121) ‘factious for redress of [personal] griefs’ (117), Julius Caesar 
would inevitably have put contemporary audiences in mind of the beliefs and ideals of 
the Sidney-Essex alliance. Essex’s querulous Apologie – written at a time when rivalry 
between the two main factions in the Privy Council was at crisis point – was published 
only just before Shakespeare wrote Julius Caesar. (Wells 2002: 210)  
Wells (2002: 210) sees a striking parallel between the envious Cassius and Es-
sex who, as he writes, “was a man with a grievance”. Essex’s deeply personal 
grudge against the Queen and his excessive ambition made him build his power 
base with the help of other disenchanted noblemen who also wanted to throw 
off the yoke of supposed tyranny and customarily used “honour” and “virtue” as 
an excuse for their militant attitude (cf. Wells 2002: 211). Despite these striking 
parallels, Shakespeare maintains his neutrality and never lets his private opin-
ions be visible. However, he does illustrate a mechanism, that he will also later 
exploit in Macbeth, namely, “that an action designed to deflect a feared event 
hastens that very outcome”; thus, though not disclosing his own views, he seems 
to be illustrating the consequences of unconstitutional actions (Wells 2002: 211-
213). In Julius Caesar desperate attempts to save the republic from the suppos-
edly tyrannous Caesar first plunge it into a civil war and later inevitably turn it 
into an empire ruled by other Caesars. However, Shakespeare’s vision, as critics 
demonstrate, is far from historical Providentialism. Quite the opposite, the play 
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seems to favour a very Nietzschean historical perspective, where perspectivism 
rather than providentialism emerge as underlying meaning carriers.  
For Hugh Grady, Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar belongs to the so called 
“Machiavellian moment”. The play does not only present a plethora of charac-
ters who might have possibly been inspired by Machiavelli’s prescriptions from 
The Prince concerning power, but also shows the world “where the hand of 
Providence is seemingly absent”, thus communicating “the new ideas of non-
Providential history” (Grady 2011: 124-126). The play explores “[t]he motif of a 
time out of joint”, that will later be developed in Hamlet, where the characters 
are presented by impossible moral choices (Grady 2011: 129). Brutus prefigures 
Hamlet in his soliloquies. He is, like Hamlet, and later also Macbeth, facing the 
moral despair of necessary patricide. According to Grady (2011: 132), in his 
Roman plays Shakespeare presents “all-too-human figures drawn from an 
adoption of the secular-humanist historiography of Machiavelli, Tacitus, and 
(here) Plutarch.” As it seems, taking a Machiavellian perspective of moral rela-
tivity enables Shakespeare to combine a sceptical notion of limited human ca-
pabilities with a call for self-assertion in action. Grady (2011: 134) suggests that 
Julius Caesar captures these two presumably contradictory visions: the “recog-
nition of the fatality of chance, and more importantly, the opening up of a li-
mited but real opportunity for political agents to change history.” I would follow 
Grady in his argumentation and perception of the play as Machiavellian in this 
sense. Though, to my mind, such a perspective is not only Machiavellian but 
truly Nietzschean. In his writings Nietzsche frequently dismantles the myth of 
human free will in the face of universal contingency. Yet Nietzsche’s stance does 
not yield to existentialist despair but rather constitutes a strong individualist 
assertion and a call for self-creation despite limiting circumstances. Such is also 
my take on the tragedy of Julius Caesar as I strongly believe that, like Macbeth 
and King Lear, this play also communicates radical scepticism, at the same time 
being a strong mark of early modern interiority and singularity.2 Grady (2011: 
135) pessimistically concludes that “[t]he Machiavellian world of objectified 
power depicted in the play is not glorious but empty.” I would perversely claim 
that it is both glorious and empty. It elaborately stages a profound clash of great 
politics and a very personal, highly interiorized dimension of emotions. This 
human element played out at the backdrop of the political game blurs moral 
priorities as political obligations get mixed up with down-to-earth affects.  
As it seems, in this combination of the two supposedly contradictory 
elements, Julius Caesar emerges as Shakespeare’s first experimental tragedy. 
Before the Roman tragedy Shakespeare wrote the so called “restitutional” plays 
  
2 For more information on scepticism in Shakespeare’s plays, see: Bell, Millicent. 2002. 
Shakespeare’s tragic scepticism. New Haven: Yale University Press. It is worth looking at 
the last part devoted to the Roman plays entitled “Epilogue: The Roman Frame”, 241-278. 
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where characters’ identities were subsumed under communal duties while their 
actions brought necessary moral restitution and restored the imbalanced sense 
of belonging. As Andreas Mahler (2005: 193) observes: “[t]he tragedy of Julius 
Caesar is Shakespeare’s first attempt to deconstruct his very own masquerade 
of Tudor absolutism as universal ‘brotherhood’.” The initial premise on which 
the play seems to be built is indeed the idea of brotherhood, yet its “restitutional 
characters” like Caesar or Brutus are flawed (Mahler 2005: 182, 190). Both the 
faulty protagonist of the play – Caesar as well as his tragic successor – Brutus, 
break free from their obligations towards their brothers. As Mahler (2005: 190) 
underscores  
[t]his discrepancy between restitutional agent and individual action is much more 
fundamental than the discrepant punctuation of the underlying plot system into two 
complementary versions of the same story; it reveals an intrinsic doubleness in the 
play’s plot structure itself. What it negotiates is the question of agency in the face of 
an increasing disintegration of providentialist belief. It addresses the problem of the 
early modern subject.  
I totally agree with Mahler, who believes that the play is Shakespeare’s early in-
stance of grappling with subjectivity. Caesar, though not a fully developed charac-
ter, is an example of powerful self-assertion. His identity is marked by his exclu-
sion from a band of brothers, which manifests Nietzsche’s belief in self-creation as 
a solitary enterprise. Brutus, according to Mahler (2005: 192), is a “typical ‘in-
between’ character” as he functions in between his interiorized self and a public 
servant in the process of the restoration of brotherhood. However, as I will be 
arguing, his reasons to kill Caesar are deeply personal, while his resolve mani-
fested later on is also an expression of his newly-emergent identity, entirely sepa-
rate from brotherly concerns. As it seems, the moral relativity combined with 
Brutus’s emerging asserted selfhood gave rise to numerous critical responses con-
cerning his motivations, decisions and, above all, his moral outlook. Caesar might 
indeed be “a cardboard figure in the play”, as Grady (2010: 23) calls him, yet it is 
only against him that the overhuman potential of Brutus can be measured. For 
this reason, I intend to investigate both of these figures in terms of their 
Nietzschean potential. After all, even in the aftermath of Caesar’s death, both 
Rome and Brutus still have to grapple with the mighty spirit of Caesar. It is also 
against this structural function that Brutus’s identity is shaped and his interiority 
played out. As David Lucking (2010: 120) aptly observes:  
Hamlet is by no means the first of Shakespeare’s works to focus on the element of the 
imponderable residing in human conduct, and more especially on the impossibility on 
occasion of specifying the reasons for acts that might have the most far-reaching con-
sequences. In Julius Caesar, in particular, the issue is dramatized in terms that closely 
anticipate those of the later play, one of the more perplexing problems it poses being 
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that of whether any full coherent account of human motivation is possible whatsoever. 
As is only to be expected in a work that is deeply interested in the ambiguous of politi-
cal action, discrepancies between real and professed motives, between covert intention 
and overt justification, are evidenced in a number of personages who conceal personal 
or caste interests beneath a veneer of public commitment.  
It seems that Julius Caesar is a work where authentic motivations are veiled by 
political fashioning. In the play, where the words “reason” and “cause” are con-
stantly repeated, while demands for clarification multiply, real motivations be-
hind characters’ actions remain obscure or at best unsatisfactory (Lucking 
2010: 122). Though the behaviour of several characters raises questions con-
cerning their real motivations, it seems that the enigmatic load of the tragedy 
focuses predominantly on the mind of Brutus. Indeed, the sheer scope of critical 
responses to Brutus’s motivation is astounding. Traditionally, Brutus is read as 
an honourable and noble figure, though easily manipulated, as his relationship 
with Cassius demonstrates. Moralistic accounts would hold his position as mor-
ally dubious and based on misguided illusions. For instance, A.A. Ansari (1985: 
20, 27) calls Brutus “a divided being” but rejects his moral outlook as a “a sham 
to cover up self-delusion”. Grady (2010: 19) calls Brutus “a figure of good inten-
tions gone tragically wrong”. It is indeed worth noticing Brutus is by no means a 
successful politician. All his political decisions following Caesar’s assassination 
turn out to be disastrous. William R. Bowden (1966: 60) suspects a mental 
shortcoming of Brutus when he boldly asserts that “[s]omething more than 
mere bad lack is necessary to account for a man’s being so consistently wrong.” 
For all his political failures, Brutus is nevertheless tainted with an aristocratic 
snobbery – and there seems to lie his willingness to yield to Cassius’s allure-
ment. Jan Blits (1981: 158) aptly observes that “[m]en such as Brutus are ambi-
tious for love. They wish to be loved rather than to love because being loved 
closely resembles being honoured. Both are tributes of esteem. Love between 
such men is therefore jealous; like honour, it is ardently sought and only be-
grudgingly given.” In Blits’s opinion, Brutus’s character is far from that of a 
disinterested servant of the Republic. In him the conflict between a sense of 
brotherly duty and personal aspiration for honour rage and eventually bring 
about his failure. For this reason, Brutus’s moral indefiniteness invites a 
Nietzschean analysis. Brutus faces a moral dilemma that requires a reversed 
moral outlook, as an act of assassination is otherwise worth moral condemna-
tion. Yet, in his mind there are “higher” reasons to justify the means. Brutus is 
forced to overcome the overpowering influence of Caesar. He attempts to build 
a sense of brotherhood between himself and his fellow conspirators. The con-
spirators develop a shared sense of belonging, yet, in the course of the play, the 
“love” they share is exposed as an illusion. From the start the sense of brother-
hood is imbalanced by Caesar’s elevated position. The attempts to restore 
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“brotherhood” under Brutus’s leadership turn to dust despite Brutus’s attempts 
to rebuild it. As I will be arguing, the dynamics of the relationship between the 
men in the play has definitely more to do with agonistic politics rather than 
affection understood as mutual care for the welfare of the other party. Agonistic 
relations emerge in Julius Caesar as a point of contact between the ideals of the 
ancient Rome, Nietzschean concepts, as well as early modern conceptualiza-
tions of the social. It is also the concept of the agon that inspires Caesar’s and 
subsequently Brutus’s overhuman potential.  
It is Coppélia Kahn, in her excellent article entitled “‘Passion of some 
difference’: friendship and emulation in Julius Caesar”, that draws attention to 
parallels between the ancient concept of the agon and values communicated in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. She writes that: “[t]he Republic as an ideology is 
intricately bound up with the basically agonistic, highly competitive nature of 
the Roman ruling elite” (Kahn 2005: 273). Kahn (2005: 271) defines the jealous 
love between e.g. Cassius and Brutus, as “emulation (from Latin aemulari: ‘to 
rival’)”, which “is the central motif of the Greco-Roman heroic tradition called 
the agon, that ‘zero-sum game’ of rivalry through which the hero wins his name 
by pitting himself against his likeness or equal in contests of courage and 
strength.” Brutus and Cassius seem to be linked by a common aim, yet, they also 
compete with each other. Friendships between men in the play are marked by 
inescapable rivalry. For this reason, the idea of brotherhood between the con-
spirators is a faulty one. As Kahn (2005: 275) aptly observes: “the conspirators’ 
assumption that all Romans are brothers, united by their shared belief in the 
Republic, is flatly contradicted by an equally Roman spirit of emulation.” This 
would mean that the play by Shakespeare presents men striving to fulfil their 
personal ambitions under the guise of republican values. I believe that it is not 
only the relationship of Brutus and Cassius that is agonistic in nature but also 
Brutus’s attempt to overcome Caesar’s spirit. The characters in the play are dri-
ven by varying degrees of the Nietzschean will to power, that is unveiled in its 
sublimated forms. As Lawrence J. Hatab (2002: 134) expounds Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the agon:  
[…] Nietzsche maintains that civilization is not something separate from nature but 
a modulation of more vicious natural drives into less destructive forms. In the light 
of Hesiod’s distinction between a good and bad Eris, Nietzsche distinguishes be-
tween a brutal drive to annihilate and a modified drive to defeat in a competition, 
what the Greeks called an agon. The proliferation of contests in ancient Greece rep-
resented both a sublimation of cruel instincts and a setting for the production of ex-
cellence, since talent unfolds in a struggle with a competitor […]  
The Greek agon, as Kahn herself maintains, was emulated by the Romans and 
evidently understood by the early modern audience. Nietzsche’s key philosophi-
cal concepts as the will to power or self-overcoming can be driven back to his 
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background as a classical philologist. It is no wonder then that Nietzsche held 
the historical Julius Caesar in great admiration. It also no surprise that the 
Shakespearean Julius Caesar seems to have been Nietzsche’s favourite play. 
One may assume that it is this agonistic spirit, pointed out by Kahn, that drew 
Nietzsche towards this particular play by Shakespeare. So, as it seems, apart 
from the sceptical attitude towards human epistemological potential that the 
play seems to be communicating along with its agonistic model of manly rela-
tions, Nietzsche’s own admiration for the play adds one more argument in fa-
vour of a Nietzschean analysis of Shakespeare’s tragedy of Julius Caesar. Thus, 
in my analysis, I follow Kahn’s assumption of the Roman agon portrayed by 
Shakespeare, which I intend to combine with Nietzsche’s later conceptualiza-
tions, also having their origin in the very idea of the agon. Because Julius Cae-
sar is one of the few examples of Shakespeare’s plays Nietzsche actually ex-
pressed his view on, I also incorporate these thoughts into my interpretation 
along with other comments on the historical Caesar that are also scattered in 
Nietzsche’s writings.  
4.1.2. “I love/ The name of honour more than I fear death” – 
Brutus (Julius Caesar, 1.2.88-89)  
The opening scene of the play in a very subtle yet complex way introduces the 
themes that will become central to the Nietzschean analysis of Julius Caesar. 
Flavius and Murellus express their dismay at the joy of Rome’s inhabitants who 
have taken to the streets to celebrate Caesar’s victorious come-back. Despite the 
celebratory atmosphere, the two men scorn the chaos that unfolds as a conse-
quence of the people unlawfully taking a holiday. Quite significantly the scene 
already prefigures the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination as it illustrates how 
impressionable the mob of Rome really is. The attitude of contempt towards 
this the two patricians have seems also to herald the way Brutus will totally 
misunderstand crowd psychology and will politically underestimate the power 
of the plebeians. His aristocratic snobbery will turn out to be his political na-
iveté that will not let Brutus see the danger of herd instincts. What also seems 
crucial is the fact that, like Macbeth, the play opens with a very shaky sense of 
order. It is worth noticing that Caesar’s victory overshadows the fall of another 
great man, the son of the Republic – Pompey. Murellus is shocked at the ease 
with which the Romans come to terms with his fall and asks disbelievingly: 
“Knew you not Pompey?” (Caesar, 1.1.38). The fall of Pompey coinciding with 
the rise of Caesar does not only underscore the agonistic spirit of Roman poli-
tics but also encloses the play within the vicious circle of its contingency as it is 
subject to the whims of the mob whose favour has to be richly bought. The 
commoners are of “basest mettle” as Flavius terms them, and so they do not 
Breaking the bonds … 179 
hold any individual opinions but can be guided by a skilful manipulator (Cae-
sar, 1.1.62). It is Caesar that now moves the crowds, though Flavius and Murel-
lus want to minimise his influence by trying to remove his ubiquitous presence 
by throwing off his images and driving away “the vulgar from the streets” (Cae-
sar, 1.1.71-72). They seem to believe that by cancelling the crowds that function 
as Caesar’s extension they can arrest Caesar’s influence. Flavius claims that: 
“These growing feathers plucked from Caesar’s wing/ Will make him fly an or-
dinary pitch,/ Who else would soar above the view of men/ And keep us all in 
servile fearfulness” (Caesar, 1.1.74-76). His sinister tone points to the potential 
consequences of Caesar’s power seizure and to his supposed excessive ambition, 
which eventually become the main reason for his assassination. Despite popular 
support, for the patricians Caesar emerges as highly dangerous, a source of evil 
and a potential demolisher of existing order. Flavius’s remark, though tinged 
with fear and envy, yet clearly shows that Caesar indeed flies high. In spite of 
the atmosphere of impending doom already felt in the air, one has a feeling that 
it is Caesar who is the first hand candidate for an overman in the play. 
The figure of the historical Caesar has long been an object of an intense 
“tyrannicide debate” in which poets and historians have been trying to decide 
whether Caesar had actually been a tyrant prior to his assassination, and so de-
termine if the course of events was necessary and, more importantly, justified.3 In 
the light of the inconclusive material, the debate is still open, while the historical 
events remain subject to interpretation. Shakespeare is equally ambiguous in his 
treatment of Caesar, and for this reason critics have not reached any consensus 
concerning the supposed tyranny of Caesar. It is certain that the notion of exces-
sive ambition was anathema to the Elizabethans and it is the arch-sin that other 
characters in Shakespeare’s play attribute to Caesar. Yet, what many critics point 
out is that Brutus’s first soliloquy does not communicate Caesar’s ambition as a 
fact but only as a dim possibility. In the following scenes of the play one learns 
about Caesar from other characters who themselves are frequently driven by their 
particular interests. If one is to learn about Caesar’s imperial aspirations, one 
should focus on the subtle clues Shakespeare’s gives in Caesar’s own words that 
actually betray his intentions. Scene 2, where Caesar makes his first appearance, 
opens with a conversation about a religious ritual Calphurnia is to undergo in 
order to be cured of her infertility. The way Caesar brutally unveils his wife’s sup-
posed barrenness gives one some insight into his dynastic ambition. Since he has 
no legitimate heir, he is unable to pass on his heritage. Caesar’s wish to “shake off 
[Calphurnia’s] sterile curse” expresses his primordial masculine desire to extend 
his patriarchal influence beyond his own existence (Caesar, 1.2.9). Antony’s 
comment – “When Caesar says ‘Do this’, it is performed” (Caesar, 1.2.10) – does 
  
3 For more details on “the tyrannicide debate”, see: Daniell, David. 2006. “Introduc-
tion”, in: David Daniell (ed.). Julius Caesar. London: The Arden Shakespeare, 29-38. 
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not only underscore Antony’s blind and servile attitude towards Caesar but also 
aptly summarizes Caesar’s self-creating ability. He seems to be charismatic 
enough to make others believe that he indeed always has things his way. This im-
pression is further underscored by his scoffing at the Soothsayer’s warnings when 
he dismisses them by saying “He is a dreamer. Let us leave him. Pass” (Caesar, 
1.2.24). The underlying message is that Caesar himself is not a dreamer but a 
maker or a creator who would cancel metaphysics as an unnecessary burden. With 
all this apparent veil of invincibility, one quickly learns that, as Grady aptly puts it: 
“He is hyper-conscious of his appearance as a political actor, and everything that 
he says and does in the play is in service to his image of unshakable self-
confidence and self-sufficiency” (Grady 2010: 22). The public persona that Caesar 
emulates is that of a god. Critics have frequently drawn similarities between this 
fashioned sense of immortality and Queen Elizabeth’s meticulously controlled 
appearance at the twilight of her reign. As David Daniell (2006: 25) points out: 
“[e]ven elementary knowledge of Queen Elizabeth’s policies in the years up to her 
death allows parallels between herself and a tyrannical Caesar. Queen Elizabeth, 
as age advanced, put herself out as immortal, not only as the eternally enduring 
Faerie Queen or Gloriana”. The Shakespearean Caesar professes his permanence 
when he says to Cassius: “Caesar doth not change” (Caesar, 3.1.27), or when he 
delivers his statement of stability and resistance to any change as he refuses to let 
Cimber come back from his banishment:  
But I am constant as the Northern Star, 
Of whose true fixed and resting quality 
There is no fellow in the firmament. 
The skies are painted with unnumbered sparks; 
They are all fire, and every one doth shine. 
But there’s but one in all doth hold his place. 
So in the world: ‘tis furnished well with men, 
And men are flesh and blood, and apprehensive. 
Yet in the number I do know but one 
That unassailable holds on his rank, 
Unshaked of motion; and that I am he 
Let me a little show it. (Caesar, 3.1.66-76)  
Interestingly enough Queen Elizabeth’s motto was “Semper Eadem” (“Always 
the same”) which was also meant to underscore the stability of her rule and her 
nature as a just monarch who is not ruled by her whims.4 Changeability and 
  
4 The motto was previously used by her mother Anne Boleyn. For more information 
on the circumstances of its adoption, see: Weir, Alison. 2009. “The concubine’s little 
bastard”, in: Alison Weir. The Lady in the Tower: The fall of Anne Boleyn. London: 
Vintage. 378-396. 
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proneness to whims was seen as a defining feature of a tyrant. For the conspira-
tors, Caesar’s act of resistance is seen in the opposite way – it seems to be as yet 
another argument that Caesar – merciless and unbent – is actually a tyrant.5 As 
it seems, the parallel between the Shakespearean Caesar and Queen Elizabeth I 
does not resolve the tyrannicide debate because the perception of Elizabeth as a 
tyrant is also a contentious issue and an open-ended question. Cristina León 
Alfar (2003: 61), writing specifically about Elizabeth, points out that within the 
complex framework of early modern politics the dividing line between a tyrant 
and a just monarch is very flimsy as “[…] depending on the policy, one’s subject 
tyrant is another subject’s just monarch.” The issue of tyranny was indeed a 
contentious one during the English Renaissance and there is a wealth of source 
texts where the boundaries between a just rule and tyranny is touched upon. In 
an early text, the famous An homily against disobedience and wilful rebellion 
from the Book of sermons (first edition 1547), the absolutist monarch is por-
trayed as a King anointed by God, total obedience to him is required, while 
questioning of his will is seen as a sin against God. Alfar (2009: 120) claims that 
this text blurs justice and tyranny as the king has a sacred position regardless of 
being merciful or merciless towards his people. It seems that the turn of the 
epochs at the end of Elizabeth’s reign brought about even more voices where the 
notion of tyranny was taken up. For instance, in Fulke Greville’s verse treatises 
the notion is frequently recalled as a great peril to the country and to be 
avoided. Greville points to the central position of the monarch, but he under-
scores a crucial role of nobility functioning as checks and balances of the politi-
cal system and monarchical control. In the part of A Treatise of monarchy 
(never completed and posthumously printed in 1633) entitled “Of Nobility” he 
writes that “From whence nobility doth of creation/ A secret prove to kings and 
Tyranny:/ For as the stamp gives bullion valuation,/ So these fair shadows of 
authority/ Are marks for people to look up unto,/ And see what princes with or 
Earth can do” (Greville 2006: 122). Such could be, then, the role of the con-
spirators’ plot, who decide to stop the tyrannous aspirations of their fellow aris-
tocratic patrician. At least these are their professed aims – to protect the repub-
lic from tyranny. However, Greville in his works also expresses a popular senti-
ment concerning democracy, namely, the ease with which it may turn into a 
tyrannous oligarchy. The very title of the verse tract The excellency of Monar-
chy gives a clue as to the message of the entire work as it is a laudatory treatise 
on the superiority of monarchy over other political systems. In the last part “The 
Excellency of Monarchy compared with Aristocracy and Democracy Jointly” 
Greville (2006: 228) writes:  
  
5 Following this line of argument, one could also add that Caesar’s insistence on per-
manence as opposed to change is also deeply un-Nietzschean. The project of self-creation in 
self-overcoming requires constant change in response to ever new challenges. 
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Now, though I know our books are fill’d 
with praise 
Of good men’s vertues, freedoms popular: 
Yet he that will not audit words, by ways, 
And over-look the dreams of Time with care 
In smart succession: he shall clearly find 
No long liv’d State hath been of either kind.  
In the next stanza he develops his argument by adding that: “For whatsoever 
stile these men affect/ Of OPTIMATES, of DEMOCRACY,/ Their courses 
basely practice, and effect/ A servile OLIGARCHICAL TYRANNY;/ As well in 
laws as in establishment;/ Like ill mixt humours, never will content” (Greville 
2006: 228). Greville seems to be saying that despite the virtue of the people 
forming a democratic state, the system is flawed and so it invites misuse and 
the abuse of power. People when given sovereignty can very easily turn to the 
misuse of power. So this is the other side of the coin and a different conceptu-
alization of tyranny. In just such a way one could read the events presented in 
Julius Caesar, as the best intentions of Brutus are eventually subverted and 
the conspiracy, instead of averting, actually inspires the feared course of ac-
tion. So, monarchy emerges a far more superior system with its power cen-
tralized in one individual’s hands. The ideas of the divine rights of kings 
gained momentum with the ascension of James I who had a firm belief in his 
sacred position, which he also expressed in his treatises on the power of 
kings. Even after the civil war, works like Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia 
defended the divine rights of Kings. In this sense, Shakespeare’s play ex-
presses the anxious atmosphere of its period as it renders the ambiguity of 
Caesar’s position and leaves the question securely unresolved, underscoring 
the inherent relativity of political stances and theories. The perception of Cae-
sar’s tyranny is flimsy. He remains an ambiguous political agent, who is sup-
ported by the plebeians and resented by the patricians.6 His godly status is 
politically construed, as the ensuing scenes make clear.  
  
6 There are indeed many critical responses to the question of Caesar’s tyranny and 
many readings supported by source research concerning early modern political thought. It 
is impossible to refer to all of them, neither would this discussion be purposeful for this 
dissertation. However, it is worth pointing to Barbara L Parker’s article “From Monarchy to 
Tyranny: Julius Caesar among Shakespeare’s Roman Works”. Parker sees Caesar’s tyranny 
in terms of his servility to the mob. She writes that: “In addition to mirroring the ruler’s ills, 
the state also mirrors his political temperament; and Caesar’s tyranny is paralleled by that 
of the populace. For it is not Caesar who rules; it is the mob […]” (Parker 2005: 119). Her 
view, in my opinion, is not in accordance with the early modern ideas on monarchy as the 
Renaissance tyrant would above all be against his people, while Caesar seems to be a ser-
vant of his plebeians. However, Parker captures the essence of Nietzsche’s perception of 
tyranny. Servility towards the herd would definitely be out of Nietzsche’s “overhuman” 
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What renders Caesar a dramatic enigma and what frustrates any at-
tempts at a unified perspective on him is the fact that one gets to know Caesar 
mostly through other characters’ statements. Cassius is driven by jealousy and 
deep resentment, which renders many of his comments highly subjective. In his 
eyes, the would-be monarch emerges as a sickly man, deaf in one ear and suffer-
ing from wild bouts of epilepsy. For Cassius, who had once saved Caesar from 
drowning in the Tiber and seen him shaking and groaning in fever, it seems 
unthinkable that “a man of such a feeble temper should/ So get the start of the 
majestic world/ And bear the palm alone” (Caesar, 1.2.129-131). Cassius despe-
rately tries to deconstruct Caesar’s political persona and expose him to Brutus 
as a sham. Brutus is evidently worried by the unfolding events when he says: 
“Vexed I am/ of late with passions of some difference, Conceptions only proper 
to myself” (Caesar, 1.2.39-41). However, he never picks up on any of the sarcas-
tic utterances about Caesar. I would argue that this is because part of the pro-
fessed love Brutus’s holds for Caesar is his reverence of his greatness. For Bru-
tus, Caesar’s poor health is no reason to believe he is any less great a man than 
Caesar tries to present himself as. Brutus responds to arguments about honour, 
which he understands in terms of the agon. Cassius’s lengthy exposition about 
Caesar behaving “as a sick girl” do not impress Brutus (Caesar, 1.2.128). How-
ever, he is moved when he hears the flourish and the people shouting, which, to 
my mind, underscores that Brutus sees the power and influence heaped on Cae-
sar as the reason to overcome him. Cassius’s words “honour is the subject of my 
story” are an invitation to an agonistic competition, but his argumentation is 
really worthy of slaves’ morality, to use Nietzsche’s rhetoric (Caesar, 1.2.92). 
Brutus’s initial wavering at the ideas Cassius intends to divulge is a piece of 
evidence for Brutus’s deeply personal attitude to the upcoming confrontation 
with Caesar. Brutus asks Cassius: “Into what dangers would you lead me, Cas-
sius,/ That you would have me seek into myself/ For that which is not in me?” 
(Caesar, 1.2.63-64). This question is really a supposition, as it shows that the 
conflict is already there playing out in Brutus’s head. However, I would insist 
that Cassius’s and Brutus’s understanding of the figure of Caesar are totally 
different. In his naïve and intellectually primitive insistence on equality be-
tween the patricians, Cassius unveils his self-delusion. His mockery is aimed at 
undermining Caesar’s position on the basis of his physical inferiority. One could 
assume that Cassius tries to manipulate Brutus by appealing to his vanity, but 
                                                                                                                                        
perception – this being another argument against Caesar as an overman. David Hawkes in 
his article “Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar: Marxist and Post-Marxist Approaches” connects 
Caesar’s elevation into an idol with Renaissance Puritanism, which had as its main aims 
“the eradication of idolatry” (Hawkes 2005: 210). In his view the play presents republican 
sentiments by its implicit criticism of idolatry (Hawkes 2005: 210). One can assume that 
the blind and unreasonable idolatry of Caesar by the mob would also be something that 
Nietzsche too would criticize as idolatry. 
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as I was trying to show playing on petty jealousies does not really stir Brutus. 
He already carries the need to better or overcome Caesar, while this yearning 
stems from respect rather than envy as Brutus says “yet I love him well” (Cae-
sar, 1.2.82). Cassius’s contempt really unfolds the extent of Caesar’s greatness 
as he is the one who inspires the lowliest of instincts like envy, pride, and mur-
derous desire. As David Willburn (2005: 215) writes: “[i]n Freudian terms, Cae-
sar is an ego-ideal to which others either aspire to or conspire against. Caesar’s 
famous constancy is his virtù, an ideal of virility and ethical integrity.” In Nietz-
schean terms, Caesar embodies much of what the overhuman potential is. For 
people holding on to the existing order of affairs he emerges as the source of all 
evil as he is about to demolish that order. Brutus seems to understand this me-
chanism. Knowing that he loves Caesar, he nevertheless desires to top him.  
As mentioned, Caesar’s poor health, highlighted even more by Casca’s 
description of his collapse in front of the Senate after declining the crown in 
Scene 2, Act I, does not necessarily rule out his potential as Übermensch. Quite 
the contrary, the essence of Nietzsche’s Überwindungsmotif lies in the ability of 
an individual to overcome his infirmities. Caesar, despite his physical weak-
nesses, is perceived by the masses as a victorious leader who deserves the 
crown. From Cassius’s speech one learns that “this man/ Is now become a god, 
and Cassius is/ A wretched creature and must bend his body/ If Caesar careless-
ly but nod on him” (Caesar, 1.2.115-118). Nietzsche frequently underscores the 
importance of strength and health for the over-man. However, one should bear 
in mind Nietzsche’s special understanding of health, as health is seen not as the 
lack of diseases but as the ability to overcome disease (Kaufmann 1973: 131). In 
a classic maxim from The twilight of the idols Nietzsche (2007c: 5) says “that 
which does not kill me, makes me stronger” and thus underscores the impor-
tance of suffering in the creation of the over-man. In this sense, these “individu-
alizing touches”, as David Daiches (1976: 8) calls Caesar’s physical impair-
ments, only prove his overhuman abilities to over-come illness and emerge even 
stronger. Interestingly enough, Nietzsche himself when speaking about his 
Übermensch tried to support his arguments by referring to historical figures 
that came close to his ideal. Among them he enumerated Goethe, Napoleon and 
Julius Caesar.7 What is important, just as in Napoleon, Nietzsche did not ad-
mire the military or political prowess in Julius Caesar. As Walter Kaufmann 
(1974: 316) writes, Nietzsche saw Caesar as “the embodiment of the passionate 
man who controls his passions: the man who, in the face of universal disintegra-
tion and licentiousness, knowing this decadence as part of his own soul, per-
forms his unique deed of self-integration, self-creation and self-mastery.” 
  
7 For more details on the examples of historical overmen proposed by Nietzsche look in 
Walter Kaufmann’s (1974: 307-317) Nietzsche – philosopher, psychologist, Antichrist. or in 
Zbigniew Kuderowicz’s (1979: 137-143) Nietzsche. 
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Nietzsche (2007c: 64) admired Caesar, who “preserved himself against sickness 
and headaches [by] heavy marches, the simplest mode of living, uninterrupted 
sojourns in the open air, continual hardships.” As can be seen, in the historical 
Caesar Nietzsche underscored the qualities that Shakespeare only possibly 
hinted at in his portrayal of his Caesar. One learns that, despite his serious ail-
ments, Caesar “doth bestride the narrow world/ Like a Colossus, and we petty 
men/ Walk under his huge legs and peep about/ To find ourselves dishonoura-
ble graves”, as one learns from Cassius (Caesar, 1.2.135-138). There is a sharp 
contrast between the charismatic personality of Caesar and “petty men” as 
painted by Cassius. The trait of Caesar’s character that will not be accepted is 
his apparent ambition, which threatens Rome with tyranny – as Cassius says: 
“[...] let Caesar seat him sure,/ For we will shake him, or worse days endure” 
(Caesar, 1.3.310-311). However, in Act 1, scene 2, he declines the crown, not 
once but three times. Despite the dissatisfaction of the masses, he refrains from 
seizing absolute power. One can conjecture that this act approximates him to 
the Nietzschean over-man. As Nietzsche (2007c: 71) writes on great individuals:  
[t]he highest type of free man would have to be sought where the greatest resistance 
has continually to be overcome: five paces away from tyranny, on the very threshold 
of the danger of thraldom. This is psychologically true if, by the word ‘tyrants’ we 
mean inexorable and terrible instincts which challenge the maximum of authority 
and discipline to oppose them – the finest example of this is: Julius Caesar [...]  
As can be seen, an over-man is someone who is powerful enough to be able to 
gain ultimate control over others but who, thanks to his intellectual integrity, 
does not yield to his tyrannical potential. So, as Walter Kaufmann explains: 
“tyranny over others is not part of Nietzsche’s vision, though the failure to in-
dulge in it is no virtue unless one has the power to become a tyrant and refrains 
deliberately” (Kaufmann 1974: 316). It seems that the powerful Caesar, in the 
act of declining the crown, may be proving his dignity and mastery. He seems to 
act not out of pity, but out of “the excess of his power” (Kuderowicz 1979: 116). 
However, as demonstrated, Shakespeare’s Caesar is a good political actor so his 
refusal of the crown might very well be seen as an act of political self-fashioning 
rather than Nietzschean self-overcoming, especially in the light of his change of 
heart in Act 2, Scene 28. He first decides to stay home when he hears the pro-
phetic dreams of his wife but later is encouraged by Decius to change his mind 
  
8 For a detailed debate on self-fashioning versus self-overcoming in Julius Caesar I re-
fer the reader to my earlier article on Shakespeare’s Roman play where I focus on the juxta-
position of the two key characters in the play. For more details see: Burzyńska, Katarzyna. 
2015. “Man is something that should be overcome”: Self-Fashioning versus Self- Overcom-
ing of Shakespearean Over-Reachers as Seen through the Lens of Friedrich Nietzsche's 
Philosophy”, in: CURRENTS. A Journal of Young English Philology Thought and Review, 
1, 12-26.  
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and go to the Senate. It seems that he only changes his mind when he hears that 
“the Senate have concluded/ To give this day a crown to mighty Caesar./ If you 
shall send them word you will not come,/ Their mind may change” (Caesar, 
2.2.93-96). His change of heart proves that, despite his earlier refusal to take 
the crown, he is now determined to accept it. In the light of the present turn of 
events, his earlier refusal appears to have been a purely political act, a cunning 
element in his skilful political career. Unfortunately, Shakespeare does not give 
one any insight into Caesar’s mind that would substantiate a Nietzschean per-
spective on him. Shakespeare’s portrayal is distanced and filtered through the 
eyes of those who have already deemed Caesar a tyrant. The idea of self-mastery 
that Nietzsche apparently admired in the historical Caesar, in Shakespeare’s 
play may merely be a conjecture. However, the yearning for self-overcoming 
realized in “self-creation” and “self-mastery” is, in my opinion, reflected in 
Brutus, whom Shakespeare burdens with an essentially Nietzschean dilemma.  
As mentioned, Cassius in his lengthy rhetorical manipulations finally 
strikes a note that inspires Brutus to further consideration. He says: “O, you and 
I have heard our fathers say/ There was a Brutus once that would have brooked/ 
Th’ eternal devil to keep his state in Rome/ As easily as a king” (Caesar, 1.2.157-
160). Cassius refers to the historical figure of Lucius Junius Brutus, who is Mar-
cus Brutus’s great ancestor. This original Brutus changed Rome from a mo-
narchy to a republic (Berman 1972: 197). So, presumably Cassius is referring to 
the republican values that Brutus holds as dear as his own honour. Yet his 
words have a double and quite subversive meaning because the original Brutus 
is recalled as someone who had such a powerful influence that he actually held 
Rome in his own monarchical power. He toppled the power of the old system in 
order to create a new one, but he himself simultaneously rose in might to tower 
over others. So, as it seems, the reference to republicanism is really a metaphor-
ical veil for a fierce battle between influential individuals. Cassius’s words are 
meant to appeal to Brutus by invoking his great paternal ancestor and at the 
same time make him raise his hand against the new mighty patriarch – Caesar. 
However, this intricate paternal metaphor opens a new, and highly personal 
dimension of Brutus’s yearning to topple Caesar. Brutus, following the example 
of his original progenitor, is to break the bond between him and the new proge-
nitor – Caesar. What is even more crucial is that the patriarch might actually be 
Brutus’s real father. Though Shakespeare does not explore Plutarch’s hint that 
Brutus might have been Caesar’s illegitimate son, as some critics have pointed 
out, he does drop some clues and leaves them unexplored, possibly to streng-
then the effect, knowing that his audience could have been acquainted with 
Plutarch’s record of Caesar’s and Brutus’s life (Fleissner 1997: 109-110). Plu-
tarch in his Lives of noble Grecians and Romans explains that Caesar had mer-
cy over Brutus after the defeat of Pompey because of his previous intimacy with 
Brutus’s mother. In Chapter 63, on Marcus Brutus, Plutarch writes that:  
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[i]t is said that Caesar had so great a regard for him that he ordered his commanders 
by no means to kill Brutus in the battle, but to spare him, if possible, and bring him 
safe to him, if he would willingly surrender himself; but if he made any resistance, to 
suffer him to escape rather than do him any violence. And this he is believed to have 
done out of a tenderness to Servilia, the mother of Brutus; for Caesar had, it seems, 
in his youth been very intimate with her, and she passionately in love with him; and, 
considering that Brutus was born about that time in which their loves were at the 
highest, Caesar had a belief that he was his own child. (Plutarch 2012)9  
Shakespeare never explicitly refers to this passage from Plutarch though he 
otherwise follows his story-line quite faithfully. However, as R.F. Fleissner ob-
serves, he does mention that Brutus gave Caesar “the most unkindest cut of all” 
(Caesar, 3.2.181). Also, Caesar is made to say “Et tu, Brutè?”, which could be 
rendered as “And you, son?” (Fleissner 1997: 109). The pain caused by Brutus’s 
wound has a double significance. Not only is this the deadly blow but also a 
blow from a natural son. Fleissner (1997: 110) writes that:  
[u]npleasant though such a gross association may be, at least it can prompt the valid 
view that Brutus was somehow paying his natural father back for the ‘gift’ of bas-
tardy (a terrible stigma, in Renaissance times at any rate). What other significance 
could logically emerge? In answer, consider the underlying meaning that because the 
son was Brutus, his stab was therewith psychologically the most brutal as well. Or, 
better, these two meaning would have been conflated, enriching the overall effect.  
If indeed Shakespeare would like us to believe that Brutus was an illegitimate son 
of Caesar, the nature of Brutus’s sacrifice has an even deeper meaning. Literally as 
well as metaphorically Brutus has to overcome the influence of his powerful father 
and free himself from it in order to emerge a self-determined identity. Freud who 
heavily exploited the idea of sons’ primeval desires to tower over their fathers was 
by no means the first one to capitalize on Oedipus’s story. Nietzsche, in his insis-
tence on masculine self-sufficiency frequently alluded to the need to break fatherly 
bonds in the pursuit of individual independence. Interestingly enough Nietzsche 
himself chose Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar in order to illustrate his idea of self-
overcoming and striving for mental independence. In The gay science he expressed 
his admiration for Shakespeare’s Brutus. Nietzsche (2007b: 93) calls Julius Caesar 
the greatest of Shakespeare’s tragedies “still called by the wrong name”. What 
Nietzsche admires the most is exactly Brutus’ self-overcoming, captured in his re-
alization of the necessity for the final sacrifice. Nietzsche (2007b: 93-94) writes:  
  
9 I am using fragments from Plutarch’s Lives translated by John Dryden available at: 
The University of Adelaide South Australia (http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/-
plutarch/lives/) (date of access: 21 Feb. 2014). Shakespeare was most probably using Sir 
Thomas North’s translation from 1579. Fragments of this version of Plutarch can be found 
in the Appendix to The Arden Shakespeare Edition of Julius Caesar (2006), 323-371. 
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[i]ndependence of soul! That’s what at stake here! No sacrifice can be too great for 
that: one has to be capable of sacrificing even one’s dearest friend for it, even if he 
should be the most marvellous human being, the ornament of the world, the genius 
without peer – if one loves freedom as a freedom of great souls and this freedom is 
endangered because of him […]. The height at which he places Caesar is the finest 
honour he could bestow on Brutus: only thus does he raise Brutus’ inner problem to 
immense proportions as well as the strength of mind that was able to cut this knot! 
In his soliloquies, sleepless Brutus shows that he suffers an ordeal due to Caesar’s 
planned murder yet, for Nietzsche the extent of his greatness lies in his ability to 
cut the knot tying him to mighty Ceasar whose imposing presence, as long as he 
lives, can never allow Brutus’s own self to flourish. The essence of Nietzschean 
self-overcoming is encapsulated in a desire to make oneself anew so passionately 
that even filial bonds cannot impede its intensity. I would argue that Nietzsche’s 
perspective on the Shakespearean Brutus is a very convincing theory though 
Nietzsche does not support his interpretation with textual evidence.  
Critics have pondered upon Brutus’s motives to kill Caesar, for whom he 
constantly professes love and devotion. They either have not been satisfied with 
the explanations uttered by Shakespeare’s characters or have taken Brutus’s 
references to “the general good” for granted (Caesar, 1.2.85). One has to ob-
serve that “the general good” Brutus supports himself with is frustratingly unde-
fined, while the abstract term “Rome” is hard to grasp. So, one could very well 
see that “the general good” easily turns into “my good”, which the aforemen-
tioned subversive words by Cassius also illustrate. As Jan H. Blits (1981: 165) 
aptly summarizes:  
Brutus’ thoughts center on himself. He imagines his fame and glory as his alone, nei-
ther blurred nor obscured by any fellow Roman. More importantly and surprisingly, 
however, he sees personal victory undiminished and perhaps even enhanced by his 
country’s collapse. His “life’s history” somehow stands above and apart from Rome.  
From the very opening of the play one learns that Brutus is a highly respected 
Roman citizen. Brutus’s moral integrity is underscored numerously in the play 
by Cassius, but also by Cinna and Casca. The conspirators want Brutus to take 
part in Caesar’s murder because “that which would appear offence in us/ His 
countenance, like richest alchemy,/ Will change to virtue and to worthiness” 
(Caesar, 1.3.158-160). Outwardly, Brutus’s involvement would legitimize the 
act, but it would not automatically make it virtuous. Brutus’s personal dimen-
sion of the sacrifice and its moral ramifications would be the same. Cassius ex-
presses his admiration for Brutus’ supposed virtue by saying:  
I know virtue to be in you, Brutus, 
As well as I do know your outward favour. 
Well, honour is the subject of my story: 
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I cannot tell what you and other men 
Think of this life, but for my single self 
I had as lief not be as live to be 
In awe of such a thing as I myself. 
I was born free as Caesar, so were you (Caesar, 1.2.90-97).  
Though Cassius speaks of equality, he actually capitalizes on singularity as he 
invokes the “single self”. Cassius’s words cancel out the notion of virtue as 
communal good, instead they point to a personal integrity that is in conflict 
with conventionally understood virtue. Cassius reflects an essential aspect of 
Brutus’s task as he rightly assumes a role of a mirror of his desires. He points to 
the vitality of the individual’s independence and freedom of thought. As men-
tioned, his lengthy exposition of Caesar’s weaknesses is not necessary as it is the 
virtue of individual independence that rebels in Brutus against Caesar. Brutus 
may be virtuous in theory, but in practice he turns out to be a hopeless em-
bodiment of Nietzschean egocentrism or egoism. His later arguments with Cas-
sius when he chaffs at his bribery but at the same time demands the money 
extorted by illegal means, illustrates that his high-mindedness is much over-
stated (Caesar, 4.3.74-90). As David Hawkes (2005: 205) aptly observes: 
“Brutus’s snobbery prevents him from condescending to appeal to the lower 
classes for money, which he again terms “trash”. Instead, he demands it from 
Cassius as the rightful due of personal friendship.” So, as can be seen, he is not 
really thinking about the common good. The welfare of the citizens of Rome is 
never properly uttered by him, while a very personal notion of “honour” is 
evoked. One could ask what one has really to do with the other? Brutus’s and 
the other conspirators’ egoistic sense of honour brings only civil war to Rome. 
What is also worth pointing out is that ultimately the play portrays the disaster 
of republican values, underscoring rather that power is won by the strong-
willed.10 Both Brutus and Antony belong to such people, yet political victory 
  
10 This is an important argument in a debate about Shakespeare’s presumed republican 
leanings presented in Julius Caesar. If, as some critics believe, the play shows republican-
ism in a favourable light, it is a highly politically contentious work for early modern stan-
dards, as it goes against the mainstream of contemporary political thought – that would see 
absolutist monarchy as the perfect system. Yet, despite any admiration for Brutus’s suppos-
edly disinterested love for the Republic, one can see that the play shows the catastrophic 
consequences of desperate attempts to cling to the old system. The system itself also seems 
to be ineffective as Caesar’s growth in power perfectly illustrates. Barbara L. Parker ob-
serves that: “The Roman Republic perfectly illustrated the perils of monarchic collapse, as 
well as the constitutional decline such collapse incurred” (Parker 2005: 112). She refers to 
Fulke Greville’s popular work “Of Monarchy”, where the expulsions of kings in Rome is 
portrayed as a disaster (“many headed power”). She also gives an example of Elyot’s works. 
She writes that: “Elyot articulates what was conventionally considered the fatal flaw of 
republicanism: multiple sovereignty. As survival lay in unity, so ruin lay in plurality, which 
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belongs to those who do not make their contempt for herd instincts clear but 
rather capitalize on them i.e. Marc Antony. Like Macbeth, Brutus is a political 
failure, though a potential overman. The arguments Brutus has with Cassius 
also underscore Brutus’s agonistic nature. As Kahn suggested, in the relation-
ship of Brutus and Cassius even love emerges really as a contest, where Brutus 
wants to present himself as a better son of Rome than anyone else – supposedly 
the best republican. Kahn (2005: 278) writes that: “Republican principle has 
become the stakes in a contest of emulation in which Brutus competes to distin-
guish himself as the Roman most devoted to the Republic.” The paradox of 
Brutus’s cause lies in the fact that his striving to better all others cancels the 
very point of republican equality and a sense of brotherhood between the con-
spirators. Brutus’s friendship with Cassius does not seem to be based on recip-
rocity or mutual care. In this sense it is Nietzschean, as it involves a degree of 
servility and due admiration towards Brutus on the part of Cassius.11 
Brutus is burdened with a typically Nietzschean trait of egocentrism that 
is manifested in his indulgence in solitary reflection. His first soliloquy, as Will-
burn (2005: 219) points out: “[…] is remarkable for itself and for its position as 
one of Shakespeare’s earliest dramatic models of private thought, or intrapsych-
ic process, or the influence of emotion upon reason.” Willburn is right in point-
ing out that it is the emotional load that influences Brutus’s decision to join the 
conspiracy. What is also crucial is the fact that, though the soliloquy is meant to 
provide reasoning for and against the deed, it starts with a conclusion; “It must 
be by his death” (Caesar, 2.1.10). One can see that in Brutus’s head the deed is 
already performed. What follows is, in Willburn’s (2005: 220) words, a “‘ratio-
nalization’ – or the use of commonplace and intellect to justify a choice made of 
unacknowledged emotion, or wish.” Walter Reinsdorf (1982: 84) claims that:  
Brutus, recognizing from the start Caesar’s imperial assumptions, grants unhesitat-
ingly that he must die, a decision both political and personal. Caesar devours himself 
to become a god – the progenitor of all subsequent imperial deities. Soon he will de-
vour others. Knowing that he must act quickly, Brutus never debates the assassina-
tion before, and never regrets it after. 
I would argue that this statement is only partly true. Caesar’s tyrannical poten-
tial, as mentioned, is not entirely clear and this is also visible in Brutus’s first 
                                                                                                                                        
ensured faction (precipitating the sundering of the state), a struggle for supremacy, and 
thus perpetual strife” (Parker 2005: 112). 
11 Hatab explains the Nietzschean perspective on the exclusive nature of the agon, and 
thus on its bearing on friendship between the competitors, by saying that: “Nietzsche rec-
ognized the political purposes of the agon […], but he clearly took it to be an aristocratic 
activity, in which the few talented types would compete for cultural and political status” 
(Hatab 2002: 134). Brutus definitely sees himself as such an aristocratic type and, what is 
more, he sees himself as superior even to his fellow conspirators. 
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soliloquy. Caesar might be indeed fashioned into a deity and emerge a progeni-
tor, but his position as such is a reflection of Brutus’s own deep desires and 
longings. Brutus deceives himself by saying: “And for my part/ I know no per-
sonal cause to spurn at him,/ But for the general” (Caesar, 2.1.10-12). If it were 
indeed so, the argumentation that follows it would have been more convincing, 
whereas Brutus leaves his motives undisclosed. He fears that Caesar might 
change his nature, but there is little reason to believe that this will indeed hap-
pen. Brutus says: “to speak truth of Caesar,/ I have not known when his affec-
tions swayed/ More than his reason” (Caesar, 2.1.19-21). Brutus seems to be 
basing his line of argument on a very orthodox vision of ambition. Knowing him 
to be ambitious himself, there is really no wonder he is not very convincing 
when he says: “But ‘tis a common proof/ That lowliness is young ambition’s 
ladder,/ Whereto the climber-upward turns his face;/ But, when he once attains 
the upmost round,/ He then unto the ladder turns his back,/ Looks in the 
clouds, scorning the base degrees/ By which he did ascend. So Caesar may” 
(Caesar, 2.1.21-27). Caesar may or very well he may not. Brutus’s words are a 
conjecture based on circumstantial evidence. In his speech his need of emula-
tion, or unrealized will to power, mixes with typical early modern illustrations 
of the evils of excessive ambition. He uses popular images from early modern 
iconography e.g. “the adder”, “young ambition’s ladder” or “serpent’s egg”. All 
these images are to be seen as harbingers of the fall of the overly ambitious. 
Even Montaigne, following his contemporaries in orthodox views on ambition, 
wrote in Chapter IX of his Essays that ambition is “the defect […] intolerable in 
those who take upon them public affairs” (Montaigne 2006, loc. 1237-1238). 
However, as mentioned, despite the compelling imagery, Brutus’s accusations 
of excessive ambition on the part of Caesar lack substance. They are part of 
Brutus’s own construction of reality, based on his experience but fuelled by his 
emotions. Not only is the real motive veiled but the one put forward emerges as 
a construct. The world of Julius Caesar is, as a whole, a construct built of hu-
man interpretations rather than facts. In Act 1, Scene 3 Casca describes fright-
ening supernatural occurrences e.g. tempests of fire, lions in the streets, men 
burning in flames that have been seen by the Romans. Cicero summarizes 
Casca’s revelations by saying: “Indeed, it is a strange-disposèd time./ But men 
may construe things after their fashion,/ Clean from the purpose of the things 
themselves” (Caesar, 1.3.33-35). Cicero does not only dismiss these metaphysi-
cal anxieties but captures the meaning of Nietzsche’s perspectivism. The word 
“construe” is here crucial as it underscores the inherent relativity of Shake-
speare’s Rome. Brutus’s truth is construed as much as Antony’s later on when 
he slyly manipulates information over Caesar’s dead body to stir the mob. In the 
reality of this ubiquitous relativity Brutus also seems to be bending existing 
experience to serve his purpose, to illustrate his version of future events. Even 
the movement of the Sun seems to be an object for a debate as the seemingly 
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insignificant squabble between the conspirators in Brutus’s orchard proves 
(Caesar, 2.1.100-110). The manipulation of facts (or to be more precise inter-
pretations) manifests the contingency of knowledge. It is not only an expression 
of Renaissance scepticism that the play is infused with but also a Nietzschean 
perspectival vision in which life itself is a subject to interpretation.12 Real moti-
vations are unutterable, possibly because they are consigned to instincts rather 
than rational responses. The characters of Caesar, Antony and even Brutus can 
never be fully graspable because the material provided about them and by them 
is subject to multidirectional reading.  
The full extent of Brutus’s mind is never disclosed by Shakespeare as he, 
like his later protagonists, remains partly enigmatic. Like Macbeth and Hamlet, 
Brutus too is a character of a deeply reflective nature. Similarly to Macbeth, his 
“active” reflectiveness is metaphorically encapsulated in his sleeplessness and 
solitude. Nietzschean self-overcoming is a never ending process of sublimating 
one’s will to power. Shakespearean overmen, having welcomed their challenges, 
are condemned to perpetual vigilance. Brutus, too, is left alone face to face with 
the challenges his mind fashions: “Boy! Lucius! – Fast asleep? It is no matter./ 
Enjoy the honey-heavy dew of slumber./ Thou hast no figures nor no fantasies/ 
Which busy care draws in the brains of men./ Therefore thou sleep’st so sound” 
(Caesar, 2.1.228-232). He seems to be indicating here that real men do not 
sleep as they always remain ready and vigilant. Brutus also has to face his chal-
lenge of self-overcoming on his own, and so he does not only distance Lucius 
but also his wife Portia. He is very unwilling to share his innermost thoughts 
with her as if he was sure that the extent of his overcoming is only his responsi-
bility. Brutus is shaking off the influence of the surrounding characters: Caesar, 
Portia and even Cassius. Interestingly, Montaigne claims that solitude is the 
curse of ambitious men when he says: “Let us tell ambition that it is she herself 
who gives us a taste of solitude; for what does she so much avoid as society?” 
(Montaigne 2006, loc. 4618). Nietzsche’s project of self-creation is similarly a 
solitary enterprise. Although, as mentioned, the assassination is meant to be an 
act confirming brotherly values, due to Brutus’s decision not to require an oath 
from each conspirator, he cancels the subjectivity of all the others conspirators. 
He renders himself an unofficial leader of the conspiracy, turning all the others 
into a nameless mass. Thus, his rampant subjectivity is confirmed, while the 
  
12 Nietzsche’s perspectivism is rendered in a most apt and brief way in an aphorism 
found in his notebooks dated around the end of 1886 or beginning of 1887 that goes: 
“Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei dem Phänomen stehen bleibt „es giebt nur Thatsa-
chen“, würde ich sagen: nein, gerade Thatsachen giebt es nicht, nur Interpretationen…” 
(http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1886,7[60]). Kaufmann in his Portable 
Nietzsche renders the same fragment as: “Against that positivism which stops before phe-
nomena, saying ‘there are only facts,’ I should say: no, it is precisely facts that do not exist, 
only interpretations…” (Nietzsche as quoted in: Kaufmann 1982: 458). 
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brotherhood is really turned into an illusion. Brutus’s specific Nietzschean indi-
vidualism is later confirmed in his speech during Caesar’s funeral. David Daich-
es (1976: 21), in his study on Julius Caesar suggests that Brutus’ main character 
quality is his tendency to extreme abstractness. He claims that Brutus’ speech is 
governed by some extremely abstract logic, which “does violence to the realities 
of human existence and human relationships” (Daiches 1976: 37). I would add 
that this abstractness is a consequence of Brutus’s individualized treatment of 
morality, which is against the so called general good he initially refers to. In his 
public speeches he cuts himself away from the gory and bloody business of the 
murder by its abstract ritualization. He says: “Let’s be sacrificers, but not butch-
ers, Caius./ We all stand up against the spirit of Caesar/ And in the spirit of men 
there is no blood./ O, that we then could come by Caesar’s spirit/ And not dis-
member Caesar!” (Caesar, 2.1.166-170). If his decision is finally made in the 
name of his mental independence, his abstractness does indeed violence to the 
reality of human moral relations. Through his words he demonstrates that ecs-
tatic freedom of the mind that is exactly the essence of the Nietzschean will to 
power – the creative force of the strong-minded. The abstract reasoning in Bru-
tus’ speech when he justifies his decision seems to be symptomatic of “the self-
overcoming of the will to power” (Kaufmann 1974: 235). This means nothing 
else than reason sublimating impulses. As Walter Kaufmann (1974: 235) writes:  
[b]oth impulse (passion) and reason (spirit) are manifestations of the will to power; 
and when reason overcomes the impulses, we cannot speak of a marriage of the two 
diverse principles but only of the self-overcoming of the will to power. This and only 
this basic force has first manifested itself as impulse and then over-comes its own 
previous manifestation. 
So, first Brutus, in pain and sheer suffering, over-comes his natural inclinations 
to love and loyalty and decides to sacrifice his dear friend in the name of inde-
pendence and freedom from his tyranny. Later, the ritualization of the murder 
emerges as the Nietzschean sublimation of the lowest of impulses. The love that 
Brutus holds dear is first channelled towards his yearning for freedom and then 
transfigured into the fight against “the spirit of Caesar”, understood as mental 
tyranny or intellectual slavery. As Zbigniew Kuderowicz (1979: 142) writes, the 
Nietzschean overman is born in pain and suffering. However, when he eventu-
ally is shaped he emerges a far more powerful man. Walter Kaufmann (1974: 
244) points out  
the powerful man is the rational man who subjects even his most cherished faith to 
the severe scrutiny of reason and is prepared to give up his beliefs if they cannot 
stand this stern test. He abandons what he loves, if rationality requires it. He does 
not yield to his inclinations and impulses and is willing to give up even his relatives 
and friends, if intellectual integrity demands it. 
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This definition seems to suit the character of Brutus very well. Once he makes 
the decision to kill Caesar, he revels in his new found freedom and power. He is 
the decision-making authority who directs the whole event, assigning roles and 
devising the plan of action. He is the one who consoles Cassius in the moment 
of panic, when the threat of failure appears. When the deed is done, he also 
naturally assumes the role of the leader as he says: “Stoop, Romans, stoop,/ And 
let us bathe our hands in Caesar’s blood/ Up to the elbows and besmear our 
swords./ Then we forth, even to the market-place,/ And waving our red weap-
ons o’er our heads/ Let’s all cry, ‘Peace, freedom, and liberty!’” (Caesar, 3.1.105-
110). Brutus’s new found reserves of energy and enthusiasm can be sharply con-
trasted with his sulkiness before the murder. It does not only befit a definition 
of the Nietzschean self-overcoming overhuman but also a Baconian vision of 
ambition from his Essays. Francis Bacon believed ambitious men to be hungry 
for action. In roused activity they find vent for their excessive energy. If de-
prived of a possibility to rise, they become dangerous. It is worth recalling the 
words of Bacon in his essay Of ambition when he writes that:  
AMBITION is like choler; which is an humor that maketh men active, earnest, full of 
alacrity, and stirring, if it be not stopped. But if it be stopped, and cannot have his 
way, it becometh adust, and thereby malign and venomous. So ambitious men, if 
they find the way open for their rising, and still get forward, they are rather busy 
than dangerous; but if they be checked in their desires, they become secretly discon-
tent, and look upon men and matters with an evil eye, and are best pleased, when 
things go backward; which is the worst property in a servant of a prince, or state. 
(Bacon 2009, loc. 1365-1369)  
One may wonder if the call for overcoming in Brutus has a similar underpin-
ning, as his bitterness and anxiety about Caesar transforms into exhilaration 
and energy in the aftermath of his murder. So, Brutus is both Baconian and 
Nietzschean. He initially may seem to be a character split into his private self 
and a public persona; but these two are finally merged in the process of self-
overcoming and sublimation in order to create the Nietzschean over-man. He 
merges his public persona with his personal cause. 
Nevertheless, despite the strength of his will to power and his abilities of 
self-overcoming, Brutus is eventually crushed by the Triumvirs. He is faced with 
Antony, “a skilled and unscrupulous manipulator of others’ feelings for his own 
purposes” (Daiches 1976: 38). As it appears, Brutus’ hubris is his inability to 
correctly estimate the power of the Roman masses, which, when skilfully mani-
pulated, turn out to be uncontrollable. In his “over-human” egotism he seems to 
have overestimated the crowds’ abilities to comprehend his deed as the act of 
bestowing freedom onto them. His funeral speech is not only abstract, as Daich-
es claims, but above all Nietzschean. Its abstractness is expressed in its amoral 
character. There is no wonder that the masses do not understand the nature of 
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Brutus’s sacrifice as it is absolutely beyond conventional morality to kill some-
one that one loves deeply, as Brutus holds he loved Caesar. He claims:  
not that I loved Caesar less, 
but that I loved Rome more. Had you rather Caesar 
were living, and die all slaves, than that Caesar were 
dead, to live all free men? As Caesar loved me, I weep 
for him. As he was fortunate, I rejoice at it. As he was 
valiant, I honour him. But, as he was ambitious, I slew 
him. There is tears for his love, joy for his fortune, 
honour for his valour, and death for his ambition. (Caesar, 3.2.21-28) 
 His reasoning captures the very essence of the Nietzschean agon where one 
respects and even loves his opponent at the same time, being ready to slay him 
when necessity arises. Brutus excuses himself by a non-defined notion of Rome, 
yet the briefness of his speech, its emotional detachment, as well as Brutus’s 
leaving off demonstrates that, in his overhuman conceit, he does not feel 
obliged to explicate his deeds in detail. However, in the world of political self-
fashioning, his magnanimity is totally misconstrued by his political opponents 
and misunderstood by the easily manipulated masses. This is no wonder, be-
cause as Kuderowicz (1976: 138) writes, “for the proponents of the existing mo-
rality the over-man occurs as the embodiment of all evil”.13 If Brutus is the over-
man, then he towers far beyond the comprehension of his contemporaries. Just 
as his speech demonstrates his overhuman potential, Antony’s is “human, all 
too human” as it is designed to stir pity, fundamentally a herd instinct. At the 
peak of his emotional appeal he says: “You are not wood, you are not stones, but 
men:/ And, being men, hearing the will of Caesar,/ It will inflame you; it will 
make you mad” (Caesar, 3.2.143-145). He capitalizes on Caesar’s love for the 
people as opposed to Brutus’s abstract “Rome”. Above all, he gives tangible evi-
dence for this love in the form of Caesar’s will that provides for the people of 
Rome. His quite opposite reading of the past events underscores even further 
the relativity permeating the whole play. The perspective depends totally on the 
emotional load implicit in the words of the speaker. Antony’s perspective ap-
proximates the dictates of conventional morality, where pity is seen as a natural 
emotion as opposed to singular pursuit in the agon. Thus, it seems little wonder 
that his highly manipulative, emotion-based speech stirs herd instincts and 
incites the mob to rise against the conspirators. In the face of political schem-
ing, Brutus’s solitary enterprise of self-overcoming turns out to be disastrous. 
However, Brutus, who demonstrated a stoical attitude even in the face of his 
wife’s death, remains so when his project is halted by circumstances. It seems 
that in his stoicism and in his postponing of suicide until the very last moments, 
  
13 The translations of quotations from Kuderowicz’s book are mine. 
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until the opposing army is about to capture him, he demonstrates, what 
Nietzsche would call, amor fati.14 Amor fati or the “love of fate” is Nietzsche’s 
recipe for life affirmation in the face of its inherent suffering, it is his ultimate 
“yes-saying” (Kaufaman 1974: 243). In Ecce Homo Nietzsche (2007d: 35) says: 
“[m]y formula for human greatness is amor fati: not wanting anything to be 
different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just enduring 
what is necessary, still less concealing it – all idealism is hypocrisy in the face of 
what is necessary – but loving it...”. In the face of death, Brutus says: “My heart 
doth joy that yet in all my life/ I found no man but he was true to me./ I shall 
have glory by this losing day/ More than Octavius and Mark Antony/ By this 
vile conquest shall attain unto” (Caesar, 5.5.34-38). In these words Brutus 
seems to be saying his very last “yes” to life with all its suffering as well as the 
joy that one attains only by conquering oneself. However, in his love of fate 
Brutus does not demonstrate resignation as his suicide emerges as his final act 
of defiance. Kahn (2005: 281) aptly observes that: “Essentially, suicide is the 
final stage of emulation, because it is understood primarily as a means not 
merely of avoiding defeat, but of defeating one’s rival by depriving him of his 
expected triumph.” Even in death Brutus does not give up his agonistic nature 
because, in a very Roman style, he will not let others deprive him of his honour, 
understood as the right of self-determination. So, one could say that Brutus’s 
Roman suicide is also his final attempt at Nietzschean self-overcoming.  
Although instinctively one would point to Julius Caesar as the first-hand 
candidate for an over-man in the play, in the course of the analysis, it turns out 
that he can be seen a negotiator of identity, who in his political self-cancellation 
loses his over-human potential. Ultimately, it is Brutus, the overreacher and the 
violator of the progenitors’ bond, who emerges as the over-man in the play. 
From the point of view of traditionally conceived morality, his deed is unques-
tionably murder and hence worth condemning. Nevertheless, there is no deny-
ing that his yearning to transcend and attain intellectual independence is 
somewhat admirable. Regardless of one’s personal assessment of Brutus’ deeds, 
it seems that he can be inscribed into Nietzsche’s philosophical vision and serve 
as an instance of the realization of Nietzsche’s over-man. Nietzsche’s had a 
deeply personal attitude to this particular play as he apparently identified him-
self with Brutus. The relation between Brutus and Caesar, as portrayed in Sha-
  
14 In a note on the philosophical background, R.J. Fleissner claims that Shakespeare’s 
Julius Caesar was inspired by neo-stoical ideas, rather than classical stoicism. In neo-
stoicism suicide was not seen in a favourable light and so should be read Brutus’s suicide 
(Fleissner 1985: 344). The fact that the act can be read in numerous ways proves, to my 
mind, the argument that the play communicates Nietzsche’s perspectivism in the multiplic-
ity of its possible interpretative directions. In order to read more on ancient philosophical 
influences in the play, see: Auffret, Jean. 1974. “The Philosophic Background of Julius Cae-
sar”, in: Cashiers Elisabethains 5: 67-92. 
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kespeare, might be compared to Nietzsche’s turbulent relationship with Richard 
Wagner. Nietzsche initially saw Richard Wagner as his intellectual father and 
mentor. However, he quickly started feeling suffocated by Wagner’s intellectual 
imperialism that, as he evidently felt, blocked his own philosophical develop-
ment. Their ways finally separated, but Nietzsche for a long time struggled to 
free himself from Wagner’s influence, both academically and mentally.15 As 
Kaufmann (1976: 36) observes:  
[i]n the man whose passion for philosophy was praised even by the ancients, in Brutus 
whose Stoic persuasion Nietzsche, who called himself ‘the last of the Stoics’ […], 
stressed persistently, in the hero who sacrificed Caesar though he himself had been 
Caesar’s adopted son (and, according to Plutarch, perhaps actually Caesar’s natural 
son) – Nietzsche (as he himself says of Shakespeare) finds the ‘symbolism’ of a ‘dark 
event and adventure out of’ his ‘own soul of which he wants to speak only in signs’.  
As can be seen, Nietzsche’s praise of Brutus adds yet another argument in favour 
of Brutus being seen as a Nietzschean overman. Nietzsche himself sensed Brutus’s 
yearning for independence and his deep need to overcome. He read this need as 
symptomatic of Brutus’s overcoming of the will to power and sublimation. How-
ever, as my analysis hopefully illustrates, Nietzsche’s personal attitude towards 
Julius Caesar stems from the fact that the play indeed illustrates concepts that 
became crucial for the philosopher. In his creative unrest and primordial will to 
power Brutus approximates other Shakespearean characters who also share de-
grees of overhuman potential – like Macbeth and Edmund.  
4.2. Macbeth (Macbeth) 
4.2.1. Critical responses to Macbeth and interpretative paths 
It seems safe to assume that, next to Hamlet, Macbeth is probably the most heav-
ily analysed play in the Shakespearean canon. Its charismatic, yet mysterious and 
gloomy protagonist has been an object of new historical, materialist, philosophical 
and psychoanalytic criticism. The profusion of Macbeth analyses indisputably 
underscores its inexplicability and, paradoxically, invites Nietzschean analysis as 
one of the so far uncharted paths. In order to work out the interpretative direction 
for this intensely criticised play, I feel obliged to briefly touch upon the existing 
body of thought concerning the tragedy of Macbeth before I move onto my analy-
sis in the spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy. For a very long time, the play had been 
seen as a moral parable illustrating the orthodox view of ambition and the pitfalls 
  
15 For more information, see Walter Kaufmann. 1974. Nietzsche-Philosopher, Psychol-
ogist, Antichrist. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. e.g. p. 36. 
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of overreaching. Recent studies, immersed deeper in the circumstances of the 
play’s production, demonstrated that Macbeth’s moral message as well as the 
behaviour and the decisions of the protagonist frequently subvert rather than 
support the official political line of thinking. As I will be trying to argue, Macbeth 
is a play about morality as well as power or to be more precise about the interde-
pendence of the two. It is this thematic core centring around the ethical dimen-
sion of power that makes the play intensely Nietzschean, even more than Tam-
burlaine, The Jew of Malta or Julius Caesar. In Marlowe’s characters, who are 
above all self-asserted all-powerful statements of singular identity, ethical reflec-
tion is barely existent. In Julius Caesar, Brutus’s interiority, though very personal, 
nevertheless revolves around the political matter of raison d’état. In Macbeth, the 
statement of the will and its consequences realized in intense moral deliberations 
unite to create a fuller and deeper experience of ‘overhuman’ potential, where 
animal instinct is coupled with all-too human contemplation. Macbeth is unques-
tionably a play with morality as its central preoccupation; however, it is by no 
means a moralistic story, which I will also try to demonstrate in my short account 
of the play’s criticism.  
As R.A. Foakes (1982: 7) aptly observes, Macbeth is the last play in Sha-
kespeare’s canon to present the fall of a great man who over-reached himself 
and was brought down by the uncompromising wheel of fortune. Consequently, 
as he himself points out, the play had been often seen as “a morality” (Foakes 
1982: 10). In such a reading the play is seen as “the presentation of the two con-
tending forces, the forces of good and evil”, where the concentration of evil is 
encapsulated in the character of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth (Ghosh 1983: 2). 
The “metaphysical” interpretation of the play, willy-nilly, partly pushes the re-
sponsibility for the criminalization of Macbeth’s soul onto the female agents, 
Lady Macbeth and the witches, while the protagonist, essentially “good and 
noble”, suffers through the ordeal of a peculiar psychomachia (cf. Ghosh 1983: 
3). P. G. Ghosh (1983: 4) tries to demonstrate that the witches constitute “an 
essential factor in setting off and accelerating the criminal process in Macbeth’s 
soul and, incidentally, the great spiritual struggle within it.” Lady Macbeth who 
breaks down and goes mad under the burden of her conscience represents “a 
pyrrhic victory”, while Macbeth’s tragedy culminates in “the defeat of the moral 
will” (Ghosh 1983: 6-7) As the author writes:  
[e]vil had decisively overcome the moral will and turned the rich life of the hero into 
a desert, taking Shakespeare’s vision of evil-haunted reality to a dead end, to an im-
passe of impenetrable contradiction. Macbeth is the last Shakespearian tragedy typi-
fying the titanic struggle of good and evil that had made its first appearance in Ham-
let (Ghosh 1983: 20).  
What is missing in this account of Macbeth’s character is the observation that 
the very “rich life”, that the author is referring to, originates in this supposed 
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“evil”. One has to realize that Macbeth would have never reached his utmost 
philosophical depth without his transgression and subsequent acts of violence. 
Also the claim of Macbeth’s essential goodness seems much exaggerated in the 
light of his cruelty on the battlefield. Lady Macbeth speaks with contempt of 
“the milk of human kindness” that is apparently inherent in Macbeth’s charac-
ter (Macbeth, 1.5.17). Yet it is not this quality that guarantees his success. Mac-
beth is neither praised by his wife for his kindness nor by his warrior compan-
ions who rather extol his acts of atrocity against the rebel. Mercy and pity, in a 
very Nietzschean spirit, are seen as signs of weakness. In quite an opposite 
evaluation of the play, Marilyn French (1992: 15) claims that:  
[a]t the conclusion of this tragedy, we accept without demur the judgement that 
Macbeth is a butcher. In fact, however, he is no more a butcher at the end than he is 
at the beginning. Macbeth lives in a culture that values butchery. Throughout the 
play manhood is equated with the ability to kill. Power is the highest value in Scot-
land, and in Scottish culture, power is military prowess. Macbeth’s crime is not that 
he is a murderer: he is praised and rewarded for being a murderer. His crime is a 
failure to make the distinction his culture expects among the objects of his slaughter. 
In French’s analysis, the reason behind this failure is Lady Macbeth’s and the 
witches’ temptation that stands for the supernatural intervention that misguides 
the protagonist. As I will be trying to prove in my analysis, Macbeth’s impulse to 
kill Duncan stems from his internal urge to over-come and over-reach his limiting 
circumstances. The influence of his wife is indisputably crucial, but Macbeth’s 
decisions are guided by his need to over-come the influence of both Duncan and 
Lady Macbeth. I also believe that both Ghosh’s and French’s analyses, though 
constituting extreme oppositions, force Macbeth into the straitjacket of simplified 
moral valuations. In my view, the play frustrates moral expectations rather than 
confirms orthodox visions. Yet as R.A. Foakes accurately observes: “This way of 
regarding Macbeth as an exemplary play displaying the degeneration of a great 
criminal […] has satisfied many, although it does not account for a sense that 
somehow, in spite of everything, Macbeth retains an heroic stature at the end […]” 
(Foakes 1982: 10).  I follow Foakes (1982: 10) in his view that “[m]oralistic ac-
counts of the play” are plagued by contradictions and “are torn between condemn-
ing [Macbeth] as a criminal and rescuing a grandeur, integrity, even virtue for him 
at the end.” As I have frequently repeated concerning both Marlovian and Shake-
spearean characters, the moral imperative in them is frequently missing or heavily 
compromised, yet the audience’s or the readers’ sympathy unconditionally sup-
ports them. In the case of Macbeth, the orthodox pattern condemning the exces-
sively ambitious is only superficially met. The deep structure of the play celebrates 
Macbeth’s overreaching.  
Recent criticism seems to share this morally complex view of the play, as 
the simple “Jamesian” reading of the play is more and more often called into 
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question. For a very long time it was unquestionably believed that Macbeth was 
Shakespeare’s attempt to flatter James I, written in the aftermath of The Gun-
powder Plot (Davidson 2000: 181-183). Clifford Davidson (2000: 183) poses a 
crucial question whether the play is indeed a demonstration of flattery if it 
presents the deposition of a virtuous King and unveils the vulnerability and 
dangers of the monarchical position. Macbeth’s exploitation of spies and his 
merciless use of violence in the elimination of his potential political opponents 
resembles the tyrannical espionage both in the Elizabethan as well as Jamesian 
regime (Davidson 2000: 186-189). Of course, one can assume that James saw 
himself as a righteous monarch whose position was divinely inspired, whereas 
the play presents a tyrant in the figure of Macbeth. In The true law of free mo-
narchies (1603) James sees the role of the King as an all-powerful, albeit just 
and merciful father. He writes:  
[t]he King towards His people is rightly compared to a father of children, and to a 
head of a body composed of divers members. For as fathers, the good Princes and 
magistrates of the people of God acknowledged themselves to their subjects. And for 
all other well ruled commonwealths, the rule of Pater patriae was ever and is com-
monly used for Kings” (James VI and I 2011: 143).  
James’s vision of kingship characterized by wisdom but also pity, seems to be 
encapsulated in the character of Duncan who “Hath borne his faculties so meek, 
hath been/ So clear in his great office, that his virtues/ Will plead like angels, 
trumpet-tongued...” (Macbeth, 1.7.17-19). In Basilikon Doron (1603) James 
seems to be even more precise in his vision of kingship as he explicitly makes a 
distinction between a good king and a tyrant, a differentiation between legiti-
mate and illegitimate King, that the tragedy of Macbeth also supposedly pre-
sents. One can safely assume that in appearance James would have officially 
identified with Duncan, though his (as well as Elizabeth’s) rule might have very 
well approximated Macbeth’s. This divide between appearance and reality 
seems to define the play’s inherent subversive nature, especially because, as 
mentioned, the spotlight and sympathy falls on the tyrant – Macbeth. Cristina 
León Alfar (2003: 119-120), following Alan Sinfield, also questions the Jame-
sian reading, claiming that there is no difference between Macbeth’s rule than 
other contemporary European monarchs, while the events in the play might 
promote “the deposition of all tyrants – legitimate and illegitimate.” As she 
writes: “The spectral nature of legitimate and illegitimate rule […] haunts 
Shakespeare’s tragedy and suggests that the violence of Macbeth and Lady 
Macbeth is subject to a more complex set of circumstances than moral denun-
ciations of them allow” (Alfar 2003: 120). Analysing the text of 1570 An homily 
against disobedience and wilful rebellion, Alfar demonstrates that the dividing 
line between a legitimate and illegitimate kingship is really very intangible. Al-
far (2003: 120) claims that:  
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[i]f Macbeth is read in light of the Homily’s notions of divine right, then the legiti-
macy of Macbeth’s reign, at least insofar as it is viewed as a reign ordained by God, is 
secure. Neither Duncan’s nor Malcolm’s reigns may be assumed as either legitimate 
or less tyrannous. And neither Macbeth and Malcolm can escape their roles as trai-
tors. For in the Homily the differences between the tyrant and the king, the loyal 
subject and the rebel, become slippery. 
What I would add to Alfar’s very apt remarks is the observation that Macbeth, 
in its subversive message, underscores the relativity of the social order and 
forcibly unveils it as a human construct. Similarly to Julius Caesar, the visions 
of power and its legitimacy are painstakingly constructed by men in order to 
secure their singular positions. Davidson seems to echo Alfar’s comments by 
highlighting that:  
[t]he orthodox Tudor and Jacobean political doctrines are part of the intellectual mi-
lieu of Shakespeare’s plays. Nevertheless, it is absolutely true that there is much 
more than a mere display of the official party line to be seen in a play such as Mac-
beth or in Shakespeare’s history plays, for the playwright’s inherent interest in the 
consequences of the urge to power displays the futility of ambitious acts and the 
anxiety with which power will be accompanied. (Davidson 2000: 191) 
It is exactly this human dimension of ambition that occupies the central place in 
the tragedy of Macbeth and also disrupts the “official” moral and political order. 
The focus on the protagonist’s urge to over-come also opens up the Nietzschean 
path in the analysis of Macbeth. 
The quality of ambition as a leading trait of Macbeth’s character can 
again be driven back to Bradley’s Shakespearean tragedy. Bradley (1992: 308), 
in a very Nietzschean spirit, aptly identifies ambition as Macbeth’s identity 
building tool when he posits that Macbeth  
[...] was exceedingly ambitious. He must have been so by temper. The tendency must 
have been greatly strengthened by his marriage. When we see him, it has been fur-
ther stimulated by his remarkable success and by the consciousness of exceptional 
powers and merit. It becomes a passion. […] On the other hand, his passion for 
power and instinct of self-assertion are so vehement that no inward misery could 
persuade him to relinquish the fruits of crime, or to advance from remorse. 
Not only does Bradley identify Macbeth’s relentless urge to act as “ambition”, 
but also he points out Macbeth’s moral relativity. The issue of “ambition” be-
comes central in both psychoanalytical as well as philosophical studies of Mac-
beth. Studies that profess Freudian origins would identify Macbeth’s “desire for 
a new self as a figuratively Oedipal desire, since it implies the incestuous re-use 
of the mother’s womb to usurp the father’s procreative authority” (Watson 
1984: 4). In a psychoanalytical analysis the play becomes a seat of powerful 
desires played out in between the influences of father and mother figures. In the 
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case of Macbeth the powerful father-figure is taken by Duncan while the role of 
a “seductive mother” is filled by Lady Macbeth (cf. Hogan 1983: 391). As Robert 
N. Watson (1984: 4) explains: “[i]ncestuous physical gratification, from this 
viewpoint, is not the ultimate goal of the Oedipal impulse, but rather the fanta-
sized means toward an autogenous identity.” I am myself sceptical towards the 
supposed “universality” of Freudian readings as I do strongly feel that psycho-
analysis reduces Shakespearean characters to stock figures or fixed composites 
of essentialist drives, yet I speak one voice with Watson when he sees Macbeth’s 
actions in terms of a symbolical “self-birth” – already proposed by Nietzsche 
long before Freud. Watson (1984: 3) believes that in order: “[t]o escape both the 
constraints of their natural births and the artificiality of a manufactured self, 
Shakespeare’s ambitious protagonists often attempt to enforce a symbolic re-
birth, through which they can become the children of their own desires or ide-
als.” This statement is true for Marlowe’s protagonists like Tamburlaine and 
Barabas, as well as Shakespeare’s Brutus and, above all, Macbeth.  
Macbeth’s innermost desires have also been filtered through the lens of 
philosophical analyses with the help of another of Nietzsche’s near contempora-
ries, namely, Søren Kierkegaard. A Kierkegaardian analysis sees Macbeth’s 
“ambition” as symptomatic of “dread”; a mixture of fear, indefiniteness and 
fascination (Cheung 1984: 433-434). As King-Kok Cheung (1984: 434) explains: 
“Macbeth seems a captive spectator in the theatre of his mind, shielding his eyes 
from the bloody scenes, yet aroused by them.” Kierkegaard, like Nietzsche, saw 
individual identity always suspended in “this peculiar supra-temporality” (Palf-
rey 2004: 110). For Kierkegaard himself Macbeth is “the existing subject in the 
moment” (Palfrey 2004: 100). I am inclined to believe that Nietzsche could have 
seen Macbeth’s singularity in just such a way. Simon Palfrey (2004: 96) identi-
fies Shakespeare and Kierkegaard as “pioneers of inwardness”. To this short list 
I would also add the name of Nietzsche, whose philosophy is notoriously, al-
most solipsisticly, individualist. Interestingly enough, what Kierkegaard himself 
observes is that Shakespeare’s drama, including Macbeth, does not engage in 
deeply religious dilemmas. Shakespeare “does seem to presuppose a more pro-
fane model of selfhood than Kierkegaard’s God-ordained hybrid of finitude and 
eternity” (Palfrey 2004: 99). I could not agree more with this statement and for 
this reason I believe that Macbeth, though plagued with existentialist dread, 
seems much closer to Nietzschean rather than Kierkegaardian ideals. Cheung 
(1984: 439) writes that:  
[d]read haunts both Macbeth and his spectators. Under the spell of Shakespeare’s 
poetry, we too are startled by the witches, we too are fascinated by horrid images, we 
too are amazed by Lady Macbeth. While the scene of infanticide etched by her is in-
human and morally revolting, its graphic imagery is captivating. 
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To my mind, it is not only the poetry that is so captivating, it is the sudden and 
ecstatic Nietzschean realization that we too are taken in by immorality. When 
Macbeth finally reaches the decision to carry out murder, we do not gasp and 
say “No!”. Rather we live through the intensity of the deed, the chill of immoral-
ity – of going beyond good and evil, yielding to our innermost instincts. So it is 
Macbeth’s immorality that constitutes his Nietzschean potential. This has al-
ready been partially touched upon in psychoanalytical and philosophical read-
ings which, when combined, render the two-fold vision of the play 
 its corporeal and slightly animalic edge with profound reflection. These two 
paths, when they cross, culminate in a Nietzschan perspective. Writing against 
such a rich background of Macbeth criticism I intend to utilize the fruits of 
these analyses, at the same time giving my analysis a new Nietzschean edge. 
Both interpretative directions, though not decisive, leave a trace in my reading 
of the play. The tenability of Kierkegaardian analyses persuades me further of 
the immense potential in a Nietzschean analysis, while certain psychoanalytical 
ideas like “self-birth” go hand in hand with Nietzsche’s concepts and substanti-
ate my point of view. I will be reading Macbeth’s “black and deep desires” as 
manifestations of his strong will to power, while his philosophical deliberations 
as the realization of the eternal return (Macbeth, 1.4.58). In my view, Macbeth’s 
motivation stems from the need to over-come the influence of first Duncan, and 
later Lady Macbeth in his personal self-growth. I live behind moralistic ac-
counts of the play, following Nietzsche’s assumption that such readings would 
be fundamentally “against life”. Nietzsche’s contempt for all-too hasty moralis-
ing can be found in his brief comment on Shakespeare’s Macbeth, which I 
would like to make a point of departure for my analysis. Nietzsche (2006a: 141) 
writes in Daybreak:  
[w]hoever thinks that Shakespeare’s theatre has a moral effect, and that the sight of 
Macbeth irresistibly repels one from the evil of ambition, is in error: and he is again 
in error if he thinks Shakespeare himself felt as he feels. He who is really possessed 
by raging ambition beholds this its image with joy; and if the hero perishes by his 
passion this precisely is the sharpest spice in the hot draught of this joy. Can the poet 
have felt otherwise? How royally, and not at all like a rogue, does his ambitious man 
pursue his course from the moment of his great crime! Only from then on does he 
exercise ‘demonic’ attraction and excite similar natures to emulation – demonic 
means here: in defiance against life and advantage for the sake of a drive and idea. 
One cannot be as certain about what Shakespeare himself believed about ambi-
tion as Nietzsche in this fragment is, yet, as my account of Macbeth criticism 
hopefully illustrates, it is this moral relativity that drives the play. In the spirit 
of Nietzschean relativity thus I wish to open the discussion on the question of 
Macbeth’s “joy” in his immorality.  
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4.2.2. “Blood will have blood” – Macbeth (Macbeth, 3.4.152)  
The subsequent chaotic and destructive events are already heralded by the ap-
pearance of the weird sisters in the opening of the play when one of them utters 
a famous pun “Fair is foul, and foul is fair”, later echoed by Macbeth in his con-
versation with Banquo (Macbeth, 1.1.12). This memorable and highly enigmatic 
sentence reverberates throughout the play, being an apt mental short-cut for the 
atmosphere of moral relativity that suffuses the tragedy of Macbeth. However, 
as I will be arguing, this bleak world, thrown-off balance, is not a portrayal of 
medieval perspective but rather early modern reality plagued by the curse of 
radical scepticism. At its very opening the play invites a “reversed” reading of its 
content and, in a very Nietzschean style, it signals not to take anything at its 
face value. The presence of the witches is traditionally attributed to the newly 
revived interest in witchcraft shared by James VI and I, to which he gave his 
vent in e.g. Daemonologie (1597). Critics have often identified the subversive 
role of the witches in the play, seeing them as agents threatening the given 
world order. Yet quite perversely, as Peter Stallybrass suggests, they do not con-
stitute “residual medieval ‘superstition’, but at least in part, the potent construc-
tion of some of the foremost intellectuals of the time, including Bodin” (Stally-
brass 1982: 191).16 So, according to Stallybrass, the weird sisters function as an 
expression of the newly born ‘modern’ intellectual vanguard. Dympna Cal-
laghan (1992: 368) also echoes Stallybrass by claiming that James’s diabolism 
was an expression of modern scepticism, since witchcraft persecutions em-
ployed “a profoundly scientific, empirical method in many respects, one of 
which the female body is the principle object of knowledge.” It is, indeed, true 
that the revival of witch hunting had a new and supposedly “scientific” side yet, 
to my mind, the weird sisters’ presence has also a wider philosophical meaning 
as it opens up space for a deeper metaphysical crisis, in which all, so far reliable, 
sets of values and rules disintegrate. Scepticism seems to be a defence reaction 
to the expansion of horizons; or the growth in knowledge which inescapably 
brings lack of security. The more one knows the less sure one is of one’s place in 
the universe and consequently one feels less secure. Macbeth’s reaction to the 
witches’ prophecy is indeed quintessentially sceptical as he ‘attacks’ them with 
  
16 Stallybrass reads Jamesian witchcraft paranoia politically as one of the useful tools to 
uphold a patriarchal system that ignores difference and ‘deviance’. He writes that: “Witch-
craft accusations are a way of reaffirming a particular order against outsiders, or of attack-
ing an internal rival, or of attacking ‘deviance’. Witchcraft in Macbeth [...] is not simply a 
reflection of a pre-given order of things: rather, it is a particular working upon, and legiti-
mization of, the hegemony of patriarchy” (Stallybrass 1982: 190). I agree with his line of 
argumentation, though, as I am showing in my analysis, there are wider and deeper precon-
ceptions concerning the revival of the interest and more specifically the prominent position 
of the witches in Macbeth. 
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his questions: “Say from whence/ You owe this strange intelligence or why/ 
Upon this blasted heath you stop our way/ With such prophetic greeting. Speak, 
I charge you” (Macbeth, 1.3.78-1). He asks about the source of knowledge, its 
utility, and the reasons for its disclosure. In quite an opposite manner Banquo 
sees the prophecy as “the instruments of darkness” and the words of “the devil” 
(Macbeth, 1.3.136, 113). As Bernhard Taureck (1996: 154) suggests, Banquo’s 
interpretation of the witches’ prophecy is medieval. Taureck (1996: 154) writes 
that: “His interpretation remains entirely medieval, while Macbeth has a com-
pletely different perception. In his view, there is a crisis of metaphysical knowl-
edge, a crisis that can be used as a vacuum of foundation in order to create one-
self. That creates the very impact of modernity in the play.” So Taureck (1996: 
155) sees the presence of the witches and Macbeth’s reaction as a response to a 
wider “crisis of metaphysical knowledge.” The metaphysical anxiety and the 
deconstruction of valuations, symbolically encapsulated in the witches, creates 
space for a Nietzschean self-overcoming and self-creation. When Macbeth ech-
oes the witches by saying “So foul and fair a day I have not seen”, he makes a 
truly perspectivist statement of his own identity (Macbeth, 1.3.39). This short 
and enigmatic sentence is also a self-assertion in which the conventional duality 
of good and evil falls apart in order to be moulded into a whole that is both foul 
and fair. In the figure of Macbeth these categories become blurred.  
Unconventionally the tragedy does not open with a vision of relative or-
der, but rather in medias res, in the midst of a raging battle. Though, as one 
learns, the ultimate chaos is averted by Macbeth, the opening of the play 
presents a vision of a revolt. The goddess Fortune, heralded as a whore, was on 
the side of the rebel Macdonwald who could have won were it not for “brave 
Macbeth […]/ [d]isdaining Fortune” who beats him in a mortal duel. The cap-
tain records that Macbeth “with his brandished steel,/ Which smoked with 
bloody execution,/ Like valor’s minion, carved out his passage” (Macbeth, 
1.2.19-21). This introductory speech turns out to be brutally ironical as it is ex-
actly Macbeth who, like Macdonwald, takes fate into his own hands and “carves 
out his passage” to power and position. Macbeth’s first soliloquy already unfolds 
his intentions of “conceiving political self-creation”, which Taureck mentions as 
a reaction to the metaphysical vacuum (Taureck 1996: 153). For a moment 
Macbeth also admits the same attitude to the prophecy as Banquo does when he 
says: “If chance will have me king, why, chance may/ crown me/ Without my 
stir” (Macbeth, 1.3.157-158). He ponders upon leaving off all his actions to the 
decree of fate, yet once the possibility of self-overcoming opens up, as a fantas-
tical imagining it transforms into an inescapable actuality. Potentiality mixes up 
with execution and “nothing is but what is not” (Macbeth, 1.3.155). At the same 
time, despite the horror Macbeth feels at the idea of the “fantastical” murder, he 
feels every sensation in his body more intensely and acutely (Macbeth, 1.3.152). 
He claims: “that suggestion/ Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair/ And 
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make my seated heart knock at my ribs” (Macbeth, 1.3.147-149). For Cheung 
(1984: 437) the feeling that “Shakes so [Macbeth’s] single state of man” is exact-
ly the Kierkegaardian ‘dread’, the realization of the evil nature of the deed and 
simultaneously the hopeless fascination by the possibility (Macbeth, 1.3.153). I 
would argue that Macbeth’s heightened sensitivity and his awoken virility has 
more to do with his awareness of his will to power, the possibility of self-
overcoming that unfolds before him and, finally, a realization of the need to 
embrace the instinct rather than repudiate it. As much as Macbeth understands 
the moral duplicity inherent in the deed, he refuses to hold it as any serious 
consideration. He frequently pushes the thought away e.g. when he dismisses 
his doubts by saying: “Come what come may”, which, to my mind, clearly sug-
gests that at this stage he is resigned to any eventuality (Macbeth, 1.3.163). I 
believe it is not exactly “dread” that causes Macbeth’s uneasiness as his mind 
specifically identifies the fear with the necessity to commit the murder of Dun-
can. As critics suggest, killing itself should not be a problem for Macbeth be-
cause he is a brilliant and effective soldier. The memory of extreme brutality 
with which Macbeth dealt with the rebel Macdonwald is still fresh in our minds. 
I believe that Macbeth is so shaken because he realizes that this act of murder 
would be his first step towards his self-identification. The murder would be his 
first act of his singular and individual will, requiring taking responsibility for 
himself. In Nietzschean terms, Macbeth stares into the abyss and realizes that it 
stares back at him.17 This is the moment of the realization of his single identity 
separate from his communal duty towards his war companions, his King or his 
country. The prospect of murder creates the space of potential independence 
and is an expression of free-thinking. At the same time it is a source of great 
discomfort because Macbeth still belongs to the past. He is, as yet, not a modern 
man who “feels responsible only for what one wants and does, and finds one’s 
pride in oneself” (Nietzsche 2007b: 115). Nietzsche (2007b: 115) writes about 
such men of the past: “To be alone (allein), to experience things by oneself (ein-
zeln), to neither obey nor rule, to represent an individual (ein Individuum be-
deuten) – that was no pleasure back then, but a punishment; one was sentenced 
‘to be an individual (Individuum)’. Freedom of thought was considered ‘discom-
fort itself’.” These are the feelings stirred in Macbeth by this horrible glimpse 
into the abyss. However, this new unknown dimension of existence “beyond 
good and evil” brings a new insight into his awoken identity. The “horrid image” 
that makes his heart pound is awoken “against the use of nature” (Macbeth, 
1.3.148,150). I would argue that the word “use” is crucial as it points to the su-
  
17 I am referring here to Nietzsche’s aphorism from Beyond good and evil which, in my 
opinion, aptly captures the nature of Macbeth’s identity awakening. Nietzsche says: “Who-
ever fights with monsters should see to it that he does not become one himself. And when 
you stare for a long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you. (Nietzsche 2002: 69). 
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perficiality of the so called “natural” order of things. This contentious idea also 
slowly dawns on Macbeth. Its subversive potential stirs discomfort, but also 
fascination. Nietzsche seems to be right in his assessment of the discomfiture 
caused by the newly found singular identity as Macbeth’s heightened awareness 
of his will for the early modern standards appears to be a pathological condi-
tion. In Robert Burton’s The anatomy of melancholy (1621) “will” is described 
as inferior and secondary to reason. Yet one wills only when reason first com-
prehends and approves the object of the will. As Burton (1998: 146) explains: 
“[w]ill is the other power of the rational soul, which covets or avoids such things 
as have been before judged and apprehended by the understanding.” If this does 
not happen so, one has to do with a morbid condition. Human will and reason 
used to be in perfect union which is now disrupted and, hence, “will” or “this 
appetite is many times rebellious in us, and will not be contained within the lists 
of sobriety and temperance” (Burton 1998: 147). In his view, giving in to “head-
strong passions, violent perturbations of the mind” and numerous ailments are 
consequences of our appetite (Burton 1998: 147-148). Macbeth realizes his in-
domitable will and, in Burton’s vision, he seems to approximate a dangerous 
morbid condition. In a Nietzschean perspective, he emerges as an antecedent of 
a future man in the circumstances of the past.  
Macbeth’s will to power invites a comparison with Marlowe’s Tambur-
laine, whose relentless striving has no limits. As Foakes (1982: 7) points out, 
Shakespeare was under the influence of Marlowe, who paradoxically “had bro-
ken the moralising pattern of such stories as mirrors of magistrates by showing 
Tamburlaine striding on to even further conquests, and endowed with a mind 
aspiring to beauty and poetry as well as to power and an earthly crown”. Sha-
kespeare’s Macbeth is definitely closer to Marlowe than to his contemporary 
moralists who would condemn ambition as the arch-sin. Yet Macbeth, as Foakes 
(1982: 8) also aptly observes, approximates Dr Faustus in the creation of his 
own hell. Perversely, even in his most atrocious acts of butchery Macbeth re-
mains a philosopher of life, albeit growing gloomier and more profound. Mac-
beth, despite his intense will, differs from Tamburlaine – who may be speaking 
about beauty in astonishing verse, but would not really stop to ponder on the 
meaning and ramifications of his actions. Macbeth not only reflects, he maso-
chistically dissects his condition. However, this dissection egocentrically re-
volves around his person, rendering his moral outlook very Nietzschean. As 
Morris (1982: 32) observes: “Macbeth is moved to mediate on life and death, 
but his vision is limited to the earthly realm. The poor player, who struts and 
frets his hour upon the stage, is then ‘heard no more’.” Morris suggests that 
Macbeth is not only opposite to simple moralism but almost atheistic in its 
message. As he writes: “The point is, surely that the presentation of goodness 
and holiness in Macbeth is muted and peripheral. The tyrant is eventually 
overthrown by human powers, in hand-to-hand combat, where the presence of 
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God is neither invoked nor declared, though it may be assumed” (Morris 1982: 
33). Simultaneously, one sees that because the Absolute is pushed to the very 
margins, the centre of gravity shifts to the powerful and “wilful” protagonist. 
Once Macbeth realizes the full shape of his project of self-overcoming, he starts 
seeing Duncan’s murder as a challenge to his self-identification. I follow Foakes 
(1982: 15) in his assessment of the murder as “breaking through the sound bar-
rier for the first time.” Discomforting as it may be, the extent of one’s individual 
will, the very excitement of finding the individual self, makes the temptation 
irresistible. Foakes (1982: 17) observes that: “[…] his full sense of the terrible 
nature of the murder he is about to do also makes the over-coming of his 
scruples, of the horror he feels, of all the large part of himself that rebels against 
it, so much the greater challenge.” The challenge to the budding singular indivi-
duality has both a moral and a very personal dimension as Macbeth has to raise 
his hand to hit a “Supreme Father”.  
The fact that Duncan functions as a fatherly figure has been pointed out 
by numerous critics.18 In the play the idea seems to be confirmed by Lady Mac-
beth’s words: “Had he not resembled/ My father as he slept, I had done’t” 
(Macbeth, 2.2.16-17). However, the role of a father in the early modern circums-
tances may have indeed very little to do with affection, but rather power dynam-
ics. Lady Macbeth’s statement is tinged with apprehension as for her, like for 
Macbeth, the father-figure remains the locus of authority that curbs individual 
aspirations. The patriarchal ideal, strengthened with James’s ascension, gives 
ultimate justification for the condemnation of ambition and trampling of per-
sonal liberties. The virtues of obedience and loyalty to the King, the earthly rep-
resentative of the Divine Father, are extolled by James himself in the aforemen-
tioned The true law of free monarchies (1603). However, the ideas of the divine 
rights of Kings survive well after James’s reign. Robert Filmer’s Patriarchia, or 
the natural power of kings (1680), written already after the English Civil War 
  
18 This interpretative path is typical for psychoanalytic critics who “have emphasised 
the patricidal character of the regicide” (Hogan 1983: 385). Patrick Colm Hogan (1983: 385) 
makes a short summary of this interpretative tradition. Interestingly, for Rick Bowers Mac-
beth’s ultimate motivation is: sibling jealousy, while “[...] the idea of parricide remains 
indistinct because it is not clear even to Macbeth” (Bowers 1980: 58-59) Janet Adelman 
makes the idea of patricide a point of departure for gender analysis. She writes that: “In 
Hamlet, Shakespeare had constructed the Fall as the death of the ideal father; here, he 
constructs a revised version in which the Fall is the death of the ideally androgynous parent. 
For Duncan combines in himself the attributes of both father and mother: he is the centre 
of authority, the source of all nurturance, planting the children to his throne and making 
them grow. He is the father, an androgynous parent from whom, singly, all good can be 
imagined to flow, the source of a benign and empowering nurturance the opposite of that 
imagined in the witches’ poisonous cauldron and Lady Macbeth’s gall-filled breasts. Such a 
father does away with any need for a mother: he is the image of both parents in one, threat-
ening aspects of each controlled by the presence of the other” (Adelman 1992: 53). 
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and the Protectorate, provides the political legitimization for the restored mo-
narchy, but also proves the social vitality of the earthly “Supreme Father” idea. 
Additionally, this vitality underscores the “unnaturalness” of Macbeth’s ambi-
tions, which even eighty years later would have seemed pathological. Filmer’s 
justification of monarchical rights has, as if, an evolutionary basis and is derived 
from biblical sources – where Adam is seen as the first patriarch, ordained by 
God himself. Filmer (2013: 11) writes:  
[c]reation made man Prince of his Posterity. And indeed not only Adam, but the suc-
ceeding Patriarchs had, by Right of Father-hood, Royal Authority over their Chil-
dren. Nor dares Bellarmine deny this also. That the Patriarchs (saith he) were en-
dowed with Kingly Power, their Deeds do testify; for as Adam was Lord of his Chil-
dren, so his Children under him, had a Command and Power over their own Chil-
dren; but still with subordination to the First Parent, who is Lord-Paramout over his 
Childrens Children to all Generations, as being the Grand- Father of his People. 
It may seem that Filmer’s vision of kingship only continues the ideas already pre-
sent in James’s writings. However, Filmer writes against a slightly different back-
ground, whose roots, to my mind, one can already find in Macbeth, namely, the 
notion of personal freedom. Filmer writes of liberty that: “It is hard to say whether 
it be more erroneous in Divinity, or dangerous in Policy” (Filmer 2013: 7). At the 
same time he claims that: “the greatest Liberty in the World (if it be duly consid-
ered) is for a people to live under a Monarch” (Filmer 2013: 9). In his vision, the 
feeling of independence residing in an individual is a morally dubious and politi-
cally dangerous notion. No wonder Macbeth feels the exhilarating chill first at the 
very thought of realizing his singularity and then at the possibility of following this 
liberating impulse. Just as early modern orthodox views on ambition assume that 
ambition is solely a pursuit of status and power, Macbeth’s desires are more than 
that, since they are coupled with his fatal realization of his singularity and the 
actuality of his existence – that only get stronger and stronger as the play pro-
gresses. The sensation is new to Macbeth who up till now has always been in the 
position requiring loyalty and servitude, which at the same time have been under-
stood by him as the greatest possible honour. The act of killing Duncan is one 
thing for him but living afterwards, taking full responsibility for his new position, 
is something quite new and challenging. So Macbeth says:  
[i]f it were done when ‘tis done, then ‘twere well 
It were done quickly. If th’ assassination 
Could trammel up the consequence and catch 
With his surcease success, that but this blow 
Might be the be-all and the end-all here, 
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, 
We’d jump the life to come. (Macbeth, 1.7.1-7) 
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The position the murder would place Macbeth in, a position of a self-
determined individual, is full of uncertainty. Were it not for this anxiety of being 
oneself, of living up to one’s own vision of oneself, the challenge would be no 
challenge at all. Taking responsibility for one’s self-overcoming is equal to wel-
coming a project of perpetual uncertainty, of forever overcoming oneself. Mac-
beth himself does not fear the moral consequences of Duncan’s murder but he is 
perfectly aware that the moral right will be on Duncan’s side as he claims that: 
“[b]ut in these cases/ We still have judgment here, that we but teach/ Bloody 
instructions, which, being taught, return/ To plague th’ inventor. This even-
handed justice/ Commends th’ ingredience of our poisoned chalice/ To our own 
lips” (Macbeth, 1.7.7-12). He knows that the act can backfire not because he 
believes that a “heaven’s cherubin” will descend from above to judge him, yet he 
sees that people believe so and they will be moved by pity in case his guilt is 
known. It is interesting that pity is thus coupled with potential grievous pun-
ishment (Macbeth, 1.7.22). This Nietzschean mechanism presents pity as a per-
versely empowering feeling that assumes the right to judge and punish. Mac-
beth seems to be speaking with contempt of this popular support, which blurs 
single individuality into one blind, punishing hand. He says:  
[b]esides, this Duncan 
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been 
So clear in his great office, that his virtues 
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against 
The deep damnation of his taking-off; 
And pity, like a naked newborn babe 
Striding the blast, or heaven’s cherubin horsed 
Upon the sightless couriers of the air, 
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye, 
That tears shall drown the wind (Macbeth, 1.7.16-25).  
Duncan’s kingship is marked with “meekness” and virtue, while at the same 
time his kingdom is plunged into the chaos of rebellion. So, the effectiveness of 
his rule might very well be called into question. He seems to be a man who is 
unable to commit a violent deed, and so the safety of his realm depends on men 
like Macbeth.19 One sees that Duncan’s trustworthiness puts the realm in dan-
ger as he “built an absolute trust” on Macdonwald, who subsequently led a re-
bellion against him (Macbeth, 1.4.15-16). His further reliance on Macbeth also 
proves his lack of political instinct and complete inability to predict other peo-
  
19 By Machiavellian standards an effective prince should assert his will aggressively 
(Riebling 1991: 275). Riebling (1991: 275), following Machiavelli, observes that “[...] a prince 
cannot maintain his power by relying on the virtù of another; like the goddess, the state 
belongs to the man who wins her by force.” 
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ple’s intentions. Duncan himself admits his shortcoming when he says: 
“[t]here’s no art/ To find the mind’s construction in the face” (Macbeth, 1.4.13-
14). Barbara Riebling (1991: 276), in her brilliant analysis of Macbeth in the 
light of Machiavelli’s The prince, observes that: “[…] Duncan, however admira-
ble a man, is by Machiavellian standards a dangerous king – a ruler whose gen-
tle and trusting character has invited treason, civil war, and foreign invasion. By 
being a perfect Christian, Duncan succeeds in becoming a perfect lamb – a sac-
rificial offering on the altar of real-world politics”. By Nietzschean standards, 
Duncan embodies “mediocrity”, that characterizes “emasculated” men whose 
“failure to do evil is to be ascribed merely to [their] inability to do evil” (Kauf-
mann 1974: 224). For Nietzsche it would be rather Duncan who represents a 
morbid condition, where all instincts are silenced in favour of “morality as ti-
midity”, to use Nietzsche’s (2002: 85, 86) expression. As opposed to Duncan, 
Macbeth, who is acutely aware of his desires, represents “the healthiest of all 
tropical monsters” (Nietzsche 2002: 85). He says: “I have no spur/ To prick the 
sides of my intent, but only/ Vaulting ambition, which o’erleaps itself/ And falls 
on th’ other—” (Macbeth, 1.7.25-28). Macbeth may not be a perfect psychologist 
when he identifies the tempest of his desires as “[v]aulting ambition”, but he 
fully comprehends the intensity of his affects and a burning need to live by their 
whispers. He seems to be more apt when he announces: “Stars, hide your fires;/ 
Let not light see my black and deep desires./ The eye wink at the hand, yet let 
that be/ Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see” (Macbeth, 1.4.57-60). On 
hearing that Duncan appoints his elder son as his heir, Macbeth is more aware 
of being pushed forever to the position of dependency and under the threat of 
never being able to realize his inner call for over-coming. It is a deep desire to 
assert one’s identity, contempt of weakness and mediocrity as well as jealousy 
and, finally, ambition that are raging in Macbeth’s heart. Primordial instincts 
fuse with an intense reflection to form Macbeth’s will to power, which he him-
self globally dubs as ambition because even to him it seems a dangerous and 
morbid affliction. Macbeth, essentially more a philosopher rather than a politi-
cian, also turns out to be an ineffective monarch, but he must first open his pro-
ject of eternal self-overcoming to learn this. The impossibility of his position lies 
in the need to overcome the fatherly Duncan and the moral heritage encapsu-
lated in his kingly position. As I have argued, Macbeth’s reflection on Duncan’s 
meekness is tinged with contempt, and possibly communicates his doubt in the 
divine underpinning of the monarch’s position. It is not Duncan’s authority or 
his command of power that make his position legitimate and hence “divine”, but 
rather the social conceptualization of his role and position. These are the as-
pects Macbeth capitalizes on in his second soliloquy. These are the arguments 
that “speak” in Duncan’s favour. Macbeth weighs his arguments when he says: 
“[h]e’s here in double trust:/ First, as I am his kinsman and his subject,/ Strong 
both against the deed; then, as his host,/ Who should against his murderer shut 
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the door,/ Not bear the knife myself” (Macbeth, 1.7.12-16). The arguments re-
main in the sphere of custom and tradition. It is wrong to raise your hand on 
your guest, your kinsman and your king, especially a merciful king. Though he 
does not seem to be a successful ruler, he is loved thanks to the virtue of his 
meekness. The very same virtue that makes him a failure as a King provides a 
“divine” legitimization for his rule. In his soliloquy Macbeth unveils that he is 
painfully aware of the popular morality and its hypocritical superficiality. Like 
in the case of Caesar, popular support is on Duncan’s side. Communal pity that 
“[s]hall blow the horrid deed in every eye” is conceptualized as a “like a naked 
newborn babe”, a symbolic portrayal of helplessness, weakness, but also sup-
posedly innocence – though in his dissection of love for Duncan Macbeth effec-
tively proves that it really is a herd instinct (Macbeth, 1.7.24, 21). It is interest-
ing that when Macbeth’s resolve melts back into his previous dependency, it is 
Lady Macbeth who boosts his confidence, recalling a strikingly similar image of 
a tender love towards a baby she herself had given suck to (Macbeth, 1.7.62-63). 
With the shocking image of the babies’ dashed brains, Lady Macbeth reminds 
Macbeth of his own vision of pity stripped naked to a mere herd instinct. Jack 
D’Amico (1986: 33), in his Machiavellian analysis of the play points out the 
weaknesses of Duncan’s rule as well as Macbeth’s awareness of the social con-
struction behind supposedly “good” impulses. He aptly points out that “[i]t is 
Macbeth who sees conscience as the product of social rather than natural forces. 
The way to change human nature is to change what man controls, not the body 
but the state” (D’Amico 1986: 34). It seems that in this respect both Machiavelli 
and Nietzsche speak one voice as they believe that one should not curb one’s 
instincts but rather creatively apply them in the project of self-creation, if nec-
essary against the precepts of popular morality. As D’Amico observes, the con-
ventional notion of conscience seems to be absent in Machiavelli’s works, while 
Shakespeare has a lot to say about it in Macbeth. D’Amico (1986: 31-32) be-
lieves this, even though indistinctly one can discern a construct of political con-
science in Machiavelli. This idea supposedly overshadows Macbeth’s decisions. 
I would argue that it is, indeed, conscience that is speaking through Macbeth, 
though it is neither a moral or political conscience, so much as an intellectual 
one. Intellectual conscience, according to Nietzsche (2007b: 29-30), is some-
thing that is lacking in most people who take for granted all the values that life 
is built upon and unquestionably live by.20 Lack of Macbeth’s moral conscience, 
  
20 The call for an “intellectual conscience” seems to be a mark of free-thinkers who dare 
to question moral valuations. It is Nietzsche’s first step in his revaluation of values. In The 
gay science Nietzsche (2007b: 29-30) writes: “[e]veryone looks at you with strange eyes and 
goes on handling their scales, calling this good and that evil; nobody as much as blushes 
when you notice that their weights are underweight – nor do they become indignant with 
you; perhaps they laugh at your doubts. I mean: to the great majority it is not contemptible to 
believe this or that and to live accordingly without first becoming aware of the final and most 
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to my mind, is expressed in his stubborn attachment to his crown once he has 
attained it through criminal means. Even in the most hopeless position Macbeth 
never renounces his deeds or expresses any remorse. Being ultimately an un-
successful politician, profoundly uninterested in the fate of his country, but 
obsessively focused on himself, to my mind, Macbeth is much closer to the 
Nietzschean philosophical overhuman rather than a shrewd Machiavellian poli-
tician. This means that he is burdened with an intellectual conscience that 
makes him incessantly question his motivation, his decisions and their out-
come. However, this intense questioning has little to do with godliness or fear of 
God, but rather with the human deconstruction of moral affects and phenom-
ena. Macbeth’s “pathological” free-thinking sees through the artificiality of the 
divine rights of kings but simultaneously sees the “transcendental” influence it 
holds over its subjects. Filmer (2013: 15) writes in Patriarchia that:  
[i]n all Kingdoms or Commonwealths in the World, whether the Prince be the Su-
pream Father of the People, or but the true Heir of such a Father, or whether he 
come to the Crown by Usurpation, or by Election of the Nobles, or of the People, or 
by any other way whatsoever; or whether some Few or a Multitude Govern the 
Commonwealth: Yet still the Authority that is in any one, or in many, or in all these, 
is the only Right and natural Authority of a Supream Father. There is, and always 
shall be continued to the end of the World, a Natural Right of a Supreme Father over 
every Multitude, although by the secret Will of God, many at first do most unjustly 
obtain the Exercise of it. 
Filmer explicitly sanctifies the position and the role of a King, who remains the 
Supreme Father to the nation regardless of his origin. So strong is Filmer’s op-
position to social liberties that he even exempts a monarch who has gained the 
crown through usurpation. In this way Filmer welcomes an internal paradox 
into his vision of the divine rights of kings. On the one hand, the King’s position 
is holy and untouchable. On the other, usurpation opens the way for those who 
want to attain this state of unquestionable authority. This supposed divinity of a 
king is thus a flimsy defence against the ambition of potential usurpers. This 
viscous circle is inherent in Macbeth’s position. He sees that only in kingship 
can one fully realize one’s personal liberty, and so being a King is the only pos-
sibility to fulfil his rampant will to power. Unlike Brutus, Macbeth does not even 
bother to fashion himself as a champion for social liberties or the rights of a 
republic. He sees the crookedness of dogmas and wants to take advantage of 
them. It seems that he wants to leap to the transcendental state of reverence so 
that his will is asserted and never questioned again. Bowers (1980: 58) claims 
that “[t]o Macbeth [...] kingship represents a set of transcendental principles. 
                                                                                                                                        
certain reasons pro and con, and without even troubling themselves about such reasons 
afterwards: the most gifted men and the noblest women still belong to this ‘great majority’.” 
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The death of Duncan will be, for Macbeth, the death of doubt, the birth of a 
powerful inner peace conceived through the ultimate self-assertion”. Bowers 
(1980: 58) believes that Macbeth fetishises kingship. I believe that he is, as yet, 
not fully aware that the process of his self-overcoming has no conclusion, being 
a perpetual process of ever asserting one’s identity.  
For Macbeth, his deep intellectual conscience that forces him to ever 
question himself eventually becomes his curse, as he deeply longs for certainty 
and closure. The Nietzschean project of self-overcoming excludes such a possi-
bility. In The gay science Nietzsche (2007b: 152-153) poses a list of questions 
and answers to his fellow free-thinkers. He writes:  
[w]hat do you believe in ? – In this: that the weight of all things must be determined 
anew. […] What does your conscience say? – ‘You should become who you are. […] 
Where lie your greatest dangers? – In compassion. […] What do you love in others? 
– My hopes. […] Whom do you call bad? – He who always wants to put people to 
shame. […] What is most human to you? – To spare someone shame. […] What is the 
seal of having become free? – No longer to be ashamed before oneself.21 
The nature of Nietzsche’s questioning perfectly expresses Macbeth’s intense 
reflection, while the contents of the questions and answers reflects Macbeth’s 
dilemmas. Macbeth believes that his over-coming lies in his hands. The failure 
of his plan could be brought by the whispers of compassion or reawakening of 
his moral conscience that could bring shame. The only way to go on is to reject 
any qualms. Morris (1982: 48) writes that: “Just as the king has ‘two bodies’ so 
Macbeth has two minds: the prosaic, unpolitical military intelligence, and the 
powerful, creative visionary imagination, fuelled by guilt. In the one, he acts; in 
the other, he is tortured.” When Macbeth’s public and private selves thus strike 
in conflict, it is Lady Macbeth who rekindles Macbeth’s hushed desires because 
what Macbeth loves most about himself, following Nietzsche’s question-answer 
diagnosis, are his hopes, which only Lady Macbeth’s reflects, being gifted with 
an equally intense will to power.22 It is she who most explicitly verbalizes and 
orders the tumult of Macbeth’s desires. When Macbeth’s resolve wavers, he says 
to her: “I dare do all that may become a man./ Who dares do more is none 
(Macbeth, 1.7.51-52). To which she replies: “What beast was ‘t,/ then,/ That 
made you break this enterprise to me?/ When you durst do it, then you were a 
man;/ And to be more than what you were, you would/ Be so much more the 
man” (Macbeth, 1.7.53-58). What remains indistinct in Macbeth’s soliloquies 
becomes solidly expressed in Lady Macbeth’s insistence that Macbeth should 
become more than a man. Lady Macbeth’s challenge becomes an open invita-
  
21 These are questions and answers posed in The gay science in aphorisms: 269, 270, 
271, 272, 273, 274, 275 (Nietzsche 2007b: 152-153). 
22 For a more detailed analysis of Lady Macbeth’s overhuman potential see: Chapter 5. 
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tion to the project of self-overcoming or giving birth to Macbeth’s doing so as an 
overhuman. She angrily attacks Macbeth by referring to a beast, that incited 
him to conceive the plan of murder. However, her term of address is heavy with 
meaning. By drawing a parallel between Macbeth and a beast, Lady Macbeth 
seems to be expressing a very Nietzschean notion: in order to become an 
overman, one has to be a beast first. For Renaissance theologians such a notion 
would sound fantastical as early modern men seemed to be caught in a severe 
conflict of passions and reason (Tillyard 2011: 75-76). They would claim that a 
human being is a creature suspended in between a beast and an angel. One can 
either aim higher or degenerate into a beastly state. In order to aspire to the 
heavenly grace, one is obliged to turn one’s back on the beast that is part of 
one’s nature. As, for instance, Sir John Hayward in David’s tears, or an exposi-
tion of the penitential psalms (1622) writes:  
[c]ertainly, of all the creatures under heaven which have received being from God, 
none degenerate, none forsake their natural dignity and being, but only man. Only 
man, abandoning the dignity of his proper nature, is changed like Proteus into divers 
forms. And this is occasioned by the liberty of his will. And as every kind of beast is 
principally inclined to one sensuality more than to another, so man transformeth 
himself into that beast to whose sensuality he principally declines. Thus did the an-
cient wise men shadow forth by their fables of certain persons changed into such 
beasts whose cruelty or sottery or other brutish nature they did express. (Hayward as 
quoted in: Tillyard 2011: 74)  
So in Hayward’s account of human nature “the liberty of [man’s] will”, like in 
Filmer’s Patriachia, is also a subversive quality. To the freedom of will Hayward 
attributes man’s degeneration. Lady Macbeth seems to be aware of the complex 
nature of man’s condition. She acknowledges Macbeth’s beastly side, but she 
tries to persuade him that, as part of his nature, it is necessary to utilize its po-
tential. A parallel with Nietzsche’s “beasts of prey and men of prey” is yet again 
hard to avoid (Nietzsche 2002: 84). For Nietzsche (2002: 84-85), men who 
embrace their beastly instincts are real pictures of health. Those who see essen-
tial evil in them seem to misunderstand human nature, which thrives on in-
stincts or affects. Lady Macbeth succeeds to persuade Macbeth using this veiled 
Nietzschean argument because once he makes a final decision to carry out the 
assassination he is “settled” and will “bend up” (Macbeth, 1.7.92). Having de-
cided, he is, like Brutus, determined and consistent. When asked by Banquo 
about the witches’ prophecy, he does not lie when he says: “I think not of/ 
them”, because from now on he is no longer dependent on anyone else than 
himself and he knows that his fate is in his own hands (Macbeth, 2.1.27-28). In 
his next soliloquy his whole being is so intensified that the plains of fantasy and 
reality blur. It is “[a] dagger of the mind” that leads him to Duncan’s chamber 
(Macbeth, 2.1.50). The deed is not yet performed but Macbeth is so determined 
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that in his head, in his “heat-oppressèd brain”, he is already past the challenge 
(Macbeth, 2.1.51). The murder had to take place in his head first in order to be 
materialized. That is why he can say: “I go, and it is done” (Macbeth, 2.1.75). 
Once it was decided, it was already done for Macbeth – the very act of killing 
seemed a mere formality.  
Macbeth desperately sought self-assertion and believed that Duncan’s 
murder would be a gate to realize his will to power. Yet already minutes after 
the murder it starts to dawn on him that the murder was no rite of passage. In a 
highly symbolical moment of recognition Macbeth utters the most surprising 
words: “I could not say ‘Amen’” (Macbeth, 2.2.39). It seems perversely ironic 
that he wanted to conclude the act of murder with a holy word that otherwise 
closes prayer. Shaken and disbelieving, Macbeth asks Lady Macbeth: “But whe-
refore could not I pronounce “Amen”?/ I had most need of blessing, and 
“Amen”/ Stuck in my throat” (Macbeth, 2.2.42-44). The unutterable word 
“Amen”, meaning “so be it!”, would indeed signify closure and the fulfilment of 
a challenge, while in reality Macbeth opened the way for a permanent action 
where one challenge will follow another. Macbeth has not become an overman, 
but only begun the process of becoming one. He has not fully grasped his posi-
tion when he says: “Methought I heard a voice cry “Sleep no more!/ Macbeth 
does murder sleep” (Macbeth, 2.2.47-48). The imperative “Sleep no more” be-
comes Macbeth’s curse, his own eternal return to the horrible. The moment 
strikingly parallels Zarathustra’s recognition when he himself sees the unavaila-
bility of every moment inexorably and eternally repeating. One day he wakes up 
and exclaims:  
[u]p, abysmal thought, out of my depths! […] Here there is thunder enough to make 
even graves learn to listen! And wipe the sleep and all that befogs and blinds you 
from your eyes! Hear me with your eyes too: my voice is a remedy even for those 
born blind. And once you are awake, you shall remain awake eternally. […] Zarathus-
tra summons you, the godless one! I, Zarathustra, the advocate of life, the advocate 
of suffering, the advocate of the circle – you I summon, my most abysmal thought! 
Hail to me! You are coming – I hear you! My abyss speaks, I have unfolded my ulti-
mate depth to the light! Hail to me! Here now! Give me your hand – ha! Let go! 
Haha! – Nausea, nausea, nausea – oh no” (Nietzsche 2006b: 173-174).  
For Zarathustra, as for Macbeth, the moment is as liberating as it is nauseating 
and threatening it can possibly be. Sleep may appear as well a deserved rest or a 
symbolic expression of inaction and passivity. Macbeth chose a path that re-
quires constant vigilance and ever-lasting testing. He shrinks from the thought, 
and that is why he refuses to go back to Duncan’s chamber to leave the daggers 
there. He hopelessly confesses: “I’ll go no more./ I am afraid to think what I 
have done. Look on ‘t again I dare not” (Macbeth, 2.2.65-67). He is unwilling to 
relive his deed though he already instinctively knows he will literally and meta-
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phorically repeat the murder eternally. At the same time, the intensity of his 
senses is so heightened that he attains a higher level of feeling as he says: “How 
is ‘t with me when every noise appals me?” (Macbeth, 2.2.76). This increased 
vigilance can be contrasted with one of the final scenes when Macbeth says 
something radically opposite:  
I have almost forgot the taste of fears. 
The time has been my senses would have cooled 
To hear a night-shriek, and my fell of hair 
Would at a dismal treatise rouse and stir 
As life were in ‘t. I have supped full with horrors. 
Direness, familiar to my slaughterous thoughts, 
Cannot once start me. (Macbeth, 5.5.11-17)  
From the moment of murder onwards Macbeth oscillates in between extreme 
emotions from wild bravado through resignation and despair to regained energy 
and motivation. In his fluctuation of moods Macbeth turns out to be painfully 
human as he himself constantly questions his overhuman potential and his 
suitability for the course of action he himself chose. In response to a demon who 
whispers to one’s ear the suggestion of eternal return, Nietzsche prophesies a 
similar reaction of despair or liberated rejoicing.23 Macbeth seems to go through 
both of these emotions alternating in the course of the remaining action. 
In the aftermath of the murder, though initially thrown off-balance, 
Macbeth comes to terms with his new position of ever answering to new chal-
lenges. He announces that: “[t]o be thus is nothing,/ But to be safely thus” 
(Macbeth, 3.1.52). With this in mind, he plans the murder of Banquo and 
Fleance, as well as Macduff and his entire household. The execution of the first 
murder also marks the beginning of the end in intimacy between Macbeth and 
  
23 Nietzsche (2007b: 194-195) introduces the notion of the eternal return in the form of 
a parable in The gay science (aphorism number 341): “The heaviest weight. – What if some 
day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ‘This life as 
you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times 
again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought 
and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the 
same succession and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and 
even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and 
again, and you with it, speck of dust!’  Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your 
teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would have answered him: ‘You are a god, and never have I heard any-
thing more divine.’  If this thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform 
and possibly crush you; the question in each and every thing, ‘Do you want this again and 
innumerable times again?’ would lie on your actions as the heaviest weight! Or how well 
disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fer-
vently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” 
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Lady Macbeth, without whom the murder might have not taken place at all. 
Being an overpowering influence on Macbeth and a great aid to him in crisis 
situations, it seems unjustified that she is gradually pushed away and excluded 
from his further plans. If one is to see Macbeth as a Nietzschean figure, his 
movement in the direction of further exclusion and solitude should not come as 
a great surprise. Having overcome the influence of Duncan, Macbeth seeks to 
free himself from Lady Macbeth, whose control over the murder plot was in-
deed substantial. He wants to prove to himself as well as her that he can meet 
further challenges on his own without her help. His self-overcoming involves 
the overcoming of powerful influences. As Fredrick Appel (1991: 82, 81) aptly 
puts it, Nietzsche professed “noble self-sufficiency” in his “repeated praise of the 
therapeutic effects of solitude and his insistence on intensely personal, inimita-
ble paths to ethical-spiritual development.” In search of solitude, Macbeth 
withdraws from any company when he announces that “To make society/ The 
sweeter welcome, we will keep ourself/ Till suppertime alone” (Macbeth, 3.1.45-
47). It seems to be self-sufficiency that Macbeth wishes to attain, though it is 
disputable whether it is indeed noble, or quite the opposite, especially that he is 
more and more unable to welcome his society sweetly. He appears to develop 
more and more contempt towards humanity in general. Macbeth gives vent to it 
in his conversation with the three murderers hired to assassinate Banquo and 
his son. In his speech Macbeth compares different types of men to breeds of 
dogs. By choosing such a measurement scale he seems to be articulating his 
bitterly ironical assessment of mankind:  
[a]y, in the catalogue you go for men, 
As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, 
curs, 
Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves are clept 
All by the name of dogs. The valued file 
Distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle, 
The housekeeper, the hunter, every one 
According to the gift which bounteous nature 
Hath in him closed; whereby he does receive 
Particular addition, from the bill 
That writes them all alike. And so of men. (Macbeth, 3.1.103-113)  
One could argue that Macbeth’s speech expresses his own sense of superiority 
over the seemingly primitive cut-throats, though as it seems, his words are to 
summarize people’s qualities in general. It is also possible to assume that Mac-
beth is expressing a Renaissance social sentiment that would take hierarchy and 
rank for granted. Yet there seems to be a deeper, Nietzschean contempt for 
communal existence inherent in Macbeth’s words. As Appel (1991: 82) explains, 
for Nietzsche “[t]he dependent type of person cannot bear the thought of exis-
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tence without the warmth generated by close proximity to other herd animals.” 
In the light of Macbeth’s recognition of his constant overcoming, he appears to 
look down on any forms of such “warmth”, while his exclusion of Lady Macbeth 
from his circle of trust is dictated by his deep need to prove himself. Finally, 
what also emerges as crucial is Macbeth’s own anguish at a prospect of not be-
ing able live up to his own vision of himself. Macbeth wonders whether he really 
is a pedigree hound or a mere mongrel.  
As I would like to argue, this conflict between the overhuman vision 
Macbeth holds of himself and his doubt about his suitability for it lie at the very 
basis of his final fall. Macbeth conceived his fantasy of self-birth.24 Yet, his 
project of actively living up to it, in a perpetual vicious circle of eternal return, 
turns out to be greater than himself. Fatally for Macbeth he falls back into the 
dependency he tried to over-come in the first place. He clings to his fantasy, 
simultaneously abstaining from his further self-overcoming. The first signal for 
his great crisis of faith in himself comes with his panic attack during the ban-
quet. With the appearance of Banquo’s ghost he exclaims:  
[b]lood hath been shed ere now, i’ th’ olden time, 
Ere humane statute purged the gentle weal; 
Ay, and since too, murders have been performed 
Too terrible for the ear. The time has been 
That, when the brains were out, the man would die, 
And there an end. But now they rise again” (Macbeth, 3.4.91-96).  
In his words Macbeth’s previous atheistic resolve disintegrates and he yields to 
the metaphysical forces he so far saw as no impediment in his bloody business. 
Now, as it seems, Macbeth starts believing that it is not enough to behead a man 
to get rid of himself, as dead bodies come back to plague him. In a highly anti-
metaphysical Nietzschean discussion of overhuman potential, the presence of 
otherworldly creatures like ghosts or the witches, as well as their power and 
influence over the events in the play, might seem a little problematic. However, 
to my mind, it seems off-topic to ponder upon their nature. It is of little conse-
quence whether one sees them as expressions of the early modern belief in oth-
erworldly apparitions or simply Macbeth’s psychological projections as some 
modern critics have suggested. What is more crucial is the fact that Macbeth’s 
  
24 Both on the level of terminology as well as content I am very much indebted to Janet 
Adelman’s article entitled “‘Born of woman’: Fantasies of maternal power in Macbeth”, in: 
Alan Sinfield (ed.) New Casebooks – Macbeth. Houndmills: Macmillan, 53-68. Adelman 
suggests that Macbeth is structurally based on the fantasy of self-birth, which is equal to the 
radical exclusion of the female from the play. I personally believe that Adelman’s vision of 
the play parallels the Nietzschean idea of self-birth, though Nietzsche himself often strongly 
capitalizes on the maternal influence. I will come back to the issue of self-birth when I dis-
cuss Lady Macbeth as well as Lear’s daughters in Chapter 5. 
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growing dependence on them manifests his wavering belief in his power to con-
trol his process of self-overcoming. Whether the returning dead bodies are 
really ghosts or metaphorical figures of speech signifying political consequences 
of Macbeth’s actions seems unimportant. The fact is that with Macbeth’s crisis 
after Banquo’s murder, he decides to go back to the witches to demand the dis-
closure of his fate. Thus, Macbeth who so far relied on his own initiative pushes 
his desperately-won independence back into the hands of forces that lie outside 
himself. His command to butcher Macduff’s entire household seems to be his 
last independent action, though it turns out to be futile and politically unrea-
sonable. From this moment onwards he starts relying on the prophecy, waiting 
passively for it to come true, whereas previously he actively tried to transform 
its decrees. His withdrawal into passivity makes him surrender to the bondage 
of the metaphysics he had first rejected. His situation emerges particularly pre-
carious as the play, toying with the notion of eternal return, offers a powerful 
alternative to Macbeth’s overhuman potential in the figure of Malcolm. Riebling 
(1991: 279) believes Malcolm to be a perfectly Machiavellian character. She 
claims that:  
[a]t the beginning of the play, Duncan ‘rules’ by the rules; later his son will ‘rule’ by 
breaking them. These opposing images of the good king frame the portrait of Mac-
beth and his criminal regime, and it is Malcolm’s politic practice that emerges as the 
normative standard against which both Duncan and Macbeth are measures. (Rie-
bling 1991: 274-275)  
In his conversation with Macduff, Malcolm indeed presents political dexterity 
and Machiavellian slyness. He expresses a typically Machiavellian notion of the 
two-faced nature of political activity when he says that: “Angels are bright still, 
though the brightest fell./ Though all things foul would wear the brows of/ 
grace,/ Yet grace must still look so” (Macbeth, 4.3.27-30). Though treading 
cautiously in order to check Macduff’s intentions, he expresses a surprising 
thought by admitting to his profound hunger for power: “It is myself I mean, in 
whom I know/ All the particulars of vice so grafted/ That, when they shall be 
opened, black Macbeth/ Will seem as pure as snow, and the poor state/ Esteem 
him as a lamb, being compared/ With my confineless harms” (Macbeth, 4.3.61-
66). What Malcolm seems to be saying is that, in comparison to the blackness of 
his own soul, Macbeth will seem a petty offender. What is more, he confesses 
his limitless lust: “[b]ut there’s no bottom, none,/ In my voluptuousness” (Mac-
beth, 4.3.73-74). I would argue that Malcolm’s admittance serves to illustrate 
that the will to power is not an exclusive instinct, but rather a universal mecha-
nism. It seems that all people share degrees of the will to power, though their 
overhuman potential is a question of their readiness to utilize their instincts in 
the pursuit of their growth in power. Malcolm, as mentioned, is equipped with 
an immense potential that emerges as particularly menacing in the light of 
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Macbeth’s state of resignation. When Macbeth says: “[b]ring me no more re-
ports. Let them fly all”, he seems to be giving himself up to fate (Macbeth, 
5.3.1). He later admits that he no longer feels fear. On the surface, one could 
read this as a sign of his courage, but Macbeth discovers that he actually feels 
nothing and he longs for the past when the intensity of his feeling was such that 
he felt it pounding in his breast. Nietzsche frequently underscores in his writ-
ings that it is better for a man to feel supposedly evil affects rather than feel 
nothing, as that is equal to emasculation (Kaufmann 1974: 224). For Macbeth, 
the lack of such a basic instinct as fear means the death of all his intense pas-
sions. Macbeth’s emotional desert may be starkly contrasted with Malcolm’s 
attitude, seething in lust and hunger. On a more global level, one could risk a 
statement that the tragedy illustrates the eternal return in operation. The circu-
lation of energy and power drives the play as this power moves from the indi-
vidual to the individual, depending on their skill and resolve. Life energy bursts 
out now in Malcolm, but one could conjecture that this will change with time 
and also bring desolation, marking the eternal return of all things. 
As mentioned, the perspective of the eternal return is understandably 
threatening and nauseating for anyone who realizes it. However, despite the 
dread stirred in anyone who faces the notion, Nietzsche proscribes a renewed 
fight with circumstances in the process of self-overcoming. In Macbeth the re-
solve weavers and disintegrates. His resignation seems to be culminated in his 
famous speech delivered in the light of the news on Lady Macbeth’s death. Mac-
beth says:  
[s]he should have died hereafter. 
There would have been a time for such a word. 
Tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
To the last syllable of recorded time, 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing. (Macbeth, 5.5.20-31)  
Here is Macbeth’s most nihilistic face. There seems no life energy, no will to power 
or any will at all left in this man, only bottomless existential despair. Unlike 
Brutus or Edmund, in the face of his death Macbeth seems to be burning in an-
guish rather than manifesting a Nietzschean love of life energy. Indeed, this final 
soliloquy might persuade one to believe so – were these the final words uttered by 
Macbeth. However, eventually Macbeth refuses to succumb to despair and, in his 
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final moments, tries to take his fate yet again into his own hands. I would argue 
that his statement of amor fati is even stronger than Brutus’s. After all, Macbeth 
announces: “[w]hy should I play the Roman fool and die/ On mine own sword? 
Whiles I see lives, the gashes/ Do better upon them” (Macbeth, 5.8.1-3). Macbeth 
is saying that as long as the last breath lingers in his breast, he is ready to oppose 
the fate to which he only seems to have succumbed. The last of what one sees of 
Macbeth are the glimpses of his old energy and will to power, while his very last 
words are: “I will not yield” (Macbeth, 5.8.32). So maybe life in itself is indeed “a 
tale/ Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/ Signifying nothing”, but that still is 
no reason to discard it (Macbeth, 5.5.29-31). Life, in Nietzschean terms, is a sum 
of what one makes of it, while the tragedy of Macbeth is a story of a man who tries 
to create himself. Life energy roars in his veins and to life energy Macbeth is ulti-
mately committed.  
At the conclusion of the analysis of Macbeth’s overhuman potential, it 
seems interesting to come back to Nietzsche’s own assertion about the character 
of the Scottish King. Nietzsche believed that Macbeth, like anyone “possessed by 
ambition”, revelled in his passion (Nietzsche 2006a: 141). As I have been trying 
to demonstrate, Macbeth’s passions are really fuelled by his sceptical and highly 
reflective nature. Next to Hamlet, he seems to be the most philosophical of Sha-
kespearean tragic heroes. To such figures Nietzsche dedicates the preface to The 
gay science and writes: 
[w]e philosophers are not free to separate soul from body as the common people do; 
we are even less free to separate soul from spirit. We are no thinking frogs, no objec-
tifying and registering devices with frozen innards – we must constantly give birth to 
our thoughts out of our pain and maternally endow them with all that we have of 
blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and disaster. Life – to 
us, that means constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame, and also 
all that wounds us; we simply can do no other. […] Only great pain is the liberator of 
the spirit […] Only great pain, that long, slow pain that takes its time and in which 
we are burned, as it were, over green wood, forces us philosophers to descend into 
our ultimate depths and put aside all trust, everything good-natured, veiling, mild, 
average – things in which formerly we may have found our humanity. I doubt that 
such pain makes us ‘better’ – but I know that it makes us deeper.[...] one emerges 
from such dangerous exercises in self-mastery as a different person, with a few more 
question marks, above all with the will henceforth to question further, more deeply, 
severely, harshly, evilly, and quietly than one had previously questioned. The trust in 
life is gone: life itself has become a problem. Yet one should not jump to the conclu-
sion that this necessarily makes one sullen. Even love of life is still possible – only 
one loves differently. (Nietzsche 2007b: 6-7) 
This lengthy exposition seems to be a perfect summary for a Nietzschean analy-
sis of Macbeth. The Scottish King, as presented, conceives his self-birth and 
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welcomes the challenge accompanying its fulfillment. On the way, in the course 
of his constant questioning, he realizes the process requires meeting challenge 
perpetually. The thought nauseates and threatens to engulf him. Yet even with 
his trust in life diminished, he eventually emerges as a life-affirmer. Morally, all 
Macbeth’s decisions are dubious or for some even worth condemning so it is 
hard to believe that Macbeth grows “better” in the course of the play, but it is 
unquestionable that he eventually is more profound. A similar mechanism takes 
place in the case of Edmund from King Lear, the last character under scrutiny.  
4.3. Edmund (King Lear) 
4.3.1. Critical responses to Edmund and interpretative paths 
On the one hand, Edmund, the bastard son of Gloucester – textually a relatively 
minor character in the tragedy of King Lear – perfectly fits the tradition of the 
Renaissance over-reachers. He is gifted with the energetic rhetorical flamboy-
ance characteristic of such over-reachers like Tamburlaine. His self-confident 
commitment to the powers of nature, his taste for subversion and unlimited 
vision expanding along with emergent opportunities make him an appropriate 
candidate for a Nietzschean overman. As opposed to his grim and far gloomier 
brother Edgar, he frequently acts as a voice of unrestrained life-energy. Just as 
Edgar might possibly be read as an existentialist – commenting on the contin-
gency of human existence in King Lear, Edmund seems to be more of a life phi-
losopher, like Brutus and Macbeth, also embracing the Nietzschean amor fati. 
On the other hand, Edmund’s callous indifference to the suffering of his fellow 
creatures and his gradual submerging into isolation make him a life force more 
to be dreaded than admired. Edmund’s problematic overhuman potential stems 
from his, traditionally highlighted by critics, supposed villainy as well as his 
minor position in Shakespeare’s text. When faced with the “noble Brutus”, 
whose moral integrity and republican cause has been frequently extolled by 
critics, Edmund may indeed seem a downright petty villain. Also, his presence 
in the text where the multiplicity of other themes and imposing figures steals 
the attention of the reader or spectator cannot be compared to that of e.g. Mac-
beth, who is the protagonist and the tragic hero. Edmund’s textual contribution 
to the tragedy of King Lear may seem insignificant when one compares him to 
the Marlovian mighty figures of Tamburlaine or Barabas who dominate the 
plays both text-wise and plot-and action-wise. Yet it is undeniable that he is the 
driving force in the sub-plot and he emerges as the prime force in the self-
destructive love triangle with the elder sisters – Goneril and Regan. If one were 
to moralize the message of the play taking into account the orthodox Elizabe-
than views on ambition, one would be bound to observe that Edmund’s exces-
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sive ambition is ultimately punished just as Goneril’s and Regan’s lust is. Critics 
have long acknowledged Edmund’s significant role in the play against his rela-
tive insignificance in the text. However, he has been traditionally labelled as a 
villainous character, even if somewhat interesting due to his exuberant indi-
vidualism. It is his supposed “delay” in exposing the information concerning 
Cordelia’s and Lear’s whereabouts in the last scene of the play (which eventually 
brings about the deaths of the key characters) that seems to have fuelled the 
critics’ imagination most frequently, especially in the context of Edmund’s vil-
lainy. It appears that in criticism Edmund combines the two important tradi-
tions that read him as a signpost of either medieval Vice, pointing to the inher-
ently Christian nature of the play, or newly emerged Renaissance individualism, 
acknowledging Edmund’s free-spiritedness.25 It seems worth recalling some of 
these interpretative directions before plunging into the Nietzschean reading of 
Edmund, the bastard.  
When flattened to a mere elaboration on the medieval allegorical cha-
racter of Vice from morality plays, Edmund may be very well called “a shallow 
opportunist” (McNeir 1968: 215). Though Waldo McNeir (1968: 214) never 
mentions the character of Vice, he insists on reading Edmund through the 
Christian pattern of redemption when he speaks of Edmund’s “sequential work-
ings of repentance, slow and laborious, in a mind inadequate to the effort de-
manded of it.” MacNeir seems to relegate Edmund to the canon of hellish and 
inherently evil characters for whom there is no hope, and who ultimately prove 
themselves worthless. As he claims, rather unjustly and with no recourse to 
textual evidence, Edmund “lacks Aaron’s bravura, Tybalt’s fire, Cluadius’s effi-
ciency, Iago’s ingenuity, Octavius Caesar’s cold calculation, and Aufidious’s 
admiration of what he hates” (McNeir 1968: 215). I would argue for the oppo-
site, however, as Edmund possesses all these qualities and even more, which is 
the topic of the present analysis. In Edmund’s hesitance to reveal his orders 
concerning Lear’s and Cordelia’s fate, McNeir sees the slowness of mind charac-
teristic of the inherently evil, and obstinate to the workings of Godly grace. As 
McNeir (1968: 208) writes: “Edmund’s mind labors and stirs against the inertia 
of its own immorality. It has stirred three times, moved by feelings associated 
  
25 For an interesting reading of Edmund as Vice see: Findlay, Alison. Illegitimate 
power: bastards in Renaissance drama. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Findlay is interested in Edmund’s bastardy as a prime motivation for his behaviour, but she 
senses the complexity of his character when she poses a crucial question: “Is Edmund in-
herently wicked because of his base birth or is he only playing the part of Vice? The text 
remains tantalisingly ambiguous” (Findlay 1994: 72). Interestingly, Findlay interprets the 
inherent “wickedness” of other Renaissance bastards in the context of the Vice tradition on 
stage. “The majority of adult bastards are villains. Sometimes they are part of a demonic 
environment, related to witches or devils or to the Vice of the morality tradition” (Findlay 
1994: 39-40). 
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with true repentance – confession, contrition, and compassion; but each time 
the effort has been followed by a pause.” The author tries to prove that Edmund 
fails due to “moral weakness” (McNeir 1986: 215-216). Yet to my mind, such a 
hasty condemnation seems to be an all-too human judgement. It is unquestion-
able that the character of Edmund has long baffled and puzzled the critics. A 
lengthy analysis which culminates in the pronouncement of the inherent evil 
encapsulated in Edmund seems to be not only overly simplistic, but also inex-
haustible. I would argue that it leaves us with more loose ends than tangible 
answers, including the very fundamental ones concerning human nature. If 
Edmund is inherently evil, why is it so and why is he so resistant to grace? If he 
is irrevocably depraved, does it mean that Cordelia is inherently good, pure and 
innocent? What is the source of evil and what of goodness then? Finally, we are 
tempted to ask whether the boundaries between good and evil can be so clearly 
drawn, especially in the context of the notion of a very doubtful poetic justice in 
King Lear? Fundamentally these questions are theological dilemmas encapsu-
lated in the play. Forcing both Edmund and the whole play into a narrowly de-
fined Christian pattern of redemption cancels the validity of the discussion. 
McNeir’s (1968: 191) article also seems to capitalize on a very orthodox associa-
tion of atheism and free thinking with moral degeneration. “Edmund’s ethic of 
the survival of the fittest” is supposed to be a sign of moral depravity. Such a 
view may be in accordance with the Elizabethan popular perception of atheism, 
but it does not seem to be a serious and objective premise for the entire analy-
sis, especially taking into account the reality of Elizabethan and Jacobean politi-
cal life.26 Neither is the claim of Edmund’s opportunism convincing as it is evi-
dent in the text that Edmund creates opportunities for himself and is entirely a 
self-made man. It is interesting that McNeir (1968: 189) calls Edmund “a prime 
mover” in the play at the same time accusing him of swimming with the flow. 
For these reasons, I believe that the pronouncement of Edmund as a chief sin-
ner, along with the evil sisters, kills the psychological and interpretative poten-
tial of the whole play. After all, the tragedy of King Lear is a monument to the 
complexity of human nature, where Lear is initially an utterly contemptible 
figure while Gloucester a gullible and ignorant opportunist. They both undergo 
a radical transformation from blindness to insight and it is undoubtable that 
Edmund has indeed a crucial role in this change, even if he is one of the prime 
sources of the “purifying” suffering.  
Naturally, a Christian reading of the character of Edmund goes beyond 
enclosing him within the pattern of the allegory of Vice. Some critics acknowl-
  
26 The character of Edmund may indeed be read as a portrayal of a contemporary 
Elizabethan ‘atheist’ in the vein of the Marlovian Machiavel from The Jew of Malta, but 
McNeir does not acknowledge such an interpretative direction. He rather takes Edmund’s 
“moral depravity” for granted. 
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edge Edmund’s villainy, yet they are more generous in granting him redemp-
tion. In his close reading of the last scene, Richard Matthews (1975: 25) insists 
that “Edmund’s delayed conversion” received too little “critical attention” as it is 
one of many mysterious or unexplained events in a highly “puzzling play”. In his 
vision, the last scene also presents the pattern of Christian redemption, but here 
it is brought to a success as: “At last, the bastard acts to save the lives of others. 
In his instructions, Edmund attempts to work the same miraculous change on 
nature and inanimate objects that love worked on him; he tries to convert the 
instruments of evil into the instruments of good” (Matthews 1975: 27). Mat-
thews (1975: 29) believes that Edmund reaches “Atonement and Redemption by 
a Mediator”, which means that his soul is saved through the sacrifice of Cordelia 
and Lear. I personally feel that just as Edmund’s presumed change of heart dic-
tated by the saving grace of love is an example of interpretative sentimentality, 
it also does not seem plausible to believe that the desire both sisters shared for 
Edmund had much to do with Christian love as much as it does not seem likely 
that Edmund loved them. To my mind, it is sheer naiveté to attribute such sen-
timentality to Edmund, who is otherwise so calculating and coldly reasonable. 
In the context of Cordelia’s brutal death Matthews (1975: 27) posits a crucial 
question: “May the good die foully?”, which he reverses in the context of Ed-
mund’s final scene: “May the foul die well?”. If one were to look at the way Ed-
mund dies through the lenses of the Christian pattern of redemption, it almost 
turns into a portrayal of medieval ars moriandi. However, it is crucial to bear in 
mind that it is a thoroughly un-Christian man that is dying. As I will be arguing, 
Edmund is far closer to a downright encapsulation of a Nietzchean Antichrist, 
dying in the spirit of Nietzsche’s amor fati, rather than a converted Christian. 
Following on the idea of the love that supposedly permeates the texture of King 
Lear I would like to refer to one more article about Edmund where the idea is 
carried even further, as Edmund’s villainy is explained through “love’s failure” 
(Summers 1977: 225). Claude J. Summers (1977: 225-228) acknowledges Sha-
kespeare’s indebtedness to the traditions of “the familiar stage-Machiavel and 
the Vice figure from medieval drama”, but she also capitalizes on Edmund’s 
psychological make-up in which lack of love is of a profound impact. Next to the 
appreciation of “his intelligence, his daring and his individuality” Summers 
(1977: 225) points to “a significant relationship between villainy and victimiza-
tion”. She is also probably the first critic to point out Edmund’s illegitimacy as a 
highly significant aspect in the formation of his character and motivation. 
Though I see Summers’ insistence on the lack of love as slightly sentimental, I 
follow in her footsteps concerning bastardy as the key to learning more about 
Edmund’s over-reaching tendencies. Hopefully, it is also clear by now that I find 
the traditional ways of reading Edmund insufficient. Neither the condemnation 
of Edmund as a blatant villain, nor an attempt at his conversion and salvation, 
seem to be exhaustive as they do not account for the appeal Edmund often holds 
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for the critics and the audiences. As G. Wilson Knight (1964: 125) writes in his 
classic article on King Lear entitled “King Lear and the comedy of grotesque” 
Edmund is the “wittiest and most attractive of villains”. There is much to 
Knight’s observation, as Shakespeare had an incredible ability to make his vil-
lains morally dubious but also irresistibly appealing rather than “didactically” 
off-putting. This turns out to be true e.g. for Iago, as well as Edmund. This ap-
peal, as I would argue, is hardly due to Edmund’s crypto-Christian stance but 
rather his energetic revelling in his immorality, his wit and calculating reason. 
Though the depth of Shakespeare’s tragedy admits multiple interpretative direc-
tions, it is painstakingly difficult to see King Lear through the lens of Christian 
hope and mercy. I strongly believe that the aforementioned Christian readings 
of Edmund are not only counter-intuitive, but really missing the point. The 
Christian perspective on King Lear seems to be a desperate attempt at an allev-
iation of the terrible message of the play culminating in despair and anguish. 
Kaufmann, who would like to see Shakespeare as a precursor of existentialism, 
writes of Shakespeare that:  
suffering and despair were to his mind not revelations of the worthlessness of this 
world but experiences that, if intense enough, were preferable to a more mediocre 
state. ‘Ripeness is all’, not faith, hope, even charity, but that maturity of which love, 
disillusionment, and knowledge born of suffering are a few important facets. (Kauf-
mann 1980: 4-5)  
It is in Edmund that these intense emotions, that Kaufmann points to, find their 
vent. In the midst of raging suffering, one finds a character who lives by life-
affirmative impulses – beyond mere mediocrity. In his own twisted way Ed-
mund brings in this life affirmative power to the play – besides him there is no 
one and nothing – only gloomy existentialist despair.  
4.3.2. “Thou, Nature, art my goddess. To thy law / My services 
are bound” – Edmund (Lear, 1.2.1-2)  
In the light of the existentialist contingency in King Lear Edmund just like 
Tamburlaine, Barabas or Macbeth, calls for a different moral outlook. As he is 
also a subversive force bringing down the stale existing order, it seems evident 
that he lives by a different morality – like a Nietzschean overman. Thus, in or-
der to bring new insight to the reading of Edmund, one requires a revaluation of 
the traditionally-conceived valuations, at the same time plunging Edmund into 
the discussion of Renaissance subjectivity. As Robert J. Bauer (1968: 359) 
writes: “Edmund in his speeches and behavior exemplifies Renaissance indi-
vidualism par excellence and that nature to him means a life force that thrives 
so long as he strives.” Bauer is definitely right when he highlights Edmund’s 
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individualism, as he is indeed exceptionally strong-willed. The distance he 
keeps from the rest of the characters as well as the subversive nature of his en-
terprise encapsulate Edmund’s singularity. The sense of his interiority and in-
tense self-examination is evident in his famous speeches. One can see this in the 
concentration of the pronoun “I” which, as it seems, Edmund uses quite fre-
quently when discussing his situation but also for commenting on the external 
events. He memorably exclaims: “I grow, I prosper” (Lear, 1.2.21). Edmund 
makes himself a point of reference on top of all the others e.g. when he com-
ments on Gloucester’s gloomy observations on “these late eclipses in the sun 
and moon” (Lear, 1.2.103). Gloucester remains a detached observer of the 
gloomy reality when he observes that: “Love cools, friendship falls off, brothers 
divide: in cities mutinies; in countries, discord; in palaces treason; and the bond 
cracked ‘twixt son and father” (Lear, 1.2.106-109). It is of course brutal irony on 
the part of Shakespeare that Gloucester is blind to the dawning problems in his 
own household; however, the contrast between his passive observance and Ed-
mund’s active self-referencing is noticeably striking. When alone, Edmund 
chaffs at Gloucester’s anxieties while focusing his entire energy on himself. He 
claims: “Fut! I should have been that I am had/ the maidenliest star in the fir-
mament twinkled on my bastardizing” (Lear, 1.2.131-133). For Edmund the 
macrocosm, that Gloucester marvels at and fears, shrinks and folds into the 
microcosm of his own individuality. The nihilistic crisis Gloucester repines at is 
for Edmund “the excellent foppery of the world” and “an admirable evasion of 
the whoremaster man” who can “lay his goatish disposition on the charge of a 
star” (Lear, 1.2.118, 126-128). If it is not the star that can be blamed for his dis-
position, it is his own choice that makes him what he is. Edmund’s rejection of 
the “spherical predominance” is at the same time an act of self-definition or 
self-creation in the vein of Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo. Edmund’s emphasis on the 
self-creating power of choice and decision when he says: “I should have been 
that I am” is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s question in the sub-title to Ecce Homo: 
“Wie man wird, was man ist”. Nietzsche’s (2007b: 152) appeal to “become what 
you are” (“Du sollst der werden, der du bist”), taken from the poet Pindar, first 
appears in The gay science and is of great bearing on the Nietzschean philoso-
phy of subjectivity.27 Alexander Nehamas (1983: 385) claims that it is the 
“most haunting of Nietzsche’s haunting aphorisms”. Babette E. Babich (2003: 
29) calls it “dissonant and yet intrinsically inspiring”. Indeed, it is both haunt-
ing and inspiring as it encapsulates the Nietzschean insistence on the signifi-
  
27 The whole aphorism is a two-liner: “What does your conscience say? – ‘You should 
become what you are’” (Nietzsche 2007b: 152). As the translator of The Gay Science in-
forms, Nietzsche took the aphorism from Pindar’s Second Pythian Victory-Ode. In Pindar’s 
poem the line has rather a limited, strongly contextual meaning, whereas for Nietzsche “the 
saying had deeper implications of self-discovery and self-realization” (taken from the trans-
lator’s note Josephine Nauckhoff p. 152). 
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cance of the individual as well as his/her active process of forming and shaping. 
Edmund undoubtedly expresses a similar sentiment as he is dissonant in his 
subversive and explosive ambitions but intrinsically inspiring in his resolve. 
However, one should notice that Edmund’s ambition strikes one as both mod-
ern and early-modern. Robert J. Bauer (1968: 359-360) sees his “rampant indi-
vidualism” as a product of Ockham’s nominalism as much as Montaigne’s scep-
ticism. Interestingly, he combines these philosophical influences with the 
Nietzschean will to power when he professes that he does not  
use the term ‘individualism’ to refer to the Christian man whose unique spiritual soul is 
highly regarded in the divine scheme, but rather to that ego fascinated by his own 
power, that singular being who, in the light of nominalism, scepticism, and moral em-
piricism, stands untrammelled by real relations to others; that solitary figure so keenly 
aware of his sovereignty and self-sufficiency that he must assert the superior value of 
himself in the face of all circumstances, laws, opponents. This individual retains his in-
tegrity so long as he contends against the external; he thrives by a kind of Bergsonian 
élan vital or even a Nietzschan Wille zur Macht. (Bauer 1968: 359)  
As can be seen, Bauer encloses Edmund’s identity within the early modern con-
ceptions of identity, but at the same time he sees the seeds of the modern sub-
jectival perception. It also becomes clear that some critics instinctively feel the 
overhuman potential in Edmund though, to my mind, the direction “beyond 
good and evil” is still left unexplored.  
As presented, the interpretative paths concerning Edmund revolve 
around his “nature” whether seen as plainly villainous and irredeemable or re-
deemed in the act of atonement. It seems entirely comprehensible to follow this 
line of thinking as Edmund himself, in his self-asserting manifesto in Act 1, 
Scene 2, professes his commitment to the goddess of Nature (Lear, 1.2.1-22). 
Also, it seems clear that the question of nature is very much problematized in 
the tragedy. Shakespeare problematizes the supposed naturalness of family 
relations at the backdrop of social and political conflicts. Here I believe lies the 
core of the issue as the question of nature is inextricably steeped in social con-
straints so ingrained in the minds of the characters that they go almost unno-
ticed, and, as seen, often also unexplored by critics. For these reasons it is ne-
cessary to read Edmund’s nature in the context of his social circumstances, 
namely, his illegitimacy. As I believe, Edmund’s bastardy, seen also in a wider 
light of Elizabethan and Jacobean perspectives on primogeniture, undoubtedly 
influences and shapes his ambitions and motivations of the subversive indivi-
dualist. Within this socially construed nature, bastardy can be read in a wider 
context of the stifling workings of the patriarchal system. As I will be arguing, 
King Lear, along with other early-modern texts, obsessively demonizes bastardy 
as a social threat. Moreover, it problematizes an interdependent trinity that 
always echoes female sexuality: the threat of bastardy, the threat of adultery 
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and, finally, the threat of female sexuality.28 The tragedy of King Lear is, to my 
mind, a seat of stifling repression that swells until it burst in an uncontrollable 
vicious circle of fury. As cultural materialists repeatedly underscore, the plays of 
Shakespeare undermine the ideological circumstances of their production, at 
the same time being steeped in them. The circumvention of these ideological 
implications takes place through agents who are driven by an entirely different 
moral outlook. In the case of Edmund, the moral underpinnings of his actions 
are highly problematic while he is undeniably a fruit of the repressive and limit-
ing patriarchal environment. Thus, in this sexually paranoiac condition, an 
overhuman Edmund is pushed to action.  
In order to fully grasp how the mechanism of repression influences the 
emergence of Edmund as a potential overman, it is necessary to trace his pres-
ence in the text of King Lear from the very beginning, namely, from the very 
opening of the play when he is an almost silent witness to the conversation of 
Gloucester and Kent before the arrival of Lear on stage. The majority of critics 
focus on Edmund’s own rich and philosophically intense soliloquies, which pro-
vide us with most data on his motivation. Yet it is crucial to note that the first 
appearance of silent Edmund on stage is fraught with consequences, as it sets 
the tone for the future developments and draws the background concerning his 
status and position at the court. The very first mention of Edmund is, highly 
symbolically, Kent’s question: “Is not this your son, my lord?” (Lear, 1.1.7). 
Ironically, this opening question must echo in the minds of the readers or spec-
tators when Edmund’s crimes against Gloucester resound in their utmost cruel-
ty. However, at the same time, this opening question marks Edmund’s inferior 
and confused status of Gloucester’s bastard son, as the embarrassed Gloucester 
replies: “[h]is breeding, sir hath been my charge. I have so often blushed to ac-
knowledge him that now I am brazed to’t” (Lear, 1.1.7-9). By means of this and 
the following explication of the circumstances surrounding Edmund’s concep-
tion, birth and growing up, Gloucester introduces the rhetoric of shame and 
repression, which further envelops the entire play. One learns that “this young 
fellows’s mother could; whereupon she grew round-wombed, and had, indeed, 
sir, a son for her cradle ere she had a husband for her bed. Do you smell a 
fault?” (Lear, 1.1.12-15). Summers (1977: 226) claims that in publicly embar-
rassing Edmund in front of Kent, Gloucester magnifies “the feeling of exclusion” 
that must already be strong due to Edmund’s illegitimacy. Though Gloucester 
claims that he harbours affection to both his sons in equal measure, by referring 
to his other son as being begotten “by order of law” Gloucester underscores his 
reverence for the oppressing system that inescapably relegates his bastard son 
  
28 Speaking about Edmund, I will focus on the idea of bastardy – while the questions of 
adultery and female sexuality will be discussed in the next chapter when I fill focus on the 
women in King Lear. 
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to a lower caste of society (Lear, 1.1.18). Edmund emerges as a “knave” and 
“whoreson”, whose bringing to the world “was good sport” (Lear, 1.1.20,22). 
However good-humoured or affectionate Gloucester’s words might be read, it is 
unquestionable that the chasm between the two sons as well as between the son 
and the father is turned into an abyss. As it is later proved, “the abyss stares 
back” – to use yet again Nietzsche’s metaphor.29 Gloucester acknowledges the 
fairness of Edmund’s mother yet instrumentally objectifies her into a plaything. 
Edmund, in turn, is a living evidence of Gloucester’s transgression and a re-
minder of a guilty and shameful pleasure of which the fruit – ‘the whoreson’ – 
“must be acknowledged”, though evidently reluctantly (Lear, 1.1.22-23). In the 
light of the degradation and further absence of the mother figure, there seems 
little wonder Edmund commits his energy and strength to the Mother Nature. 
In his insistence to redeem his “impurity” he metaphorically wishes to redeem 
his absent mother. In Edmund’s appeal to nature there almost seems a Freu-
dian fantasy to top the father in the marriage with this metaphorical mother. 
Coming back to the shame-ethic that opens King Lear, Gloucester, despite his 
protestations of care and love towards both his sons, implicitly signals his re-
pudiation of the bastard son when he says: “He hath been out nine years, and 
away he/ shall again” (Lear, 1.1.31-32). One can evidently see that the presence 
of the living proof of his shame is offensive to Gloucester, which is manifested in 
Gloucester willingness to hastily send Edmund away. Gloucester’s stance on the 
origin of Edmund as well as his legal status resulting in his illegitimacy illu-
strates the Elizabethan double standard on the nature of sexuality.  
This double standard is built on the oppressive and consequently re-
pressive treatment of human instincts in Christianity, which is unquestionably a 
basis for the legal standards that provide dictum on the position of illegitimate 
children in society. In the 1562-text An homily on the state of matrimony one 
reads that:  
[t]he word of Almighty God doth testify and declare whence the original beginning of 
matrimony cometh and why it is ordained. It is instituted of God to the intent that 
man and woman should live lawfully in a perpetual friendly fellowship, to bring forth 
fruit, and to avid fornication. By which means a good conscience might be preserved 
on both parties, in bridling the corrupt inclinations of the flesh within the limits of 
honesty. For God hath straitly forbidden all whoredom and uncleanness and hath 
from time to time taken grievous punishments of this inordinate lust, as all stories 
and ages hath declared. (An homily of the state of matrimony 2011: 301)  
  
29 From the famous aphorism in Beyond good and evil (nr 146) “Whoever fights with 
monsters should see to it that he does not become one himself. And when you stare for a 
long time into an abyss, the abyss stares back into you” (Nietzsche 2002: 69). Following up 
on Nietzsche’s metaphor one can also see that indeed Edmund turns into a monster of 
tyranny such as he initially fights. 
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So, from the homily one learns that adultery is by nature impure and punish-
able by God. By virtue of analogy, the fruit of fornication must obviously be of 
the same defiled nature. As Michael Neill (1993: 278-279) explains: “[i]n Latin 
adultero meant not only ‘to commit adultery’ but also ‘to pollute or defile’, a 
pollution which once again seems to have been understood as the consequence 
of inadmissible mixture, since adulterium (adultery) also referred, for example, 
to the grafting together of different varieties of plant.” Illegitimate children are, 
as a result, not only impure but also they constitute dangerous and disruptive 
mixtures against the God-ordained order of things. Neill (1993: 278) writes 
that: “Bastards are un-whole because they are the offspring not of ‘one flesh’ but 
of two bodies: there is an inherent and sinister doubleness about their begetting 
(one may think of Iago’s ‘beast with two backs’) which renders them neither one 
thing nor the other, at once indeterminate and duplicitous.” This indeterminate 
status of the “whoreson” – Edmund – makes Gloucester inclined to send him 
away according to a Christian logic that “if a part of your body ‘offend thee’ you 
should ‘cut it off’ (Mark 9: 43 as quoted in: Kaufmann 1974: 223). This logic of 
“abnegation, repudiation and expatriation of the passions” constitutes the bulk 
of Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity (Kaufmann 1974: 223). As I see it, 
Gloucester is reminded of his illicit sinful passion for the anonymous fair lady 
through the image of his son Edmund. His attempts at the repudiation of both 
the passion and its fruit is concordant with Nietzsche’s criticism of repudiation 
in Christianity and also illustrates the logic of Elizabethan scorn for excessive 
sexual passion. With his characteristic vehemence Nietzsche (1967: 207) ex-
plains his attack on “religious morality” in The will to power:  
[a]ffect, great desire, the passion for power, love, revenge, possessions –: moralists 
want to extinguish and uproot them, to “purify” the soul of them. The logic is: the 
desires often produce great misfortune, consequently they are evil, reprehensible. A 
man must free himself from them: otherwise he cannot be a good man – This is the 
same logic as: ‘if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out.’ In the particular case in which 
that dangerous ‘innocent from the country’, the founder of Christianity, recom-
mended this practice to his disciples, the case of sexual excitation, the consequence 
is, unfortunately, not only the loss of an organ but the emasculation of a man’s char-
acter – And the same applies to the moralist’s madness that demands, instead of the 
restraining of the passions, their extirpation. Its conclusion is always: only the cas-
trated man is a good man.  
The circumstances of Edmund’s begetting – namely great desire and passion – 
are for Gloucester reasons for shame, not only in the light of moral considera-
tions revolving round the supposed essential impurity of such affects but also in 
the light of obedience to the legal authority, which is challenged by the disrup-
tive energy of the passions. The idea of the blood purity is a significant element 
in the smooth functioning of the patriarchal state based on the patrilineal rules 
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of inheritance. Yielding to uncontrollable passions outside of marriage is an act 
of disobedience against the system and, thus, poses an authentic threat to the 
stability of the state. At a first glance, this may not seem to be so as the system 
of primogeniture systematically ignores illegitimate children. However, as the 
example of Edmund demonstrates, by ignoring bastards, the Elizabethan state 
paradoxically “breeds” unwanted subversion in the very core of its bosom.  
Within the patriarchal system a bastard son is termed fillius nullius, 
which denotes his legal invisibility equal almost to that of women, who have 
neither inheritance rights nor any developed legal identity in the Elizabethan 
and Jacobean society. As Neill (1993: 273) explains at length:  
[i]n its origins ‘bastard’ had been a relatively neutral descriptive term. Apparently 
deriving from Old French bast (‘pack-saddle’), it distinguished the placeless pack-
saddle child from the established offspring of the marriage-bed. Social historians are 
generally agreed that while the medieval period saw a gradual hardening of such dis-
tinctions, with the bastard being formally defined as filius nullius by the end of the 
twelfth century, the definition carried no particular stigma; rather it served, within 
patriarchal system of primogeniture, simply to mark off the children who were enti-
tled to inherit from those who were not. The filius nullis (as the rules of heraldic ca-
dency imply) was not so much the son of nobody, as the heir of nobody. Even in the 
latter Middle Ages, when church attitudes were becoming more censorious, an alle-
gation of bastardy was primarily a weapon in struggles over inheritance, rather than 
a slur on character and reputation. Historians generally argue that the condition of 
illegitimacy began to incur a significant degree of publicly articulated moral oppro-
brium only towards the end of the sixteenth century, when it attracted the attention 
of Puritan reformers on the one hand and of Poor Law administrators, keen to pro-
tect the parish from the charge of unwanted infants, on the other. 
As can be seen, the gradual victimization or criminalization of bastards is inex-
tricably linked with the post-reformation tightening of morals based on abnega-
tion from extramarital sex as impure and sinful. These sentiments seem to be 
expressed in the status of Edmund as well as the traits of his character. The core 
of Edmund’s rebellion against “the plague of custom” stems from his feelings of 
injustice as to the impossibility of inheriting title and land (Lear, 1.2.3). Michael 
Neill points out the bitter irony of Kent’s reply to Gloucester’s embarrassed 
acknowledgment of the whore’s son (Neill 1993: 283). Kent jokingly says of 
Edmund: “I cannot wish the fault, the issue of it being so proper” (Lear, 1.1.16-
17). The piquancy of this remark lies in the very fact of Edmund being “funda-
mentally improper” as the being proper in the early-modern reality is equal to 
the possession of land property (Neill 1993: 283). Edmund’s legal status as unfit 
for inheritance turns him into an “unpossessing bastard” (Lear, 2.1.67). It is 
Margreta de Grazia (1996: 21) who seems to have coined the term “propertied 
individualism” that defines the Renaissance identity through possession. She 
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illustrates her proposition by the example of Lear, who is stripped of his identity 
as a king once he relinquishes the control over his lands to his daughters. Yan 
Brailowsky (2009: 198) extends Grazia’s definition to all the other characters in 
the play when he makes an observation that: “[i]n King Lear, land is the basis 
for property, and landed property is what defines men: one has a Christian 
name only when one is not a landowner – all other characters are known by 
their toponym.” This is indeed true in the case of Edmund, who is introduced in 
Act 1, scene 1 by his first name among such characters as Gloucester, Kent, Bur-
gundy or France. In the context of the early modern “propertied individualism” 
Edmund is not only a fillius nullius but also a persona non grata in the system 
that neither acknowledges nor needs him. However, his undefined position 
creates an ever-expanding void that calls to be filled with a new conceptualiza-
tion of identity – based on personal wit and skill. Edmund frequently under-
scores his ability to circumvent the unfairness of the system e.g. when he claims 
“[l]et me, if not by birth, have lands by wit,/ All with me’s meet that I can fash-
ion fit” (Lear, 1.2.181-182). For the modern standards, the first name address is 
a strong statement of personal or singular identity. Shakespeare’s Edmund, to 
my mind, is thus a precursor of quite a modern conceptualization of identity – 
of a self-made man. His unregulated legal status of an outcast socially relegates 
him to the sphere that is beyond good and evil. John Donne in his Ivvenilia or 
certain paradoxes and problems (1633) remarks that the legal ostracism of 
bastards frees them from the mainstream legal environment and thus contrib-
utes to their wickedness or alternatively their greatness. In an answer to his 
problem question “Why haue Bastards best Fortune?” Donne (2003) writes:  
either then it must be that the Church hauing remoued them from all place in 
the publike seruice of God, they haue better meanes than others to bee wicked, and 
so fortunate: Or else because the two greatest powers in this world, the 
Diuell and Princes concurre to their greatnesse.  
Michael Neill (1993: 284) summarizes this emergence of such a paradox when 
he writes:  
[t]he ‘unpossessing bastard’ of the drama, displaced from the narrative of history by 
the circumstances of his begetting, is cast loose to locate and possess himself by 
whatever invention he can contrive, discovering in his illegitimate condition some-
thing of the outlaw’s paradoxical freedom. He becomes a perfect figure for that spirit 
of ambivalent individualism, at once restlessly ambitious and full of the bitterness of 
displacement. 
What Neill calls “the bitterness of displacement” seems to be a crucial ingredi-
ent of Edmund’s psychological make-up. When he resentfully exclaims: “[w]hy 
bastard? Wherefore base?/ When my dimensions are well compact and my 
shape as true/ As honest madam’s issue?”, his indignation is quite apparent 
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(Lear, 1.2.6-9). Edmund’s forced relegation to the lower caste of the Elizabethan 
property caste-order is a source of bitterness for Edmund. Yet it does not open 
the gate of resentment as Nietzsche conceives it because Edmund is far from 
being a Chandala (untouchable) of the early-modern caste-system. I would risk 
claiming that being a fruit of a defiled intercourse he is being forced into a posi-
tion of an untouchable – branded with “baseness”, where the word “base” re-
sounds with immense force in his rebellious, self-defining soliloquy in Act 1, 
scene 2 (Lear, 1.2.10). Yet his soliloquy is more than an expression of indigna-
tion at the unfairness of circumstances; it is rather a resolution calling for action 
and thus a step beyond the limiting environment.  
I let myself draw a parallel between Nietzsche’s conception of the law of 
Manu he develops in The twilight of the idols and The Antichrist, and the Elizabe-
than “natural” order of things as conceived in the Great Chain of Being, as the 
English early-modern social system manifests an interesting, albeit paradoxical, 
class exclusiveness with a morally Christian underpinning.30 Though the Elizabe-
than social structure based on the essentialist chain of being is grounded in Chris-
tian theology, it retains a strict and immovable caste structure that is reminiscent 
of the Nietzschean Manu law in its strictness and strong focus on nobility. The 
patrilineal system, with its oppressive sexuality, is really far from the tenets of 
equality and divine justice preached in the Gospels. Actually both the ideology of 
the state and Church preach of the God-given order in which the elements of the 
macrocosm reflect the microcosm, which is manifested in the early modern source 
texts e.g. Homily of obedience (1547) or Homily against disobedience and wilful 
rebellion (1558).31 In the latter, one can read a credo of the Renaissance essential-
ist vision of “perfect felicity”: “[His Majesty] not only ordained that, in families 
and households, the wife should be obedient unto her husband, the children unto 
their parents, the servants unto their masters” (Homily against disobedience 
2011: 59). Nietzsche’s explication of Manu law, where the strict division of func-
tions, roles and behaviours is proscribed, is very reminiscent of the Elizabethan 
order.32 As Nietzsche (2006c: 185) quotes from Manu: “the chadalas are the fruits 
  
30 By drawing this parallel I refer strictly to Nietzsche’s vision of The book of Manu as I 
do not profess any specialist knowledge on either Hinduism or Buddhism. For this as well 
as the reason of expediency I am focusing solely on Nietzsche’s views and how his perspec-
tive influenced his critique of morality. 
31 To read more on the macrocosm and microcosm correspondence, see: Chapter 7 
“Correspondences”, in: Tillyard, E.M.W. [1943] 1998. The Elizabethan world picture. Lon-
don: Pimlico, 87-100. 
32 For specific fragments on The book of Manu in Nietzsche, see: The twilight of the 
idols “‘Improving’ humanity” Aphorisms nr 4, 3, 5 or The Antichrist Aphorism 56 and 57. 
For Nietzsche (2006c: 184), the New Testament in comparison with the Book of Manu is 
steeped in “the atmosphere of disease and dungeon”. It is common knowledge that 
Nietzsche abhorred the idea of equality as being weakening and emasculating for the devel-
opment of the individual. Christianity, which professes equality, is such an emasculating 
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of adultery, incest and crime” and such an early modern chandala cloak is forced 
onto Edmund along with other dramatic bastards like e.g. Spurio from The reven-
ger’s tragedy or Caesar Borgia from The Devil’s charter. The chandalas, as 
Nietzsche (2006c: 185) explains, due to their exclusion and victimization, are 
those who hate the present life the most, and harbour a hatred for life and human-
ity which eventually turns into religion. At this point in his argument Nietzsche 
(2006c: 185) turns back to his criticism of Christianity and calls it “the victory of 
chandala values” and “the eternal vengeance of the Chandala as a religion of love.” 
The Elizabethan social system seems to be a pinnacle of such Christian hypocrisy 
as it retains an artificial social caste system at the same time professing equality in 
the face of God. In such a system the bastard is a disruptive and subversive ele-
ment driven by his lust for either revenge or power. The former can be found in 
Spurio, who exultingly announces: “[a]y, there’s the vengeance that my birth was 
wrapp’d in;/ I’ll be reveng’d for all. Now hate begin;/ I’ll call foul incest but a veni-
al sin” (The revenger’s tragedy, 1.2.168-170). The latter finds its expression in 
demonic Caesar Borgia who claims:  
[n]ow Caesar Muster vp thy wittes together. 
Summon thy sences and aduance thy selfe, 
Ware and Earth haue interpos’d their bodies, 
Betwixt the worldes bright eye and this blacke murther. 
Sweete silent night (guarded with secret starres) 
Keepe silence, and conceale this Tragedie: 
Saturne is lord ascendant of this hower, 
Propitious patron of assassinates 
Of murthers, Paracides, and massacres: 
Lord of my birth, auspitious to my life, 
This is my first degree to domination. 
Who can, or (if they could) who dare suspect, 
How Caesar Borgia kild his brother Candie? 
This is infallible, that many crimes 
Lurke vnderneath the robes of Holinesse: 
And vnderneath my Purple tunicle (The Divil’s charter 3.5.1672-1686).  
Edmund partly conforms with the portrayals of other Elizabethan and Jacobean 
bastards. To a degree, he shares Spurio’s monstrous lust in his double commit-
                                                                                                                                        
religion. The advantage Indian morality has over Christianity is the existence of the chosen 
caste of poets and philosophers. Though Nietzsche (2006c: 58) evidently flirts with the idea 
of the caste system as potentially fuelling the formation of the overman, he acknowledges 
the brutality of the Manu Law with its deterministic and ultimately contingent nature. Ul-
timately, both systems are based on a lie as they claim divine provenance, which under-
mines life itself. And a goal of “every holy lie” is to turn a human legal or moral system into 
“nature”, or in other words, into a set of universal and unquestionable premises. 
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ment to both sisters Goneril and Regan. He also seems to resemble Caesar Bor-
gia in his ambition and resolve. Edmund’s self-defining soliloquy in Act 1, scene 
2, like Caesar’s, shares a typical over-reaching language and is a harbinger of 
self-prophesised dominion. Edmund announces: “Edmund the base/ shall top 
the legitimate” (Lear, 1.2.20-21). In a very similar manner the Borgia-bastard 
extolls his illegitimacy as a marker of skill and ability. To spite all those who 
would believe otherwise he claims: “Caesar o nullo written on my guydon,/ 
When with my troopes victoriously I ride on” (The Divil’s charter, 4.2.1980-
1981). However, what seems to distinguish Edmund from Spurio or Caesar Bor-
gia is the fact that he initially does not plan to resort to cruelty or murder. He 
does capitalize on his wit when he says: “Let me, if not by birth, have lands by 
wit”, but he never intentionally hurts Edgar (Lear, 1.2.181). Unlike Caesar Bor-
gia – a truly Cain-like figure – who commits an act of fratricide – Edmund 
rather plays on Edgar’s and Gloucester’s gullibility to create an opportunity to 
his advantage.33 Both Spurio and Caesar make it their aim to either avenge cru-
elly or gain power bloodily. Cruelty and the propinquity to tyranny is, as if, an 
inherent part of their bastard characters stemming from the “impurity” and 
sinfulness of their birth. Their spitefulness is something they are born with – 
like an original sin. That is why they with “the eternal hatred […] of this ‘hu-
manity’” are the epitomes of Chandala (Nietzsche 2006c: 185). For Edmund, 
cruelty becomes a by-product of his process of growing in strength and great-
ness. Like in the case of Marlowe’s Tamburlaine or Barabas the severing of fam-
ily relations becomes a necessary element of one’s personal growth. Though 
marked as impure and misbegotten, he decides to transcend the circumstances 
of his birth. Yet it is important to note that his criticism of the system has also 
little to do with any universal claims of justice or equality that he could poten-
  
33 In a side remark, it is worth saying that the ease with which Edmund is capable of 
persuading first Edgar of his father’s disfavour (or rather fury, which requires his escaping) 
and then Gloucester of his son’s betrayal is a significant hint as to the already shaky and 
distant relationship the two share. Of course, it is a mere speculation but it seems that in a 
situation of such a discord both the son and the father would seek some more evidence 
confirming the situation. To my mind, Gloucester’s swift reaction confirms his fear of the 
potential betrayal on the part of his son. Though he does express doubt about Edgar’s ‘un-
naturalness’ he yet falls into anger quite uncontrollably (“Abhorred villain! Unnatural, 
detested, brutish villain!” etc. 1.2.76). Edgar’s fear of his father also suggests that Gloucester 
might have been a very strict and demanding father, stirring more fear than love. It is also 
possible to claim the opposite, namely, that Gloucester’s family is based on total trust and 
loyalty which Edmund brutally tramples on. However, as I have already argued, pushing the 
blame onto Edmund’s inherent spite resulting from his bastardy simplifies his very complex 
psychological make-up. It is also important to remember that one is looking at the early 
modern family relations among nobles, where the intense and intimate relationships be-
tween parents and children could not be taken for granted (for more information, look e.g. 
at the way Elizabeth I described her family relations Chapter 2 “Family” p. 6-16, quotation 
in: Starkey, David. 2001. Elizabeth: apprenticeship. London: Vintage Books.). 
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tially claim for others in similar circumstances. As Neill (1993: 274) points out, 
from the end of the sixteenth century onwards there was a sudden rise of ille-
gitimate births recorded in England, with the peak years between 1600-1620. 
This rise within the authentic social structure resulted in “the emergence of the 
adult bastard as a type of subversive irregularity” in drama (Neill 1993: 274). 
Thus, Edmund is one of “a distinct sub-species amongst the swarm of attractive 
villains who populate late Elizabethan and Jacobean drama” (Neill 1993: 273). 
The source texts I mentioned also seem to illustrate the same trend. In Ed-
mund’s manifesto, as mentioned, Edmund focuses on himself and only at one 
point does he shift from the first person singular to the plural (“Why brand they 
us/ With base? Lear, 1.2.9). This is, to my mind, done for the sake of rhetorical 
effect as he immediately shifts back to the singular pronoun when he says: “I 
must have your land” (Lear, 1.2.16). For this reason, I believe that Edmund 
cannot be deemed a social rebel as his manifesto is a statement of his own indi-
viduality. Edmund may profess a link with the plight of other bastards, but his 
aim is to improve his own standing rather than change the victimizing system. 
There is, then, little socialist impulse in Edmund as he emerges as a self-reliant 
and highly individualized bastard – a perfect candidate for an overman. 
As can be seen, Edmund does seem to confirm the popular portrayal of 
the bastard in the early modern drama, but only to a certain degree. He is bitter 
and full of indignation, but he turns his bitterness into wit and skill. He wants to 
gain power and control, but he is not driven by desire for revenge. And finally 
he does not seem to revel in extravagant cruelty. Despite his seeming proximity 
to Spurio, he is not “the cheating bastard”, “an epitome of counterfeit”, to use 
Neill’s (1993: 282) terminology. Neither is he “the monstrous bastard” whose 
misshapen physique would reflect his twisted mind like Thersites in Shakes-
peare’s Troilus and Cressida (Neill 1993: 284). If this be true, there arises a 
perverse question whether Edmund might possibly be a virtuous bastard. Con-
sequently, one has to ask whether a notion of a virtuous bastard could be con-
ceived and accepted by the early moderns. As a matter of fact, Henry Peacham 
in his famous manual Compleat Gentleman (1634) discusses the possibility of 
bastards’ nobility. In chapter 1 entitled “Of Nobility in Generall” he says:  
I proceed further, to remove certaine doubts, which as rubs clog the cleare paſſage of 
our disſcource; and the firſt concerning Baſtardy, whether Baſtards may bee ſaid to 
bee nobly borne or not […] Yet it is the cuſtome with vs, and in France, to allow them 
for Noble, by giving them ſometimes their Fathers proper Coate” (Peacham 1906: 9).  
Peacham (1906: 9) then follows this up with a long list of famous illegitimate 
sons that were made legitimate and later proved their worth and virtue. What is 
interesting in Peacham’s explication is exactly this dynamic relation between 
nobility as opposed to nobleness, which presumably go hand in hand but can 
also go awry. He discusses “nobility” both literally as a social status of belonging 
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to a higher class and more metaphorically as a certain trait of character defined 
by dignity and refinement. As he writes:  
[a] ſecond queſtion ariſeth, whether hee that is Noble deſended, may by his vice and 
baſeneſſe loſe his Nobility or no. It is anſwered, that hee that is ignoble and inglori-
ous, may acquire Nobility by Vertue: the other may very well loſe by his Vice. But 
ſuch are the miſerable corruptions of our time, that Vices goe for prime Vertues: and 
to be drunke, ſweare, wench follow the faſhion, and to do juſt nothing, are the attrib-
utes and markes now adayes of a great part of our Gentry. (Peacham 1906: 9-10)  
In his remonstrations on the contemporary times where values disintegrate, 
Peacham reminds Gloucester saying: “[w]e have seen the best of our time./ 
Machinations, hollowness, treachery and all ruinous disorders follow us disquietly 
to our graves” (Lear, 1.2.112-114). Gloucester like Peacham points out the disinte-
gration and decay at court and the houses of noblemen where like in Gloucester’s 
family “there’s son against father” (Lear, 1.2.110). Yet Peacham’s observation has a 
very Edmundian tinge as it allows for the rise of the “ignoble and inglorious” into 
the positions of nobility. So one may risk saying that Shakespeare’s Edmund 
whose “dimensions are well compact” and whose mind is “generous” and shape 
“true” arrives as an over-reacher or a Nietzschean over-man who can transcend 
the customs of the supposedly “natural” system, which actually breeds only cor-
ruption. Interestingly enough, Peacham (1906: 9) links bastardy with superhu-
man qualities when he lists the exceptional illegitimate sons:  
[w]ho are more famous than Remus and Romulus, who laid the firſt ſtone of Rome? 
more couragious and truely valiant, than Hercules, Alexander, our King Arthur of 
Britains, and William the firſt?”. Peacham concludes his deliberations on the ques-
tion of bastardy and nobility by saying: “I willingly produce theſe examples, to con-
firme our cuſtome of ennobling them; and though the Law leaneth not their ſide, yet 
ſtand they in the head of the troopes, with the moſt deſerving, yea, and many times 
(according to Euripides), proove better than the legitimate. (Peacham 1906: 9) 
The underlying, Nietzschean in my opinion, message of Peacham’s discussion is 
that the overmen are born in the struggle to over-come their circumstances. In 
order to confirm this Nietzschean mechanism it is enough to compare Peacham 
with Nietzsche and to quote again Nietzsche’s (2006c: 213-214) famous passage 
about freedom and tyranny:  
[h]ow is freedom measured in individuals and in peoples? It is measured by the re-
sistance that needs to be overcome, by the effort that it costs to stay on top. Look for 
the highest type of free human beings where the highest resistance is constantly be-
ing overcome: five paces away from tyranny, right on the threshold, where servitude 
is a danger. 
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To my mind, Edmund perfectly encapsulates this dynamic relationship between 
tyranny and servitude. In his attempt to subvert “the plague of custom” he re-
bels against the tyrannous system but, in his relations with e.g. Cornwall or the 
sisters, he is also capable of manoeuvring between servitude and independence, 
becoming a Machiavellian epitome of a fox and a lion.34 However, if he is indeed 
a Machiavellian figure, then the comparison to e.g. Alexander, the great, sup-
posedly a virtuous bastard according to Peacham, does not seem tenable any 
longer. One could argue that it is exactly Edmund that is a source of corruption 
that Peacham as well as Shakespeare’s Gloucester are anxious about. I strongly 
believe that both interpretations hold ground as Edmund is, from the start, at 
the very heart of the subversion. His bringing to the world in a supposedly “un-
natural” extramarital relationship stigmatizes and marginalizes him and pushes 
him to over-come this forced victimization. Yet his striving is instinctive rather 
than premeditated. According to Nietzsche (2006c: 176), the belief in a totally 
free will is one of “the four great errors” that humanity keeps on deceiving itself 
with. Without being deterministic, Nietzsche (2006c: 181) deconstructs the idea 
of free will and deems it a social construct invented in order to punish and dis-
cipline. Thus, in the Nietzschean vision a man is an infinite sum of his circum-
stances and his instincts. Edmund frequently actively takes advantage of the 
evolving events, which he also confirms in what he says. For instance, when he 
learns about Regan’s and Cornwall’s visit to Gloucester’s house he says: “[t]he 
Duke be here tonight? The better – best!/ This weaves itself perforce into my 
business” (Lear, 1.5.15-16). The adverb “perforce” is key here as it points to the 
urgent nature of the circumstances. Gloucester’s exposure of the letter about the 
upcoming invasion brings about a similar reaction from Edmund as he says: 
“This seems a fair deserving and must draw me/ That which my father loses, no 
less than all./ The younger rises when the old doth fall” (Lear, 3.4.22-24). At the 
same, Edmund’s manifesto is addressed to the goddess of Nature (“Thou, Na-
ture, art my goddess; to thy law/ My services are bound” Lear, 1.2.1-2) while on 
his deathbed he yet again binds his previous deeds with his ‘nature’. He says: “I 
pant for life. Some good I mean to do,/ Despite of mine own nature” (Lear, 
5.3.241-242). What he also realizes is that any act of kindness on his part is 
against his “instinctive” nature. Edmund seems to be conscious of his existence 
  
34 To quote from Machiavelli’s (2006, loc. 1023-1028) Prince: “Therefore it is necessary 
for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has been 
figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how Achilles and many other 
princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to nurse, who brought them up in his disci-
pline; which means solely that, as they had for a teacher one who was half beast and half 
man, so it is necessary for a prince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one 
without the other is not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt 
the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself 
against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.” 
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as a mixture of circumstance and impulse. When seen through a Nietzschean 
context, it is very hard to read him within the tradition of virtuous bastardy 
though he does possess certain desirable qualities. Edmund subverts the tradi-
tion at the same time being steeped in its manifestations. Shakespeare’s por-
trayal is possible, as it seems, due to positioning Edmund beyond the early 
modern conception of virtue.  
What is certain about Edmund is the fact that, despite these fixed traits 
of early modern villainy, he is a far more complex and intriguing character than 
other dramatic bastards. Critics then often ask about the source of his “attrac-
tiveness” and investigate the basis of his superiority over villains of his sort. It 
seems to be a combination of Edmund’s impulsiveness, his urge to action and 
his proneness to philosophical reflection that make him stand out. Though, as 
mentioned, he is a rather minor character, he manages to be the source of a bulk 
of intriguing philosophical comments in the play. Yan Bralinowsky (2009: 201) 
calls Edmund “the world-weary philosopher, providing the audience with in-
struction”. Edmund’s language, so rich in puns and metaphors, is in turn seen 
as a “bastard language” and, along with Edmund’s deepening moral depravity, 
provides evidence for the general “bastardization of language” in the play (Bra-
linowsky 2009: 201-204). To my mind, not only is Bralinowsky’s comment po-
litically incorrect and insensitive, it is also textually hard to defend as it is rather 
Gloucester and, above all, Edgar that are the source of the most pessimistic, and 
thus “weary” philosophy. Of course, one could say that they, being dispossessed 
and betrayed, have the right reasons to be disillusioned with life. However, it is 
worth remembering that Gloucester presents such a “weary” and anxious stance 
at the opening of the action, when he delivers his prophetic words: “[t]hese late 
eclipses in the sun and moon portend no good to us” (Lear, 1.2.110). Gloucester, 
from the start, represents a very nihilistic attitude towards life, while his speech 
provides a more general reflection on a severe crisis of his age. This crisis stems 
from the disintegration of the supposedly natural order society is built on. In 
contrast to Gloucester’s nihilistic reflection, Edmund’s attack on “the foppery of 
the world” is far from being “weary” (Lear, 1.2.118). By saying “we make guilty 
of our disasters the sun, the moon and the stars” and by mocking “heavenly 
compulsion” and “spherical predominance” Edmund rejects the metaphysical 
grounding of human existence and, more generally, metaphysics as a basis and 
explanation of the universe. In his rational condemnation of Gloucester’s fore-
boding Edmund emerges a very modern figure, though his chaffing at astrology 
can very well be read within the tradition of Renaissance scepticism of e.g. 
Pomponazzi or Montaigne. What seems more important is the fact that, funda-
mentally, Edmund does not question the crisis itself. He rather laughs at naïve 
attempts at rationalizing or, to be more precise, spiritualizing what to him is the 
dynamics of coincidence on the one hand, and human choice on the other. In 
this Edmund is truly Nietzschean. In the Untimely Meditations II, long before 
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the announcement of the death of God, Nietzsche senses the great crisis of his 
own age. Yet for him the answer to the crisis of morality is not the so called 
“world-process” which so much interests his contemporaries, but the focus on 
the individual. He writes:  
[t]he time will come when one will prudently refrain from all constructions of the 
world-process or even of the history of man; a time when one will regard not the 
masses but individuals, who form a kind of bridge across the turbulent stream of be-
coming. These individuals do not carry forward any kind of process but live contem-
poraneously with one another; thanks to history, which permits such a collaboration, 
they live as that republic of genius of which Schopenhauer once spoke; one giant 
calls to another across the desert intervals of time and, undisturbed by the excited 
chattering dwarfs who creep about beneath them, the exalted spirit-dialogue goes 
on. It is the task of history to be the mediator between them and thus again and 
again to inspire and lend the strength for the production of the great man. No, the 
goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest exemplars (Nietzsche 
2007a: 111).  
Nietzsche’s comment seems to strike at the very heart of Edmund’s character 
and his motivation. Edmund is a living enactment of going beyond a 
Nietzschean proscribed movement, beyond the nihilism of his own age. More-
over, he offers himself as an answer to this crisis his age is going through. With 
his energy and motivation he seems to provide a counterbalance to the gloomy 
philosophy of Gloucester (e.g. “As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods,/ They 
kill us for their sport” Lear, 4.1.38-39) and Edgar’s patient Job-like acceptance 
of suffering (“And worse I may be yet; the worst is not/ So long as we can say 
‘This is the worst’” Lear, 4.1.29-30). In his rejection of metaphysics and move-
ment beyond nihilism Edmund becomes a value maker, but he also emerges as 
the sole measure of his values. The key to Edmundian philosophy, quite con-
sciously driven by the Nietzschean will to power, really lies in Edmund’s first 
soliloquy, when he invokes the goddess of nature.  
Critics and scholars have long been perplexed by the paradoxical and 
double status of nature as encapsulated in the character of Edmund as well as 
the whole tragedy of King Lear. Robert J. Bauer (1968: 360) points to a crucial 
tension that is inherent in the construction of the play, namely, the Pre-Socratic 
division into “nomos – nature as law – and physis – nature as vital force”. Inte-
restingly enough, this very same tension lies at the core of Nietzschean philoso-
phy – also indebted to Pre-Socratics. As it may seem, the nature Edmund is 
bound to is of course physis, which stands for the uncontrollable vital force – so 
crucial for Nietzsche’s conception of the overman. Edmund angrily asks: “Why 
brand they us/ With “base,” with “baseness,” “bastardy,” “base,” “base,”/ Who, 
in the lusty stealth of nature, take/ More composition and fierce quality/ Than 
doth within a dull, stale, tired bed/ Go to th’ creating a whole tribe of fops/ Got 
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‘tween asleep and wake?” (Lear, 1.2.9-16). Edmund sees himself as a natural 
child because he is a fruit of passion, as opposed to the legalized Edgar who was 
begotten in the marital intercourse that, in the context of Elizabethan and Jaco-
bean nobility, was rarely based on affection but was rather a duty accompanying 
the business transaction of marriage. This brings back the idea of repressed 
emotions and the aforementioned Elizabethan double standards on nature as 
Edmund, a child of adultery, is denied legal status but also, as the opening scene 
demonstrates, respect. Yet passion, as a result of unnatural repression erupts in 
Edmund with double force and thus he gives himself entirely to physis. For 
Bauer (1968: 363), Edmund, in his rebellion against the system, his political 
shrewdness and sceptical nature, is an enactment of both Montaigne’s and Ma-
chiavelli’s ideas. I believe he is also a very Nietzschean figure. His yearning to 
transcend, or to use Nietzsche’s term, to utilize his will to power is indeed im-
mense. He initially wants the lands of his brother. Once he has the upper hand 
over Edgar, he takes away the father’s title and position. Having that, he has the 
appetite for the crown. He stirs passion in both sisters. Once they are infatuated 
with him, he is unable to decide which one he wants. So as can be seen, in his 
insatiability Edmund is like Tamburlaine, while his cunning reminds one of 
Barabas. Yet Nietzsche, in his appraisal of the affects, proposes an idea of 
“transfigured physis”.35 Already in Untimely Meditations Nietzsche (2007a: 
122) speaks of the need to learn how “to organize the chaos” of one’s passions 
“the way ancient Greeks did”. This idea is carried further and finds its refine-
ment in the concept of the overcoming of the will to power and sublimation. 
When looking at Edmund, one is left with a fundamental question: is Edmund 
the one who transfigures his physis? He does succeed in transforming the cir-
cumstances of his position, yet in the process he “sacrifices” his brother and 
father. One could suggest that, just like in the case of Shakespeare’s Brutus, the 
sacrifice is a necessary step in gaining independence. On the other hand, the 
sanctity of bonds between close family members – brothers as well as children 
and parents – has always been deeply ingrained in western society. For Elizabe-
than society (just as for modern society) family, unquestionably a social con-
struct, was perceived as the essentially natural unit. Thus, any transgression 
against the communal identity within the family was considered an appalling 
crime against nature. For this reason the act of fratricide in The Divil’s charter 
is indicative of Caesar Borgia’s utmost moral depravity, along with other ab-
horred crimes like licentiousness or incest. Yet in the Nietzschean vision, so 
sensitive to even the most subtle symptoms of nomos, the individual will to 
power might be far stronger in some than any claims of communal morality. 
Neill (1993: 285) summarizes Edmund’s supposed “nature” by saying that: 
  
35 The term is borrowed from Kaufmann, Walter 1974. 1974. Nietzsche: Philosopher, 
Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton: Princeton University Press. See: e.g. page 161. 
Chapter Four 244 
“[t]he naturally unnatural character of the bastard makes him into a living ex-
emplar of those ironic mechanisms by which nature revenges itself on the per-
petrators of vicious and unnatural acts.” So, as can be seen, Edmund is double – 
natural and unnatural at the same time. This is true for both his social standing 
as well as his character, as his individualism does not only surpass filial and 
brotherly bonds, but also socially accepted, moral codes of conduct. On the sur-
face such an acknowledgment of an individual over any morality might be a 
recipe for a catastrophe. Indeed, this is what happens in King Lear. A long trail 
of dead bodies that is left at the play’s closing may be traced back to Edmund’s 
robust individualism. It is even possible to risk a statement that King Lear as a 
whole problematizes an impossible tension between one’s own singularity rea-
lized in the individual will to power, and family identity, where one’s position 
may be heavily compromised. Yet it is impossible to blame Edmund’s yearnings 
for all the evil in the play, especially in the light of his last attempt at saving Lear 
and Cordelia.  
For many critics Edmund’s death has been one of the most perplexing 
scenes in King Lear due to Edmund’s supposed delay in the exposure of the 
information about Lear and Cordelia. There seems little point in going through 
various readings of Edmund’s and Edgar’s last conversation in which Edmund 
urges Edgar to “speak […] on” (Lear, 5.3.200). It suffices to say that critics’ res-
ponses range from the utter condemnation of Edmund’s prolonging of his con-
fession to visions of Edmund’s redemption and absolution.36 I personally be-
lieve that the very insistence on the occurrence of any “delay” is grounded in a 
naïve belief in human capabilities to control the reality whilst in this deeply 
existentialist play the space for maneuvering is really very limited. Not only is 
the death of Cordelia inscribed within Shakespeare’s brutal pattern of the tragic, 
but it also communicates the existentialist as well as a very Nietzschean sense of 
limitation that the individual being is caged in. There is no reason to doubt the 
authenticity of the brothers’ reconciliation or Edmund’s rush when he says: 
“Quickly send – /Be brief in it – to the castle, for my writ/ Is on the life of Lear 
and Cordelia;/ Nay, send in time” (Lear, 5.3. 241-244). Edmund refers to the 
  
36 A.C. Bradley seems to have inaugurated the discussion on the “delay”. For him Ed-
mund might be “sunk in dreamy reflections on his past” (Bradley 1992: 264). Bradley 
blames Edmund’s “unexplained delay” for the death of Cordelia. Quite plainly he also rele-
gates Edmund, along with Goneril, Regan, Cornwall and Oswald to the evil forces in the 
play (Bradley 1992: 264, 284). Matthews believes that Edmund’s repentance is slow but he 
finally recognizes the power of love (Matthews 1975: 27). McNeir believes that Edmund’s 
redemption is inauthentic due to his moral weakness (McNeir 1968: 215-216). Bauer, on the 
other hand, claims that the scene illustrates Edmund’s “ultimate integrity and sense of 
responsibility” (Bauer 1968: 365). He also suggests that: “It is tantamount to a recantation 
of physis and a concession to nomos” (Bauer 1968: 365). I personally believe that Edmund 
does not reject physis. He rather recognizes that it requires “ordering” or a Nietzschean 
sublimation in order to be utilized creatively.  
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necessity of hurrying up three times in one sentence which, to my mind, un-
derscores the honesty of his intentions. Edmund’s delay does not seem to be 
calculated or spiteful. However, bearing in mind his individualism, it does not 
seem surprising at all that in the moment of his own death he focuses on the 
figure of his opponent – who brought his own rise to greatness to a sudden halt. 
Edmund’s acknowledgment of the trick that fate has played on him has more to 
do with a stoical acceptance of “the wheel of Fortune” rather than Christian 
contrition. Even in his last moments Edmund asserts his being when he confi-
dently says: “The wheel is come full circle. I am here” (Lear, 5.3.172). The ac-
knowledgement of love when he says: “Yet Edmund was beloved” is also turned 
into a final statement of the self as throughout the play Edmund’s commitment 
towards the sisters is never defined (Lear, 5.3.238). What seems to be of great 
importance is the fact that in his overhuman isolation Edmund never unambi-
guously acknowledges his affection to anyone. Hence, the assertion of his singu-
larity is pushed to the extreme. The answer to the question about Edmund’s 
capabilities of organizing the chaos of his passions may be sought in his final 
attempt at saving Lear and Cordelia. It is in this moment that Edmund not only 
embraces his physis but also tries to transfigure it as he acts “despite of [his] 
own nature” (Lear, 5.3.241). At no point does he ever express his regret though 
he shows he is not without any feeling. In his final act of “goodness” he shows 
himself as a Nietzschean life affirmer. Thus, similarly to Brutus and Macbeth, 
he dies in the awareness of his strength, in the spirit of the Nietzschean amor 
fati. Of course, the moral evaluation of his actions as well as the social tenability 
of his outlook on life may fuel endless axiological debates, yet it is unquestiona-
ble that his rampant individualism grows out of his overhuman potential. As 
mentioned, Edmund is far from the hatred-driven rabble of the Nietzschean 
chandala to which his circumstances force him to surrender. Edmund, the bas-
tard, has to make or remake himself from scratch as originally he has no com-
prehensible identity. This status of being an outcast, outlaw and fundamentally 
a rebel builds his overhuman potential, which arises from his denial of the ty-
ranny of the system. As a self-proclaimed overman he does not only see the 
hypocritical face of the system that claims a monopoly on nature but also refus-
es to be a cog in the machine. He is life-energy incarnated and this energy, like a 
wild sea wave, ultimately subsumes even itself.  
Shakespeare’s innovative characterization opens up a possibility of a re-
definition of nature and consequently morality. In the light of this concept, new-
ly redefined human identity becomes an object of analytical scrutiny. As hope-
fully demonstrated, Shakespeare’s characters indeed lend themselves to an 
analysis in the spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy. Like Marlowe’s protagonists, 
Shakespeare’s overhuman figures can be characterized by their strong will to 
power, which they employ in the process of overcoming. Brutus represents Sha-
kespeare’s early instance of singular identity, where solitary reflection becomes 
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a springboard for an identity-building process. Brutus’s singularity goes hand in 
hand with the cancellation of the so called “brotherly” values in agonistic com-
petition. Self-overcoming as a solitary enterprise is even more strongly por-
trayed in Macbeth, where the protagonist’s “rampant” reflectiveness is unders-
cored by his need for solitude. Macbeth, like Brutus, kills a parricidal figure and 
shakes off the influence of all those who threaten his process of self-creation. 
Edmund emerges as an elaboration of the stage Machiavel into an incarnation 
of Nietzschean vitality and the cult of life. Similarly to Brutus and Macbeth, he 
is also determined to overcome limiting circumstances even if this requires tak-
ing unethical steps. His choices are indeed morally twisted but he is, neverthe-
less, utterly captivating. Shakespearean figures, despite deepened moral reflec-
tion, do not really follow the orthodox Renaissance condemnation of ambition. 
The moral reflection of Brutus, Macbeth and Edmund does not culminate in 
remorse or regret, but rather in the total subjection to the life force and energy. 
Despite the tragic inherent in Shakespeare, his characters communicate a Nietz-
schean love of fate. Ambition emerges as a vista to self-overcoming in an eternal 
process of identity formation and rebuilding. One may wonder if the three cha-
racters under my scrutiny actually become overmen per se. In each instance 
there are some reservations. However, one has to bear in mind that Nietzsche’s 
philosophical project was halted by his premature breakdown while his style is 
notoriously elusive. For this reason, the definition of overhuman potential may 
at points seem frustratingly ungraspable. Hence, Shakespeare’s characters as 
witnessed by those I have scrutinized may also appear unfinished overmen. Yet 
if singular existence is indeed an eternal self-overcoming, maybe a precise con-
ceptualization of the overhuman identity is beyond our reach, while Shakes-
peare’s characters have eternally something new to tell and illustrate. The elu-
siveness of the overhuman, thus, means that the potential does not have to be 
exclusively male. Nietzschean perspectivism opens a possibility of looking for an 
overman, or to be more precise, overwoman among Shakespeare’s and Mar-
lowe’s female characters. Having analysed powerful male figures, I will now 
move on to a more detailed analysis of female figures, making Nietzsche’s 
thought again a guiding matrix. The task appears more difficult as a female sub-
ject is not taken for granted in early modern drama, while Nietzsche himself is 
also heavily entangled in the highly complex gender relations of his age. How-
ever, to my mind, the sheer challenge of the task makes it academically tempt-
ing and worthwhile. 
 
Chapter Five  
Das Überweib in Shakespeare’s  
and Marlowe’s plays: Lady Macbeth,  
Zenocrate and Lear’s daughters 
In her famous speech to the troops at Tilbury, Elizabeth I (1998: 102) ad-
dressed her soldiers by saying: “I know I have the body but of a weak and 
feeble woman, but I have a heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of Eng-
land too.”1 Like the other successful fruits of Elizabeth’s rhetorical skills, this 
famous statement of courage “in the midst and heat of battle” has been fre-
quently analysed by both historians and literary scholars – and, as it seems, 
the speech is a rhetorical pearl, as Elizabeth takes full advantage of the im-
plicit Renaissance misogyny present in it. Her speech constitutes the embrace 
and, at the same time, denial of the traditionally conceived idea of femininity 
or the female nature. By acknowledging her physical and physiological consti-
tution, she underscores her intellectual capacity, at the same time making the 
masculine a point of reference. In the 19th century, at the height of the Wil-
helmine patriarchy in Germany, Friedrich Nietzsche (2006c: 105) writes in 
Ecce Homo: “Oh, what dangerous, insidious, subterranean little beasts of prey 
they are! And so pleasant into the bargain!... – Woman is incomparably more 
evil than man, cleverer too; goodness in woman is a form of degeneration…” 
Nevertheless, I would like to argue, contrary to those who see Nietzsche as a 
  
1 Parts of the present chapter have already been printed in a volume published by 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego [Łódź University Press]. For more details see: 
Cieślak, Magdalena and Agnieszka Rasmus (eds.). 2015. Multicultural Shakespeare 12, 
9-165. (http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/mstap.2015.12.issue-27/issue-files/mstap. 
2015.12.issue-27.xml) (date of access: 17.09.2015). Łódź University Press kindly agreed 
to a republishing of the text in a slightly modified and expanded version in this book. 
Multicultural Shakespeare (12) features my article entitled “Re-gendering of the Nietz-
schean Übermensch in Shakespeare’s Macbeth and Marlowe’s Tamburlaine – the Case 
of Lady Macbeth and Zenocrate”. It includes the introduction to the present chapter, the 
section on Nietzsche and the feminine, the Renaissance and the feminine as well as sub-
stantial parts of the analysis of Zenocrate and Lady Macbeth.  
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blatant misogynist, Nietzsche in his statement is actually paying women a 
compliment, and his statement is only seemingly a sexist slur. Nietzsche’s 
reasoning and its conclusions, including his revaluation of values, are based 
on “Rückschluß, or conclusion a posteriori” (Babich 1996: 27). Not only must 
one try to grasp the whole context of his words, meaning the entirety of his 
thought, but one should also never take his words only at their face value. 
Knowing that his philosophy opens up to the absolute reversal of human 
valuations, placing value “beyond good and evil”, one should reconsider the 
Nietzschean stance on the feminine indeed. Elizabeth’s Tilbury speech, but 
not only this one, makes recourse to a similar reversal of roles and functions, 
which demands a reversal of reading. It is what is weak and feeble in you that 
ultimately becomes the very heart of strength. It is this intellectual parallel 
that can be drawn between the Renaissance Queen and the 19th century phi-
losopher that I would like to make a point of departure for a rereading of the 
early modern royal women in Shakespeare and Marlowe. First of all, I will 
focus on the comparison of roles and functions of the two dramatic Queens – 
the Shakespearean Lady Macbeth and the Marlovian Zenocrate – in the con-
text of both the early modern conception of femininity and Nietzschean ideas 
on overhuman potential. Secondly, I will draw attention to Shakespeare’s 
King Lear in the pursuit of the overhuman potential among Lear’s daughters. 
I want to scrutinize the same texts that have already been under my investiga-
tion when I analysed the overhuman potential of male characters. Such a de-
cision is driven by my intention of discussing the plays more thoroughly by 
comparing and contrasting both the male and the female perspectives. As 
Juliette Dusinberre (1975: 308) writes  
Shakespeare […] did not divide human nature into the masculine and the feminine, 
but observed in the individual woman or man an infinite variety of union between 
opposing impulses. To talk about Shakespeare’s women is to talk about his men, be-
cause he refused to separate their worlds physically, intellectually, or spiritually. 
This statement might not be entirely true for Marlowe. Yet I believe here too 
it is impossible to talk about Tamburlaine’s overhuman potential without 
Zenocrate, as it is her presence that gives artistic substance to many of his 
decisions and actions, as I have partly already pointed out when speaking 
about Tamburlaine’s “vicious greatness”. In the course of my analysis I would 
like to find out whether Nietzschean overhuman potential may be of a female 
nature and if yes, in what respects it approximates and differs from the male 
perspective. As Carol Diethe (1996: 77) writes, the notion of the Überweib in 
Nietzsche’s writing is “conspicuous by its absence.” Nevertheless, as feminist 
readings of Nietzsche by Sarah Kofman, Kelly Olivier, Luce Irigaray or Carol 
Diethe demonstrate, the female question cannot be overlooked when speaking 
about Nietzsche’s philosophy. Joan Kelly-Gadol (1977: 176) in her famous 
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article entitled: “Did women have a Renaissance?” answers her title question 
negatively by saying that: “there was no renaissance for women – at least, not 
during the Renaissance.” By pointing out changes in sexuality and sex/gender 
roles, she highlights the gradual stifling and oppression of women within the 
patriarchal family and domestic roles. The under-developed Marlovian female 
characters as well as Shakespearean fatal women can be partly inscribed 
within this pattern – something that Kathleen McLuskie (1985: 89) posited 
long ago when she heralded Shakespeare as “the patriarchal bard”. However, 
both playwrights do grant their female characters a limited space and field of 
activity, with different focuses and quite different consequences. Nietzsche, in 
his period was known as a “hater of women” (“Frauenhasser”), “despiser of 
women” (“Frauenverächter”), “enemy of women” (“Frauenfeind”), and “Anti-
feminist” (Helm 2004: 64). With all his apparent female-hate and misogyny, 
Nietzsche is, nevertheless, credited for the reintroduction of the body into the 
mainstream of Western philosophy – and as a consequence the appraisal of 
female sexuality against the backdrop of the Wilhelmine “legendary” cult of 
Hausfrau (cf. Helm 2004: 74-75, Diethe 1996: 73). In this context, the inter-
section of Nietzschean overhuman potential and the early-modern femininity 
emerges, in my opinion, as even more tempting. Nietzschean insights into the 
feminine may help to reread early-modern drama, adding a new moral edge to 
the plays while the reinvestigation of the philosophical significance of the 
feminine within the Nietzschean canon helps to explore an as yet unrealized 
possibility – a possibility of an overwoman.  
5.1. Nietzsche and the feminine, the Renaissance  
and the feminine  
As mentioned, the relationship between Nietzsche and the feminine is more 
than contentious. In order to get an instinctive grasp of just how far Nietzsche’s 
supposed misogyny could go, it is enough to recall the famous whip passage 
from Thus spoke Zarathustra, where Nietzsche (2006b: 50) declares: “You go 
to women? Do not forget the whip!”.2 Apart from this, probably the most shock-
ing example, there are yet other aphorisms in the Nietzsche canon where the 
  
2 Here, like in the case of other statements on women, a too-hasty condemnation of 
Nietzsche as a misogynist is far from being objective. As Peter J. Burgard (1994: 4) ex-
plains, in order to give justice to the whip-passage one has to render it with proper punc-
tuation, namely, double quotation. It is part of Zarathustra’s conversation with the old 
woman and, to be precise, the statement is uttered by the woman. So the words are not 
only doubly removed from Nietzsche, but also belong to the narrative of “a fictionalized 
philosophy” . On top of that, the sentence ends with an exclamation mark, which, accord-
ing to Burgard (1994: 5) is “at least potentially a mark of irony”. 
Charter Five 250 
philosopher is, euphemistically speaking, critical of women. As Peter J. Burgard 
(1994: 2) suggests, there are two ways of approaching “Nietzsche’s sexist ti-
rades”. The first one is to ignore Nietzsche’s attacks on femininity and focus on 
other aspects of his philosophy. The second option involves a more creative and 
deeper engagement with Nietzscheanism. The former is actually the attitude so 
far taken by the majority of scholars, going back to the seminal scholarly works 
on Nietzsche by Walter Kaufmann (Burgard 1994: 2). Kaufmann (1974: 84) in 
his influential study claims that “Nietzsche’s writings contain many all-too-
human judgments – especially about women – but these are philosophically 
irrelevant.” As Burgard suggests, Kaufmann’s dismissal of the significance of the 
female question was not only ill-judged on the part of Kaufmann, but also “has 
seriously hindered the advancement of our understanding of Nietzsche” (Bur-
gard 1994: 3). Despite Kaufmann’s immense contribution to the study of 
Nietzschean philosophy, I must admit that I am rather of Burgard’s opinion. It 
seems that the closing of Nietzsche’s philosophy on women is too easy an op-
tion, especially that, paradoxically, it was Nietzsche’s writing that drove the 
development of feminism in Germany, as the works of early German feminist 
writers like Hedwig Dohm or Helene Stöcker demonstrate.3 The engagement of 
early German feminists with Nietzsche shows, to my mind, that the rejection of 
his philosophy on the basis of its seeming misogyny would be an act of intellec-
tual cowardice. Modern-day feminist writers appear to share my feelings, as 
there appear/are appearing more and more works tackling the feminine in 
Nietzsche. The newly-emerging canon is opened by Luce Irigaray’s love letter 
written to Friedrich Nietzsche entitled Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche. 
Frances Oppel (1993: 79) aptly observes that: “[t]his amorous sexual relation-
ship seems unlikely; what, after all, is a subtle feminist, who until this point 
stressed the pleasures of lesbian love-making, doing in a relationship of amo-
rous sexuality with a moustachioed misogynist like Nietzsche?” Irigaray seems 
to be taking the position of mockery, on the one hand. On the other, however, in 
her “love letter” to Nietzsche she engages intimately in Nietzsche’s thought. By 
mocking Nietzsche she approaches the exclusion of the feminine from the dis-
course of Western philosophy and the appropriation of the female body; and her 
intense investigation of his thought uncovers Nietzsche’s fascination with preg-
nancy, motherhood and hence “an affirmation of woman”. Yet as Ansell-
Pearson (1993: 40) observes, through Irigaray one learns that “Nietzsche af-
firms woman as the source of life only by denying to woman her independent 
reality and experience of the world.” So Nietzsche seems to be condoning patri-
  
3 To learn more about early German feminists and their responses to Nietzsche’s mi-
sogyny, see: Helm, Barbara. 2004. “Combating misogyny? Responses to Nietzsche by 
turn-of-the-century German feminists”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies 27: 64-84, or Di-
ethe, Carol. 1996. “Nietzsche and the early German feminists”, Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies 12: 69-81. 
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archal order while at the same time questioning it. Kelly Olivier (1995: 17) in her 
Womanizing Nietzsche asks a very crucial question: “As a woman, how can I 
read Nietzsche’s text?” I would build on this question and ask: How can I crea-
tively transform and utilize the heritage of Nietzsche to speak of female experi-
ence? In a sense, following in Irigaray’s and Olivier’s footsteps, I suggest that 
one should use Nietzsche’s own weapons against him. I strongly believe that 
when combined with Elizabethan and Jacobean source texts, Nietzsche’s appar-
ent aversion can be creatively used to expose the past conditions of oppressive 
systems and historical patterns of misogyny. 
As already mentioned, Nietzsche himself wrote against an oppressive 
system, in the conditions of a strongly stratified, hierarchical society and re-
stricting Lutheran morality. His writings often shocked the public, but as Carol 
Diethe (1996: 72) points out: “Nietzsche was certainly not dynamite when he 
attacked socialism, feminism, or for that matter, democracy: he was main-
stream conservative.” The issue whether one should expect more insight into 
the matter of women from such an otherwise insightful thinker as Nietzsche is a 
matter for another discussion. Nevertheless, as can be seen, Nietzsche’s assess-
ment of women is rather a product of his period and, more generally speaking, 
the tradition of Western philosophy. Kelly Oliver (1995: 17) writes that 
Nietzsche’s outlook is original and innovative as it “opens up the discussion of 
representing the other.” However, it still “closes off the possibility of 
representing the feminine other. He opens up the possibility of interpreting 
otherwise, but he excludes woman from the process of interpretation” (Olivier 
1995: 17). As it seems, this long tradition of exclusion, so strengthened by the 
Hegelian model, goes back to the Renaissance. Cartesian rationality, so often 
seen as the founding principle of the early modern (and later modern) subjec-
tivity, is undoubtedly a stepping stone in the history of philosophy. Yet one has 
to remember that it is a philosophy in which the masculine subject is always the 
point of reference. A huge body of early modern texts, both pre-Cartesian and 
post-Cartesian, present a woman as “an incomplete man” (Augtherson 1998: 
419). For instance, it is enough to cast just a cursory look at John Calvin’s 
(1998: 440) works to learn that: “the woman taketh her original from the man, 
by order therefore she is the inferior or the latter.” In the famous Homily of the 
state of matrimony one learns that the greatest value of a good wife is that she 
bends her will to the will of her husband (Homily of the state of matrimony, 
1998: 435). The research fruits of cultural materialists and new historicists have 
already demonstrated that the idea of Renaissance subjectivity, if not totally 
illusive, is definitely enslaved by the oppressive workings of ideology, and hence 
a far more complicated, exclusive rather than inclusive, phenomenon. It is how-
ever, important to note that the Renaissance discovery of a thinking subject is 
often attributed to Jacob Burckhardt, Nietzsche’s contemporary and a great 
inspiration to the philosopher. Burckhardt (2004: 98, 250) capitalizes on “the 
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development of the Individual” but at the same time he underscores the equality 
of men and women in Renaissance Italy. As mentioned, there is ground to sus-
pect that Burckhardt’s cult of individuality found its way into the Nietzschean 
conception of the over-man. The Burckhardian fascination with the primeval 
instincts of the Italian despots fighting ruthlessly for power, their “raw” manli-
ness, is, to my mind, something that might have stirred Nietzsche’s imagination 
and led to the conceptualization of the overhuman potential. Nietzsche’s Burck-
hardt-infused vision of the Renaissance makes me believe, despite Nietzsche’s 
misogynist innuendoes, that the overhuman potential does not have to be exclu-
sively masculine. Therefore, I see Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth as a first-hand 
candidate for the Übermensch, or Überweib to be more precise. Nietzsche 
might have not believed that women could have overhuman potential and that 
is why I believe that Marlowe’s Zenocrate, on the other hand, is closer to the 
ultimate Nietzschean vision of what a woman should be. Lear’s three daughters 
share overhuman potential but, as I will be arguing, they realize it on different 
plains and with separate means and aims. However, all these women are prod-
ucts of gendered discourse and thus subliminally communicate some Renais-
sance gender stereotyping.  
5.2. Critical responses and interpretative paths  
on Lady Macbeth and Marlowe’s women 
Before I plunge into the depths of a more detailed analysis of Shakespeare’s and 
Marlowe’s overwomen, I would like to address the existing body of criticism on 
two of the aforementioned women: Lady Macbeth and Zenocrate. This seems 
crucial as the interpretative paths explored so far either relegate these women to 
secondary and passive roles or, if grant them overhuman activity, evaluate their 
actions and decisions as evil or unnatural. The impression seems to be particularly 
strong in the case of Lady Macbeth, to whom critical responses seem to be so nu-
merous that they have grown into a separate locus in Shakespearean studies. The 
figure of Zenocrate has spurred relatively fewer critics to into a response. So far 
she seems to have been inscribed within a wider reflection on the portrayal of 
women in Marlowe’s plays. In the following paragraphs, I intend to engage in 
polemics with both of these critical directions. Analyses of Lady Macbeth fre-
quently seem to be motivated by either indignation at the violence of her motiva-
tion and deeds, or revolve around attempts at alleviating her share in the brutality 
pictured in the play. Lucy Brasher (1980: 14) points out that Lady Macbeth is sub-
ject to two popular interpretative visions, namely, that of a “wicked wife” image 
and that of a “terrible mother” stereotype. Marvin Rosenberg’s (1978: 160-195) 
record of possible attitudes to her also captures a similar spectrum: from a mon-
strous woman, to a wife who is full of care and sexually appealing. It is important 
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to note that all these possibilities assume a fixed and solid set of expectations con-
cerning the “right” enactment of femininity and masculinity as well as a strict 
separation of female and male prerogatives. As long as one engages in the investi-
gation of the early modern conceptions of male and female roles and their bearing 
on the constructions of the characters in Macbeth, such an attitude seems to be 
justified. Yet what many critics do is carry these misconceptions to their “modern” 
conclusions about Macbeth and his wife, assuming that these ideas are universals 
– rather than specimens of gender performativity.  
Sometimes even those critics that seem to perceive the artificiality of 
gender essentialism nevertheless end up upholding its tenets. For instance, 
Carolyn Asp (1981: 153) writes that “Lady Macbeth consciously attempts to 
reject her feminine sensibility and adopt a male mentality because she perce-
ives that her society equates feminine qualities with weakness.” For Asp 
(1981: 154), unlike Macbeth, Lady Macbeth rejects and frustrates her nature. 
Marilyn French (1992: 23) in her classic article “Macbeth and masculine val-
ues” attributes Lady Macbeth’s tragedy to the rejection of the so called “femi-
nine principle”. While Macbeth is seen, at the closing of the play, as a traitor, 
Lady Macbeth emerges as downright evil. French (1992: 17) writes: “Her 
crime is heinous because it violates her social role, which has been erected 
into principle of experience: she fails to uphold the feminine principle. For 
her, as for Goneril, this failure plunges her more deeply into a pit of evil than 
any man can ever fall.” This means that just as Macbeth violated the moral 
law, his wife offended the natural law (French 1992: 16). In response to these 
accusations, I can only pose a rhetorical question that also responds in the 
same vein as Nietzsche’s philosophy: What is really nature and why do we 
usurp the right to know its judgements? I strongly believe that Shakespeare 
problematizes, rather than essentializes, gender construction and the notion 
of nature. I also believe that both Macbeth and Lady Macbeth are driven by 
separate wills to power, as the will to power is a human instinct, and so it can 
be both feminine and masculine. For the same reason, I find criticism – that 
underscores binary oppositions – quite problematic. Critics often see Lady 
Macbeth as a text function that is introduced to “bring out the character of 
Macbeth” (Yüksel 2005: 65). With the action unfolding and Macbeth’s grow-
ing bravado, her presence is radically diminished (Yüksel 2005: 73). Yet her 
subsequent mental disintegration does not, in my opinion, cancel her intense 
motivation and action in the opening scenes. It seems that the tradition of 
seeing Lady Macbeth strictly as a binary opposition to Macbeth goes back to 
Nietzsche’s near contemporary, Sigmund Freud, who believed that it is im-
possible to read the couple’s characters separately. Following Ludwig Jekels, 
Freud (1992: 44) suggests that Lady Macbeth might not be a separate figure, 
but rather a complementary element of Macbeth’s personality. Freud (1992: 
44) claims that: “In that case it would of course be pointless to regard her as 
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an independent character and seek to discover the motives of her change, 
without considering the Macbeth who completes her.” Yet Freud (1992: 42) 
seems to be reading Lady Macbeth’s resolve and motivation as a clinical 
symptom of some malady arising from her childlessness, assuming that it is a 
pathological condition for a woman to remain childless. Freud’s remark car-
ries a lot of the 19th century misogyny that also erupts occasionally in 
Nietzsche’s remarks on women. As I will be demonstrating, this misogyny is 
reminiscent of the early-modern patriarchal conception of feminine identity. 
Thus, Nietzsche’s (like Freud’s) ideas help to illuminate the workings of the 
early modern perception on female identity.  
Yet even some of the contemporary critics believe that Lady Macbeth’s 
murderous determination is a sign of mental instability. Christine Couche 
(2010: 137) analyses Lady Macbeth’s language and behaviour as an expression 
of postpartum or postnatal psychosis. In her first soliloquy, Lady Macbeth sup-
posedly presents “a bizarre invocation of supernatural forces which reflects a 
manic sense of being all-powerful” (Couche 2010: 141). Convincing as some of 
Couche’s arguments may be, the assumption that Lady Macbeth is unstable 
from the start is a matter of pure conjecture. This conjecture does violence to 
Shakespeare’s text as the feeling of power and might is central to both Mac-
beths’ aims and aspirations. I personally marvel at the ease with which some 
people are determined to label immorality as a consequence of a mental short-
coming. An all-too-hasty judgement that there must be something wrong with 
Lady Macbeth’s head because she demonstrates incredible agility and resolve in 
her actions, seems to kill the very beauty of her inexplicability. Though A.C. 
Bradley (1992: 322), in a slightly Freudian vein, does not distinguish between 
Lady Macbeth and her husband, capitalizing rather on their similarities, he 
seems to be right when he heralds Lady Macbeth as among “the most-awe in-
spiring figures that Shakespeare drew”. The awe that Bradley has in mind stems 
exactly from Lady Macbeth’s determination, or to use Nietzsche’s terminology, 
from her strong will to power. Bradley sees Macbeth as a tragedy of ambition, 
and for once I totally agree with his labelling. He writes:  
[t]hese two characters are fired by one and the same passion of ambition; and to a 
considerable extent they are alike. The disposition of each is high, proud, and 
commanding. They are born to rule, if not to reign. They are peremptory or con-
temptuous to their inferiors. They are not children of light, like Brutus and Ham-
let; they are of the world. We observe in them no love of country, and no interest 
in the welfare of anyone outside their family. (Bradley 1992: 306)  
Hence, as can be seen, Bradley senses the same Nietzschean egoism in Lady 
Macbeth as the one defining also Macbeth. If then Macbeth, as I have been 
trying to demonstrate, is a potential overman, his wife, at moments so much 
more determined than him, is obviously a potential overwoman. To read her 
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simply as a degenerate witch or a madwoman, who leads her husband astray, 
is to deny Macbeth his aspiration and determination to reach his goals. On 
the other hand, seeing her only as his complementary element diminishes her 
own will to overcome obstacles that stand in their way for their common 
glory. It might be true that, as some critics point out, Lady Macbeth has no 
ambition of her own. As Cristina León Alfar (2009: 114) frequently observes, 
Lady Macbeth is foremost a seat of Macbeth’s desire. As in the case of Lear’s 
daughters, her role is to reflect Macbeth’s aspirations. For this reason, she 
becomes “Shakespeare’s parodic depiction of a wifely duty” (Alfar 2009: 113). 
Alfar’s argument seems very apt as, indeed, Lady Macbeth’s actions all con-
tribute to Macbeth’s success. Nevertheless, even if she fuses her husband’s 
glory with her own resolve, one cannot deny that is it she who actively helps 
to fulfil his dreams. Even if the aims of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth are com-
mon, their wills to power are separate. Thus, it is Lady Macbeth’s singular 
process of over-coming that brings her own sense of achievement, even if 
what is actually achieved belongs to her husband. It seems unjustified to read 
Lady Macbeth as a text function, and this argument is true for other “prob-
lematic” women in Shakespeare’s canon – unlike in the plays of Marlowe, 
where women’s psychology seems by far inferior to that of Shakespeare.  
Until the publication of Simon Shepherd’s ground-breaking book Mar-
lowe and the politics of Elizabethan Theatre (1986), there has been very little 
critical attention devoted to Marlowe’s dramatic women. His female characters 
had been largely dismissed by critics as “one-dimensional and wooden”, to use 
Emily C. Bartels’ (1993: 25) phrase. Against the critical grain of seeing them as 
such, Bartels (1993: 25) herself observes that Marlowe’s heroines are rather 
“two-dimensional and contradictory because they reinscribe a difference that 
they simultaneously resist.” In recent years, with this new niche opened up by 
Shepherd’s and Bartels’ analyses, there has been more interest in Marlovian 
female characters. Nevertheless, as Bartels (1993: 25) points out, they still re-
main “problematic”. There is no denying that in Marlowe’s plays women occupy 
secondary or even third-rate positions. Dido, the only leading heroine of Mar-
lowe, ends her existence in very piteous circumstances; this is not to mention 
the fact that her monarchical position is taken advantage of by Aeneas to further 
his imperial aspirations. All the other women too are overshadowed by all-
powerful and charismatic masculine figures. Joanna Gibbs (2000: 164) explains 
that this happens partly due to Marlowe’s thematic devotion to physically strong 
and powerful masculine figures. He indeed demonstrates very little interest in 
the feminine nature or agency. As Kate Chedgzoy (2004: 249) points out: “[i]t is 
becoming clear that in Marlowe’s dramatic worlds women are conceptualized as 
the objects and medium of power rather than its agents: these are plays which 
both expose and participate in the subjugation and objectification of women by 
men.” The women become objects in transactions conducted by men, as hap-
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pens in the case of Zenocrate, whose marriage to Tamburlaine serves to legitim-
ize his conquest of Asia and add splendour to his newly-acquired kingly disposi-
tion. As Shepherd (1986: 180) observes women serve as a “fetishising of objects 
within gender relations”, while the plays are “trying to foreground the male 
gaze, to show specifically the male control of stage space.” Not only is Zenocrate 
“fetishized” into an object but also Helen of Troy is summoned by Dr Faustus to 
be looked at and admired (Doctor Faustus, 5.2.88-103). Abigail is literally 
equalled with material goods when Barabas exclaims: “O my girl/ My gold, my 
fortune, my felicity!” (Jew, 2.1.46-47). As can be seen, female characters are 
granted some agency, but only if their actions serve men’s interests, as happens 
in Abigail’s case. She serves her father dutifully, but her act of resistance is se-
verely punished by her death. Female determination, if it occurs infrequently, 
serves the annihilation of the agent e.g. when Olympia tricks Theridamas into 
stabbing her in the neck (Tamb. 2, 1.3.1-98). For her, the only way to escape 
Theridamas’ forced advances is to take her own life. As she herself claims:  
[d]istress’d Olympia, whose weeping eyes, 
Since thy arrival here, behold no sun, 
But, clos’d within the compass of a tent, 
Have stain’d thy cheeks, and made thee look like death, 
Devise some means to rid thee of thy life,  
Rather than yield to his detested suit, 
Whose drift is only to dishonour thee. (Tamb. 2, 1.3.1-7)  
Her cunning stratagem with the use of “magical” ointment that supposedly 
guarantees iron-hard and blade-resistant skin ironically plays on the central 
topic of Tamburlaine plays, namely, the masculine fantasy of invincibility. 
This vision of immortal power is exactly what Tamburlaine fashions himself 
into. However, as demonstrated, the female agency falls under the pressure of 
masculine desires. Yet as Gibbs (2000: 164) argues:  
[i]n Marlowe’s plays women often are allowed to make inroads into male space 
and actively engage in statesmanship. What is more, those of Marlowe’s women 
who do make authoritative interventions adopt attitudes at odds with the critical 
conception of them as inclining to privacy and harbouring feelings relating to mat-
ters of the heart to the exclusion of issues of policy. 
This argument seems to be true in the case of Isabella, Edward II’s wife, who 
skilfully manoeuvres between politics and affection. Gibbs (2000: 165-166), 
following Shepherd, observes that Isabella senses that the love bestowed by the 
King on those close to him is really more of a political tool that enables him to 
maintain position and security rather than an expression of an emotional need. 
Yet I would argue that even in Isabella’s case it is impossible to say that she 
overcomes the limitations of gender expectations in patriarchy, rather she 
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makes the most of these limitations to enact a role that only “invisibly” subverts 
the system and enables her survival. She is first able to secure her place at the 
court by appealing to Edward’s and later Mortimer’s feelings. In the face of the 
unfolding events, unlike her lover Mortimer, she stays alive, but her survival is 
hardly an example of overhuman potential, especially in that she can only make 
it through by internalizing the gender-specific expectation of herself as a weak, 
unstable and excessively passionate tool in the hands of men.  
Critics often observe that Marlowe’s female characters are not all the 
same. As Gibbs (2000: 175) claims: “[d]ifferentiating between women – some of 
whom seek subversively to reinscribe themselves within patriarchy while others 
acquiesce to it, or simply misunderstand it and suffer accordingly – Marlowe 
does more than reduce women to apolitical vessels of feeling who are nothing 
but adjuncts of his male characters.” I believe my brief record of Marlovian he-
roines illustrates this point. Hopefully, at the same time, it demonstrates that 
there seems little ground for the pursuit of overwomen in Marlowe’s plays. The 
female presence in his plays rather serves to emphasize the overhuman poten-
tial of the male characters. For this reason, I decided to include the analysis of 
Zenocrate, especially as a counterbalance to Lady Macbeth who, to my mind, is 
a very influential and imposing figure, characterized by her overhuman poten-
tial. Marlowe himself might have not been insensitive to female experience. 
However, I believe that he was fairly uninterested in women, which is con-
firmed by the relatively small textual contribution of his female characters as 
well as their secondary positions. This means that Marlowe’s women are closer 
to a Nietzschean vision of a woman as man’s companion, wife and mother, ra-
ther than an independent Überweib, which becomes a key element in my read-
ing of Zenocrate and her role. Bartels (1993: 25) aptly points out that: “[e]ven as 
Marlowe exposes male dominance as male dominance, he presents women who, 
despite initial acts of resistance, are willingly complicitous in enforcing its 
terms, and who are unaware or indifferent to the limitations that we see in their 
circumscribed situations.” Such is exactly Zenocrate’s attitude as her initial 
defiance towards Tamburlaine turns into absolute loyalty, even at the cost of 
previous family ties and personal entanglements. Lady Macbeth’s loyalty and 
support for her husband’s desires is of equal measure, but frequently too it is 
she who stands at the helm of their marriage vessel.  
5.3. Lady Macbeth and Zenocrate 
I would like to open my discussion on Zenocrate and Lady Macbeth by a reference 
to Carol Diethe (1996: 70) who very aptly summarizes the Nietzschean attitude 
towards women by calling it “a procedure […] of the typical middle-class male, 
who simultaneously idealized and feared woman in equal measure, and solved the 
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conflict by dividing women into two types, the Eves and the Madonnas.” Yet, ac-
cording to Diethe (1996: 70), for Nietzsche all women are, in a sense, Eves. In this 
assessment, Nietzsche is not far from the popular portrayal of women in the Ren-
aissance, which sees a woman as the seed of the original sin – the ultimate inciter 
and the temptress. In the popular misogynist poem by C. Pyrrye (1996: 429) enti-
tled The praise and dispraise of women (1551) one reads: “Also as Eve from joyful 
place,/ (alas, alas the while)/ Her posterity did deface,/ and cast into exile.” This 
essentialist dual picture of female nature is also inscribed within the fabrics of 
Elizabethan and Jacobean drama. Just as Lady Macbeth could be read as a pro-
verbial Eve, so can Zenocrate be seen in terms of an unsexed Madonna. Both of 
these women share some common features. They are both companions to their 
excessively ambitious husbands. The relationships with their husbands are very 
intense and passionate, though the nature of these passions seems to be quite 
different. So too is the nature of their respective companionships and relations 
with the men. The first encounter with Lady Macbeth informs us of a relative 
equality between the spouses as well as quite a substantial degree of intimacy 
between them. In the fatal letter which apparently infects Lady Macbeth’s mind 
with ambition and a temptation to murder Duncan, Macbeth calls her his “dearest 
partner of greatness” (Macbeth, 1.5.11). In the following reflections of Lady Mac-
beth on her husband she expresses her doubt in Macbeth. She says: “yet do I fear 
thy nature;/ It is too full o’ the milk of human kindness/ To catch the nearest way: 
thou wouldst be great;/ Art not without ambition; but without/ The illness should 
attend it” (Macbeth, 1.5.16-20). In her vision, he might be too soft for the future 
roles she would like to see him in. Interestingly, Lady Macbeth never questions 
her own strength of will in the pursuit of power. She says: “[h]ie thee hither, That I 
may pour my spirits in thine ear; And chastise with the valour of my tongue” 
(Macbeth, 1.5.25-27). So, from the start it is visible that she frames herself as the 
architect of the future order of things. The first encounter with Zenocrate, on the 
other hand, is quite different. As we know, her passage through the lands con-
quered by Tamburlaine is halted by his army. As a consequence, she is held hos-
tage and, as Shepherd (1986: 179) calls her, she becomes “part of the loot of an 
ambush” . In the first conversation between Tamburlaine and Zenocrate he more 
or less plainly informs her of his intentions. Initially Zenocrate, the daughter of 
the sultan of Egypt, disdains Tamburlaine. Her contempt seems to have a class 
difference underpinning it as she says: “Ah, shepherd, pity my distressed plight!/ 
(If, as thou seem’st, thou art so mean a man,)/ And seek not to enrich thy follow-
ers/ By lawless rapine from a silly maid” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.7-10). Zenocrate is under-
standably not happy with the prospect of becoming a concubine or even wife to 
the shepherd warrior. What is more, she seems to hate the idea of being a trophy 
wife, a kind of an ornament and legitimization for Tamburlaine’s conquest, to 
make it even worse – taken by force. Yet despite this, she nevertheless down-
grades herself by calling herself “a silly maid”. Having no other alternative, she 
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yields to Tamburlaine and says: “I must be pleas’d perforce,— wretched Ze-
nocrate!” (Tamb. 1, 1.2.258). Her first meeting with Tamburlaine almost coincides 
with the arrival of Theridamas, with whom Tamburlaine parleys to make him join 
forces. Zenocrate is a witness to the conversation and her aristocratic presence, in 
a sense, seals the deal. Interestingly enough, once Zenocrate stops being part of 
the bargain she undergoes a surprising change of heart. From Scene II in Act III, 
when in her conversation, she announces: “Ah, life and soul, still hover in his 
breast,/ And leave my body senseless as the earth,/ Or else unite you to his life 
and soul,/ That I may live and die with Tamburlaine!” (Tamb. 1, 3.2.21-24), she 
becomes passionately, almost blindly, loyal to Tamburlaine and she becomes his 
ever present companion.  
Unlike the relationship of Lady Macbeth and Macbeth, Zenocrate’s and 
Tamburlaine’s relation is, at least originally, non-sexual. Though Zenocrate is 
often deemed Tamburlaine’ “concubine” by his opponents (Agydas, Zabina etc.) 
she herself mentions only “[h]is talk much sweeter than the Muses’ song” (Tamb. 
1, 3.2.50). When Tamburlaine first meets the Sultan, her father, he says of Zeno-
crate: “[a]nd for all blot of foul inchastity,/ I record heaven, her heavenly self is 
clear” (Tamb. 1, 5.1.489-490), which clearly suggests that the expression of affec-
tion among them is limited to this almost chivalric game of wooing with beautiful 
words. Shepherd (1986: 183) points out that “[h]ere the feeling for Zenocrate, 
especially the fetishising of her chastity, fits into place in the imperial project.” 
What is also important is the fact that Tamburlaine speaks poetry to a woman who 
evidently has no other choice than to listen to it, while this “talk much sweeter 
than the Muses’ song” is used by him to cover up authentic power relations 
(Shepherd 1986: 184-185). In Macbeth the situation is quite the opposite. There is 
no poetry to obscure the power relations. The power dynamics evidently demon-
strate Lady Macbeth’s self-confidence as well as the passionate nature of their 
marriage. She challenges Macbeth: “Art thou afeard/ To be the same in thine own 
act and valor/ As thou art in desire?” (Macbeth, 1.7.43-45). Of course, her words 
might be read twofold, but I would argue that Lady Macbeth contrasts Macbeth’s 
sexual capacity and his virulent libido with his political naiveté and meekness. In 
her vision of manhood political caution or obedient conservatism are equal to 
emasculation. In a very Nietzschean way Lady Macbeth clearly wants to channel 
or transfigure Macbeth’s libido into a more effective will to power. However, as 
mentioned, she fears Macbeth’s nature burdened with “the milk of human kind-
ness”, or in Nietzschean terminology – mediocrity. Nietzsche would see that, more 
than often, the so called “good” impulses are really sublimated low instincts (Hol-
lingdale 2001: 144-145). This is why Lady Macbeth senses fear in Macbeth’s soft-
ness and pity. Following Nietzsche (2002: 84-85) in Beyond good and evil, one 
could say that Lady Macbeth is a “tropical” woman – a kind of a Cesare Borgia 
figure, in Nietzsche’s aphorism deemed a “man of prey”, the “healthiest of all trop-
ical monsters”. Lady Macbeth has a very acute sense of human instincts, both her 
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husband’s as well as her own. She wants to embrace them and take advantage of 
them. This, in Nietzschean terms, is a sign of health and strength.4 However, de-
spite the sexual tension and intimacy that is implicit in the conversations of Mac-
beth and his wife, it seems to be clear that she resents Macbeth for his qualms. She 
keeps on questioning his manhood and tries to change this “temperate man” into 
more than a man (Nietzsche 2002: 85). She tells him: “[w]hen you durst do it, 
then you were a man;/ And, to be more than what you were, you would/ Be so 
much more the man” (Macbeth, 1.7.56-57). Lady Macbeth puts Macbeth in the 
chains of a very limiting, essentialist definition of manhood and one has a feeling 
that the more she pushes him to “greatness”, the less respect she can muster for 
him. After all, she is the one who plans the murder and carries out her plan – us-
ing Macbeth more as her tool rather than treating him as a partner in this trans-
gression. She explicitly demands relinquishing all control over the enterprise from 
Macbeth for the sake of her command when she claims: “and you shall put/ This 
night’s great business into my despatch;/ Which shall to all our nights and days to 
come/ Give solely sovereign sway and masterdom” (Macbeth, 1.6.79-82). So, one 
can see that in the case of Macbeth there is a reversed mechanism as compared to 
Tamburlaine. The intensity of passion between Macbeth and his wife shrinks ra-
pidly together with the increase of their power. This is, in my opinion, due to the 
misguided expectations the spouses have of one another. Lady Macbeth’s con-
straining ideal of masculinity far exceeds Macbeth’s capacity to live up to her vi-
sion. Macbeth also seems astounded by her energy and managing skills. Lady 
Macbeth, to my mind, does not only exceed the expectations of Macbeth, she gen-
erally does not fit in with the pattern of Renaissance femininity defined by total 
obedience and subjugation to the husband. At one point Macbeth resolves not to 
kill Duncan when he says: “We will proceed no further in this business” (Macbeth, 
1.7.34). Faced with quite a firm decision to give up the plan, she responds with a 
bitter attack on Macbeth’s manhood. Such behaviour is far beyond the traditional-
ly conceived Renaissance wife’s obedience. However, as mentioned, this reversal 
of roles as well as the rise in power results in the disintegration of their intimate 
union. In Tamburlaine, the opposite takes place – the more power Tamburlaine 
gains, the more Zenocrate feels inclined to fall for him.  
If, as mentioned, it is not physical intimacy that brings Tamburlaine 
and Zenocrate together, one may ask what fuels Zenocrate’s change of atti-
tude towards Tamburlaine. I believe it is exactly Tamburlaine’s increase of 
power and influence that Zenocrate finds so appealing. Tamburlaine seems to 
be aware of this mechanism. For this reason, he waits with the wedding until 
his position as the ultimate ruler of the East is secured. I would also argue 
that it is his manliness defined as the animalic drive towards mastery that 
  
4 For more information on “tropical men”, see: Beyond good and evil (aphorism 197) 
and Nietzsche’s elaboration on the topic in The twilight of the idols (IX 37).  
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makes him such a charismatic figure both for his companions and Zenocrate. 
Agydas, Zenocrate’s servant, is totally perplexed when he finds out that Zeno-
crate, initially so dismayed at Tamburlaine, feels strongly attracted to him. He 
exclaims in total shock: 
[h]ow can you fancy one that looks so fierce, 
Only dispos’d to martial stratagems? 
Who, when he shall embrace you in his arms, 
Will tell how many thousand men he slew;  
And, when you look for amorous discourse, 
Will rattle forth his facts of war and blood, 
Too harsh a subject for your dainty ears. (Tamb. 1, 3.2.39-45) 
Yet for Zenocrate, obviously in love, Tamburlaine is “fair”. In warfare he has 
absolutely no brakes, his ambition sees no limiting horizon, because he is the 
“Horizon-stretcher.”5 But in love he has only “sweet words” for Zenocrate. So 
Tamburlaine is an artist clad in the robes of a barbarian or, the other way 
around, he is a barbarian with artistic leanings. Anyhow this explosive mixture 
forms his overhuman potential that wins also Zenocrate’s heart. Nietzsche 
(2006b: 28), in his highly poetic style, famously announces: “Courageous, un-
concerned, sarcastic, violent – thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and al-
ways loves only a warrior” – though Nietzsche uses his woman-metaphor here 
to speak about wisdom rather than women. His comment perfectly illustrates 
the Tamburlaine-Zenocrate dynamics. Shepherd (1986: 184) believes that Mar-
lowe portrays Zenocrate as a woman who “has no desires”, which supposedly 
proves that the text does not only show a sexist ideology, but is openly sexist. As 
far as I agree that Tamburlaine is downright misogynist in his appropriation of 
Zenocrate, I also believe that she is genuinely attracted to him. Zenocrate’s not 
aware of the controlling “male gaze”, that Shepherd points out, in her conversa-
tion with Agydas, so there is no need to doubt the authenticity of her falling for 
Tamburlaine. Once in love with her rough warrior, she also finds in herself pre-
viously unknown reserves of cruelty and excessive indulgence in power. In her 
treatment of Zabina she matches Tamburlaine in her exaggerated display of 
violence. Of course, in everything she does she always stays in the shadow of 
Tamburlaine. In this she does not only fulfill an early modern role traditionally 
cut out for women, but she also approximates a very Nietzschean ideal of wom-
anhood. In Beyond good and evil Nietzsche (2002: 69) claims that: 
“[c]omparing man and woman overall, you could say: woman would not have a 
genius for finery if she did not have an instinct for the secondary role.” One can 
  
5 In her newest account of Marlowe’s drama Lisa Hopkins calls Marlowe “the Hori-
zon-stretcher”. To read more, see: Hopkins, Lisa. 2008. Christopher Marlowe – A Re-
naissance dramatist. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 106. 
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feel indignation reading Nietzsche’s comments on women, especially because of 
their inescapable essentialism, which is otherwise criticized in Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy. However, there is no escaping an observation that in the case of Ze-
nocrate a “secondary” role is something that she embraces willingly, taking ad-
vantage of the “finery” that is implicit in it. What is more, the Zabina/ Zenocrate 
dynamics also underscore the early-modern (as well as very Nietzschean as it 
seems) division of women into two ideologically-constraining categories of Eves 
and Madonnas. As Shepherd (1986: 189) writes: “Tamburlaine singles out 
Zabina for particular humiliation, specifically insisting that other women mis-
treat her, just as he singles out Zenocrate for particular veneration.” So, one can 
see that “the ideological opposition passionate/chaste woman is inflected by the 
male conqueror [...]” Zenocrate passes her loyalty test through her chastity. She 
encapsulates the Nietzschan vision of the feminine also in other aspects where 
Lady Macbeth apparently fails, namely, in her maternal duties.  
Zenocrate is a mother of three sons, who in the dreams of Tamburlaine 
follow in his footsteps to become “the scourge and terror of the world” (Tamb. 
2, 1.3.59). Having fulfilled her most significant role of bringing sons to the 
world, Zenocrate is asked by Tamburlaine to: “rest […] like a lovely queen” 
(Tamb. 2, 1.2.16). And from now on her role is pretty much limited to being 
“lovely” – if indeed her role was ever anything other than that. Tamburlaine 
continues to venerate her chastity even when she is his wife and the mother of 
his children. As Burnett (1991: 34) writes: “[t]he aestheticizing of Zenocrate is 
also, of course, robbing her of any sexual threat; Tamburlaine is controlling her 
by situating her in an environment of frosty inaccessibility. It is, then, an act of 
appropriation or colonization: Tamburlaine is marking the extent of his em-
pire.” So, it is visible that his focus on her chastity is an extension of his will to 
tower over others, including his wife. When speaking about his sons he says: 
“[b]ut that I know they issued from thy womb/ That never looked on man but 
Tamburlaine” (Tamb. 2, 1.2.31-32). Mary Stripling (2007: 216) sees “the womb 
as a locus of control”. Zenocrate through Tamburlaine’s obsessive control is 
turned into the impossible embodiment of a virgin and a mother (Stripling 
2007: 214). This in turn seems to be an extension of Tamburlaine’s plan of self-
divinization. Yet, perversely with the fulfilment of this profound transformation 
into a Virgin Mother, her power is believed to have increased (Stripling 2007: 
214). If indeed Zenocrate holds any power at all, it is encapsulated in her mo-
therhood or the influence she can exert on her children. Stripling sees the reali-
zation of the power crisis under Tamburlaine’s roof in the scene when Tambur-
laine expresses his disappointment that his sons resemble their mother too 
much. He says: “When these, my sons, more precious in mine eyes,/ Than all 
the wealthy kingdoms I subdued,/ Placed by her side, look on their mother’s 
face:/ But yet methinks their looks are amorous,/ Not martial as the sons of 
Tamburlaine” (Tamb. 2, 1.2.18-22). Stripling suggests that Tamburlaine’s dis-
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may is an expression of his deep anxiety over the power that seems to be slip-
ping from his hands. She writes that: “Tamburlaine, in his mind, has created his 
own (Oedipal) nightmare; by crowning a queen who has given birth to princes, 
he has made himself obsolete” (Stripling 2007: 216). I personally believe, how-
ever, that Zenocrate’s potential influence is much exaggerated. Despite the mys-
terious power her mothering skills may hold, her authentic authority is limited 
to next to nothing. Her response to Tamburlaine’s doubt seems to confirm this 
argument as she says: “My gracious lord, they have their mother’s looks,/ But, 
when they list their conquering father’s heart” (Tamb. 2, 1.3.35-36). Zenocrate 
seems to be relinquishing any claims to her sons and the ensuing conversation 
proves that both the wife and the sons are subjected to the mighty will of the 
father. The subsequent outbursts of anger at the “femininity” of Calyphas and 
finally the murder of the cowardly son by Tamburlaine prove that he will anni-
hilate anyone who stands in the way of his project. In the face of his extremely 
radical execution of obedience and loyalty it is actually Zenocrate’s great 
achievement that she can at least protect her sons as long as she herself lives. 
Her fulfillment of maternal duties merely guarantees her and her sons security, 
but is hardly an expression of any authentic power.  
According to early modern standards, a woman attains salvation 
through child-bearing (Augtherson 1998: 419). Zenocrate’s metaphorical fa-
shioning into a Virgin Mother seems to at least secure her a veneration of her 
husband that moves far beyond the grave. Contrarily Lady Macbeth’s barren-
ness subliminally seems to go hand in hand with her moral and mental disin-
tegration. The question of the progeny of Macbeth and Lady Macbeth has long 
perplexed critics. Their responses range from the downright dismissal of the 
importance of this issue to more detailed analyses of the protagonists’ perso-
nalities in connection with their failed family relations.6 I believe that the 
question of children or rather their lack in Macbeth is an issue of profound 
importance, both on the level of structure and style as well as character moti-
  
6 One could refer to the famous discussion started by L. C Knights (1964) in his ar-
ticle “How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth? An Essay in the Theory and Practice of 
Shakespeare Criticism”, in: Explorations. New York University Press. 15-54, where the 
author dismisses character analysis in the vein of A.C. Bradley. Obviously he does not 
really focus on the question of children, but he generally criticizes the idea of even posing 
such questions. Knights claims that “the only profitable approach to Shakespeare is a 
consideration of his plays as dramatic poems, of his use of language to obtain a total 
complex emotional response” (20). More recent critics tend to go back to the motivations 
and possibilities implicit in characters’ speeches and their influence on behaviour. Mi-
chael D. Bristol in his article entitled “How many children did she have?” goes back to 
this question in order to analyse the motivation of Lady Macbeth (in: Joughin, John J 
(ed.). 2000. Philosophical Shakespeares. (18-33) London: Routledge). In his view, her 
behaviours might be connected with an unexplained trauma connected to her failure to 
actually produce progeny (Bristol 2000: 32-33). 
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vation and the entire message the play communicates. Macbeth, just as Tam-
burlaine, expects male progeny from Lady Macbeth when, astounded by her 
energy and initiative, he says: “Bring forth men-children only; For thy un-
daunted mettle should compose/ Nothing but males” (Macbeth, 1.7.83). So, it 
is not only Lady Macbeth who defines the masculinity of her husband through 
the animalic drive towards mastery. Also Macbeth forces his wife into an es-
sentialist definition of femininity which predominantly sees her as the carrier 
of his sons. In other words, in a very Nietzschean vision, Macbeth frames her 
as the mother of his “overhuman” progeny. However, for the early-modern 
standards, Lady Macbeth emerges as a complete degeneration of nature when 
she delivers her most controversial anti-maternal credo: “I have given suck, 
and know/ How tender ‘tis to love the babe that milks me:/ I would, while it 
was smiling in my face,/ Have pluck’d my nipple from his boneless gums/ 
And dash’d the brains out, had I so sworn as you/ Have done to this” (Mac-
beth, 1.7.63-51). It is this seeming perversion of her “natural” instincts that 
Macbeth finds shocking yet irresistible. Some critics believe that Macbeth’s 
yielding to his wife’s persuasion lies in the threat of “maternal malevolence” 
that is first eclipsed in the witches’ temptation (Adelman 1992: 55). As Janet 
Adelman (1992: 57) writes:  
[t]he image of murderously disrupted nurturance is the psychic equivalence of the 
witches’ poisonous cauldron; both function to subject Macbeth’s will to female 
forces. For the play strikingly constructs the fantasy of subjection to maternal ma-
levolence in two parts, in the witches and in Lady Macbeth, and then persistently 
identifies the two parts as one. Through this identification, Shakespeare in effect 
locates the source of his culture’s fear of witchcraft in individual human history, in 
the infant’s long dependence on female figures felt as all-powerful: what the 
witches suggest about the vulnerability of men to female power on the cosmic 
plane, Lady Macbeth doubles on the psychological plane.  
This all means that Macbeth is vulnerable to Lady Macbeth as she metaphori-
cally attacks him in her famous speech. The attack on his masculinity is equal 
to the attack on his deeply ingrained infant dependence on the mother. Yet 
connecting Lady Macbeth to the supernatural evil embodied in the witches is 
more than risky than it seems, as it pushes the responsibility for the commit-
ted crimes solely to the female agents. Seeing Macbeth as a good son who 
trespasses under the temptation or even threat of this supposed transgressive 
“maternal” force does violence to the play. It counterfeits both Macbeth’s and 
Lady Macbeth’s desires. It is important to remember that Lady Macbeth has 
power over Macbeth predominantly because he desires the crown, as much as 
she wants him to have it. It is he that first kindles the thought of murder in 
his head, when he ponders on the valuation of the prophecy. He says:  
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[i]f good [prophecy], why do I yield to that suggestion 
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair, 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs, 
Against the use of nature? Present fears 
Are less than horrible imaginings: 
My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical, 
Shakes so my single state of man, that function 
Is smother’d in surmise; and nothing is/ But what is not. (Macbeth, 1.3.147-155)  
Lady Macbeth only instructs him on the necessity of sacrificing “fatherly” bonds 
of primogeniture. In her famous speech reversing nurturance she is like Tam-
burlaine, whose hand did not waver for a second when he raised his knife to kill 
his own son. Lady Macbeth is ready to sever the most sacred connection that a 
mother has with her child when circumstances of necessity arise. She wants to 
demonstrate to Macbeth that “over-coming” is a process where the greatest 
sacrifice is necessary as well as that she is capable of such an act and so should 
he be also. This requires trampling on the supposedly natural obligations. If she 
is able to sacrifice her bond with a baby, he should overcome his duty towards 
the fatherly figure of Duncan. At the same time she turns the prospect of king-
ship into an absolute imperative in their growth. Power is thus a duty that dig-
nity requires, the only way to overcome circumstances. Lady Macbeth thus 
holds a position of moral relativity, where she attempts to deconstruct social 
bonds that are veiled with claims of nature. In her vision, the individual 
emerges as the only measurement scale for action.  
If one is to embrace such a radically Nietzschean perspective on the 
individual and reads Lady Macbeth as its embodiment, her allegedly close 
relationship with the witches becomes even less tenable. I am of Alfar’s 
(2009: 117) opinion that: “Lady Macbeth’s relationship to the witches […] is 
more tenuous than is often assumed. Their representation as spectral appari-
tions sets them apart from Lady Macbeth, whose role in the tragedy is cir-
cumscribed fundamentally by the material conditions governing gender, eco-
nomic, and hierarchical relations.” The witches are “otherworldly” and “phan-
tasmatic” (Alfer 2009: 117). In Nietzschean terms, one could say that just as 
Lady Macbeth, with her energy and determination, stands for the uncontroll-
able life force, the witches represent degeneration. They belong to different 
plains of existence and, as it seems, have different aims. Lady Macbeth always 
means well to her husband e.g. when she helps him to devise the plan of mur-
der and carry it out, as well as when she rescues him from any suspicion dur-
ing the banquet. The witches present Macbeth with a prophecy – which is 
only a handful of hints. Faced with the prophecy, Macbeth is free to act as he 
wishes. The witches themselves either mean harm or at best are indifferent to 
Macbeth. In Dympna Callaghan’s (1992: 358) interpretation, they stand for 
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the same perverse maternity that Lady Macbeth professes as they represent 
“the threat of matriarchy”. Callaghan (1992: 358) believes that: “[f]emale rule, 
rather than being merely an element of demonism, becomes its very embodi-
ment.” The equation between Lady Macbeth and the witches serves to work 
the ideological effect of demonising female power. As Callaghan (1992: 358) 
writes: “[i]n order to negate the symbolic threat of matriarchy, a number of 
deft ideological manoeuvres were required to subsume the threat of female 
power amid a wider preoccupation with the legions of hell.” However, as I 
have been trying to illustrate, Lady Macbeth’s maternal sacrifice is an expres-
sion of her overhuman potential or her ultimate will to power. The witches, 
whose potential aim is to wreak havoc, are naturally an expression of the early 
modern fear of malevolent female power. However, Lady Macbeth’s and the 
witches’ actions cannot be equated to one another for the very reason of the 
intentions behind them. If the witches’ role is to manipulate Macbeth into an 
“unnatural” transgression, I believe they succeed to trick both Macbeth and 
Lady Macbeth. Now, Lady Macbeth’s will to power cannot be reduced to the 
simple desire of political authority. Unlike the Queen in Holinshed’s Chroni-
cle, that served as a basis for the play, Lady Macbeth never expresses her pri-
vate ambition to hold authority. So her will to power realizes itself in action 
and “overcoming”, if not self-overcoming, then Macbeth’s overcoming – 
whom she entices to create himself anew through rejecting “natural” bonds. 
Yet it is her that assumes the position of agency and control, at least in the 
opening scenes of the play. Thus, as I intend to show, she ends up being a 
paradox, realizing and subverting the Nietzschean gender order.  
In Nietzsche’s imagined gender relations The Macbeths’ bickering over 
the right course of action in the initial scenes of the play illustrates: “the natural 
state of things, the eternal war between the sexes” (Nietzsche 2006c: 105). In a 
metaphorical sense, the opening scenes of the play portray a conflict between 
the seemingly natural definitions of masculinity and femininity as Macbeth and 
Lady Macbeth force one another into the strait jackets of gender essentialism. 
Nietzsche (2006c: 105) would summarize such a conflict by saying:  
[w]oman, the more of woman she is, fights tooth and nail against rights in gen-
eral: after all, the natural state of things, the eternal war between the sexes, gives 
her the highest rank by far. – Did anyone have ears for my definition of love? It is 
the only one worthy of a philosopher. – Love – its method is warfare, its founda-
tion is the deadly hatred between the sexes. 
After all, in this conflict it is Lady Macbeth that has the last word. However, 
whenever one thinks of the overhuman potential of Lady Macbeth, as the ar-
chitect of events in the play, as the ultimate driver of action – one always 
stumbles on the fact that it is she who eventually breaks down and commits 
suicide. If one were to follow a Nietzschean interpretation and at the same 
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time an early modern vision of femininity, one could suggest that it is exactly 
the perversion of nature that leads to Lady Macbeth’s insanity. For this 
“deadly hatred between the sexes” Nietzsche (2006c: 105-106) gives only one 
solution: “– Did anyone hear my answer to the question how to cure – ‘re-
deem’ a woman? Give her a baby. Women need children, the man is only ever 
the means: thus spoke Zarathustra.” In Thus spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche 
(2006b: 48) already gives a similar definition of womanhood: “[e]verything 
about woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: it is 
called pregnancy. A man is for woman a means: the end is always the child.” 
As can be seen, in Nietzsche’s vision the profundity of a woman’s role is en-
capsulated in her potential to bring children to the world. His maternalism is 
also seen as a biological imperative and thus women who lack this basic in-
stinct or, even worse, repudiate it emerge as unnatural. In Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy, the repudiation of instincts leads to resentiment, while a rejection of 
an instinct on which the survival of the species is dependent, in the eyes of 
Nietzsche, appears as something catastrophic. For this reason Nietzsche fears 
feminism so much. For instance, when he speaks of:  
– ‘[e]mancipation of women’ [as] the instinctive hatred of failed women, which is to 
say infertile women, against those who have turned out well, – the fight against men 
is only ever a means, pretext, tactic. By elevating themselves as the ‘women an sich’, 
as the higher women, as the ‘idealists’ of women, they want to lower the rank of 
women in general; there is no surer means of doing this than secondary education, 
trousers, and the right to belong to the political herd of voters. Emancipated women 
are basically anarchists in the world of the ‘eternal-feminine’, people in bad shape 
whose bottom–most instinct is revenge… (Nietzsche 2006c: 105-106) 
One cannot escape thinking that when it comes to feminine roles, Nietzsche 
combines a long tradition of misogyny dating back to the Renaissance with 
post-Darwinian ideas on the naturalness of the maternal instinct. Following 
Nietzsche’s line of argument, in the case of Lady Macbeth this instinct is re-
pudiated and this results in an unexpected role reversal, where it is a woman 
who assumes a position of power. However, this must be “unnatural” as her 
own words testify:  
[c]ome, you spirits 
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here; 
And fill me, from the crown to the toe, top-full  
Of direst cruelty! make thick my blood, 
Stop up the access and passage to remorse, 
That no compunctious visitings of nature 
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between 
The effect and it! Come to my woman’s breasts, 
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And take my milk for gall, your murdering ministers, 
Wherever in your sightless substances 
You wait on nature’s mischief! (Macbeth, 1.5.47-50)  
The wish to become “unsexed” is of course crucial as it implies that for a 
woman to be cruel always involves going beyond feminine nature. This “un-
sexing” realized in the assumption of power and the emergence of a woman as 
an active subject, automatically cancel the possibility of being a mother. The 
above speech coupled with Lady Macbeth’s aforementioned “anti-maternal” 
credo constitutes the core of a paradox in a Nietzschean reading of her char-
acter. Lady Macbeth’s readiness to overcome obstacles and her determination 
to sacrifice constitute her overhuman potential, but the object of her sacrifice 
and its end make her unnatural. The maternal instinct in a woman should be 
her prime driving force. In her it gives way to a masculine will to power. On 
top of all Nietzsche’s (2002: 69) misogynist statements, he also claims that: 
“[w]hen a woman has scholarly inclinations, there is usually something wrong 
with her sexuality. Even sterility makes her prone to a certain masculinity of 
taste; man is, if you will, ‘the sterile animal’.” One could ask if Lady Macbeth’s 
political “inclinations” become the source of her “sterility” and “masculinity of 
taste”, or is it the other way round that her “sterility” pushes her into the tra-
ditionally masculine sphere of power? Anyhow, following Nietzsche, there 
must be something wrong with her if she denies her maternal duties for the 
sake of political success, even if it is the success of her husband. If we indulge 
in a little make-believe and imagine Lady Macbeth as a man, we may see her 
as a perfect Nietzschean “overman”. She is characterized by excessive ambi-
tion and creativity. In order to pursue her goals, she goes beyond good and 
evil – treating the evil as incidental or necessary in the process of over-
coming. She wants to get rid of remorse as an emotion that burdens one un-
necessarily, especially when one can do nothing about the consequences of 
one’s actions. However, despite all this, she falls short of realizing over-
human potential as it is her that breaks down, burdened with the pricks of 
conscience. In the early modern conceptualization of Lady Macbeth’s mental 
disintegration one could explain it by saying, following the words of a very 
popular Homily of the state of matrimony, “she is the weaker vessel, of a frail 
heart” (Homily of the state of matrimony 1998: 437). Embracing Nietzsche’s 
cult of instincts one could summarize her condition as a consequence of deny-
ing her maternal instinct. Nevertheless, both of these stances let biology con-
dition and define what is understood as the feminine.7 
  
7 Nietzsche’s conceptualizations of the feminine seem to predate Freudian defini-
tions of womanhood, where a woman is defined by lack (e.g. penis envy). The continua-
tion of this line of argument is provided by Jacques Lacan in his “The Meaning of the 
Phallus”. For more details, see: Lacan, Jacques. 1982. “The meaning of the Phallus”, in: 
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As can be seen, Lady Macbeth’s overhuman potential in a strictly 
Nietzschean perspective cannot be fully realized because she allegedly repu-
diates a fundamental instinct that shapes her as a woman. Woman’s will to 
power must be demonstrated in the form of a maternal instinct, otherwise it 
is a perversion of nature. Yet if one frees the core of Nietzsche’s thought from 
his misogyny, one can see that Lady Macbeth is characterized by a will to 
power that could be attributed to male Shakespearean or Marlovian charac-
ters. She is as Nietzschean as Macbeth, Tamburlaine or Barabas. If, as men-
tioned, her will to power is manifested in intense agency over events, her 
break-down is a direct consequence of Macbeth’s shutting her out of his deci-
sions and plans in Act 3. This is obviously his own attempt at shaking off her 
overpowering influence and taking over his own self-overcoming that she 
initially inspired in him. After the period of her intense engagement in his 
business, Macbeth suddenly excludes her from it by saying: “[b]e innocent of 
the knowledge, dearest chuck,/ Till thou applaud the deed” (Macbeth, 3.2.51-
52). His words relegate her to the role devised for a woman by early modern 
pamphleteers and moralists. For instance, William Gouge in his marriage 
guide Of domestical duties (1622) recommends “submission in yielding to her 
[the wife’s] husband’s mind and will” which bring “contentment in resting 
satisfied and content with his estate and ability” (Gouge 1995: 91). However, 
as it turns out, Lady Macbeth cannot be satisfied with the growing disparity 
between her and Macbeth. She is left now in a position of immobility and 
inaction, which cancels the possibility to give vent to her exuberant will to 
power. In her sleep-walking scene, as Alfar (2009: 129) points out, she “pain-
fully reenacts her closest moment with her husband, when she was effective at 
remasculinizing him and consoling him.” Indeed, Lady Macbeth relives the 
moments of her greatness, her most intense tautness of the will to power 
when she says: “[f]ie, my/ lord, fie, a soldier and afeard? What need we fear/ 
who knows it, when none can call our power to/ account?” (Macbeth, 5.1.38-
41). And a moment later she calls Macbeth: “Give me your/ hand. What’s 
done cannot be undone. To bed, to/ bed, to bed” (Macbeth, 5.1.70-72). In her 
mind she goes through the moments when her influence over Macbeth had a 
healing and at the same time inspiring quality. So, as it seems, with the grow-
                                                                                                                                        
Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds.) Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the 
École Freudienne. (translated by Jacqueline Rose). New York: Norton. 74-85. Lacan 
believes that a woman can have a phallic function, but it is connected with the denial of 
her desires and the appropriation of man’s desires (Lacan 1982: 79-84). However, going 
back to the origins of early modern misogyny, a view of a woman seen as an incomplete 
man seems to have biblical origins, as God carved Eve out of Adam’s rib. The early mod-
ern period appears to follow this vision of womanhood where female physical weakness 
in contrast to man’s strength becomes a standard for seeing a woman as inferior in vir-
tually all capacities.  
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ing independence of Macbeth, his sacrificing of their mutual trust, Lady Mac-
beth withers away. It is Lady Macbeth’s forced confinement in the narrow 
definition of femininity that backfires and makes her overhuman potential 
redundant and eventually wasted. Thus, she is, as if, “forced” to confirm both 
early modern and Nietzschan misogyny.  
To my mind, both Shakespeare and Marlowe embrace the very radical 
maternalism that can be found in Nietzsche’s philosophy and that is also a 
predominant ingredient of the early-modern definition of femininity. The 
implications of this maternalism are different for both plays. Lady Macbeth 
emerges as a passionate and sensual woman who wants to push her husband 
towards greatness. Yet in the pursuit of power she becomes an active agent – 
a political animal or a female version of Tamburlaine. However, the assump-
tion of the reversed role might be interpreted as a reason for her break-down 
and ultimately her death. Zenocrate is closer to the patriarchal ideal of a 
woman – a loyal companion and a mother of three sons. In a sense, she in-
spires Tamburlaine to further conquest by becoming his ever-present admir-
er. She herself also becomes an asexual object of art worthy of admiration, 
and even in her death she remains so. The deaths of both wives leave their 
husbands rather unconcerned, which even further limits their potential roles 
as carriers of energy and creativity. Macbeth, when informed of Lady Mac-
beth’s death is already too engrossed in his own mad attempts to hold on to 
the crown, while Tamburlaine throws himself madly into the sea of further 
destruction and conquest and thus shakes off his grief pretty quickly. Both 
plays repeat the pattern of a strong man accompanied by a weaker woman, 
but the “weakness” of these female figures has a different background. While 
Zenocrate resigns herself to the role of Tamburlaine’s admirer, Lady Macbeth 
is suddenly and unexpectedly stripped from her control and relegated to the 
position of a passive observer. One can either accuse Marlowe and Shakes-
peare of perpetrating early modern misogyny and dismiss their portrayals of 
women altogether, or one can try to embrace a wider perspective and say that 
neither Shakespeare nor Marlowe are any more misogynist than Nietzsche is. 
As Sarah Kofman in her famous article “Baubȏ: Theological Perversion and 
Fetishism” suggests, there is no one definitive vision of a woman implicit in 
Nietzsche’s texts – nor is there of a man for that matter. Kofman highlights 
that there is no essential construct known as “woman as such” in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. “Woman an sich” is one of the petty attempts of turning one 
perspective into an absolute truth. Thus, woman is an affirmation of her own 
mystery. The attempt of establishing absolute truth about woman is also a 
sign of weakness, of resentiment. The same applies to the vision of a man. 
Kofman (1991: 191) writes: “‘woman’ is neither castrated nor not castrated, 
any more than man retains control (détient) over the penis.” So, obviously, 
neither Lady Macbeth emerges as an ultimate failed woman defined as the 
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lack of the right instinct, nor Macbeth can be read as a complete “overman” 
embracing his impulses. They both fall short of their potential. It really takes 
a thick skin to become an overhuman being, whether man or woman. Tam-
burlaine and Zenocrate seem to form a Nietzschean overhuman couple, but 
their relationship is deprived of a life affirmative passion and sensuality. The 
characters presented in Macbeth and Tamburlaine seem to possess overhu-
man qualities, but very often they emerge as human, or to use Nietzsche’s 
terminology, “human, all too human”. Nietzsche’s texts, taken in their entire-
ty, present a multiplicity of stances and attitudes on women and men, both 
affirmative and non-affirmative. So do the texts of Shakespeare and Marlowe, 
of which their characters constitute a fraction of the possible multiple pers-
pectives on the feminine and masculine. Against Nietzsche’s explicit reluc-
tance to see women as carriers of overhuman qualities, I would like to carry 
forward the discussion on overwomen, taking Lear’s daughters as specimens 
for my investigation. I believe that in King Lear Shakespeare created excep-
tional female figures that all share overhuman potential. Just as the elder 
sisters’ assumption of positions of authority resemble Lady Macbeth’s rever-
sal of conventional male/female roles, Cordelia brings a totally new dimen-
sion into a conceptualization of an overwoman, such as even Nietzsche could 
have not anticipated in his body of thought.  
5.4. Critical responses to Lear’s daughters  
and interpretative paths 
With its inherent questioning of the boundaries between morality and im-
morality, nature and degeneration, the tragedy of King Lear is a potent space 
where the overhuman potential may develop, as my analysis of Edmund dem-
onstrates. King Lear, through its morally inconclusive ending, even more 
than Macbeth, realizes a very Nietzschean in spirit revaluation of conven-
tional valuations. Thus, it frustrates “dogmatist’s reverse logic, Rückschluß, or 
conclusion a posteriori”, to refer to Babette B. Babich’s (1996: 27) notions. 
Instead, it calls for an extended rereading looking beyond traditional perspec-
tives. As I have already hinted, the dynamics of power, sexuality and gender 
seem to drive King Lear in its entirety. The aforementioned triad of obsessive 
anxieties within the patriarchal culture – the threat of bastardy, the threat of 
adultery, and finally the threat of female sexuality – inform and infuse the 
structure of the play. King Lear offers three powerful female figures who, 
each in her own right, strive to assert and shape their individuality against the 
backdrop of the male patrilineal culture. As I will be arguing, all three daugh-
ters of Lear seek authority and are driven by some form or other of the will to 
power. Their respective attempts to overcome the systemic limitations forced 
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onto them through the stiff conceptualizations of feminine roles and expected 
behaviours turn each of them at some stage into a freak of nature. Though 
traditionally critics tend to split the daughters, hailing Cordelia as a paragon 
of virtue while Goneril and Regan as incarnations of monstrosity, there are 
crucial similarities between them. They all frustrate Lear’s expectations con-
cerning their decisions and conduct, for which each and every one is, at some 
stage, “bastardized” and charged with a perversion of nature. This supposed 
degeneration of the natural order of things stems from the independence and 
monarchical authority, believed to be solely masculine, that these women 
acquire and master against the “nature” expected of them. In the case of each 
daughter, Lear’s frustrated conceptions of filial gratitude and obedience turn 
into his brutal, misogynist attacks on their womanhood, sexuality and mater-
nal potential. Thus, the portrayal of female power becomes inherently fused 
with female sexuality. Nietzsche’s crooked and unstable conception of wom-
anhood becomes a backdrop for the analysis of the three daughters’ overhu-
man potential as, on the one hand, it corroborates the early modern essential-
ist notions of femininity, while on the other, it praises the creative potential of 
passion and sexuality encapsulated in femininity. Nietzsche’s admiration for 
and, simultaneously, fear of womanhood, his undying fascination with the 
mystery of motherhood and the cult of pregnancy, coupled with his hopeless 
slips into essentialist maternalism and biological determinism emerge as a 
springboard for the analysis of overhuman womanhood in King Lear.  
As it seems, the supposedly instinctive divide between the eternally noble 
Cordelia and the essentially evil Goneril and Regan drawn so far by critics has 
fossilized Shakespearean criticism of King Lear into a fixed set of widely accepted 
interpretative “facts”. Interestingly enough, according to this line of thinking, 
Cordelia emerges as disinterested, morally righteous and loyal towards her father. 
Despite her act of disobedience in the love contest which has frequently been in-
terpreted as an expression of her moral straightforwardness and integrity, she has 
frequently been read as pure, innocent and simply too good for the brutal reality 
of the tragedy. Her elder sisters, mostly due to their acts of violence and cruelty, 
have been thus read as ultimately malicious, calculating and downright evil. It is 
enough to quote from the classic Shakespearean tragedy by A.C. Bradley to get 
the feel of the dichotomy which is so often interposed on King Lear. Along with 
other characters Bradley (1992: 224) allots the sisters to two groups representing 
Love and Hate. Cordelia stands for the former while the elder sisters for the latter. 
Cordelia’s “assertion of truth” inspires “devotion”, while Goneril expresses “atro-
cious wickedness”, in which her sister Regan can outstrip her only through her 
“venomous meanness” (Bradley 1992: 260-261, 276). Not only are they monstrosi-
ties-incarnated but their actions are “abnormal” and “absolutely contrary to na-
ture” (Bradley 1992: 226). Obviously, the idea that the nature expected and fru-
strated in Shakespeare’s play might be a social and, moreover, a highly stifling 
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construct never crossed Bradley’s mind. In Shakespearean criticism of King Lear, 
the conventional binary opposition, dating back to Aristotle, of good and evil, 
reason and passion, male and female, hangs heavily and often blurs Shakespea-
rean attempts at a deconstruction of such crude antitheses. Even in the more re-
cent and more subtle criticism of Marvin Rosenberg (1972: 56) in The masks of 
“King Lear” Cordelia “is the first to reveal her private self, her inner conflicts”, 
appearing thus vulnerable and innocent. The elder sisters “are concerned with 
their own convenience” and emerge as calculating and plotting against Lear from 
the very start (Rosenberg 1972: 82). It was not until the publication of the seminal 
article “The patriarchal bard: feminist criticism and Shakespeare: King Lear and 
Measure for Measure” (1985) by Kathleen McLuskie that the gendered conditions 
in which Shakespearean heroines operate, and thus the three sisters in King Lear, 
were uncovered. In the spirit of cultural materialist analysis, McLuskie (1985: 98) 
contests Williams’ belief in the existence of “permanent, universal and essentially 
unchanging human nature” in King Lear underscoring that this assumed order is 
a masculine and patriarchal construct. In other words, for the play to be emotion-
ally effective, it calls for an assumption that the daughters have burning obliga-
tions towards their fathers and if they fail to fulfil these duties, the audience grows 
shocked (McLuskie 1985: 98). As she explains, the “generalised vision of chaos is 
presented in gendered terms in which patriarchy, the institution of male power in 
the family and the State, is seen as the only form of social organisation strong 
enough to hold chaos at bay” (McLuskie 1985: 99). McLuskie (1985: 98) is most 
probably the first author to pinpoint “patriarchal misogyny” in the treatment of 
Goneril and Regan. Yet even she in her revolutionary analysis dares not to attempt 
at redeeming the elder sisters, as she seems afraid of “associating feminist ideolo-
gy with atavistic selfishness and the monstrous assertion of individual wills” 
(McLuskie 2006: 62). If one remembers that for the proponents of conventional 
morality the overman (or in this case an overwoman) may seem as an embodi-
ment of all evil, the rampant individualism of the elder sisters, like that of Ed-
mund, makes them closer to the Nietzschean ideal (Kuderowicz 1979: 138). How-
ever, as I will be arguing, all three sisters share degrees of the overhuman poten-
tial and are driven by varying forms of the will to power. Yet, before that can hap-
pen I would like to go back for a moment to McLuskie’s assessment of the tragic 
effectiveness in King Lear, supposedly based on patriarchal assumptions. I 
strongly believe that the artistic excellence of this play goes beyond any mere pa-
triarchal basis. Of course, the sisters function within this pattern – where ob-
edience and subservience are required – but they habitually frustrate the expecta-
tions of their father, taking over political roles, not only the domestic roles to 
which females were normally restricted. If we read Goneril and Regan only as 
daughters, wives and potential mothers within the domestic circle, we indeed 
stumble upon their violence and cruelty as unnatural. However, once we see them 
as monarchs, certain motivations become clearer while their relation with Lear, a 
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father and a monarch, also becomes more problematized. This is a stance taken by 
Cristina León Alfar in her excellent study of Shakespeare’s “problematic women”. 
Alfar (2003: 26) frequently calls for the need to reread women like Goneril, Regan 
and Lady Macbeth in a political, rather than domestic context. I believe that Cor-
delia also goes beyond her role of a daughter when she assumes a political role – 
as a leader of an invasion. So the core of the conflict lies in the explosive mixture 
of expectations concerning power, sexual limitations, gender roles and family 
relations. Critics, with few exceptions, have failed to notice the complexity of the 
sisters’ positions, very often limiting the events of the play to a family squabble.  
5.5. Goneril, Regan and Cordelia 
Indeed, as it appears, criticism treating on Lear’s daughters, maybe with the 
exception of Cordelia, seems to be rather scant. As Cristina León Alfar (2003: 
17) aptly observes: “troublesome female characters such as Goneril and Regan 
are among the most neglected of Shakespeare’s women in the academia.” De-
spite a slight change in the attitude towards “evil” women in Shakespeare, in 
the recent years to which the publication of Alfar’s own book Fantasies of 
female evil has fortunately contributed, it still seems necessary to devote a 
detailed analysis to the powerful women in King Lear without the exclusion 
of Cordelia, who, to my mind, counts as one. Even McLuskie perpetrates the 
tradition of keeping the elder sisters and Cordelia apart as being fundamen-
tally different and driven by separate impulses. Alisa Manninen (2009: 98-
99), in her psychological analysis of the three sisters, pleads for the inter-
changeability between Goneril and Regan, who are so often treated as one evil 
force as opposed to Cordelia. The truth is, however, that, as sisters and daugh-
ters of the same father, they share similarities but also differ in certain re-
spects. Following her line of thinking, I also believe that the analysis in the 
spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy calls for an individualist treatment of the sis-
ters. It seems that the rift between the elder sisters and Cordelia, exploited by 
critics so far, first establishes during the love contest in the opening of the 
play and it is here I would like to begin my investigation of the overwomen. 
Though the behaviour of the sisters during the contest may seem as strikingly 
different, for all of them it might actually be an opening of the path to author-
ity. I believe that Cordelia as opposed to the elder sisters chooses different 
means of self-assertion. However, I am of the opinion that what they are all 
eventually for is the establishment of their singularity.  
The love contest, the reasons behind it as well as the reactions of the 
daughters in the wake of unfolding events have bothered critics for quite a long 
time. Scholars have frequently wondered whether Lear’s actions are premeditated. 
As Henryk Zbierski (1988: 431) notes, the contest should be read as a public cele-
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bration of the most official tone, where private feelings and state business inter-
mingle. Indeed, the use of the royal “we” by Lear seems to underscore the public 
and formal occasion of the state division procedure. Being a public event, the con-
test is thus sanctioned by the authority of the state and its law, of which Lear is an 
embodiment. If one were to see the contest within such a legal framework, one 
should remember that the characters function within the system of primogeni-
ture, with patriarchy as its most crucial ingredient. Hence, it is no surprise that 
Lear first addresses his “loving” sons, husbands of his elder daughters, informing 
them of his intentions in “publishing” his “daughters’ several dowers” (Lear, 
1.1.40-43). At the same time, in his opening speech Lear announces that he wishes 
“to shake all cares and business from our age,/ Conferring them on younger 
strengths, while we/ Unburdened crawl toward death” (Lear, 1.1.38-40). So, one 
can see that he decides to relinquish his power and royal authority, which he un-
derscores in his other announcements when he says that he “will divest [himself] 
both of rule,/ Interest of territory, cares of state” (Lear, 1.1.49-50). Into this politi-
cal game of throne and authority Lear quite unfortunately introduces a very pri-
vate measurement scale of emotions. His real motivations behind the semi-
political and semi-emotional division of the kingdom have posed a serious prob-
lem for the critics. Rosenberg (1972: 17-18) even made a simplified list of major 
critical directions concerning Lear’s reasons. Yet, whatever Lear’s reasons may be, 
his decision to divide the kingdom has profound consequences for his daughters 
as it forces them to take a stance against the humiliating performance which 
weighs love against potential political power. Just as the question of Lear’s moti-
vation has been a frequent object of critical debates, the legal and emotional im-
plications of the contest for the daughters have not occupied critics that intensely. 
Legally speaking, in early modern England a dowry apportioned to a woman on 
entering marriage is the only financial asset over which she has, under strict regu-
lations, any control whatsoever (Alfar 2003: 47-48). In the play, the daughters’ 
dowries include landed property but along with it monarchical authority and pow-
er, which Lear promises, but, as the following events demonstrate, is really unwil-
ling to part with. Yet at the opening of the play one can see that power and the 
royal privileges are to be won. It is interesting to note that Lear breaches the law of 
primogeniture and instead of passing the crown automatically to his eldest daugh-
ter (or to be more precise her husband) decides to divide the Kingdom in respect 
to a barely measurable love scale (Zwierlein 2009: 67). By breaching the normal 
custom, he opens a possibility of winning power in a game. Of course, the rules of 
this game are morally very dubious as Lear demands public demonstrations of 
affection, changing his daughters into objects of a transaction. What is even more 
unfair in the deal he offers is that honesty does not pay off, as the example of Cor-
delia proves. Lear’s contest seems to pose a central paradox and hence it emerges 
as an impossible patriarchal market of exchange where women are far from sub-
jects. I believe that the daughters’ situation can be summarized by the words of 
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Luce Irigaray (1985: 85) who in The sex which is not one aptly claims that: “[a] 
woman ‘enters into’ these exchanges only as the object of a transaction, unless she 
agrees to renounce the specificity of her sex, whose ‘identity’ is imposed on her 
according to models that remain foreign to her.” The situation is paradoxical as, 
on the one hand, the proverbial ideal of feminine subservience and obedience is 
required so that an expression of affection can be taken for granted. On the other, 
against the early modern requirement of female silence in the public sphere, the 
daughters are to speak of their obligations towards their fathers. In other words, 
the daughters, as mirrors to the righteousness of the patriarchal system, are forced 
to reflect Lear’s own vision of himself. In The gender trouble Judith Butler (1999: 
57) says: “women reflect […] masculine power and everywhere reassure that pow-
er of the reality of its illusory autonomy.” Nietzsche, with his characteristic miso-
gyny, also saw women in such a mirror-function when his Zarathustra claimed 
that: “[t]he happiness of a man says: I will. The happiness of a woman says: he 
wills” (Nietzsche 2006b: 49). In this sense, Lear very much resembles the Nietz-
schean Zarathustra, who believes in the ennobling force of obedience which sup-
posedly accompanies love. Yet Zarathustra’s words provide a brutal and ironic 
commentary on the subsequent events. He prophetically announces: “[a]nd a 
woman must obey and find a depth for her surface” (Nietzsche 2006b: 49). Know-
ing that each daughter eventually frustrates Lear’s expectations, the belief that a 
woman is merely a surface that may be deepened through the stifling (possibly 
unrequited) experience of paternal “love”, is more than illusory. Following on in 
the spirit of Nietzschean misogynistic rhetoric, Lear’s daughters indeed turn into 
“dangerous playthings” as they subsequently free themselves of his overpowering 
influence (Nietzsche 2006b: 48). In his essentially unfair market of love/authority 
exchange, he requires his daughters to assume a “mirror” function in order to 
confirm his own “meaning-constitutive” power. They emerge as dangerous players 
because they, as Manninen (2009: 103) believes, fail to reflect his opinions. In-
itially, this concerns Cordelia only, but subsequently Lear grows estranged from 
his elder daughters too. Each of them is accused of being unnatural whenever they 
seem to truly speak their mind. 
As mentioned, they are to assume conventional feminine roles, which 
confirm the powerful masculine positions and shape the women as seats of 
“natural” love and kindness. For this reason, Goneril claims to love her father 
with “grace, health, beauty, honour” while Regan is “alone felicitate/ In [his] 
highness’ love” (Lear, 1.1.58, 1.1.75). As most critics agree and as the following 
events in the play demonstrate, the elder daughters’ responses to their father 
are a pose enacted in accordance with the requirements of the situation. It 
might be safely assumed that Goneril and Regan are indeed driven by the 
power that can be won in the aftermath of the love contest. I strongly believe 
that there also seems to be no reason to hold that against them. They accept 
the unequal rules of the game which forces them into the essentialist feminine 
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roles of obedience and subservience, so why bash them for the enactment of 
the expected “femininity”. Luce Irigaray (1985: 84) comments:  
in fact that ‘femininity’ is a role, an image, a value, imposed upon women by male 
systems of representation. In this masquerade of femininity, the woman loses her-
self, and loses herself by playing on her femininity. The fact remains that this 
masquerade requires effort on her part for which she is not compensated.  
As I have been trying to prove, the contest is a “masquerade of femininity” and 
such a role is indeed imposed on the daughters. What is also crucial is that they 
are not compensated for their dutiful enactment of the role as any attempt at 
claiming their newly acquired authority is met with Lear’s brutal attacks on 
their nature and femininity. For instance, a careful analysis of the first squabble 
between Lear and Goneril shows that Lear will not accept any questioning of his 
conduct. Goneril complains of “men so disordered, so debauched and bold/ 
That this our court,/ infected with their manners,/ Shows like a riotous inn. 
Epicurism and lust/ Makes it more like a tavern or a brothel/ Than a graced 
palace” (Lear, 1.4.233-237). Goneril’s arguments seem very reasonable, while 
her complaints justified, and again there seems little ground to doubt the truth-
fulness of them. Also, Goneril does not say anything offensive or cruel to her 
father. She tries to appeal to his age and experience, which should be indicators 
of his wisdom (Lear, 1.4.231). Yet it seems evident that Lear’s unruly train does 
not only abuse her hospitality but also undermines her royal authority. That she 
assumes her political function can be observed in her use of the royal “we”. Lear 
ignores her appeals and immediately questions his paternity of, in his view, 
such a disobedient daughter. He asks, with disbelief: “[a]re you our daughter?” 
– also appropriating the royal “we” (Lear, 1.4.209). So, he evidently wants to 
exert both his paternal and monarchical power while Goneril attempts to per-
form her authoritative function. Lear’s treatment of Goneril underscores the 
early modern exclusion of women from the sphere of political activity. He sees 
her remonstrations as an attack on his manhood and he punishes her with 
curses (Lear, 1.4.289). Here he also wants to bring a matter of political urgency 
back to the realm of purely domestic concerns. His staged love contest had a 
similar dimension, fusing political and private spheres. In the contest the elder 
daughters, driven by acute political instinct, are capable of enacting the re-
quired model of femininity that leads them to the acquisition of authentic 
power, which in turn gives them authority to question Lear’s judgement. Corde-
lia does exactly the same thing without accepting the abuse of patriarchy.  
As indicated, the love contest is a means to the acquisition of future au-
thority, which the elder sisters assume immediately after Lear’s supposed “abdi-
cation”. Though humiliating and requiring the enactment of a role, it opens the 
way to authentic power. That this is true one learns from Goneril’s conversation 
with Oswald when she says: “Idle old man/ That still would manage those au-
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thorities/ That he hath given away. Now, by my life,/ Old fools are babes again 
and must be used/ With checks as flatteries, when they are seen/ abused” (Lear, 
1.3.17-22). While one could suspect insincerity in Goneril’s and Regan’s prote-
stations of love straight away, this private conversation of Goneril and Oswald 
makes one sure of their true motives. In the subsequent scenes Goneril demon-
strates her acute political instinct when she doubts the effectiveness of her au-
thority as long as Lear commands his army of one hundred knights. She claims: 
“[t]his man hath had good counsel. A hundred/ knights!/ ‘Tis politic and safe to 
let him keep/ At point a hundred knights! Yes, that on every/ dream,/ Each 
buzz, each fancy, each complaint, dislike,/ He may enguard his dotage with 
their powers/ And hold our lives in mercy” (Lear, 1.4.340-347). This, as well as 
the other scene when one sees her pleading with Lear about the knights, de-
monstrates that she does not only want to protect her power and authority but 
also guard her kingdom against potential chaos and disorder. Regan’s beha-
viour, very often a copy of Goneril’s, shows that she may not have the political 
vision of her elder sister, but she is intelligent enough to imitate her. Regan’s 
rashness and propensity for violence may be indicative of her shaky confidence 
in her feel of the political situation. Yet like her sister, once she holds onto her 
power, she perfectly realizes the need to guard it against anyone wishing to un-
dermine it. The sisters are embodiments of Machiavellian morality, which cor-
roborates the Realpolitik. Their stance might be morally dubious but it is politi-
cally highly successful as they seem to instinctively feel that they are capable of 
holding on to their power effectively as long as they collaborate. The enactment 
of the traditionally female roles leads them to the possession of real authority 
and from this moment onwards the attempt at reading them through the con-
ventional model blurs their political intent. Alfar (2003: 26) writes:  
[b]ecause the gender prescriptions they ostensibly fracture have never been ade-
quately explored in relation to the dynamics of gender and power that inform 
their tragedies, they are read within their designated domestic roles as daughters 
and wives. Consequently, the political context of their actions is ignored in favour 
of a reinscription of obedience, mercy, and compassion as natural and appropriate 
feminine behaviours. Their transgressions of orthodox feminine conduct, in this 
regard, have been commodified by a literary tradition that itself constructed to 
sustain conventional moral boundaries.  
So, one can see that both Goneril and Regan try to transcend the moral bounda-
ries that are ascribed to their sex as their ambition pushes them beyond given 
standards. However, if the elder sisters are driven by a politically motivated 
form of the will to power, that enables them to get hold of authority, what 
should one make of Cordelia’s silence, which does not only bring any political 
gain but also costs her the father’s affection? It is hardly plausible to attribute 
her with political naiveté. Cordelia very well knows that the path towards politi-
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cal authority leads through flattery but it does not grant independence of deci-
sion and action. Goneril’s and Regan’s love statements may bring the political 
upper hand but it forever weaves them into the viscous circle of patriarchy. 
Once they assume the straitjacket of early modern femininity, any action that 
subverts it costs them accusations of unkindness, ingratitude and finally mon-
strosity. As Catherine Belsey (1991: 149-150) points out:  
[f]emale subjectivity in the early modern period was defined through the subjection 
to sexual and economic ideologies. Devoid of power over their lives or their bodies, 
owned rather than owning, and constantly scrutinized for violations in conduct, 
women were controlled by an intricate system of patrilineal laws and gender natu-
ralizations.  
Such is exactly the position of Goneril and Regan, but it is only Cordelia’s 
stance in the love test that ultimately underscores its impossibility for the 
daughters as women. It demonstrates how little they have to deem control 
over. Cordelia has got only her love and family commitment, a traditionally 
female and the only available domain that can be bargained. She is willing to 
reason these values for the sake of reserving her right to assert her singular-
ity. She memorably says: “I love your Majesty/ According to my bond, no 
more nor less” (Lear, 1.1.101-102). In this statement she delineates the border 
between her own independence and Lear’s influence over her. His demand of 
absolute loyalty and obedience cannot be met as this would mean her mental 
incapacitation. With cold calculation she announces: “[g]ood my lord,/ You 
have begot me, bred me, loved me./ I return those duties back as are right 
fit:/ Obey you, love you, and most honour you” (Lear, 1.1.105-108). Here she 
seems to be giving substance to her very Nietzschean claim for her mental 
independence, which she evidently holds more dear than the momentary 
comfort of her father, whom she will not stop short of humiliating. She seems 
to be saying that her dedication to him has a limit. Though she reserves the 
portion of her love for her future husband, it is her decision to do so. When 
Lear asks her with disbelief: “[b]ut goes thy heart with this?” (Lear, 1.1.116). 
She confidently answers: “[a]y, my good lord” (Lear, 1.1.117). I would argue 
that she emerges as a female version of Brutus, because she is capable of liter-
ally sacrificing her father like Brutus who sacrifices Caesar. She does not only 
subvert the required ideal of obedience by which she goes beyond the patriar-
chal model of femininity, but emotionally she distances herself from her fa-
ther. Assuming that she sees through her sisters’ true intentions, her display 
of firmness, encapsulated in her resounding “Nothing, my lord”, is an act of 
rampant egoism (Lear, 1.1.87).8 Her personal principle becomes the measure 
  
8 One may be sure that she is perfectly aware of the situation. After all she confident-
ly says: “The jewels of our father, with washed eyes/ Cordelia leaves you. I know you 
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of her identity, from which anyone else is excluded. Her behaviour is an act of 
self-assertion, because she does what she wants, not what her father expects 
or the custom requires. At the same time, it quickly becomes evident that she 
has no political scheme or a reasonable backup plan. She seems to be thriving 
on a Nietzschean dictum – “live dangerously” (Nietzsche 2007b: 161). As yet, 
she may not be a fully conscious “overwoman” but she definitely thrives on 
her newly-established independence. I would argue that she is like a 
Nietzschean “preparatory human being” who will not stop short of “living 
dangerously” manifesting “the signs of a more virile, warlike age approaching 
that will above all restore honour to bravery” (Nietzsche 2007b: 160). In The 
gay science Nietzsche (2007b: 161) heralds the coming of  
human beings who know how to be silent, lonely, determined, and satisfied and 
steadfast in invisible activities; human beings profoundly predisposed to look, in 
all things, for what must be overcome; human beings whose cheerfulness, pa-
tience, modesty, and contempt for great vanities is just as distinctive as their 
magnanimity in victory and patience with the small vanities of the defeated.  
Cordelia seems to perfectly fulfil this Nietzschean portrayal, as through her 
isolated and obstinate silence she overcomes the overpowering influence of 
her father but also attempts to overcome the tyrannous, mercantile nature of 
the patriarchal agreement thrown at her. In this market of patriarchal “love” 
Lear says that, in the wake of her “untenderness”, “her price has fallen” (Lear, 
1.1.198). He denounces his paternal duty towards her and leaves her “with 
those infirmities she owes,/ Unfriended, new-adopted to our hate,/ Dowered 
with our curse and strangered with our/ oath” (Lear, 1.1.231-234). Again, like 
in the case of Brutus or even Edmund, the overhuman potential is awoken 
and realized on the brink of tyranny.  
As demonstrated, the rules of Lear’s contest from the start force his 
daughters to fight a lost battle, and so Cordelia’s defiance emerges as an act of 
courage as well as a statement of individualism pushed even to the limit of ego-
ism. Critics have stumbled upon Lear’s rash reaction to Cordelia’s behaviour. 
Her banishment seems to constitute a structural element of the tragedy as it 
begins Lear’s journey from his error of judgement – his miscalculation of the 
situation and blindness – to insight through suffering. Yet, I do believe that 
Lear’s fury arises from more than just a miscalculation of the situation – and 
rather from an intricate framework of expectations he has concerning his 
daughters. As mentioned, Lear wishes his daughters to reflect his opinions and 
                                                                                                                                        
what you are,/ And like a sister am most loath to call/Your faults as they are named. 
Love well our/ father./ To your professèd bosoms I commit him;/ But yet, alas, stood I 
within his grace,/ I would prefer him to a better place./ So farewell to you both” (King 
Lear 1.1.311-319). This fragment does not only prove that she sees through her sisters, 
but also that she knows she is leaving him at their mercy.  
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such an attitude is in accordance with the early modern conception of woman-
hood, which sees a woman as mostly a corporeal creature while a man as a seat 
of reason. In a famous pamphlet by Juan Luis Vives (1995: 137) entitled In-
struction of a Christian woman (1529), the author mocks any woman that 
would question her husband’s judgement as the one “which turneth backward 
the laws of nature, like as though a soldier would rule his captain, or the moon 
would stand above the sun, or the arm above the head” . Such a conceptualiza-
tion of female irrationality finds its justification in early modern ideas on female 
physiology. Aristotle (1995: 46), whose works provide a “scientific” basis for 
Renaissance scholars, writes in The generation of animals that “the male pro-
vides the ‘form’ and ‘the principle of the movement’, the female provides the 
body, in other words, the material.” In Galen’s (1995: 47) On the usefulness of 
the parts of the body one reads that “the female is less perfect than the male”. 
Thus the stereotype of a woman as a formless corporeity defined by lack, is car-
ried onto the Renaissance texts. One finds similar conceptualizations in e.g. 
Helkiah Crooke’s Microcosmographia. Though he opposes Aristotle’s view that 
a woman is “an error or a monster in nature”, he maintains “that females are 
more wanton and petulant than males, we think happeneth because of the im-
potency of their minds” (Crooke 1995: 55). Finally, as can be seen, the belief in 
female physiological inferiority results in the social, political and economic vic-
timization and overriding early modern misogyny. Lear demonstrates such mi-
sogyny in his treatment of all his daughters, but, as I have been trying to dem-
onstrate, the very basis of the contest is misogynist. This inherent misogyny 
commodifies the women and Cordelia seems to be aware of this process. The 
result of the contest and Lear’s fury can be summarized by Luce Irigaray’s 
(1985: 84) words about patriarchy:  
[i]n our social order, women are ‘products’ used and exchanged by men. Their 
status is that of merchandise, ‘commodities’. How can such objects of use and 
transaction claim the right to speak and participate in exchange in general? Com-
modities, as we all know, do not take themselves to market on their own; and if 
they could talk… 
Cordelia indeed can talk, and it is her apt reasoning that spurs Lear’s anger. It 
is crucial to note that Cordelia’s silence first brings encouragements – “Speak 
again” (Lear, 1.1.90) and then threats – “How, how, Cordelia? Mend your 
speech a little,/ Lest you may mar your fortunes” (Lear, 1.1.103-104). Such an 
emotional blackmail is met with Cordelia’s clear and reasonable outlining of 
the limits of her duties towards her father. It is only then that Lear is pushed 
to anger. In the case of Lear and his daughters the conventional binary oppo-
sition of reason and passion is reversed as it is Lear that is mostly driven by 
highly affective responses. Yet his anger seems to be fuelled by exactly this 
reversal. Joseph Swetnam, the author of a famous anti-feminist pamphlet 
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entitled The arraignment of lewd, idle, froward, and unconstant women or 
the vanity of them, choose you whether, with a commendation of wise, vir-
tuous, and honest women, pleasant for married men, profitable for young 
men, and hurtful to none, when heralding his aggressive and supposedly rea-
sonable argumentation, claims that his critique of women will most probably 
be met with inconsistent blubbering from the weaker sex, which should be 
ignored as an offence to reason. He writes:  
I refer myself to the judgment of men which have more experience than myself, 
for I esteem little of the malice of women. For men will be persuaded with reason, 
but women must be answered with silence. For I know women will bark more at 
me than Cerberus, the two-headed Dog, did at Hercules when he came into Hell to 
fetch out the fair Proserpina… (Swetnam 2006)  
In Shakespeare’s tragedy exactly the opposite procedure takes place, as it is 
Cordelia who answers first with silence and then with reasonable clarity while 
Lear “barks at her” and in his passionate speech he refers to e.g. “the barba-
rous Scythian” (Lear, 1.1.117). Interestingly, it is not only Cordelia that offers 
her father reason-infused argumentation. As mentioned, the first challenge to 
Lear by Goneril is also based on solid reasoning. In Act 2, Scene 2 both sisters 
try to renegotiate the terms of Lear’s stay at their houses by limiting his train. 
Again, it is Goneril who provides intelligent reasoning when she says: “[h]ear 
me, my lord./ What need you five-and-twenty, ten, or five,/ To follow in a 
house where twice so many/ Have a command to tend you?” (Lear, 2.2.299-
302). Regan echoes her by saying “What need one?”, to which Lear emotion-
ally cries out “O, reason not the need!” (Lear, 2.2.303-304). So as can be seen, 
the questioning of Lear’s authority is based on a reversal of traditional gender 
roles – where each daughter fills a role of reason and abandons intellectual 
timidity (Hoover 1984: 61). In the words of Nietzsche (2002: 128) one could 
say that “[s]he forgets her fear of man: but the woman who ‘forgets fear’ 
abandons her most feminine instincts.” Here Nietzsche’s (2002: 128) misog-
yny seems to go hand in hand with the early modern conceptualization of 
womanhood, as for Nietzsche the rejection of female modesty is equal to the 
process of female degeneration. The excessive intellectualization of women 
leads to their abandonment of their seemingly natural roles for the sake of 
political independence, like in the case of Goneril and Regan, or mental self-
reliance, in the case of Cordelia. 
As it seems, such is Lear’s understanding of his youngest daughter’s 
rebellion. Lear announces: “I loved her most and thought to set my rest/ On 
her kind nursery” (Lear, 1.1.137-138). His words yet again hit at the very core 
of patriarchal tensions as it is “her kind nursery” that is a designated female 
role Lear has imagined for Cordelia. As Claudette Hoover (1984: 60) claims, 
the core of Cordelia’s defiance lies in “her refusal to participate in a ritual 
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based on the myth of the ‘eternal feminine’, the nurturing female who is sur-
rendering, selfless, changeless and mothering…” Indeed, Lear seems to be 
fashioning his daughters into the models of maternal love, of which “kind 
nursery” seems to be a crucial ingredient. The failure to enact this form of 
love is read as a denial of any bonds of love, hence the accusation of being “so 
untender” (Lear, 1.1.118). Nietzsche (2005a: 151) similarly conceptualized 
female love when he wrote that: “in every kind of womanly love there also 
appears something of motherly love.” Yet, against early modern misogyny, 
Nietzsche would couple maternal love with immense energy and instinctive 
intellect which can only be attributed to a woman. In a sense he professes a 
reversed form of gender essentialism, which may be seen in the Lear-Cordelia 
tension. In Human, all too human he explains:  
[t]he intellect of women reveals itself as complete control and presence of mind 
and the utilization of every advantage. She bestows it on her children as her fun-
damental quality, and the father adds the darker background of the will. His influ-
ence determines as it were the rhythm and harmony with which the new life is to 
be played; but its melody comes from the woman. – Expressed for those who 
know how to interpret: women possess reason, men temperament and passion. 
(Nietzsche 2005a: 153)  
If one were to follow on the metaphor of Cordelia as a kind and loving mother 
into which Lear wishes to fashion her, the above description perfectly encapsu-
lates their reversed dynamics. She is reason-incarnated while he stands for the 
uncontrollable and the chaotic. Yet even such a reversed gender dynamics can 
be driven back to its patrilineal model – that remains to be a point of reference. 
Lear’s emotional outbursts, despite their aggression, may be justified by the 
supposedly natural “darker” will, while Cordelia’s “intellect” remains a perver-
sion of nature when it is not utilized in the service of her “maternal” duties. 
After all, following Nietzsche, it is the man that provides “the rhythm and har-
mony”. The woman, bringing in melody, becomes an ornament and thus is for-
ever an instrument played by a man. Hence, Nietzsche seems to be paying 
women a compliment by attributing the power of possibly superior intellect to 
them though still relegating them to secondary roles. This seems to be exactly 
what Lear does. He functions as a wielder of authentic power while his daugh-
ters are to ennoble authority with demonstrations of affections. Knowing now 
that Cordelia seems to explode both the early modern and Nietzschean notions 
of womanhood, the question of her overhuman potential is still pending. If 
Nietzsche could ever conceptualize a woman as Überweib, he would seek the 
“overwoman” potential in the female embrace of her biological functions. As 
Derrida (1997: 57) suggests, out of different portrayals of women in Nietzsche’s 
texts the one that he praises is the so called “affirming model” of femininity. 
Keith Ansell-Pearson (1993: 34-35) explains that “the ‘affirming woman’ signi-
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fies the self-overcoming of the will to truth and the will to illusion; she is the 
Dionysian force which abandons all foundations and certainties, ‘the original 
mother’”. Cordelia, paradoxically by speaking the truth, which in the vein of 
Nietzschean perspectivism is really her truth, overcomes the will to absolute 
and essential truth. That in turn is an embodiment of the overcoming of the will 
to illusion that so aptly characterizes Lear. Cordelia shatters both, but also she 
evidently rejects the maternal function weaved for her by Lear. For these rea-
sons, I believe that she emerges as a Nietzschean overwoman. She is the incar-
nation of the overhuman potential that maybe even Nietzsche, in his stubborn 
biological essentialism, might have overlooked. Cordelia speaks against the 
early modern stiff femininity that forces her into a denial of the “instinct of 
freedom” that roars in her blood. At the same time she rejects blind and forced 
maternalism. I believe that her attitude might be summarized by a quotation 
form Luce Irigaray’s philosophical “love letter” to Friedrich Nietzsche where she 
contests Nietzsche’s reading of the female. Like Cordelia she rebels and asserts 
herself by saying:  
I am no longer the lining of your coat, your – faithful – understudy. Voicing your 
joys and sorrows, your fears and resentments. You had fashioned me into a mirror 
but I have dipped that mirror in the waters of oblivion – that you call life. And fur-
ther away than the place where you are beginning to be, I have turned back. I have 
washed off your masks and make up, scrubbed away your multi-coloured projec-
tions and designs, stripped off your veils and wraps that hid the shame of your 
nudity. I have even had to scrape my woman’s flesh clean of the insignia and 
marks you had etched upon it. (Irigaray 1991: 4)  
I believe that Cordelia, through her obstinacy and defiance in the love contest, 
undergoes a similar transformation. She cancels her entire forced identity as 
Lear “disclaim[s] all [his] paternal care,/ Propinquity and property of blood/ 
And as a stranger to [his] heart and [him] hold[s] [her] from this forever” 
(Lear, 1.1.114-117). By this obliteration of a forced identity she arrives at the 
newly-found identity that is entirely hers. Gönül Bakay (2005: 309) suggests 
that: “[w]ith Cordelia, Shakespeare aimed to create an androgynous character 
possessing both the age’s accepted virtues for man and woman: uniting man’s 
strength, power and steadfastness of purpose with woman’s integrity, silence, 
wisdom and pity.” Tempting as this idea really is, if it be true, then with the 
character of Cordelia Shakespeare is really perpetrating Renaissance misog-
yny by claiming that these respective qualities are essentially masculine or 
essentially feminine. The power of Cordelia, to my mind, lies in her inexplica-
bility. She indeed fuses traditionally masculine and feminine features, but she 
obliterates their gender affiliation to build herself anew. Her last speech 
seems to be a final confirmation of her overhuman potential:  
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I yet beseech your Majesty— 
If for I want that glib and oily art 
To speak and purpose not, since what I well 
Intend 
I’ll do ‘t before I speak—that you make known 
It is no vicious/ blot, murder, or foulness, 
No unchaste action or dishonored step 
That hath deprived me of your grace and favor, 
But even for want of that for which I am richer: 
A still-soliciting eye and such a tongue 
That I am glad I have not, though not to have it 
Hath lost me in your liking. (Lear, 1.1.257-268)  
Though her honesty costs her the place next to her father, she is perfectly sure 
of the righteousness of her rebellion. Thus, at the opening of the play one gets 
a glimpse of her profound will to assert identity against any “glib and oily art” 
that is the illusion of absolute truth. 
Cordelia’s indomitability earns her the awe of the king of France, who 
claims not only his love but also respect of such magnitude that he himself can-
not fully comprehend the power she has over him. He says: “‘[t]is strange that 
from their cold’st/ neglect/ My love should kindle to enflamed respect.—/ Thy 
dowerless daughter, king, thrown to my chance,/ Is queen of us, of ours, and 
our fair France” (Lear, 1.1.294-299). Hence, as I would argue, Cordelia leaves 
the stage stronger, towering over all other characters. Like her sisters she ar-
rives at the position of authority but, as I hinted, her path towards authority 
leads through absolute loyalty towards herself and nobody else. For this reason, 
I would also dread to compare Cordelia to a Christ-figure as her loyalty to her-
self borders on egocentrism and in this respect she is most Nietzschean. In the 
scene of the reconciliation with Lear she can kneel in front of him and ask his 
blessing, as she knows that she had been in the right from the very start. When 
Lear humbles himself in front of her and says that she has a good cause for not 
loving him, it is her who says magnanimously “[n]o cause, no cause” (Lear, 
4.7.86). Again, she can say this because Lear has never managed to bring her 
down or truly hurt her as her conviction in the righteousness of her own path 
could never be questioned. Cordelia’s invasion in the name of her wronged fa-
ther has been mostly read as a statement of her immense and disinterested love 
towards Lear. This, of course, might be read as quite so, but one should not 
overlook the transformed power dynamics between them in Act 4 when they 
meet again. Even in his early philosophy Nietzsche tries to see through see-
mingly altruistic motivations and uncover an ulterior motive behind them. In 
his mature philosophy the whole plethora of human impulses will be read as 
numerous forms of the will to power, but already in The gay science Nietzsche 
Charter Five 286 
(2007a: 40) sees various faces of love as “a craving for new property” or “un-
conditional and sole possession”. In such a way, one could also interpret Lear’s 
obsessive, patriarchal need to control or even “posses” his daughters. Cordelia 
frees herself from this stifling love, and through her independence reverses the 
power dynamics. When she comes back to redress her father in the moment of 
the greatest crisis, she is an all-powerful overwoman who can afford to share the 
excess of her power. By excluding women from the conceptualization of the 
Übermensch Nietzsche himself seems to have overlooked the potential of such 
mighty figures as Cordelia. However, as Keith Ansell-Pearson (1993: 31) ex-
plains:  
Nietzsche’s thinking contains an emphasis on ambiguity, on plural identity, on the 
affirmation of the constructed self in terms of an artistic task in which one freely 
gives ‘style’ to one’s character, all of which can be useful for articulating a kind of 
feminist mode of thought which seeks to subvert an essentializing of human iden-
tity, whether female or male, and which would simplify and efface ‘difference’(s).  
Such a power of subversion is encapsulated in Cordelia. For this reason she is 
so reminiscent of Irigaray’s lover of Nietzsche. Her ability to transcend 
through constancy of will turns her into the embodiment of ‘overhuman’ po-
tential. If one again moves back to the opening scene of the play, one sees that 
Cordelia’s steadfastness as well as her newly-won authority make her also 
speak to her sisters with condescension. Their last meeting, as Rosenberg 
(1972: 81) suggests, is not only a harbinger but an actual beginning of war 
between them. In my opinion, the elder sisters left now as they are with their 
gendered and thus crooked authority, have only to begin their battle for their 
right to self-determination.  
As indicated, what Lear expects from his daughters is subservience 
and hence a forced form of maternal love. Cordelia rejects the straitjacket of 
forced maternalism. Yet the phantom of the absent mother and the failure of 
maternal love overshadow the interpersonal relationships in the tragedy as is 
visible not only in the Lear family but also in Gloucester’s household. It is 
significant to note that it was Coppélia Kahn in her seminal article “The ab-
sent mother in King Lear” that pointed out the painful absence/ presence 
dynamics of the mother in King Lear. Kahn (2003: 63-64) writes that:  
[t]he aristocratic patriarchal families of Gloucester and Lear have, actually and ef-
fectively, no mothers. The only source of love, power, and authority is the father – 
an awesome, demanding presence. But what the play depicts, of course, is the fail-
ure of that presence: the failure of a father’s power to command love in a patriar-
chal world and the emotional penalty he pays for wielding that power. Lear’s insis-
tence on paternal power, in fact, belies its shakiness; similarly, the absence of the 
mother points to her hidden presence.  
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For Kahn, the identification with the mother takes place when he succumbs to 
madness. As I have already tried to demonstrate in my discussion of the char-
acter of Edmund, the entire patriarchal paranoia infusing the play can be 
driven back to this phantom of the absent mother, while this metaphor ex-
tends even further beyond the character of Lear. As already hinted, the threat 
to the stability of the patriarchal system and primogeniture always lies in the 
female, while the fear of female sexuality contributes to the construction of 
female evil. As Alfar (2003: 23) explains:  
[f]emale evil is produced by male fears of female desire, and therefore by mascu-
linist beliefs in women’s power over childbirth. But such fears are, inevitably, fi-
nally about inheritance, about the right of men to transmit their wealth to legiti-
mate heirs. For if women are the only ones who know a child’s paternity, then men 
cannot be said to contain women at all, and in fact women may not be said, with 
any comfort, to be inferior. The threat to male sovereignty and property rights 
that women pose, thus, makes women inherently duplicitous and untrustworthy, 
and produces the concept of feminine evil.  
These fears can all be visible in Lear’s treatment of his daughters, while the 
overhuman potential of Goneril and Regan is downplayed through Lear’s at-
tempts to diminish their authority. The issues of power, sexuality, bastardy 
and motherhood all clash in the frustrated attempts of Goneril and Regan to 
overcome Lear’s influence and realize their own overhuman potential. As 
mentioned, Cordelia defies Lear’s paternal, unequal game of love and loyalty, 
as a result of which she becomes “bastardized” by Lear who disclaims his pa-
ternity over his youngest daughter. One can see, the failure to repay an obliga-
tion in the form of maternal love that Lear requires results in the disgrace of 
the whole female line – the daughter and consequently the mother. Cordelia’s 
failure to comply triggers the viscous circle of an obsessive and sinister fear of 
female power encapsulated in and symbolized by the mystery of motherhood. 
These fears are manifested in the treatment of Goneril and Regan. If women 
are “inherently duplicitous and untrustworthy”, as Alfar writes, then power in 
their hands emerges as particularly dangerous. 
As already indicated, the elder daughters set about executing their au-
thority straight away and in doing so they demonstrate rationality, determina-
tion and effectiveness. As Alfar (2003: 91) points out, their first conversation 
after Cordelia’s and Kent’s banishment demonstrates “a sense of caution” 
rather than any wish to plot against their father. With an acute sense of vision 
Goneril observes Lear’s infirm judgement. The sisters agree that it is their 
responsibility to protect their power because, as Goneril aptly puts “[i]f our 
father carry authority with such/ disposition as he bears, this last surrender of 
his will/ but offend us” (Lear, 1.1.351-353). Against Lear’s impulsivity they 
plan ahead their actions. Again their rationality and eloquence, like that of 
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Cordelia’s, when contrasted with Lear’s emotionality, disrupts the early mod-
ern perception of required gender dynamics. John Knox (1995: 138), writing 
against the rule of Mary Queen of Scots, in The first blast of the trumpet 
against the monstrous regiment of women (1558) announces that:  
[a]nd first, where I affirm the empire of a woman to be a thing repugnant to na-
ture, I mean not only that God, by the order of his creation, has spoiled woman of 
authority and dominion, but also that man has seen, proved, and pronounced just 
causes why it should be. Man, I say, in many other cases, does in this behalf see 
very clearly. For the causes are so manifest, that they cannot be hid. For who can 
deny but it is repugnant to nature, that the blind shall be appointed to lead and 
conduct such as do see? That the weak, the sick, and impotent persons shall nour-
ish and keep the whole and strong? And finally, that the foolish, mad, and frenetic 
shall govern the discreet, and give counsel to such as be sober of mind? And such 
be all women, compared unto man in bearing of authority. For their sight in civil 
regiment is but blindness; their strength, weakness; their counsel, foolishness; 
and judgment, frenzy, if it be rightly considered.  
It is so ironical that in Shakespeare’s tragedy the unfolding events prove con-
trary to what Knox professes. After all, weakness and infirmity push Lear to 
relinquish his authority, while the very act is burdened with blindness and fool-
ishness. Just as these qualities are manifest in him, his daughters constantly 
prove “sober of mind”. However, Shakespeare’s perversity goes even further 
because it is Lear who frequently accuses his daughters of depraving nature. In 
his obsessive, habitual dependence on authority, Lear fears the power of his 
daughters whom he had given this power. Female power appears so monstrous 
as it does not only threaten male dominion but, in a more general sense, it ren-
ders men superfluous. It is the creative and at the same time subversive poten-
tial of motherhood that threatens to make men redundant. Derrida (1997: 31) 
proclaimed Nietzsche a philosopher of pregnancy. Indeed, the metaphor of 
pregnancy as a mental shortcut for intense creativity and ultimately a root of all 
life energy permeates Nietzsche’s thinking, but it is important to note that his 
undying fascination with motherhood also lies at the foundation of Nietzsche’s 
misogyny.9 In other words, the notion of pregnancy, contrary to what Derrida 
  
9 In Nietzsche’s numerous texts, pregnancy is equalled with budding ideas – while 
giving birth signifies giving literary or stylistic shape to thoughts e.g. in The gay science 
Nietzsche (2007b: 6) writes: “[w]e philosophers are not free to separate soul from body 
as the common people do; we are even less free to separate soul from spirit. We are no 
thinking frogs, no objectifying and registering devices with frozen innards – we must 
constantly give birth to our thoughts out of our pain and maternally endow them with all 
that we have of blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and disaster. 
Life – to us, that means constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame, and 
also all that wounds us; we simply can do no other” . In Thus spoke Zarathustra the idea 
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believes, is not merely a stylistic device but rather a lasting thought construct 
with significant bearing on Nietzsche’s vision of femininity. It is enough to men-
tion yet again the passage from Thus spoke Zarathustra: “[e]verything about 
woman is a riddle, and everything about woman has one solution: it is called 
pregnancy. A man is for woman a means: the end is always the child” (Nietzsche 
2007c: 48). In the Nietzschean vision the mystery of female creative power is 
her maternal potential. A man becomes a tool for the fulfilment of her profound 
maternal instinct, once it is realized man’s role is radically diminished. Simul-
taneously a mother becomes a self-reliant, self-defined and all-powerful creator. 
Such a conceptualization of female power results in the obsessive necessity to 
control women and the need for men to guard themselves against them. Thus, 
Nietzsche’s perspective is to a degree a continuation of early modern misogyny 
based on the fear of female sexuality and female supposed duplicity – that also 
permeates the tragedy of King Lear. The aforementioned phantom of the absent 
(and again potentially subversive) mother resurfaces and rekindles in Lear 
when he “bastardizes” Goneril. In response to her rationality and authority, 
Lear is now more specific as he maliciously calls out: “[d]arkness and devils! 
[…] Degenerate bastard” (Lear, 1.4.260-263). However, Nietzsche adds a new 
layer to sinister womanhood, which actually may contribute to the turning of his 
maternalism to the advantage of feminist studies, namely, his fascination with 
and appreciation of female instincts, as well as their creative potential. Com-
menting on Irigaray’s Marine lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, Keith Ansell-
Pearson (1993: 41) explains that “Zarathustra’s/ Nietzsche’s greatest affliction is 
that he suffers from an envy of the womb. In his desire to achieve the impossi-
ble, namely to give birth to himself, Nietzsche expresses a fundamental resent-
ment towards that which he feels ardour for and most esteems – maternal crea-
tivity.” Such seemingly contradictory tensions are also realized in the character 
of Lear. Because he fears maternal or female self-sufficiency and power, he bru-
tally attacks Goneril. He curses his second daughter for her defiance by saying:  
[h]ear, Nature, hear, dear goddess, hear! 
Suspend thy purpose if thou didst intend 
To make this creature fruitful. 
Into her womb convey sterility. 
Dry up in her the organs of increase, 
And from her derogate body never spring 
A babe to honor her. If she must teem, 
                                                                                                                                        
of pregnancy recurs as “the higher men” give birth to themselves in the pain of self-birth 
(Nietzsche 2006b: 236-237). Finally, in Ecce Homo Nietzsche (2007d: 7) announces: 
“[t]he fortunate thing about my existence, perhaps its unique feature, is its fatefulness: to 
put it in the form of a riddle, as my father I have already died, as my mother I am still 
alive and growing old.” 
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Create her child of spleen, that it may live 
And be a thwart disnatured torment to her. 
Let it stamp wrinkles in her brow of youth, 
With cadent tears fret channels in her cheeks, 
Turn all her mother’s pains and benefits 
To laughter and contempt, that she may feel 
How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it is 
To have a thankless child.—Away, away! (Lear, 1.4.289-303)  
The transferal of power has already shown Lear that Goneril is a determined 
and competitive authority. In the face of her power he craves to regain his lost 
authority in a desperate verbal assault on her body. In Nietzschean terms, the 
attack on Goneril’s fertility hits at the very core of her potential for self-
overcoming and self-creation. Lear’s wish for Goneril’s sterility is an expres-
sion of his paranoiac fear of the mother as an all-powerful life force. A birth of 
a “disnatured” child, that Lear prophesies for her, would make a mockery of 
her maternal might. It would cancel her as an agent of life energy and power. 
Hence, Lear seems to be combining primordial womb envy with an obsessive 
fear of the power encapsulated in this organ. As Coppélia Kahn (1981: 11) 
aptly observes in her book Man’s estate: Masculine identity in Shakespeare: 
“[t]he critical threat to identity is not as Freud maintains, castration, but en-
gulfment by the mother […] men first know women as the matrix of all satis-
faction from which they must struggle to differentiate themselves.” Lear in-
deed fears being devoured by his daughters, and Shakespeare’s reversed 
rhetoric fuels this anxiety as they are deemed “pelican daughters” (Lear, 
3.4.82). His term captures his fear of being engulfed, but it also underscores 
the wild energy of the maternal instinct that will stop short of nothing for the 
sake of new life. Albany’s exclamation “[t]igers, not daughters” plays on a 
similar sentiment as it combines the female with the beastly that cannot be 
tamed (Lear, 4.2.49). Again, as Nietzsche (2006c: 183) would see it, an un-
tamed beast is still better than an “improved” human being burdened with 
“morality” or conscience. Such a creature may start a project of sublimating 
the impulses while an “improved” man or woman is devoid of them at all.  
It is important to observe that paradoxically next to the fear of crea-
tive motherly potential, Lear is also burdened with a desperate need to return 
to the womb. Goneril’s remark that “Old fools are babes again” provides an 
ironical framework for Lear’s craving of maternal love, but his numerous ap-
peals to the “motherly kindness” of the daughters demonstrates a deep emo-
tional longing for such care (Lear, 1.3.20). For instance, Lear appeals to Re-
gan: “[t]hou better know’st/ The offices of nature, bond of childhood,/ Effects 
of courtesy, dues of gratitude” (Lear, 2.4.200-202). Yet, as can be seen, Lear’s 
demand of love, even at moments of great emotional strain, always has a 
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threatening dimension. This seems to be a resultant of his fear of being rele-
gated to the position of dependence, devoid of authority and authentic power 
over the lives of the daughters. His primordial fear of the mother is demon-
strated for the third time when he talks to Regan. With his characteristic tinge 
of threat, he answers Regan’s polite expression of gladness at seeing him: “[i]f 
thou shouldst not be glad,/ I would divorce me from thy mother’s tomb,/ Se-
pulch’ring an adult’ress” (Lear, 2.4.145-147). Again the threat of bastardy is 
combined with the demand for love. When faced with both sisters Lear rails at 
Goneril, to which Regan justifiably reacts: “[o], the blest gods!/ So will you 
wish on me/ When the rash mood is on” (Lear, 2.4.190-191). Critics often 
point to Goneril’s “superior intelligence” that can be contrasted with Regan’s 
“dullness”, which she covers up by “exaggerated brutality” (Booth 1987: 59). 
Yet Regan also shares political cunning, which prompts her to follow her 
slightly more active and prudent sister. It is this political instinct and ability 
to anticipate future developments that makes both sisters sly and effective 
political animals. Lear tries to force his daughters into his expected vision of 
femininity that involves due control and authority from him. As can be seen, 
the elder daughters also share overhuman potential that becomes manifest 
when they contradict Lear. They seem to follow Nietzsche’s “improved” dic-
tum from the Gospel according to Luke (18,14): “[h]e that humbleth himself 
wants to be exalted” (Nietzsche 2005: 48). However, following Hollingdale 
(2001: 144), who sees Nietzsche’s will to power as a deep psychological need, I 
would posit that the sisters, like Cordelia, wish to overcome the influence of 
their father. Yet in order to do this they take over a monarchical authority that 
is coupled with ruthless and blind political might. In this sense they are dri-
ven by a Nietzschean will to power, but their power has a very Hobbes-like 
dimension. In his famous political tract Leviathan Thomas Hobbes, predating 
Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power, claims that every human being is fu-
elled by a primordial desire to grow in might. He announces:  
[s]o that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a per-
petuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. And 
the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, 
than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate 
power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he 
hath present, without the acquisition of more. (Hobbes 2009, loc. 1817-1820)  
As Hobbes expounds, in the state of so called “nature” individuals clash in “an 
endless escalating competition for power” (Patton 1993: 147). For this reason, 
it is necessary for all people to yield to an absolute and all-powerful sovereign 
who can keep strife at bay. Though the daughters’ yearning for power might 
have a psychological and hence a Nietzschean dimension, the outward ap-
pearance it assumes is of Hobbes’ style. They shape themselves into female 
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versions of Hobbes’ Leviathans – visions of sovereign authorities. Hence, 
their failure to overcome Lear’s expectations and transfigure and shape them-
selves anew. As Alfar (2003: 22) repeatedly points out, “The tragedies say 
more, then, about the nature of power than they do about the nature of 
women. Or if they say anything about the nature of women, they seem to say 
that women are as likely to perform power in orthodox, that is masculine, 
modes as men.” However, these portrayals are untenable because they enclose 
these female Leviathans within masculinist models of wielding power and 
authority. As a consequence, the elder daughters only become copies of the 
tyrannous models provided by Lear’s patriarchy. Thus, eventually there is no 
question of Nietzschean self-overcoming, instead one is presented with the 
embodiments of the rule “might is right”. Subsequent acts of violence, start-
ing from Gloucester’s blinding, through Regan’s murder, to Goneril’s suicide 
are all demonstrations of the failure of this model. Within these stifling stan-
dards the only way to hold one’s power is to eliminate competition. Regan 
memorably tells Lear: “[h]ow in one house/ Should many people under two 
commands/ Hold amity? ‘Tis hard, almost impossible” (Lear, 2.4.275-277). 
She seems to be saying to him that there will only be one authority in the 
house. However, ironically this prophetic sentence applies to the sisters as it 
is the conflict between them that brings their rule to a halt.  
The intensity of the desire that the sisters develop for Edmund is quite 
astounding, as it clouds the judgements of these so far focused and determined 
women to such a degree that their attempts to hold and defend their authority 
totally recede into the background. Alfar (2003: 98-99) believes that:  
Goneril’s and Regan’s attraction to Edmund is symptomatic of the authority that 
both women need in order to rule. As women, they do not possess power in any 
culturally constructed sense but are subject to their culture’s definition of femi-
ninity as weak and subservient. […] Edmund possesses the masculinist ruthless-
ness that Goneril and Regan need to rule. 
As I have been trying to demonstrate, the sisters struggle against these cul-
turally imposed definitions by the assumption of masculine models of power 
execution. By commodifying these models, they fight Lear’s overpowering 
influence and try to emerge as self-reliant and independent. Yet their at-
tempts at self-determination clash with the “moral” considerations from sur-
rounding characters. Albany exclaims to Goneril: “[s]ee thyself, devil!/ Proper 
deformity shows not in the fiend/ So horrid as in woman” (Lear, 4.2.73-75), 
while Lear calls his daughters: “unnatural hags” (Lear, 2.4.319).10 Surrounded 
  
10 Interestingly enough, though these terms of address are to offend the women, per-
versely they underscore their overhuman potential. Albany’s comment puts Goneril 
beyond the accepted moral codes of conduct, while Lear’s reference to “hags” also capita-
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by characters who try to undermine and question their authority, they meet 
someone who shares their overhuman ambition. It seems that Edmund’s own 
overhuman potential is responsible for their sudden and disastrous infatua-
tion. Edmund’s bravado, his flippancy and positioning beyond good and evil, 
combined with his determination to overcome the limits of the tyrannous 
system barring him access to power and wealth, matches the sisters’ ambition 
to wield authority. Simultaneously, his lack of moral brakes reflects their Le-
viathan-like execution of sovereignty, hence, Goneril’s besotted exclamation: 
“[o], the difference of man and man!” (Lear, 4.2.33). Her conversation with 
Albany, laced with early modern gender stereotyping, also gives one a clue as 
to the expectations Goneril has of a man. When she calls Albany “milk-livered 
man” her rhetoric reminds one of Lady Macbeth who also fears her husband’s 
tender conscience and craves for staunch determination. Having in mind the 
late Cornwall’s ruthlessness one may assume that Regan’s vision of masculin-
ity resembles that of Goneril. Paradoxically, the lust the two women have for 
Edmund’s overhuman leanings automatically cancels their own potential and 
leads to their downfall. Goneril memorably declares: “I must change names at 
home and give the distaff/ Into my husband’s hands” (Lear, 4.2.20-21). It 
soon becomes clear that the distaff is forced back into her own hands.  
By succumbing to his energy and appeal, the sisters seem to give up 
their chances to transcend. Instead of sublimating their instincts, they give in 
to them. As a consequence, their unbent individuality blurs and disintegrates. 
As Claudette Hoover suggests, next to the classical Senecan model of “a mas-
culine woman” Shakespeare’s construction of Goneril and Regan exploits an 
early modern anti-feminist stereotype of “female insatiability” (Hoover 1984: 
50). The tradition goes back to early Christianity and the philosophy of the 
Church fathers who propagated the idea of women being ever sexually inex-
haustible, which unescapably meant male degradation and fall (Hoover 1984: 
58). St. Jerome hailed against all women in general when he said:  
[i]t is not the harlot, or the adulteress who is spoken of; but woman’s love in gen-
eral is accused of ever being insatiable; put it out, it bursts into flame; give it 
plenty, it is again in need; it enervates a man’s mind, and engrosses all thought 
except for the passion which it feeds. (St. Jerome 1892: 368) 
In the Middle Ages, the image reappears in e.g. Malleus Maleficarum (1487) 
where lustful women in order to fulfil their unquenchable desire give in to 
devils (Hoover 1982: 62). The tradition is still strong in the Renaissance as 
                                                                                                                                        
lizes on “supernatural” abilities, as the etymology of the word “hag” suggests. “A hag” 
may mean “a witch” or “a fury” but also “a goddess” or a “powerful supernatural woman” 
(Online Etymology Dictionary http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=hag) (date 
of access 30.12.2013).  
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the pamphlets of e.g. Swetnam or Vives perfectly prove. In The arraignment 
of women, Joseph Swetnam enumerates biblical and mythological women 
who brought their husbands down through their lust. For instance, he em-
phatically asks “Did not Jezebel for her wicked lust cause her husband’s blood 
to be given to dogs?” (Swetnam 2006). Vives who sees chastity as the only 
saving grace for women, in The instruction of a Christian woman brutally 
attacks widows deciding to remarry. He writes:  
[a]nd she, enflamed with viscious lust, forgetteth her own womb: and she that late 
afore sat mourning among her children, that perceive not their own loss and 
harms, now is picked up a new wife. […] Confess thine own viciousness. For none 
of you taketh a husband but to the intent that she will lie with him, nor except her 
lust prick her” (Vives 1995: 74).  
Indeed, Shakespeare seems to be inscribing Goneril and Regan within the 
tradition treating of female insatiability. However, he also seems to adopt it 
with a twist because the sisters’ lust seems to contribute mostly to their own 
disaster. Their desire for Edmund becomes stronger than their individual will 
to power. Regan says to Edmund: “I never shall endure her. Dear my lord,/ Be 
not familiar with her” (Lear, 5.1.18-19) while Goneril declares in an aside: “I 
had rather lose the battle than that sister/ Should loosen him and me” (Lear, 
5.1.21-22). The drawing of Goneril’s and Regan’s sudden falling for Edmund 
might be indeed an illustration of the misogyny deeply ingrained in the Chris-
tian culture. However, the myth of female insatiability travels far beyond 
Shakespeare’s times as Goneril’s and Regan’s skirmishes could very well be 
summarized by Nietzsche’s essentialist aphorisms on women. Nietzsche 
would claim that “women want to be loved without competitors” (Nietzsche 
2005a: 153). The sisters, once taken possession of by their desire, devote all 
their energies to possess Edmund. In their attempts to win him over they try 
to entice him by a promise of further dominion and power, completely forget-
ting their own project of holding onto authority. Goneril appeals to his mascu-
linity, while Regan announces: “[w]itness the world that I create thee here/ 
My lord and master” (Lear, 5.3.91-92). So, one can see that all the attempts at 
establishing self-asserted and self-determined authority on the part of the 
sisters collapses. Nietzsche (2005a: 152) writes that: “[w]omen in love come 
to be just as they are in the image that the men by whom they are loved have 
of them.” This is exactly what seems to be happening with the sisters, as they 
now willingly inscribe themselves within the pattern of patriarchy they had 
first subverted. Finally, Nietzsche (2005a: 154) writes:  
[i]n a state of hatred women are more dangerous than men; first and foremost be-
cause, once their hostility has been aroused, they are hampered by no considera-
tions of fairness but allow their hatred to grow undisturbed to its ultimate conse-
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quences; then because they are practised in discovering the wounded places eve-
ryone, every party possesses and striking at them: to which end their dagger-
pointed intellect renders them excellent service.  
If one now recalls Goneril’s act of fratricide, one can see that she will not ac-
cept surrendering Edmund to her sister; thus, following Nietzsche, she indeed 
is hampered by no considerations of fairness in their competition. In 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of self-creation, libido is just one of numerous mani-
festations of the will to power. However, what is of utmost significance is the 
fact that the transfigured and sublimated will to tower is always a far stronger 
and sophisticated creative power than the raw bodily instinct. This mecha-
nism does not work in the case of the sisters as they appear too engrossed by 
the competition over Edmund. They stop short of self-overcoming and even-
tually come to confirm both the early modern and Nietzschean misogyny.  
When Edgar intercepts Goneril’s letter with her plotting against Alba-
ny, he exclaims: “[o] indistinguished space of woman’s will!” (Lear, 4.6.300). 
His condemnation of the woman’s will, in Nietzschean terms, could very well 
be a praise of the strong will to power. Yet in the play the wills of the elder 
sisters, unlike that of Cordelia, actually turn out to be wavering and rickety. 
Alfar, following Belsey’s ideas on female suicide, claims that Goneril “acts to 
guarantee her self-definition as a monarch against the state that would con-
trol her by defining her uses of power as immoral” (Alfar 2003: 103).11 Gone-
ril’s suicide could be read as a final and desperate attempt at self-overcoming 
or at least self-assertion, though one cannot escape feeling that the attempt is 
aborted in the wake of other gory events. Thus, the sisters’ subjectivity is 
awoken only to be extinguished. Goneril and Regan, like Cordelia, definitely 
have the overhuman potential, but it seems to melt away in the course of the 
action. As indicated, because they have acquired authority under the veil of 
supposed female modesty, any subversion of this model of femininity results 
in accusations of the perversion of “nature”. The attempts to supersede the 
given model is also doubly more difficult. It seems that their viciousness 
matches their intensified need to overcome Lear’s expectations of them as 
they first appear to have willingly assumed the roles weaved for them. Though 
they later try to subvert them, eventually they are unable to give style to the 
chaos of their passions, to use Nietzsche’s rhetoric. It is hard to change the 
psychological load of the tragedy as it eventually victimizes the initially de-
manding patriarchal father. Nothing will blot out Goneril’s and Regan’s acts 
of violence, yet I do hope that the investigation of their overhuman potential 
  
11 Catherine Belsey (1993: 124-125) writes: “[s]uicide re-establishes the sovereign 
subject […] As the crowning affirmation of the supremacy of the self, and the extinction 
of finitude […] In the absolute act of suicide the subject is itself monetarily absolute. As 
an individual action, therefore, suicide is a threat to the control of the state.”  
Charter Five 296 
partly unfolds their victimization and the tyranny of the circumstances they 
operate in. In such circumstances it is only an overwoman that has the nerve 
to reject everything offered to her for a price of her independence. Now it 
seems tempting to once more refer to Nietzsche (2005a: 150), who opened his 
discussion on women in Human, all too human by saying that “the perfect 
woman is a higher type of human being than the perfect man: also something 
much rarer.” This is yet again a little piece of Nietzsche’s subjective “truths”; 
this time a specimen of “reversed” misogyny. However, speaking of Cordelia 
as a perfect “overwoman” one is almost obliged to refer to it. It seems that 
within the space of the tragedy she indeed emerges as “the perfect woman” 
and simultaneously “overwoman”, possibly the only truly “overhuman” spe-
cimen in the tragedies under my scrutiny. Just like her sisters emerge as  
“castrated/castrating women”, she arrives as an “affirming woman”.12 Nietz-
schean self-creation requires sacrifice, even of those most loved. For the sake 
of her own individual need of growth, her principles and truthfulness to one-
self first and foremost, Cordelia “sacrifices” her father. Yet, unlike for Goneril 
and Regan, her brutal act of cutting the umbilical cord saves her the futile 
combat with Lear. Though this idea might be critically contentious, to my 
mind she emerges as an embodiment of a Nietzschean self-creative egoism 
that thrusts Lear and the sisters into their own vicious circle of anxiety and 
struggle for their own identity. When Cordelia comes back, she leads an army 
to redress her “punished” father and she eventually lets Lear “set [his] rest/ 
on her kind nursery” (Lear, 1.1.138). She welcomes the role of a nurturer that 
Lear so craved for from the start. But now that also Lear is transformed, he 
sees that she turns into the embodiment of maternal power and love willingly. 
Nietzsche (2002: 127) writes:  
[s]o far, men have been treating women like birds that have lost their way and 
flown down to them from some height or another: like something finer, more vul-
nerable, wilder, stranger, sweeter, more soulful, – but also like something that has 
to be locked up to keep it from flying away.  
Nietzsche’s and Shakespeare’s imagery forms a beautiful parallel. When Lear 
unites with Cordelia, he memorably says: “[c]ome, let’s away to prison./ We 
  
12 I am here referring to Derrida’s enumeration of female types in the Nietzsche ca-
non (Derrida 1997: 57). Derrida treats the question of woman as a question of style in 
Nietzsche, so he reads female types as rhetorical tools in Nietzsche’s thought. Though 
such an instrumental treatment on the part of Derrida has been met with sometimes 
quite severe criticism (see: Ansell Pearson 1993: 35-37), his differentiation comes in 
handy when describing the three daughters in King Lear. To my mind, “his” women 
constitute quite an interesting parallel with Lear’s daughters. They are daughters of one 
father like the women in “pregnancy and birth- obsessed” Nietzsche, as Derrida sees the 
German philosopher.  
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two alone will sing like birds i’ th’ cage./ When thou dost ask me blessing, I’ll 
kneel down./ And ask of thee forgiveness” (Lear, 5.3.9-12). Paradoxically, 
though they both await their time in prison, at this stage Lear already knows, 
while Nietzsche only instinctively feels, that there is no need to fear maternal 
love, nor is there any justification for keeping women in cages of patriarchy. 
Against Nietzsche’s instinctive but unexplored feeling, Irigaray (1991: 23) 
writes: “[i]f from her you want confirmation for your being, why don’t you let 
her explore its labyrinths? Why don’t you give her leave to speak? From the 
place where she sings the end of your becoming, let her be able to tell you: 
no.” Cordelia is an encapsulation and statement of creative and all-powerful 
female negation. From this negation the overwoman or overhuman is born – 
an iconoclast of the old order and a value-maker. Of course, like in the 
Nietzschean vision, the inherently chaotic and existentialist world of the trag-




Having concluded my voyage through the rough sea of Nietzschean philoso-
phy and the early modern conception of identity, I do hope I have reached my 
planned destination. The spark of inspiration that incited me to explore the 
possibility of combining Nietzscheism and early modern singularity partly 
stemmed from my dissatisfaction at Nietzsche’s absence, or his scant, often 
unacknowledged presence, in the studies of the early modern. Though Ren-
aissance identity has been an object of intense academic debate, Nietzschean 
subjectivity has so far not served the investigation of early modern ambitious 
and highly aspirational identities. So there existed unchartered area that re-
quired mapping. Moreover, the clash of the giants – of modern philosophy – 
Friedrich Nietzsche – and of the Elizabethan and Jacobean stage – Christo-
pher Marlowe and William Shakespeare – seemed particularly tempting. My 
goal was, of course, not solely to demonstrate the utility of Nietzsche’s phi-
losophy as a methodological tool or as a gesture of academic recognition for 
the Nietzschean heritage but, above all, to present a new take on early modern 
singularity. Thus, I have attempted to immerse both Nietzsche and the two 
Elizabethan playwrights in a combined analysis that included elements of 
philosophizing and the close reading of source texts. In chapter 1 presented 
advantages and disadvantages of both classical philosophical analysis and the 
new historical or cultural materialist paradigm. Having examined the strong 
points and weaknesses of these analytical approaches I proposed my frame-
work – intended to combine the best practices. In the course of my “new his-
torical philosophizing” I first turned my attention to the historical and cul-
tural background of the English Renaissance. At the heart of early-modern 
subversion, one can find Renaissance sceptics, philosophers, adventurers and 
finally the playwrights of the Elizabethan and Jacobean stage. The English 
stage reflects the creative ferment of its period and provided a forum to dis-
cuss the all-too-often subversive topics. As it seems, in its self-overcoming of 
limiting and stifling attempts at a containment, the stage emerges thus as a 
life-affirming force, while the intense will to power of men presented on the 
stage testifies to a very Nietzschean spirit of the English Renaissance. So, 
ambition seems to be an outward manifestation of the internal will to power – 
a pure and wild life force. It gives shape and form to human singularity and 
provides a basis for the building of identity in the project of self-overcoming. 
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This is why it is limitation and containment that inspires further subversion. 
This pattern is reflected in both Marlovian and Shakespearean characters.  
Having outlined the background and investigated the identity-
building pattern in the Renaissance, I moved on to incorporate this Nietz-
schean framework into the selected plays by Marlowe and Shakespeare. The 
first analytical chapter is devoted to Marlowe’s overmen – Tamburlaine and 
Barabas. As presented, both Marlovian protagonists are initially limited by 
their confining circumstances, but they overcome these and emerge literally 
as masters of puppets in their respective environments. Tamburlaine, marked 
as inferior due to his humble shepherd roots, fashions himself into a King, 
subduing all his opponents. Barabas is disadvantaged due to his Jewishness 
and victimized by the community of Malta. Tamburlaine, though the van-
quisher of the Turks, emerges as a subversive leader exploding any notions of 
aristocratic hierarchy and supposedly divinely sanctioned “natural” laws. Ba-
rabas, in his distancing from his roots and applying a subversive moral out-
look also threatens the seeming stability of Malta. Both characters profess 
their mental and aesthetic superiority by inscribing themselves into the Nietz-
schean master/slaves rhetoric. Their ruthless and cunning actions testify to 
their ingenuity, but also demonstrate that they are characterized by particu-
larly strong wills to power. Tamburlaine and Barabas create themselves from 
scratch in the process of self-overcoming and, by asserting their strong wills, 
they manage to tower over other characters. They succeed because they never 
shun from cruelty and violence as, in a Nietzschean style, they embrace their 
primeval instincts. They do not only outplay their enemies but also cancel 
possibilities of self-assertion for those who through filial relations seem close 
to them. These imposing fathers, who will not accept challenge to their au-
thority, are willing to sacrifice their children for the sake of their continual 
ascent in power. As I tried to demonstrate, by centralizing and implicitly 
praising the strong individualities of his protagonists Marlowe’s plays com-
municate scepticism or even atheism. Being driven by subversive moralities, 
they also seem to encapsulate the pitfalls of Nietzschean immoralism. In their 
following of a Nietzschean pattern, the plays emerge as vehicles in the criti-
cism of religion, and herd instincts coupled with faith. Simultaneously 
through the criticism of the herd instinct they become celebratory statements 
of Renaissance individual self-assertion. However, the Marlovian protagonists 
still fall short of their overhuman potential. Tamburlaine seems to be aesthet-
ically sensitive, but Marlowe gives us little insight into his inner thoughts. 
Though Tamburlaine attempts sublimating his cruelty into aesthetic beauty, 
his transformation is not coupled with any deeper moral reflection. Barabas, 
an heir of the stage Machiavel, is more of an inward man, though his interiori-
ty often demonstrates his malicious relish in the failure of his enemies. In him 
interior reflection is clearly not equal to moral reflection. As much as these 
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characters creatively embrace their impulses, they seem to fail in sublimating 
them. In other words, the rejection of old morality does not necessarily lead 
to the revaluation of values. In their failure to transfigure their lowly instincts 
into a more nuanced sensitivity, they remain rough appreciations of an un-
sublimated life force. According to Nietzsche, such “beasts of prey” are still 
infinitely more superior to the emasculated, weakened slaves of conventional 
morality. Nevertheless, they clearly cannot be seen as fully-fledged overmen. 
Shakespeare seems to be offering more reflective “inward” men, who also 
share the overhuman potential of energy and intense aspiration. I thus de-
voted the remaining part of my analysis to Shakespearean figures. 
Chapter 4 investigates three ambitious characters – Brutus from Ju-
lius Caesar, Macbeth, the protagonist of the tragedy of Macbeth, and Edmund 
from King Lear. These three figures are connected by their intellectual and 
actual rebellion against their symbolical or real fathers. As can be seen, a re-
versed pattern to the one found in Marlowe unfolds, as in Shakespeare the 
sons raise their hands against seemingly all-too powerful fathers. Marlowe’s 
protagonists resist any challenges to their self-realization, denying the 
process to anyone else, while in Shakespeare’s the original progenitor’s sup-
posed invincibility is shaken. From the start Brutus, Macbeth and Edmund 
manifest an interiorized and deeply engrained urge to topple their original 
progenitors. Their intense wills to power seem to be dictated by their pride, 
ambition and an acute sense of superiority. Both Macbeth and Edmund feel 
that they have the right to seize power because they are intellectually and 
physically fit to rule. Even Brutus, who professes noble reasons behind the 
murder of Caesar, actually turns out to be a deeply egocentric man, who ab-
hors “the herd”. In order to begin their respective processes of self-
overcoming, the three men have to first overcome their limiting circums-
tances. Brutus and Macbeth need to reject moral considerations and decide to 
sacrifice their symbolical “fathers”, while Edmund defies the victimizing sys-
tem that “bastardizes” and relegates him to an inferior position. He betrays 
and sacrifices his biological father. The three characters are, in my opinion, 
characterized by Nietzschean egoism as they do not shun from ultimate sacri-
fice in the service of their self-realization. Having realized their will to power, 
they seize its grasp, overcome limiting circumstances and sacrifice those close 
to them in an attempt to assert their transfigured identities. So, they also ap-
pear as highly subversive agents threatening the status quo. All three have to 
reject divinely-sanctioned laws believed to be laid down by nature. In their 
trampling on these supposedly “natural” rights, they actually manage to ex-
pose them as socially constructed and ideologically driven. What seems to 
differentiate them from the Marlovian protagonists is their full awareness of 
the process. Through their reflection they realize their own ‘unnaturalness’ 
and the “unnaturalness” of their deeds. Despite their more developed inte-
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riority and reflectiveness, manifested in their soliloquies, these Shakespea-
rean characters do not really emerge as any better in the light of universal 
Christian morality. However, as Nietzsche would probably put it, they are 
more profound. For this reason, they appear to be “men of prey” rather than 
“beasts of prey”. The question whether they actually fully emulate the Nietz-
schean ideal of overmen is still pending. Bearing in mind the fact that self-
realization in Nietzschean terms is a never-ending process of self-overcoming, 
one could risk a statement that they closely mirror Übermenschen. They 
clearly are figures who could have captivated Nietzsche’s imagination (as Bru-
tus actually did).  
Finally, the last analytical chapter of the dissertation brings the dis-
cussion of potential Überweiben – overwomen – a in both Marlowe and Sha-
kespeare. The attempt goes against the grain of Nietzsche’s philosophical out-
put, which did not cater for female development or feminine sensitivity. 
Nietzsche, as demonstrated, clearly reserved secondary positions for women. 
However, as demonstrated, though Nietzsche himself did not make room for 
das Überweib in his canon, a Nietzschean analysis of the ‘overhuman’ poten-
tial of women does not only turn out to be possible but actually brings some 
positive results. The concept of the female over-human potential emerges as 
particularly tempting in the period overshadowed by the reign of an excep-
tionally crafty and powerful woman – Queen Elizabeth, who was also fre-
quently forced to recourse to both feminine and masculine rhetoric in defence 
of her suitability as monarch. As it turns out, overhuman potential is evident-
ly not exclusively a male domain, though, like in the case of men, some wom-
en are able to utilize it, while some are powerless in the face of the necessity 
of perpetual self-overcoming. Marlovian and Shakespearean women are 
doubly disadvantaged as they have to overcome the overpowering influence of 
their fathers or husbands in order to separate their identities from them. Ear-
ly modern women are denied separate identities, so they truly create them-
selves anew from scratch. Both Lady Macbeth and Zenocrate may appear as 
shadows behind their excessively ambitious husbands, aiding them in their 
lustful pursuits of power. However, they both demonstrate their active and 
often cruel faces in acts which seem to demand the denial of traditionally-
conceived Renaissance femininity. Zenocrate’s potential to question and un-
dermine Tamburlaine’s authority is eventually crushed by his uncompromis-
ing bearing. She is denied any voice and she remains passive in the face of 
Tamburlaine. So she comes to encapsulate a Renaissance and also more 
Nietzschean ideal of womanhood. She emulates Nietzsche’s own misogynist 
vision of a woman in a secondary role, providing aid and consolation for a 
man. Lady Macbeth clearly does not adhere to this portrayal as she frequently 
demonstrates more resolve and energy than her husband. Yet for all her “per-
version” of her “natural” instincts she is punished, as she does not seem capa-
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ble of adhering to her own vision of the overwoman she fashions for herself. 
Lear’s daughters also function in the same male-dominated world which de-
mands denying traditionally-conceived Renaissance feminine roles. Goneril 
and Regan seem to emerge as Machiavellian political animals, yet it is Corde-
lia who leads the French invasion to redress her father. As I have demonstrat-
ed, the “evil” sisters are not any more evil than their e.g. Marlovian male 
counterparts, yet they too are frequently hailed as “unnatural”. A detailed 
analysis of their overhuman potential also exposes this “nature” to be a social 
and ideological construct – meant to victimize and exploit those who have 
enough daring to be strong and to oppose. It is this fake nature that relegates 
these women back into the vicious circle of male representation. The analysis 
of Cordelia as the closest encapsulation of Nietzschean Übermensch (or 
Überweib) finishes off my discussion on overhuman potential in Shakes-
peare’s and Marlowe’s texts. I hope my line of argumentation hailing Corde-
lia, so far critically acclaimed as encapsulating the virtues of obedience and 
loyalty, is convincing enough to make one believe that Nietzschean exception-
al figures do not have to be exclusively male. I realize that, as a woman, I may 
be biased in my choices of interpretative decisions, yet to anyone wishing to 
pass such a judgment I wish to remind them that Cordelia indeed exposes 
overhuman qualities of dignity, pride and resilience in the face of rejection 
and tyrannous attempts to trample on her singularity. She truly overcomes 
her condition without compromising her moral initiative. She comes to rescue 
her father not in an act of mercy, but out of the excess of her mental strength, 
emerging thus as the closest realization of the Nietzschean ideal in the Sha-
kespearean canon. In the second meditation Nietzsche (2007a: 111) famously 
asserted that: “[i]t is the task of history to be the mediator [...] and thus again 
and again to inspire and lend the strength for the production of the great 
man. No, the goal of humanity cannot lie in its end but only in its highest 
exemplars.” I would risk stating that this brief quotation on the significance of 
reading and interpreting history for the formation of a better humanity is also 
an apt comment for the present dissertation. I have humbly taken upon my-
self a role of mediator between the early moderns in the age of Shakespeare 
and the modern perspective in search of, what Nietzsche’s calls, the “highest 
exemplars”. Following Nietzsche’s belief that the overhuman potential is real-
ly an ahistorical phenomenon, while great men were scattered around the 
centuries, I sought these overmen and overwomen in the dramas of Marlowe 
and Shakespeare. Nietzsche (2006a: 140) saw the Renaissance as “a restless, 
vigorous age which is half-drunk and stupefied by its excess of blood and 
energy.” As it seems, the analysis of Marlowe’s and Shakespeare’s plays prove 
his comment right, just as the plays prove to be a field where great energy, the 
cult of life and overhuman potential are intensely acted out.  
 
 
Reinterpretacja „nadczłowieczego” potencjału  
w Renesansie: jednostki o wyjątkowo silnej 
ambicji (ang. „overreachers”)  
w dramatach Marlowe’a i Szekspira  
w świetle filozofii Nietzschego. 
Streszczenie 
Głównym celem niniejszej pracy jest analiza wybranych bohaterów dramatów 
Williama Szekspira i Krzysztofa Marlowe’a w świetle kluczowych koncepcji 
filozofii Fryderyka Nietzschego. Analizowane postaci, określane w języku 
angielskim jako „overreachers”, charakteryzują się wyjątkowo silną ambicją  
i niejednokrotnie bezkompromisowo dążą do władzy i panowania. Niezłomni  
i ambitni bohaterowie dramatyczni dzieł Szekspira i Marlowe’a mają wiele cech 
wspólnych z nietzscheańskim nadczłowiekiem charakteryzującymi się silnym 
napięciem woli mocy. Ta analogia staje się punktem wyjścia do reinterpretacji 
„nadczłowieczego” potencjału w angielskim dramacie renesansowym, a także 
przyczynkiem do ogólniejszej refleksji na temat tożsamości człowieka renesansu. 
Połączenie nietzscheanizmu ze studiami nad angielskim dramatem 
siedemnastowiecznym jest niewątpliwie niszą badawczą, gdyż do tej pory 
nietzscheanizm nie stanowił narzędzia metodologicznego w dyskusji nad 
tożsamością człowieka odrodzenia. Zatem wykorzystanie potencjału filozoficznego 
nietzscheanizmu służy zarówno próbie odczytania na nowo pojęcia 
jednostkowości człowieka renesansu, jak również praktycznemu wykorzystaniu 
refleksji niemieckiego filozofa w interpretacji literackiej. Praca składa się z pięciu 
rozdziałów, z których dwa pierwsze są rozdziałami teoretycznymi, a trzy kolejne 
analitycznymi.  
Ponieważ dysertacja ma na celu połączenie klasycznej analizy filozoficznej 
z owocami najnowszych badań w dziedzinie szekspirologii i studiów nad 
renesansem angielskim pierwszy rozdział stanowi wprowadzenie do założeń tych 
dwóch głównych kierunków interpretacyjnych. Przedstawione są wady i zalety obu 
metod, następnie zostaje wypracowana baza metodologiczna do dalszej analizy 
tzw. metoda łączona („newhistoricalphilosophizing”), która ma na celu 
wykorzystanie najlepszych praktyk. Rozdział drugi stanowi wprowadzenie 
historycznego i kulturowego tła angielskiego renesansu, a także miejsca pojęcia 
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ambicji w świato-poglądzie człowieka epoki nowożytnej. Mimo powszechnego 
potępienia ambicji w renesansowej polityce i światopoglądzie, szczegółowa analiza 
w duchu nietzscheańskiej dekonstrukcji konwencjonalnej moralności ukazuje,  
że politycy i mężowie stanu to często ludzie ambitni, popychani do działania 
osobistymi aspiracjami. To nietzscheańska wola mocy objawiająca się  
w różnorakich formach definiuje wyjątkowe jednostki angielskiego renesansu. 
Odgórne próby stłamszenia działalności wywrotowej paradoksalnie sprzyjają 
rozkwitowi renesansowego indywidualizmu. Kluczowi indywidualiści to sceptycy, 
filozofowie, a także dramatopisarze za rządów Elżbiety I, a potem Jakuba I. 
Angielski teatr odzwierciedla twórczy klimat epoki i staje się swego rodzaju forum, 
gdzie nowe idee zostają poddane dyskusji. Angielska scena teatralna służy  
przede wszystkim nietzscheańskiej afirmacji siły życiowej, a silna wola mocy 
bohaterów tragicznych świadczy o nietzscheańskim duchu epoki. Zatem ambicja 
jest zewnętrznym przejawem wewnętrznej woli mocy, która wyraża się  
w nieograniczonej sile życiowej. Energia życiowa, którą Nietzsche opisał w swoich 
dziełach ponad dwieście lat później pozwala opisać proces tworzenia tożsamości 
człowieka renesansu w toku „samo-przezwyciężania” (ang. „self-overcoming”). 
Dlatego też próby ograniczenia działalności wywrotowej na gruncie polityki i 
filozofii w rzeczywistości inspirują dalsze akty sprzeciwu i oporu. Kolejne rozdziały 
dysertacji mają na celu ukazanie tego schematu w sztukach Marlowe’a i Szekspira.  
Pierwszy rozdział części analitycznej pracy poświęcony jest „nadludziom” 
w dramatach Krzysztofa Marlowe’a – Tamerlanowi i Barabaszowi. Obu bohaterów 
początkowo ograniczają okoliczności, ale w procesie „samo-przezwyciężania” 
wyrastają na niezależnych i potężnych kowali własnego losu. Tamerlan, mimo 
swoich pasterskich korzeni, pokonuje wszystkich swoich przeciwników i zostaje 
potężnym władcą całego wschodniego świata. Barabasz ze względu na swoje 
żydowskie pochodzenie również wydaje się być na przegranej pozycji  
w homofobicznej społeczności Malty, ale potrafi zdystansować się od swoich 
korzeni i przyjąć nową wywrotową moralność, która zagraża iluzorycznemu 
porządkowi na wyspie. Tamerlan, pogromca Turków, staje się nietuzinkowym 
władcą, który obala starą arystokratyczną hierarchię a wraz z nią „naturalne” 
prawo – rzekomo usankcjonowane przez samego Najwyższego. Obaj mężczyźni 
są głęboko przekonani o swojej wyższości zarówno na gruncie możliwości 
mentalnych jak i wrażliwości estetycznej, a ich wypowiedzi przyjmują 
nietzscheańską retorykę moralności panów i niewolników. Bezkompromisowe 
wybory i moralnie wątpliwe zachowanie bohaterów dowodzą ich ambicji,  
ale także ogromnej inteligencji, która nieprzypadkowo jest powiązana z 
nietzscheańską koncepcją woli mocy. Tamerlan i Barabasz tworzą samych siebie 
z niczego w procesie samoprzezwyciężania i dzięki swojej woli mocy górują nad 
swoimi wrogami. Postaci te dowodzą swojego nadludzkiego potencjału, dlatego 
że nie boją się odwołać do najbardziej pierwotnych instynktów. Nie tylko udaje 
się im przechytrzyć swoich wrogów, ale także zamykają możliwość 
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samoprzezwyciężania i kształtowania charakteru tym, którzy są im najbliżsi. 
Obaj sią surowymi ojcami, którzy nie znoszą sprzeciwu i są gotowi poświęcić 
dobro swych dzieci, aby nieustannie piąć się w górę na drabinie władzy  
i wpływu. Rys charakterologiczny bohaterów Marlowe’a pozwala twierdzić, że 
jego sztuki są przesycone sceptycyzmem lub nawet ateizmem. Wydaje się, że ich 
znaczenie zależy od niekonwencjonalnej moralności, która jest budulcem dla 
silnych osobowości tytułowych bohaterów. Wywrotowa moralność Marlowe’a 
jest niemal lustrzanym odbiciem nietzscheańskiego immoralizmu. Sztuki 
Marlowe’a jak gdyby napisane w duchu nietzscheanizmu stają się motorem 
krytyki religii, instynktu stadnego i wiary, tym samym będąc wyrazem 
renesansowego indywidualizmu i samostanowienia jednostki. Jednak głębsza 
analiza ukazuje, że protagoniści Marlowe’a nie realizują w pełni swojego 
„nadczłowieczego” potencjału. Tamerlan wydaje się być estetycznie wrażliwy, 
ale pozbawiony głębszej moralnej refleksji. Nie udaje mu się w pełni wy-
sublimować okrucieństwa. Czytelnik ma szansę poznać wnętrze Barabasza, ale 
ukazuje ono człowieka, który czerpie dziką radość z cierpienia innych. W obu 
przypadkach odrzucenie tradycyjnej moralności nie jest równoznaczne z 
przewartościowaniem wartości. W nietzscheańskiej wizji bohaterowie ci pozostają 
„drapieżnikami”. Taki stan jest zaledwie wstępem do kształtowania nadczłowieka.  
Rozdział czwarty przedstawia trzech ambitnych bohaterów kanonu 
szekspirowskiego: Brutusa ze sztuki Juliusz Cezar, tytułowego Makbeta  
i Edmunda z tragedii Król Lear. Tych trzech bohaterów łączy bunt przeciwko 
metaforycznym lub prawdziwym ojcom. Odwrotnie niż w sztukach Marlowe’a, 
to synowie u Szekspira podnoszą ręce na swych potężnych ojców. Władczy 
protagoniści Marlowe’a tłamszą ambicje swych dzieci, podczas gdy bohaterowie 
szekspirowscy dekonstruują autorytet patriarchów. Makbet i Edmund są 
głęboko przekonani o swoim potencjale, który usprawiedliwia wyciągniecie ręki 
po władzę. Brutus, mimo wyznawania szlachetnych ideałów okazuje się być 
również człowiekiem niezwykle ambitnym, który gardzi „stadem”. Każdy  
z bohaterów słucha podszeptów swojej wybujałej woli mocy i jest gotowy 
poświęcić swojego ojca w procesie kształtowania własnej „nadludzkiej” 
tożsamości. Występując przeciwko „boskim” prawom wypowiadają posłuszeństwo 
„naturze”, która w głębszej analizie okazuje się być tylko społecznym  
i ideologicznym konstruktem. W świetle tradycyjnej moralności ich czyny  
i decyzje są godne potępienia, ale w toku analizy nietzscheańskiej ukazują się 
być potencjalnymi nadludźmi. Bohaterowie szekspirowscy niekoniecznie są 
moralnie lepsi od postaci Marlowe’a, ale są na pewno wzbogaceni o refleksję 
etyczną zbliżoną do nietzscheańskiego eksperymentu „poza dobrem i złem”, 
burzącego granice konwencjonalnej moralności.  
Ostatni rozdział części analitycznej podejmuje temat kobiecego 
„nadludzkiego” potencjału w sztukach Marlowe’a i Szekspira. Choć sam 
Nietzsche w swojej wizji filozoficznej nie stworzył miejsca dla dasÜberweib 
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(„nadkobiety”), nietzscheańska analiza sytuacji kobiet w renesansie wydaje się 
być konieczna zwłaszcza, że epoka Szekspira jest też czasem panowania 
Królowej Elżbiety, jednej z najbardziej rozpoznawalnych i potężnych monarchiń 
w historii Europy. Królowa Elżbieta sama niejednokrotnie wykorzystywała 
zarówno konwencjonalnie męskie lub żeńskie zabiegi retoryczne w obronie 
swojej pozycji jako monarchy – roli tradycyjnie zarezerwowanej dla mężczyzny. 
Przegląd krytyki feministycznej, jakiej poddana została filozofia Nietzschego 
pokazuje, że „nadludzki” potencjał to nie tylko i wyłącznie domena męska.  
Z kolei, analiza sytuacji kobiet renesansu dowodzi, że ta grupa społeczna jest 
podwójnie pokrzywdzona. W ideologicznym klimacie epoki kobieta z założenia 
nie ma autonomicznej tożsamości oddzielnej od mężczyzny. Ponadto bohaterki 
dramatów są zmuszone przezwyciężać wpływ wyjątkowo dominujących mężów 
i/lub ojców. Szekspirowska Lady Macbeth i Zenocrate ze sztuki Marlowe’a zdają 
się stać w cieniu swoich głodnych władzy mężów. Jednak obie ukazują swoje 
okrutne oblicza podejmując decyzje, które są sprzeczne z tradycyjnym 
renesansowym pojmowaniem kobiecości i roli kobiety w społeczeństwie. 
Zenocrate nie jest w stanie realizować swojego nadludzkiego potencjału  
w obliczu bezkompromisowości Tamerlana. Ostatecznie, staje się symbolem 
typowo renesansowej i równo-cześnie nietzscheańskiej, mizoginicznej koncepcji 
kobiecości. Lady Macbeth jest zupełnym przeciwieństwem Zenocrate, jednak za 
„wypaczenie” instynktów uważanych za naturalne w renesansie kobieta ta 
zostaje symbolicznie ukarana. Córki Leara również odrzucają tradycyjnie 
kobiece role, gdyż funkcjonują w świecie polityki zdominowanej przez 
mężczyzn. Goneryla i Regana zdają się być skutecznymi „zwierzętami 
politycznymi”, ale ich makiaweliczne decyzje są odbierane jako wypaczenie tzw. 
„naturalnych” ról kobiecych i męskich. Dokładniejsza analiza w duchu 
nietzscheańskiego przewartościowania moralności ukazuje społeczne 
okoliczności budowania moralności, a tzw. „natura” okazuje się być wyłącznie 
ideologicznym konstruktem służącym represjonowaniu kobiet. Interpretacja 
Kordelii jako postaci najbliższej nietzscheańskiej wizji nadczłowieka zamyka 
rozdział piąty i ukazuje, że potencjał nadludzki nie musi być wyłącznie cechą 
męską. Szekspirowską Kordelię cechuje poczucie dumy i godności, a także 
wierność własnym ideałom nawet w ekstremalnych okolicznościach. Wbrew 
dotychczasowym analizom odczytującym Kordelią jako ideał kobiecej pokory 
analiza nietzscheańska ukazuje, że Kordelia jest bohaterką wywrotową, której 
nieoczekiwane zachowanie dekonstruuje konwencjonalną rolę kobiety  
w społeczeństwie.  
Nietzsche wierzył głęboko, że historia wcale nie ukazuje linearnego  
i kierunkowego rozwoju ludzkiej cywilizacji (Nietzsche 2007a: 111). To 
oznacza, że w dziejach ludzkości po Ziemi chodziły już wybitne jednostki, 
które nosiły znamiona nadludzi. To przekonanie przyświecało projektowi 
poszukiwania takich właśnie indywidualności w angielskim renesansie  
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i w jego najdoskonalszej artystycznej odsłonie – dramacie epoki nowożytnej za 
rządów Elżbiety I i Jakuba I. Zdaniem Nietzschego ludzie współcześni mają za 
zadanie być mediatorami między wiekami minionymi, a dniem dzisiejszym  
w szeroko zakrojonym projekcie dekonstruowania starych wartości i budowania 
nowych. Dysertacja ta podjęła próbę odczytania na nowo tożsamości wybitnych 
jednostek angielskiego renesansu w duchu nietzscheańskiego przewartościowania 
oraz odrzucenia zastałych i niejednokrotnie skostniałych interpretacji. W toku 
analizy wykazano, że twórczy ferwor poszczególnych jednostek renesansu 
angielskiego rzeczywiście okazał się być przyczynkiem do ewolucji 
indywidualizmu, który cechuje wieki współczesne. Sztuki Szekspira i Marlowe’a 
wydają się być najtrafniejszymi dokumentami tegoż kreatywnego fermentu, który 
nadaje znaczenie i tożsamość jednostce oraz afirmuje często okrutną, lecz 
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